Die Kritische Sozialtheorie sowie die kommunistische Herrschaftsphilosophie haben in der posthegelianischen Befreiungslehre ihren Ursprung. Die Kritische Theorie versuchte diesen Denkansatz gegen seine totalitären Konsequenzen anzuwenden. Dieselben Weltdeutungschemata, die man an der Sowjetideologie anstößig fand, galten aber als akzeptabel, sobald man nur zur Kritik der westlichen Industriegesellschaft überging. Der Hauptpunkt der neomarxistischen Kritik des Sowjetsystems bestand darin, daß man die besondere institutionelle Form, in der der reale Sozialismus das Heil zu verwirklichen beanspruchte, in Frage stellte, ohne andere Lösungen der institutionellen Probleme (...) anzubieten oder das zugrundeliegende Denkprogramm aufzugeben, in dessen Kontext diese Probleme durchaus legitim gestellt werden konnten. Die relativen Leistungen der Kritischen Theorie sind in ihren sozial-politischen Folgen zu suchen, u. zw. darin, daß sie zwei Grundlagen der totalitären Ideologie, von der die Legitimierung des Gesellschaftssystems herrühte, erschütterte: (1) Verfügung über die Tradition; (2) Verfügung über die Sprache, in der über heilsrelevante Fragen gesprochen wurde. /// Both critical theory and communist philosophy arise from the posthegelian theory of salvation. Critical theory undertook the effort to preserve the hard core of this theoretical background and at the same time to criticize by its means the totalitarian consequences the communist ideology had derived from it. In effect, the very same patterns of thought which critical theory believed to denounce as instruments of totalitarian manipulation were accepted as soon as they proved useful to contest advanced industrial society and its world view. The crucial point of the new-leftist criticism of the Stalinist ideology was the rejection of a central claim of the latter according to which the salvation predicted in the leftist-revolutionary tradition has found its actual fulfilment in the institutional framework of the Soviet state. Challenging this claim, the Neomarxists neither abandoned this tradition nor offered another solution to the institutional problems which result from it. The relative achievements of critical theory lie in the damage it has caused to the two foundations of the totalitarian ideology, i.e.: (1) its authority over tradition and (2) its authority over language. (shrink)

Among them are essays by French philosophers Louis Bourdeau and Victor Espinas, which founded the ideas in the 1880s and 1890s.

This article argues that the limited influence of Ludwik Fleck's ideas on philosophy of science is due not only to their indirect dissemination by way of Thomas Kuhn, but also to an incommensurability between the standard conceptual framework of history and philosophy of science and Fleck's own more integratedly historico-social and praxis-oriented approach to understanding the evolution of scientific discovery. What Kuhn named "paradigm" offers a periphrastic rendering or oblique translation of Fleck's Denkstil/Denkkollektiv , a derivation that may also account (...) for the lability of the term "paradigm". This was due not to Kuhn's unwillingness to credit Fleck but rather to the cold war political circumstances surrounding the writing of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions . Following a discussion of Fleck's anatomical allusions, I include a brief discussion of Aristotle (on menstruation and darkened mirrors) and conclude with a reference to the productivity of error in Mach and Nietzsche. (shrink)

Let I be an ideal of subsets of a Polish space X, containing all singletons and possessing a Borel basis. Assuming that I does not satisfy ccc, we consider the following conditions (B), (M) and (D). Condition (B) states that there is a disjoint family F $\subseteq$ P(X) of size c, consisting of Borel sets which are not in I. Condition (M) states that there is a Borel function f: X → X with $f^{-1}[\{x\}] \not\in$ I for each x ∈ (...) X. Provided that X is a group and I is invariant, condition (D) states that there exist a Borel set B $\not\in$ I and a perfect set P $\subseteq$ X for which the family $\{B + x: x \in P\}$ is disjoint. The aim of the paper is to study whether the reverse implications in the chain (D) $\Rightarrow$ (M) $\Rightarrow$ (B) $\Rightarrow$ not-ccc can hold. We build a σ-ideal on the Cantor group witnessing (M) & ¬ (D) (Section 2). A modified version of that σ-ideal contains the whole space (Section 3). Some consistency results on deriving (M) from (B) for "nicely" defined ideals are established (Sections 4 and 5). We show that both ccc and (M) can fail (Theorems 1.3 and 5.6). Finally, some sharp versions of (M) for invariant ideals on Polish groups are investigated (Section 6). (shrink)

We address ZFC inequalities between some cardinal invariants of the continuum, which turned out to be true in spite of strong expectations given by [11].

We study the cardinal invariants of measure and category after adding one random real. In particular, we show that the number of measure zero subsets of the plane which are necessary to cover graphs of all continuous functions may be large while the covering for measure is small.

