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  1. Brian A. Ball, Dorothy Edgington & John Hawthorne, Semantics, Meta-Semantics, and Ontology: A Critique of the Method of Truth in Metaphysics.
    In this thesis, Semantics, Meta-Semantics, and Ontology, I provide a critique of the method of truth in metaphysics. Davidson has suggested that we can determine the metaphysical nature and structure of reality through semantic investigations. By contrast, I argue that it is not semantics, but meta-semantics, which reveals the metaphysically necessary and sufficient truth conditions of our claims. As a consequence I reject the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment. In Part I, chapter 1, I argue that the metaphysically primary truth (...)
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  2. Ic Beall (2013). Deflated Truth Pluralism. In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press 323.
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  3. J. C. Beall (2013). Deflated Truth Pluralism. In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press
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  4. JC Beall (2000). On Mixed Inferences and Pluralism About Truth Predicates. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):380-382.
  5. Lajos L. Brons (2015). Wang Chong, Truth, and Quasi-Pluralism. Comparative Philosophy 6 (1):129-148.
    In (2011) McLeod suggested that the first century Chinese philosopher Wang Chong 王充 may have been a pluralist about truth. In this reply I contest McLeod's interpretation of Wang Chong, and suggest "quasi-pluralism" (albeit more as an alternative to pluralism than as an interpretation of Wang Chong), which combines primitivism about the concept of truth with pluralism about justification.
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  6. Stefano Caputo (2012). Three Dilemmas For Alethic Functionalism. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):853-861.
    According to Lynch’s aletich functionalism truth is manifested by/immanent in different properties in different domains of discourse; so a core concept of Alethic Functionalism is the concept of the relation of manifestation holding between truth and other properties. The claim I’m going to defend is that Lynch makes too many theoretical demands on the manifestation relation and this makes it a metaphysical monster, that is to say a relation with mutually inconsistent features. In order to make manifestation a coherent notion (...)
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  7. Roy T. Cook (2011). Alethic Pluralism, Generic Truth and Mixed Conjunctions. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):624-629.
    A difficulty for alethic pluralism has been the idea that semantic evaluation of conjunctions whose conjuncts come from discourses with distinct truth properties requires a third notion of truth which applies to both of the original discourses. But this line of reasoning does not entail that there exists a single generic truth property that applies to all statements and all discourses, unless it is supplemented with additional, controversial, premises. So the problem of mixed conjunctions, while highlighting other aspects of alethic (...)
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  8. Nikolaj Pedersen Cory Wright (ed.) (forthcoming). Truth Pluralism: Current Debates. O.U.P..
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  9. Aaron J. Cotnoir (2013). Pluralism and Paradox. In Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press 339.
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  10. Aaron J. Cotnoir (2013). Validity for Strong Pluralists. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):563-579.
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  11. Aaron J. Cotnoir (2009). Generic Truth and Mixed Conjunctions: Some Alternatives. Analysis 69 (3):473-479.
    Christine Tappolet posed a problem for alethic pluralism: either deny the truth of conjunctions whose conjuncts are from distinct domains of inquiry, or posit a generic global truth property thus making other truth properties redundant. Douglas Edwards has attempted to solve the problem by avoiding the horns of Tappolet's dilemma. After first noting an unappreciated consequence of Edwards's view regarding a proliferation of truth properties, I show that Edwards's proposal fails to avoid Tappolet's original dilemma. His response is not successful, (...)
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  12. Marian David (2011). Review of M. Lynch: Truth as One and Many. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):743 - 746.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 89, Issue 4, Page 743-746, December 2011.
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  13. Julian Dodd (2013). Deflationism Trumps Pluralism! In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press 298.
  14. Douglas Edwards (2013). Truth, Winning, and Simple Determination Pluralism. In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press
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  15. Douglas Edwards (2013). Naturalness, Representation and the Metaphysics of Truth. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):384-401.
    : This paper explores how consideration of the notions of naturalness and eligibility, which have played an increasingly significant role in contemporary metaphysics, might impact on the study of truth. In particular, it aims to demonstrate how taking such notions seriously may be of benefit to ‘representational’ theories of truth by showing how the naturalness of truth on a representational account provides a response to the ‘Scope Problem’ presented by Lynch (2009).
