This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
42 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
  1. JC Beall (2000). On Mixed Inferences and Pluralism About Truth Predicates. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):380-382.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Stefano Caputo (2012). Three Dilemmas For Alethic Functionalism. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):853-861.
    According to Lynch’s aletich functionalism truth is manifested by/immanent in different properties in different domains of discourse; so a core concept of Alethic Functionalism is the concept of the relation of manifestation holding between truth and other properties. The claim I’m going to defend is that Lynch makes too many theoretical demands on the manifestation relation and this makes it a metaphysical monster, that is to say a relation with mutually inconsistent features. In order to make manifestation a coherent notion (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Roy T. Cook (2011). Alethic Pluralism, Generic Truth and Mixed Conjunctions. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):624-629.
    A difficulty for alethic pluralism has been the idea that semantic evaluation of conjunctions whose conjuncts come from discourses with distinct truth properties requires a third notion of truth which applies to both of the original discourses. But this line of reasoning does not entail that there exists a single generic truth property that applies to all statements and all discourses, unless it is supplemented with additional, controversial, premises. So the problem of mixed conjunctions, while highlighting other aspects of alethic (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Aaron J. Cotnoir (2013). Pluralism and Paradox. In Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press. 339.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Aaron J. Cotnoir (2013). Validity for Strong Pluralists. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):563-579.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Aaron J. Cotnoir (2009). Generic Truth and Mixed Conjunctions: Some Alternatives. Analysis 69 (3):473-479.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Marian David (2011). Review of M. Lynch: Truth as One and Many. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):743 - 746.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 89, Issue 4, Page 743-746, December 2011.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Julian Dodd (2013). Deflationism Trumps Pluralism! In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press. 298.
  9. Douglas Edwards (2013). Naturalness, Representation and the Metaphysics of Truth. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):384-401.
    : This paper explores how consideration of the notions of naturalness and eligibility, which have played an increasingly significant role in contemporary metaphysics, might impact on the study of truth. In particular, it aims to demonstrate how taking such notions seriously may be of benefit to ‘representational’ theories of truth by showing how the naturalness of truth on a representational account provides a response to the ‘Scope Problem’ presented by Lynch (2009).
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Douglas Edwards (2012). On Alethic Disjunctivism. Dialectica 66 (1):200-214.
    Alethic pluralism is the view that truth requires different treatment in different domains of discourse. The basic idea is that different properties play important roles in the analysis of truth in different domains of discourse, such as discourse about the material world, moral discourse, and mathematical discourse, to take three examples. Alethic disjunctivism is a kind of alethic pluralism, and is the view that truth is to be identified with the disjunctive property that is formed using each of the domain-specific (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Douglas Edwards (2011). Simplifying Alethic Pluralism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):28-48.
    What is truth? What precisely is it that truths have that falsehoods lack? Pluralists about truth (or “alethic pluralists”) tend to answer these questions by saying that there is more than one way for a proposition, sentence, belief—or any chosen truth-bearer—to be true. In this paper, I argue that two of the most influential formations of alethic pluralism, those of Wright (1992, 2003a) and Lynch (2009), are subject to serious problems. I outline a new formulation, which I call “simple determination (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Douglas Edwards (2009). Truth-Conditions and the Nature of Truth: Re-Solving Mixed Conjunctions. Analysis 69 (4):684-688.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Douglas Edwards (2008). How to Solve the Problem of Mixed Conjunctions. Analysis 68 (298):143–149.
    The problem of mixed conjunctions, due to Tappolet (2000), threatens to undermine alethic pluralism by showing that it cannot account for the truth of conjunctions in which the conjuncts spring from different domains of discourse. In this paper I argue, firstly, that the problem is not just a problem for alethic pluralism and, secondly, that the problem can be solved.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Michael Horton & Ted Poston (2012). Functionalism About Truth and the Metaphysics of Reduction. Acta Analytica 27 (1):13-27.
    Functionalism about truth is the view that truth is an explanatorily significant but multiply-realizable property. According to this view the properties that realize truth vary from domain to domain, but the property of truth is a single, higher-order, domain insensitive property. We argue that this view faces a challenge similar to the one that Jaegwon Kim laid out for the multiple realization thesis. The challenge is that the higher-order property of truth is equivalent to an explanatorily idle disjunction of its (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Andrea Iacona (2008). Faultless or Disagreeement. In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Max Kolbel (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press. 287.
    Among the various motivations that may lead to the idea that truth is relative in some non-conventional sense, one is that the idea helps explain how there can be ‘‘faultless disagreements’’, that is, situations in which a person A judges that p, a person B judges that not-p, but neither A nor B is at fault. The line of argument goes as follows. It seems that there are faultless disagreements. For example, A and B may disagree on culinary matters without (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Catherine Legg (2014). Charles Peirce's Limit Concept of Truth. Philosophy Compass 9 (3):204-213.