Each one of T.H. Marshall's trinity of human rights rested on the state as, simultaneously, its birth place, executive manager and guardian. And no wonder. At the time Marshall tied personal, political and social freedoms into a historically determined succession of won/bestowed rights, the boundaries of the sovereign state marked the limits of what humans could contemplate, and what they thought they should jointly do, in order to make their world more user-friendly. The state enclosed territory was the site of (...) private initiatives and public actions, as well as the arena on which private interests and public issues met, clashed and sought reconciliation. In all those respects, the realm of state sovereignty was presumed to be self-contained, selfassertive and self-sufficient. (shrink)

Why do most of us consider ourselves free but also believe there is little we can change in the way the world is run - individually, severally, or even collectively? Why has the growth of individual freedom coincided with the growth of collective impotence? Bauman argues that this condition hangs on the agora - the space where private and public meet to seek the creation of 'public good', a 'just society', or 'shared values'. The problem is that little remains of (...) such old style spaces. We cannot, he argues, overcome our collective impotence without resorting to politics and using the vehicle of political agency. Three orientation points for a reconstruction of politics are suggested: the republican model of the state and of citizenship, basic income as a universal entitlement, and re-enabling the institutions of autonomous society by catching up with the controlling extraterritorial powers in an age of globalization. (shrink)

Life in Fragments is a continuation of the themes and motifs explored in Zygmunt Bauman's acclaimed study, Postmodern Ethics (Blackwell, 1993).

Introduction: Morality in Modern and Postmodern Perspective Shattered beings are best represented by bits and pieces. Rainer Maria Rilke As signalled in its ...

In 1905 two different microbes were proposed to fill the vacant role of etiologic agent for syphilis, one, the Cytorrhyctes luis, by John Siegel, the other, Spirochaeta pallida, by Fritz Schaudinn. After gathering and reviewing the evidence the majority of medical scientists decided in favor of Schaudinn's candidate. In a previous issue Jean Lindenmann challenged Ludwik Fleck's suggestion that under suitable social conditions Siegel's candidate could just as well have won acceptance by the scientific community (). To refute this counterfactual (...) thesis, Lindenmann presented an asymmetric account of the dispute over the etiology of syphilis. He adopted the view of the proponents that Schaudinn's spirochete had already been there in syphilitic lesions for centuries, only awaiting the discovery of an appropriate staining technique to be revealed. Here a more symmetric analysis of the episode will be attempted, paying serious attention to the arguments put forward by the spirochete's opponents, who expatiated on the many possibilities of inadvertently creating artifacts through microscopic preparation and staining. The symmetric account that is presented in this rejoinder thus aims to trace the simultaneous construction of facts and artifacts. It will not, however, resurrect Fleck's counterfactual thesis. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the relation between logic and ontology. In particular, it demonstrates how classical logical theory can clarify the ontological part of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. To this end, the work examines the adequacy of a formal system that was devised by the Polish logician, mathematician and philosopher Roman Suszko (1919–1979) as a model for the Tractatus. Following a brief explanation of the Tractarian ontology, the main ideas of Suszko’s system and its philosophical significance will be considered. The (...) latter will be illustrated in the context of central Tractarian concepts. Finally, two implications for a better understanding of the Tractarian ontology will be pointed out. (shrink)

In several manuscripts, written between 1894 and 1897, Twardowski developed a new theory of judgement with two types of judgement: existential and relational judgements. In Zur Lehre he tried to stay within a Brentanian framework, although he introduced the distinction between content and object in the theory of judgement. The introduction of this distinction forced Twardowski to revise further Brentano'stheory.His changes concerned judgements about relations and about non-present objects. The latter are considered special cases of relational judgements. The existential judgements (...) are analysed in a Brentanian way; whereas relational judgements are analysed in a Brentanian way only as far as the act is concerned, but not when it comes to the object: the object of a relational judgement is a relationship. With this notion of relationship Twardowski comes close to introducing a concept of state of affairs for the object of (relational) judgements. (shrink)

Leśniewski’s systems deviate greatly from standard logic in some basic features. The deviant aspects are rather well known, and often cited among the reasons why Leśniewski’s work enjoys little recognition. This paper is an attempt to explain why those aspects should be there at all. Leśniewski built his systems inspired by a dream close to Leibniz’s characteristica universalis: a perfect system of deductive theories encoding our knowledge of the world, based on a perfect language. My main claim is that Leśniewski (...) built his characteristica universalis following the conditions of de Jong and Betti’s Classical Model of Science (2008) to an astounding degree. While showing this I give an overview of the architecture of Leśniewski’s systems and of their fundamental characteristics. I suggest among others that the aesthetic constraints Leśniewski put on axioms and primitive terms have epistemological relevance. (shrink)