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  16. Douglas Edwards (2012). On Alethic Disjunctivism. Dialectica 66 (1):200-214.
    Alethic pluralism is the view that truth requires different treatment in different domains of discourse. The basic idea is that different properties play important roles in the analysis of truth in different domains of discourse, such as discourse about the material world, moral discourse, and mathematical discourse, to take three examples. Alethic disjunctivism is a kind of alethic pluralism, and is the view that truth is to be identified with the disjunctive property that is formed using each of the domain-specific (...)
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  17. Douglas Edwards (2012). Alethic Vs Deflationary Functionalism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (1):115-124.
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Volume 20, Issue 1, Page 115-124, February 2012.
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  18. Douglas Edwards (2011). Simplifying Alethic Pluralism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):28-48.
    What is truth? What precisely is it that truths have that falsehoods lack? Pluralists about truth (or “alethic pluralists”) tend to answer these questions by saying that there is more than one way for a proposition, sentence, belief—or any chosen truth-bearer—to be true. In this paper, I argue that two of the most influential formations of alethic pluralism, those of Wright (1992, 2003a) and Lynch (2009), are subject to serious problems. I outline a new formulation, which I call “simple determination (...)
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  19. Douglas Edwards (2009). Truth-Conditions and the Nature of Truth: Re-Solving Mixed Conjunctions. Analysis 69 (4):684-688.
    Alethic pluralism, on one version of the view , is the idea that truth is to be identified with different properties in different domains of discourse. 1 Whilst we operate with a univocal concept of truth, and a uniform truth predicate, the thought is that the truth property changes from one domain to the next. So the truth property for talk about the nature and state of the material world may be different from the truth property for moral discourse .Tappolet (...)
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  20. Douglas Edwards (2008). How to Solve the Problem of Mixed Conjunctions. Analysis 68 (298):143–149.
    The problem of mixed conjunctions, due to Tappolet (2000), threatens to undermine alethic pluralism by showing that it cannot account for the truth of conjunctions in which the conjuncts spring from different domains of discourse. In this paper I argue, firstly, that the problem is not just a problem for alethic pluralism and, secondly, that the problem can be solved.
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  21. Matti Eklund (2004). Book Review. Saving the Difference. Crispin Wright. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 113:288-92.
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  22. Richard Fumerton (2013). Alethic Pluralism and the Correspondence Theory of Truth. In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press 197.
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  23. Michael Horton & Ted Poston (2012). Functionalism About Truth and the Metaphysics of Reduction. Acta Analytica 27 (1):13-27.
    Functionalism about truth is the view that truth is an explanatorily significant but multiply-realizable property. According to this view the properties that realize truth vary from domain to domain, but the property of truth is a single, higher-order, domain insensitive property. We argue that this view faces a challenge similar to the one that Jaegwon Kim laid out for the multiple realization thesis. The challenge is that the higher-order property of truth is equivalent to an explanatorily idle disjunction of its (...)
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  24. Andrea Iacona (2008). Faultless or Disagreeement. In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Max Kolbel (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press 287.
    Among the various motivations that may lead to the idea that truth is relative in some non-conventional sense, one is that the idea helps explain how there can be ‘‘faultless disagreements’’, that is, situations in which a person A judges that p, a person B judges that not-p, but neither A nor B is at fault. The line of argument goes as follows. It seems that there are faultless disagreements. For example, A and B may disagree on culinary matters without (...)
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  25. Max Kölbel (2013). Should We Be Pluralists About Truth? In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press 278--297.
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  26. H. Krings (1983). What is Truth-the Pluralism of the Concept of Truth. Philosophisches Jahrbuch 90 (1):20-31.
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  27. Catherine Legg (2014). Charles Peirce's Limit Concept of Truth. Philosophy Compass 9 (3):204-213.
    This entry explores Charles Peirce's account of truth in terms of the end or ‘limit’ of inquiry. This account is distinct from – and arguably more objectivist than – views of truth found in other pragmatists such as James and Rorty. The roots of the account in mathematical concepts is explored, and it is defended from objections that it is (i) incoherent, (ii) in its faith in convergence, too realist and (iii) in its ‘internal realism’, not realist enough.
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  28. Michele Lubrano (2014). Alethic Pluralism and Logical Paradoxes. In Fabio Bacchini, Stefano Caputo & Massimo Dell'Utri (eds.), New Frontiers in Truth. Cambridge Scholars Publishing 132-142.
    In this contribution I will examine Cotnoir’s (2013) solution to the problems that alethic pluralism faces when it comes to logical paradoxes. I will argue that his proposal fails to be a viable option and I will put forward an alternative approach, more Tarskian in spirit, but with the same “pluralist” trait of Cotnoir’s solution. Such an alternative approach is based on the idea that each truth predicate can be associated with an index that fully describes its relation with other (...)
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  29. M. Lynch (2013). Three Questions for Truth Pluralism. In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press 21.
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  30. M. P. Lynch (2005). Alethic Functionalism and Our Folk Theory of Truth. Synthese 145 (1):29 - 43.
    According to alethic functionalism, truth is a higher-order multiply realizable property of propositions. After briefly presenting the views main principles and motivations, I defend alethic functionalism from recent criticisms raised against it by Cory Wright. Wright argues that alethic functionalism will collapse either into deflationism or into a view that takes true as simply ambiguous. I reject both claims.
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  31. Michael Lynch (2004). True to Life: Why Truth Matters. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
  32. Michael P. Lynch (2009). Truth as One and Many. Clarendon Press.
    What is truth? Michael Lynch defends a bold new answer to this question. Traditional theories of truth hold that truth has only a single uniform nature. All truths are true in the same way. More recent deflationary theories claim that truth has no nature at all; the concept of truth is of no real philosophical importance. In this concise and clearly written book, Lynch argues that we should reject both these extremes and hold that truth is a functional property. To (...)
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  33. Michael P. Lynch (2008). Three Forms of Pluralism About Truth. Philosophia Scientiae 12 (1):109-124.
    Alethic pluralism is the view that there is more than one way for propositions to be true. This paper examines three ways of understanding this idea and argues that each has significant flaws. It concludes by suggesting a way for the pluralist to construct a more plausible position.RésuméLe pluralisme aléthique est la conception suivant laquelle il y a plus d’une manière pour des propositions d’être vraies. Cet article étudie trois manières de comprendre cette idée et argumente que chacune a des (...)
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  34. Michael P. Lynch (2008). Alethic Pluralism, Logical Consequence and the Universality of Reason. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):122-140.
  35. Michael P. Lynch (2006). Rewrighting Pluralism. The Monist 89 (1):63-84.
  36. Michael P. Lynch (2005). Summary. Philosophical Books 46 (4):289-291.
  37. Michael P. Lynch (2004). Truth and Multiple Realizability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):384 – 408.
    Pluralism about truth is the view that there is more than one way for a proposition to be true. When taken to imply that there is more than one concept and property of truth, this position faces a number of troubling objections. I argue that we can overcome these objections, and yet retain pluralism's key insight, by taking truth to be a multiply realizable property of propositions.
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  38. Michael P. Lynch (ed.) (2001). The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives. The MIT Press.
    These essays center around two questions: Does truth have an underlying nature? And if so, what sort of nature does it have?
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  39. Michael P. Lynch (2000). Alethic Pluralism and the Functionalist Theory of Truth. Acta Analytica 24:195--214.
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  40. Michael Patrick Lynch (2012). The Many Faces of Truth: A Response to Some Critics. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (2):255-269.
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Volume 20, Issue 2, Page 255-269, May 2012.
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  41. Michael Patrick Lynch (1995). On the True and the Real. Dissertation, Syracuse University
    I argue for the consistency of the following views. First, there can be irreconcilable but equally true ways to categorize or "carve up" the world into objects; second, truth is an objective concept. In short, I claim that one can be a metaphysical pluralist, but an absolutist about truth. ;The first part of the work is taken up with explaining metaphysical pluralism. This is said to be the thesis that all propositions and all facts are relative to conceptual schemes. Thus, (...)
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  42. Alexus McLeod (2011). Pluralism About Truth in Early Chinese Philosophy: A Reflection on Wang Chong's Approach. Comparative Philosophy 2 (1):38.
    The debate concerning truth in Classical Chinese philosophy has for the most part avoided the possibility that pluralist theories of truth were part of the classical philosophical framework. I argue that the Eastern Han philosopher Wang Chong (c. 25-100 CE) can be profitably read as endorsing a kind of pluralism about truth grounded in the concept of shi 實 , or “actuality”. In my exploration of this view, I explain how it offers a different account of the truth of moral (...)
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  43. Jay Newhard (2014). Alethic Functionalism, Manifestation, and the Nature of Truth. Acta Analytica 29 (3):349-361.
    Michael Lynch has recently proposed an updated version of alethic functionalism according to which the relation between truth per se and lower-level truth properties is not the realization relation, as might be expected, and as Lynch himself formerly held, but the manifestation relation. I argue that the manifestation relation is merely a resemblance relation and is inadequate to properly relate truth per se to lower-level truth properties. I also argue that alethic functionalism does not justify the claim that truth per (...)
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  44. Jay Newhard (2013). Four Objections to Alethic Functionalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 38:69-87.
    Alethic functionalism is a sophisticated version of alethic pluralism according to which truth per se is a functional property supervening on lower level truth properties. After presenting alethic functionalism, I discuss four objections to it. I raise a new objection to alethic functionalism that if Objectivity, Norm of Belief, and End of Inquiry are the three truisms, correspondence is necessary and sufficient to satisfy the truisms, so that alethic functionalism capitulates to a correspondence theory of truth. Second, I present a (...)
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  45. Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (2012). Recent Work on Alethic Pluralism. Analysis 72 (3):588-607.
    While historically prominent theories of truth such as the correspondence theory, coherentism, pragmatism, verificationism, and instrumentalism diverge in many ways, they converge in at least one fundamental respect. They are all monist theories of truth. They incorporate the thesis that there is one property—and one property only—in virtue of which propositions can be true. The truth pluralist, on the other hand, rejects this idea. There are several properties in virtue of which propositions can be true. This article offers a survey (...)
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  46. Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (2010). Stabilizing Alethic Pluralism. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):92-108.
    Alethic pluralism is the view that the nature of truth is not uniform across domains. There are several ways of bang true $(T_1 ...\,T_n )$ A simple argument, the 'instability challenge', purports to show that this view is inherently unstable. One can simply say that something is uniformly true if and only if it is T₁ or ... or $\,T_n $ . Being uniformly true is a single truth property that applies across the board, and so the nature of truth (...)
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  47. Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (2006). What Can the Problem of Mixed Inferences Teach Us About Alethic Pluralism? The Monist 89 (1):103-117.
    Here is a well-known thought about truth: Truth consists in correspondence with reality. A sentence is true just in case what it says corresponds with how the world is. Theories of truth that incorporate this thought are naturally regarded as robust or “heavyweight”. Truth is to be understood in a realist fashion. The world decides what is true and what is not. A recent incarnation of the correspondence view is found in truth-maker theories, whose adherents maintain that truths are true (...)
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  48. Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Douglas Edwards (2011). Truth as One(s) and Many: On Lynch's Alethic Functionalism1. Analytic Philosophy 52 (3):213-230.
    Advocates of traditional views on truth such as the correspondence and coherence theories converge on two theses about truth: substantivism and monism. According to the former thesis, truth consists in some substantive property or relation F. According to the latter thesis, there is exactly one property or relation (whether substantive or not) in terms of which truth is to be accounted for across all truth-apt domains of discourse. The correspondence theorist thus has it that a proposition is true just in (...)
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  49. Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (forthcoming). Varieties of Alethic Pluralism (and Why Alethic Disjunctivism is Relatively Compelling)∗. In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press
    The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of various forms of alethic pluralism. Along the way we will draw a number of distinctions that, hopefully, will be useful in mapping the pluralist landscape. Finally, we will argue that a commitment to alethic disjunctivism, a certain brand of pluralism, might be difficult to avoid for adherents of the other pluralist views to be discussed. We will proceed as follows: Section 1 introduces alethic monism and alethic pluralism. Section 2 (...)
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  50. Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.) (2013). Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press.
    The relative merits and demerits of historically prominent views such as the correspondence theory, coherentism, pragmatism, verificationism, and instrumentalism have been subject to much attention in the truth literature and have fueled the long-lived debate over which of these views is the most plausible one. While diverging in their specific philosophical commitments, adherents of these historically prominent views agree in at least one fundamental respect. They are all alethic monists. They all endorse the thesis that there is only one property (...)
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