    This entry explores Charles Peirce's account of truth in terms of the end or ‘limit’ of inquiry. This account is distinct from – and arguably more objectivist than – views of truth found in other pragmatists such as James and Rorty. The roots of the account in mathematical concepts is explored, and it is defended from objections that it is (i) incoherent, (ii) in its faith in convergence, too realist and (iii) in its ‘internal realism’, not realist enough.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. M. P. Lynch (2005). Alethic Functionalism and Our Folk Theory of Truth. Synthese 145 (1):29 - 43.
    According to alethic functionalism, truth is a higher-order multiply realizable property of propositions. After briefly presenting the views main principles and motivations, I defend alethic functionalism from recent criticisms raised against it by Cory Wright. Wright argues that alethic functionalism will collapse either into deflationism or into a view that takes true as simply ambiguous. I reject both claims.
    No categories
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Michael Lynch (2004). True to Life: Why Truth Matters. Cambridge, Mass.: Mit Press.
  19. Michael P. Lynch (2009). Truth as One and Many. Clarendon Press.
    What is truth? Michael Lynch defends a bold new answer to this question. Traditional theories of truth hold that truth has only a single uniform nature. All truths are true in the same way. More recent deflationary theories claim that truth has no nature at all; the concept of truth is of no real philosophical importance. In this concise and clearly written book, Lynch argues that we should reject both these extremes and hold that truth is a functional property. To (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Michael P. Lynch (2008). Alethic Pluralism, Logical Consequence and the Universality of Reason. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):122-140.
  21. Michael P. Lynch (2006). Rewrighting Pluralism. The Monist 89 (1):63-84.
  22. Michael P. Lynch (2005). Summary. Philosophical Books 46 (4):289-291.
  23. Michael P. Lynch (2004). Truth and Multiple Realizability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):384 – 408.
    Pluralism about truth is the view that there is more than one way for a proposition to be true. When taken to imply that there is more than one concept and property of truth, this position faces a number of troubling objections. I argue that we can overcome these objections, and yet retain pluralism's key insight, by taking truth to be a multiply realizable property of propositions.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Michael P. Lynch (ed.) (2001). The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives. The Mit Press.
    These essays center around two questions: Does truth have an underlying nature? And if so, what sort of nature does it have?
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Michael P. Lynch (2000). Alethic Pluralism and the Functionalist Theory of Truth. Acta Analytica 24:195--214.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Michael Patrick Lynch (2012). The Many Faces of Truth: A Response to Some Critics. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (2):255-269.
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Volume 20, Issue 2, Page 255-269, May 2012.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (2012). Recent Work on Alethic Pluralism. Analysis 72 (3):588-607.
    While historically prominent theories of truth such as the correspondence theory, coherentism, pragmatism, verificationism, and instrumentalism diverge in many ways, they converge in at least one fundamental respect. They are all monist theories of truth. They incorporate the thesis that there is one property—and one property only—in virtue of which propositions can be true. The truth pluralist, on the other hand, rejects this idea. There are several properties in virtue of which propositions can be true. This article offers a survey (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (13 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (2010). Stabilizing Alethic Pluralism. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):92-108.
    Alethic pluralism is the view that the nature of truth is not uniform across domains. There are several ways of bang true $(T_1 ...\,T_n )$ A simple argument, the 'instability challenge', purports to show that this view is inherently unstable. One can simply say that something is uniformly true if and only if it is T₁ or ... or $\,T_n $ . Being uniformly true is a single truth property that applies across the board, and so the nature of truth (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (2006). What Can the Problem of Mixed Inferences Teach Us About Alethic Pluralism? The Monist 89 (1):103-117.
    Here is a well-known thought about truth: Truth consists in correspondence with reality. A sentence is true just in case what it says corresponds with how the world is. Theories of truth that incorporate this thought are naturally regarded as robust or “heavyweight”. Truth is to be understood in a realist fashion. The world decides what is true and what is not. A recent incarnation of the correspondence view is found in truth-maker theories, whose adherents maintain that truths are true (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Douglas Edwards (2011). Truth as One(s) and Many: On Lynch's Alethic Functionalism1. Analytic Philosophy 52 (3):213-230.
    Advocates of traditional views on truth such as the correspondence and coherence theories converge on two theses about truth: substantivism and monism. According to the former thesis, truth consists in some substantive property or relation F. According to the latter thesis, there is exactly one property or relation (whether substantive or not) in terms of which truth is to be accounted for across all truth-apt domains of discourse. The correspondence theorist thus has it that a proposition is true just in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (forthcoming). Varieties of Alethic Pluralism (and Why Alethic Disjunctivism is Relatively Compelling)∗. In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press.
    The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of various forms of alethic pluralism. Along the way we will draw a number of distinctions that, hopefully, will be useful in mapping the pluralist landscape. Finally, we will argue that a commitment to alethic disjunctivism, a certain brand of pluralism, might be difficult to avoid for adherents of the other pluralist views to be discussed. We will proceed as follows: Section 1 introduces alethic monism and alethic pluralism. Section 2 (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.) (2013). Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press.