This paper is a contribution to the reconstruction of Tarski’s semantic background in the light of the ideas of his master, Stanislaw Lesniewski. Although in his 1933 monograph Tarski credits Lesniewski with crucial negative results on the semantics of natural language, the conceptual relationship between the two logicians has never been investigated in a thorough manner. This paper shows that it was not Tarski, but Lesniewski who first avowed the impossibility of giving a satisfactory theory of truth for ordinary language, (...) and the necessity of sanitation of the latter for scientific purposes. In an early article (1913) Lesniewski gave an interesting solution to the Liar Paradox, which, although different from Tarski’s in detail, is nevertheless important to Tarski’s semantic background. To illustrate this I give an analysis of Lesniewski’s solution and of some related aspects of Lesniewski’s later thought. (shrink)

In the paper, the proof of the non-locality of quantum mechanics, given by Bedford and Stapp (1995), and appealing to the GHZ example, is analyzed. The proof does not contain any explicit assumption of realism, but instead it uses formal methods and techniques of the Lewis calculus of counterfactuals. To ascertain the validity of the proof, a formal semantic model for counterfactuals is constructed. With the help of this model it can be shown that the proof is faulty, because it (...) appeals to the unwarranted principle of “elimination of eliminated conditions” (EEC). As an additional way of showing unreasonableness of the assumption (EEC), it is argued that yet another alleged and highly controversial proof of non-locality of QM, using the Hardy example, can be made almost trivial with the help of (EEC). Finally, a general argument is produced to the effect that the locality condition in the form accepted by Stapp and Bedford is consistent with the quantum-mechanical predictions for the GHZ case under the assumption of indeterminism. This result undermines any future attempts of proving the incompatibility between the predictions of quantum theory and the idea of no faster-than-light influence in the GHZ case, quite independently of the negative assessment of the particular derivation proposed by Stapp and Bedford. (shrink)

In the article the possibility of breaking the eigenvalue-eigenstate link in quantum mechanics is considered. An argument is presented to the effect that there are some non-maximal observables for which the implication from eigenstates to eigenvalues is not valid, i.e. such that although the probability of revealing certain value upon measurement is one, they don't possess this value before the measurement. It is shown that the existence of such observables leads to contextuality, i.e. the thesis that one Hermitean operator can (...) represent more than one physical observable. Finally, contextuality brought about by these considerations is compared with contextuality suggested by the Kochen-Specker paradox. (shrink)

The article deals with one particular problem created by the counterfactual analysis of causality à la Lewis, namely the context-sensitivity problem or, as I prefer to call it, the background condition problem. It appears that Lewis’ counterfactual definition of causality cannot distinguish between proper causes and mere causal conditions – i.e. factors necessary for the effect to occur, but commonly not seen as causally efficacious. The proposal is put forward to amend the Lewis definition with a condition, based on the (...) notion of cotenability, which would eliminate the problem. It is shown that the corrected definition of causality leads to the transitivity of the causal relation. Possible objections to the proposed solution, involving the assumption of indeterminism and the preemption cases, are given a thorough consideration. (shrink)

One of the basic assumptions of David Lewis''s formal semantics of counterfactuals is that the crucial relation of comparative similarity between possible worlds is a linear ordering.Yet there are arguments that when we take into account relativistic features of space-time, this relationshould be only a partial ordering. The first part of the paper deals with the question of how to formulate appropriatetruth conditions for counterfactuals under the supposition of a partial ordering of possible worlds. Such truthconditions will be put forward, (...) and it will be argued that they are more general than those proposed in recentliterature, because they turn out to be applicable also when the so-called Limit Assumption is not met. The secondpart analyzes two relativistically invariant ways of interpreting spatiotemporal counterfactuals with antecedentsreferring to free-chance point events. After briefly examining key differences between these two approaches,the issue of their extension for a broader class of antecedents will be addressed. Following the approach of Finkelstein (1999), who has proposed a specifically designed similarity relation between possible worlds, servingas a generalization tool in the case of one of the above intuitions, the possibility of a similar extension forthe second interpretation will be considered. The main result of the paper is the theorem to the effect that thegeneralization of the second intuition is impossible to obtain. More specifically, the theorem proved in the paperstates that there is no similarity relation which together with the Lewis-style truth conditions for counterfactualswould imply the second of the above interpretations as a special case. Some consequences of thistheorem for the applicability of the Lewis logic of counterfactuals to quantum phenomena will be briefly mentionedat the end of the paper. (shrink)

This is an extended critique of comments made by Abner Shimony and Howard Stein on Henry Stapp’s proof of the non-locality of quantum mechanics. Although I claim that ultimately Stapp’s proof does not establish its purported conclusion, yet Shimony and Stein’s criticism contains a number of weak points, which need to be clarified.

In recent years, the so-calledindispensability argument has been given a lotof attention by philosophers of mathematics.This argument for the existence of mathematicalobjects makes use of the fact, neglected inclassical schools of philosophy of mathematics,that mathematics is part of our best scientifictheories, and therefore should receive similarsupport to these theories. However, thisobservation raises the question about the exactnature of the alleged connection betweenexperience and mathematics (for example: is itpossible to falsify empirically anymathematical theorems?). In my paper I wouldlike to address this (...) question by consideringthe explicit assumptions of different versionsof the indispensability argument. My primaryclaim is that there are at least three distinctversions of the indispensability argument (andit can be even suggested that a fourth,separate version should be formulated). I willmainly concentrate my discussion on thisvariant of the argument, which suggests thepossibility of empirical confirmation ofmathematical theories. A large portion of mypaper will focus on the recent discussion ofthis topic, starting from the paper by E.Sober, who in my opinion put reasonablerequirements on what is to be counted as anempirical confirmation of a mathematicaltheory. I will develop his model into threeseparate scenarios of possible empiricalconfirmation of mathematics. Using an exampleof Hilbert space in quantum mechanicaldescription I will show that the most promisingscenario of empirical verification ofmathematical theories has neverthelessuntenable consequences. It will be hypothesizedthat the source of this untenability lies in aspecific role which mathematical theories playin empirical science, and that what is subjectto empirical verification is not themathematics used, but the representabilityassumptions. Further I will undertake theproblem of how to reconcile the allegedempirical verification of mathematics withscientific practice. I will refer to thepolemics between P. Maddy and M. Resnik,pointing out certain ambiguities of theirarguments whose source is partly the failure todistinguish carefully between different sensesof the indispensability argument. For thatreason typical arguments used in the discussionare not decisive, yet if we take into accountsome metalogical properties of appliedmathematics, then the thesis that mathematicshas strong links with experience seems to behighly improbable. (shrink)

The paper consists of two parts. The first part begins with the problem of whether the original three-valued calculus, invented by J. ukasiewicz, really conforms to his philosophical and semantic intuitions. I claim that one of the basic semantic assumptions underlying ukasiewicz's three-valued logic should be that if under any possible circumstances a sentence of the form X will be the case at time t is true (resp. false) at time t, then this sentence must be already true (resp. false) (...) at present. However, it is easy to see that this principle is violated in ukasiewicz's original calculus (as the cases of the law of excluded middle and the law of contradiction show). Nevertheless it is possible to construct (either with the help of the notion of supervaluation, or purely algebraically) a different three-valued, semi-classical sentential calculus, which would properly incorporate ukasiewicz's initial intuitions. Algebraically, this calculus has the ordinary Boolean structure, and therefore it retains all classically valid formulas. Yet because possible valuations are no longer represented by ultrafilters, but by filters (not necessarily maximal), the new calculus displays certain non-classical metalogical features (like, for example, non-extensionality and the lack of the metalogical rule enabling one to derive p is true or q is true from pqq is true).The second part analyses whether the proposed calculus could be useful in formalizing inferences in situations, when for some reason (epistemological or ontological) our knowledge of certain facts is subject to limitation. Special attention should be paid to the possibility of employing this calculus to the case of quantum mechanics. I am going to compare it with standard non-Boolean quantum logic (in the Jauch–Piron approach), and to show that certain shortcomings of the latter can be avoided in the former. For example, I will argue that in order to properly account for quantum features of microphysics, we do not need to drop the law of distributivity. Also the idea of reading off the logical structure of propositions from the structure of Hilbert space leads to some conceptual troubles, which I am going to point out. The thesis of the paper is that all we need to speak about quantum reality can be acquired by dropping the principle of bivalence and extensionality, while accepting all classically valid formulas. (shrink)

Cognitive activity, which essentially consistsof the use of signs, does not only depend onthe internal (mental, or brain) processes. Thefirst part of the paper presents severalversions of the idea of the external andcultural organization of individual''s mentalprocesses. The second part of the paperconsiders a future development of cognitivescience as a science of the extended andsocially constructed mind. KazimierzTwardowski''s theory of intentionality and histheory of actions and products provide theconceptual framework of the undertaken analysis.

With the passing of S. A. Janovskaja, contemporary Soviet philosophy has lost one of its leading experts in logic and in combining creativity with survival.

I present a fragment from thehistory of the Russian reception of HerbertSpencer''s sociology. The discussion concernstwo diametrically opposed but exceptionallyimportant figures in the history of Russianthought, Nikolai Mikhajlovskij (1842–1904) andKonstantin Leont''ev (1831–1891). As one of thechief ideologues of the Populist movementMikhajlovskij turned Spencer''s ideas into anegative frame of reference for his own`romantic socialist utopia''. In turn, Leont''evformulated his extremely conservative politicalviews on the basis of Spencer''s organicistsociology. Though at the opposite ends of thespectrum both standpoints succeeded inexhibiting the political implications (...) of thepositivist and naturalist style of thinking. (shrink)