    The relative merits and demerits of historically prominent views such as the correspondence theory, coherentism, pragmatism, verificationism, and instrumentalism have been subject to much attention in the truth literature and have fueled the long-lived debate over which of these views is the most plausible one. While diverging in their specific philosophical commitments, adherents of these historically prominent views agree in at least one fundamental respect. They are all alethic monists. They all endorse the thesis that there is only one property (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Christine Tappolet (2010). Review of Michael P. Lynch, Truth as One and Many. [REVIEW] Mind 119:1193-1198.
    Review of Michael P. Lynch's "Truth as One and Many".
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Christine Tappolet (2000). Truth Pluralism and Many-Valued Logics: A Reply to Beall. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):382-385.
    Mixed inferences are a problem for those who want to combine truth-assessability and antirealism with respect to allegedly nondescriptive sentences: the classical account of validity has apparently to be given up. J.C. Beall's response is that validity can be defined as the conservation of designated valued (Beall 2000). I argue that since it presupposes a truth predicate that can be applied to all sentences, this suggestion is not helpful. I also consider problems arising from mixed conjunctions and discuss the deeper (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (13 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Christine Tappolet (1997). Mixed Inferences: A Problem for Pluralism About Truth Predicates. Analysis 57 (3):209–210.
    In reply to Geach's objection against expressivism, some have claimed that there is a plurality of truth predicates. I raise a difficulty for this claim: valid inferences can involve sentences assessable by any truth predicate, corresponding to 'lightweight' truth as well as to 'heavyweight' truth. To account for this, some unique truth predicate must apply to all sentences that can appear in inferences. Mixed inferences remind us of a central platitude about truth: truth is what is preserved in valid inferences. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Cory D. Wright (2012). Is Pluralism About Truth Inherently Unstable? Philosophical Studies 159 (1):89-105.
    Although it’s sometimes thought that pluralism about truth is unstable---or, worse, just a non-starter---it’s surprisingly difficult to locate collapsing arguments that conclusively demonstrate either its instability or its inability to get started. This paper exemplifies the point by examining three recent arguments to that effect. However, it ends with a cautionary tale; for pluralism may not be any better off than other traditional theories that face various technical objections, and may be worse off in facing them all.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Cory D. Wright (2010). Truth, Ramsification, and the Pluralist's Revenge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):265-283.
    Functionalists about truth employ Ramsification to produce an implicit definition of the theoretical term _true_, but doing so requires determining that the theory introducing that term is itself true. A variety of putative dissolutions to this problem of epistemic circularity are shown to be unsatisfactory. One solution is offered on functionalists' behalf, though it has the upshot that they must tread on their anti-pluralist commitments.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Cory D. Wright (2005). On the Functionalization of Pluralist Approaches to Truth. Synthese 145 (1):1-28.
    Traditional inflationary approaches that specify the nature of truth are attractive in certain ways; yet, while many of these theories successfully explain why propositions in certain domains of discourse are true, they fail to adequately specify the nature of truth because they run up against counterexamples when attempting to generalize across all domains. One popular consequence is skepticism about the efficaciousness of inflationary approaches altogether. Yet, by recognizing that the failure to explain the truth of disparate propositions often stems from (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (2010). Truth, Pluralism, Monism, Correspondence. In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan.
    When talking about truth, we ordinarily take ourselves to be talking about one-and-the-same thing. Alethic monists suggest that theorizing about truth ought to begin with this default or pre-reflective stance, and, subsequently, parlay it into a set of theoretical principles that are aptly summarized by the thesis that truth is one. Foremost among them is the invariance principle.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Bill Wringe (2009). Making the Lightness of Being Bearable. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):453-487.
    In this paper I argue against Divers and Miller's 'Lightness of Being' objection to Hale and Wright's neo-Fregean Platonism. According to the 'Lightness of Being' objection, the neo-Fregean Platonist makes existence too cheap: the same principles which allow her to argue that numbers exist also allow her to claim that fictional objects exist. I claim that this is no objection at all" the neo-Fregean Platonist should think that fictional characters exist. However, the pluralist approach to truth developed by Wright in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Jeremy Wyatt (2014). Pluralism and the Absence of Truth. Dissertation, University of Connecticut
    In this dissertation, I argue that we should be pluralists about truth and in turn, eliminativists about the property Truth. Traditional deflationists were right to suspect that there is no such property as Truth. Yet there is a plurality of pluralities of properties which enjoy defining features that Truth would have, were it to exist. So although, in this sense, truth is plural, Truth is non-existent. The resulting account of truth is indebted to deflationism as the provenance of the suspicion (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Jeremy Wyatt (2013). Domains, Plural Truth, and Mixed Atomic Propositions. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):225-236.
    In this paper, I discuss two concerns for pluralist truth theories: a concern about a key detail of these theories and a concern about their viability. The detailed-related concern is that pluralists have relied heavily upon the notion of a domain, but it is not transparent what they take domains to be. Since the notion of a domain has been present in philosophy for some time, it is important for many theorists, not only truth pluralists, to be clear on what (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation