Related categories
Siblings:
95 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
  1. Arif Ahmed (2011). Walters on Conjunction Conditionalization. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):115-122.
    This discussion note examines a recent argument for the principle that any counterfactual with true components is itself true. That argument rests upon two widely accepted principles of counterfactual logic to which the paper presents counterexamples. The conclusion speculates briefly upon the wider lessons that philosophers should draw from these examples for the semantics of counterfactuals.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Ana Arregui (2009). On Similarity in Counterfactuals. Linguistics and Philosophy 32 (3):245-278.
    This paper investigates the interpretation of counterfactual conditionals. The main goal of the paper is to provide an account of the semantic role of similarity in the evaluation of counterfactuals. The paper proposes an analysis according to which counterfactuals are treated as predications “ de re ” over past situations in the actual world. The relevant situations enter semantic composition via the interpretation of tense. Counterfactuals are treated as law-like conditionals with de re predication over particular facts. Similarity with respect (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. S. Barker (1999). Counterfactuals, Probabilistic Counterfactuals and Causation. Mind 108 (431):427-469.
    It seems to be generally accepted that (a) counterfactual conditionals are to be analysed in terms of possible worlds and inter-world relations of similarity and (b) causation is conceptually prior to counterfactuals. I argue here that both (a) and (b) are false. The argument against (a) is not a general metaphysical or epistemological one but simply that, structurally speaking, possible worlds theories are wrong: this is revealed when we try to extend them to cover the case of probabilistic counterfactuals. Indeed (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Stephen Barker (2011). Can Counterfactuals Really Be About Possible Worlds? Noûs 45 (3):557-576.
    The standard view about counterfactuals is that a counterfactual (A > C) is true if and only if the A-worlds most similar to the actual world @ are C-worlds. I argue that the worlds conception of counterfactuals is wrong. I assume that counterfactuals have non-trivial truth-values under physical determinism. I show that the possible-worlds approach cannot explain many embeddings of the form (P > (Q > R)), which intuitively are perfectly assertable, and which must be true if the contingent falsity (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Francesco Berto (2009). Impossible Worlds. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2009).
  6. Tomasz Bigaj (2013). How to Evaluate Counterfactuals in the Quantum World. Synthese 190 (4):619-637.
    In the article I discuss possible amendments and corrections to Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals that are necessary in order to account for the indeterministic and non-local character of the quantum world. I argue that Lewis’s criteria of similarity between possible worlds produce incorrect valuations for alternate-outcome counterfactuals in the EPR case. Later I discuss an alternative semantics which rejects the notion of miraculous events and relies entirely on the comparison of the agreement with respect to individual facts. However, a controversy (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Tomasz Bigaj (2006). Non-Locality and Possible Worlds. A Counterfactual Perspective on Quantum Entanglement. Ontos Verlag.
    This book uses the formal semantics of counterfactual conditionals to analyze the problem of non-locality in quantum mechanics. Counterfactual conditionals enter the analysis of quantum entangled systems in that they enable us to precisely formulate the locality condition that purports to exclude the existence of causal interactions between spatially separated parts of a system. They also make it possible to speak consistently about alternative measuring settings, and to explicate what is meant by quantum property attributions. The book develops the possible-world (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Tomasz Bigaj (2004). Counterfactuals and Spatiotemporal Events. Synthese 142 (1):1 - 19.
    One of the basic assumptions of David Lewis''s formal semantics of counterfactuals is that the crucial relation of comparative similarity between possible worlds is a linear ordering.Yet there are arguments that when we take into account relativistic features of space-time, this relationshould be only a partial ordering. The first part of the paper deals with the question of how to formulate appropriatetruth conditions for counterfactuals under the supposition of a partial ordering of possible worlds. Such truthconditions will be put forward, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. John C. Bigelow (1976). If-Then Meets the Possible Worlds. Philosophia 6 (2):215-235.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Jens Christian Bjerring (forthcoming). On Counterpossibles. Philosophical Studies:1-27.
    The traditional Lewis-Stalnaker semantics treats all counterfactuals with an impossible antecedent as trivially or vacuously true. Many have regarded this as a serious defect of the semantics. For intuitively, it seems, counterfactuals with impossible antecedents---counterpossibles---can be non-trivially true and non-trivially false. Whereas the counterpossible "If Hobbes had squared the circle, then the mathematical community at the time would have been surprised'' seems true, "If Hobbes had squared the circle, then sick children in the mountains of Afghanistan at the time would (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. G. Lee Bowie (1979). The Similarity Approach to Counterfactuals: Some Problems. Noûs 13 (4):477-498.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno (2013). Remarks on Counterpossibles. Synthese 190 (4):639-660.
    Since the publication of David Lewis’ Counterfactuals, the standard line on subjunctive conditionals with impossible antecedents (or counterpossibles) has been that they are vacuously true. That is, a conditional of the form ‘If p were the case, q would be the case’ is trivially true whenever the antecedent, p, is impossible. The primary justification is that Lewis’ semantics best approximates the English subjunctive conditional, and that a vacuous treatment of counterpossibles is a consequence of that very elegant theory. Another justification (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno (2008). Counterfactuals and Context. Analysis 68 (297):39–46.
    It is widely agreed that contraposition, strengthening the antecedent and hypothetical syllogism fail for subjunctive conditionals. The following putative counter-examples are frequently cited, respectively.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Gabriele Contessa (2006). On the Supposed Temporal Asymmetry of Counterfactual Dependence; Or: It Wouldn't Have Taken a Miracle! Dialectica 60 (4):461–473.
    The thesis that a temporal asymmetry of counterfactual dependence characterizes our world plays a central role in Lewis’s philosophy, as. among other things, it underpins one of Lewis most renowned theses—that causation can be analyzed in terms of counterfactual dependence. To maintain that a temporal asymmetry of counterfactual dependence characterizes our world, Lewis committed himself to two other theses. The first is that the closest possible worlds at which the antecedent of a counterfactual conditional is true is one in which (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Lewis G. Creary & Christopher S. Hill (1975). Book Review:Counterfactuals David Lewis. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 42 (3):341-.
  16. Charles B. Cross (2011). Comparative World Similarity and What is Held Fixed in Counterfactuals. Analysis 71 (1):91-96.
    Berit Brogaard and Joe Salerno (Counterfactuals and Context, ANALYSIS 68 (2008): 39-46) argue that the standard Stalnaker-Lewis counterexamples to hypothetical syllogism, strengthening the antecedent, and contraposition trade on a failure to hold fixed the context in which truth values are determined for the premises and conclusion in each counterexample. I argue that no contextual fallacy is committed in the standard counterexamples, and I offer a different view of what it is for a fact to be held fixed by a counterfactual (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Charles B. Cross (2008). Antecedent-Relative Comparative World Similarity. Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (2):101-120.
    In “Backward Causation and the Stalnaker–Lewis Approach to Counterfactuals,” Analysis 62:191–7, (2002), Michael Tooley argues that if a certain kind of backward causation is possible, then a Stalnaker–Lewis comparative world similarity account of the truth conditions of counterfactuals cannot be sound. In “Tooley on Backward Causation,” Analysis 63:157–62, (2003), Paul Noordhof argues that Tooley’s example can be reconciled with a Stalnaker–Lewis account of counterfactuals if the comparative world similarity relation on which the Stalnaker–Lewis account relies is allowed to be antecedent-relative. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Charles B. Cross (2006). Conditional Logic and the Significance of Tooley's Example. Analysis 66 (292):325–335.
    In "Backward causation and the Stalnaker-Lewis approach to counterfactuals," Analysis 62 (2002): 191–97, Michael Tooley argues that if a certain kind of backward causation is possible, then a Stalnaker-Lewis style comparative world similarity account of the truth conditions of counterfactuals cannot be sound. Tooley’s target is one particular type of semantics, but, as I show, the significance of Tooley’s example goes well beyond its consequences for any one semantics for the conditional.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Keith DeRose (1994). Lewis on 'Might' and 'Would' Counterfactual Conditionals. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):413 - 418.
  20. Vladan Djordjevic (2012). Similarity and Cotenability. Synthese 190 (4):681-691.
    In this paper I present some difficulties for Lewis’s and similar theories of counterfactuals, and suggest that the problem lies in the notion of absolute similarity. In order to explain the problem, I discuss the relation between Lewis’s and Goodman’s theory, and show that the two theories are not related in the way Lewis thought they were.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Dylan Dodd (forthcoming). Quasi-Miracles, Typicality, and Counterfactuals. Synthese.
    If one flips an unbiased coin a million times, there are 2 1,000,000 series of possible heads/tails sequences, any one of which might be the sequence that obtains, and each of which is equally likely to obtain. So it seems (1) ‘If I had tossed a fair coin one million times, it might have landed heads every time’ is true. But as several authors have pointed out, (2) ‘If I had tossed a fair coin a million times, it wouldn’t have (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Daniel Dohrn, Counterfactuals, Accessibility, and Comparative Similarity.
    Berit Brogaard and Joe Salerno (2008) have defended the validity of counterfactual hypothetical syllogism (CHS) within the Stalnaker-Lewis account. Whenever the premisses of an instance of CHS are non-vacuosly true, a shift in context has occurred. Hence the standard counterexamples to CHS suffer from context failure. Charles Cross (2011) rejects this argument as irreconcilable with the Stalnaker-Lewis account. I argue against Cross that the basic Stalnaker-Lewis truth condition may be supplemented in a way that makes (CHS) valid. Yet pace Brogaard (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Dorothy Edgington (2004). Counterfactuals and the Benefit of Hindsight. In Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World. Routledge.
  24. Brian Ellis, Frank Jackson & Robert Pargetter (1977). An Objection to Possible-World Semantics for Counterfactual Logics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):355 - 357.
  25. Kit Fine (2012). A Difficulty for the Possible Worlds Analysis of Counterfactuals. Synthese 189 (1):29-57.
  26. David Galles & Judea Pearl (1998). An Axiomatic Characterization of Causal Counterfactuals. Foundations of Science 3 (1):151-182.
    This paper studies the causal interpretation of counterfactual sentences using a modifiable structural equation model. It is shown that two properties of counterfactuals, namely, composition and effectiveness, are sound and complete relative to this interpretation, when recursive (i.e., feedback-less) models are considered. Composition and effectiveness also hold in Lewis's closest-world semantics, which implies that for recursive models the causal interpretation imposes no restrictions beyond those embodied in Lewis's framework. A third property, called reversibility, holds in nonrecursive causal models but not (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Eduardo García-Ramírez (2012). Trans-World Causation? Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):71-83.
    According to Lewis, causal claims must be analysed in terms of counterfactual conditionals, and these in turn are understood in terms of relations of comparative similarity among single concrete possible worlds. Lewis also claims that there is no trans-world causation because there is no way to make sense of trans-world counterfactuals without automatically making them come out to be false. In this paper I argue against this claim. I show how to make sense of trans-world counterfactuals in a non-trivial way (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Anthony S. Gillies (2007). Counterfactual Scorekeeping. Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (3):329 - 360.
    Counterfactuals are typically thought--given the force of Sobel sequences--to be variably strict conditionals. I go the other way. Sobel sequences and (what I call) Hegel sequences push us to a strict conditional analysis of counterfactuals: counterfactuals amount to some necessity modal scoped over a plain material conditional, just which modal being a function of context. To make this worth saying I need to say just how counterfactuals and context interact. No easy feat, but I have something to say on the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Phillip Goggans (1992). Do the Closest Counterfactual Worlds Contain Miracles? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2):137 - 149.
    David Lewis and many others hold that the "antecedent-worlds" relevant for the evaluations of most counterfactuals contain violations of the laws of the actual world, or "miracles". But this isn’t necessary. We may think of the counterfactual present "as if" it were the result of an unlawful divergence from actual history, while still extrapolating to a lawful counterfactual past. Not only does this account render miracles unnecessary, it serves as a unified way to evaluate forward and backward counterfactuals.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Jeffrey Goodman (2004). An Extended Lewis-Stalnaker Semantics and The New Problem of Counterpossibles. Philosophical Papers 33 (1):35-66.
    Closest-possible-world analyses of counterfactuals suffer from what has been called the ‘problem of counterpossibles’: some counterfactuals with metaphysically impossible antecedents seem plainly false, but the proposed analyses imply that they are all (vacuously) true. One alleged solution to this problem is the addition of impossible worlds. In this paper, I argue that the closest possible or impossible world analyses that have recently been suggested suffer from the ‘new problem of counterpossibles’: the proposed analyses imply that some plainly true counterpossibles (viz., (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Lars Bo Gundersen (2004). Outline of a New Semantics for Counterfactuals. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (1):1–20.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Alan Hájek (2007). Most Counterfactuals Are False. Unpublished Article.
  33. John F. Halpin (1989). Counterfactual Analysis: Can the Metalinguistic Theory Be Revitalized? Synthese 81 (1):47 - 62.
    This paper evaluates the recent trend to renounce the similarity approach to counterfactuals in favor of the older metalinguistic theory. I try to show, first, that the metalinguistic theory cannot work in anything like its present form (the form described by many in the last decade who claim to be able to solve Goodman''s old problem of cotenability). This is so, I argue, because the metalinguistic theory requires laws of nature of a sort that we (apparently) do not have: current (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. John Hawthorne (2005). Chance and Counterfactuals. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):396–405.
    Suppose the world is chancy. The worry arises that most ordinary counterfactuals are false. This paper examines David Lewis' strategy for rescuing such counterfactuals, and argues that it is highly problematic.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Mark Heller (1995). Might-Counterfactuals and Gratuitous Differences. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (1):91 – 101.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Vincent Hendricks (ed.) (forthcoming). Synesthe Volume.
  37. Hans G. Herzberger (1979). Counterfactuals and Consistency. Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):83-88.
  38. Boris Kment (2006). Counterfactuals and Explanation. Mind 115 (458):261-310.
    On the received view, counterfactuals are analysed using the concept of closeness between possible worlds: the counterfactual 'If it had been the case that p, then it would have been the case that q' is true at a world w just in case q is true at all the possible p-worlds closest to w. The degree of closeness between two worlds is usually thought to be determined by weighting different respects of similarity between them. The question I consider in the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Daniel Krasner & Mark Heller (1994). The Miracle of Counterfactuals: Counterexamples to Lewis's World Ordering. Philosophical Studies 76 (1):27 - 43.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Thomas Kroedel (forthcoming). Dualist Mental Causation and the Exclusion Problem. Noûs:n/a-n/a.
    The paper argues that dualism can explain mental causation and solve the exclusion problem. If dualism is combined with the assumption that the psychophysical laws have a special status, it follows that some physical events counterfactually depend on, and are therefore caused by, mental events. Proponents of this account of mental causation can solve the exclusion problem in either of two ways: they can deny that it follows that the physical effect of a mental event is overdetermined by its mental (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Thomas Kroedel & Franz Huber (forthcoming). Counterfactual Dependence and Arrow. Noûs.
    We argue that a semantics for counterfactual conditionals in terms of comparative overall similarity faces a formal limitation due to Arrow’s impossibility theorem from social choice theory. According to Lewis’s account, the truth-conditions for counterfactual conditionals are given in terms of the comparative overall similarity between possible worlds, which is in turn determined by various aspects of similarity between possible worlds. We argue that a function from aspects of similarity to overall similarity should satisfy certain plausible constraints while Arrow’s impossibility (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Igal Kvart (1986). A Theory of Counterfactuals. Hackett.
  43. David Lewis (1981). Ordering Semantics and Premise Semantics for Counterfactuals. Journal of Philosophical Logic 10 (2):217-234.
  44. David Lewis (1979). Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow. Noûs 13 (4):455-476.
  45. David Lewis (1977). Possible-World Semantics for Counterfactual Logics: A Rejoinder. Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):359-363.
  46. David Lewis (1973). Counterfactuals and Comparative Possibility. Journal of Philosophical Logic 2 (4):418-446.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. David K. Lewis (2001). Counterfactuals. Blackwell Publishers.
  48. David K. Lewis (1983). Philosophical Papers. Oxford University Press.
    This is the second volume of philosophical essays by one of the most innovative and influential philosophers now writing in English. Containing thirteen papers in all, the book includes both new essays and previously published papers, some of them with extensive new postscripts reflecting Lewis's current thinking. The papers in Volume II focus on causation and several other closely related topics, including counterfactual and indicative conditionals, the direction of time, subjective and objective probability, causation, explanation, perception, free will, and rational (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Barry Loewer (2007). Counterfactuals and the Second Law. In Huw Price & Richard Corry (eds.), Causation, Physics, and the Constitution of Reality: Russell's Republic Revisited. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Barry Loewer (1976). Counterfactuals with Disjunctive Antecedents. Journal of Philosophy 73 (16):531-537.
  51. Storrs McCall (1984). Counterfactuals Based on Real Possible Worlds. Noûs 18 (3):463-477.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  52. Michael McDermott (2007). True Antecedents. Acta Analytica 22 (4):333-335.
    In this note I discuss what seems to be a new kind of counterexample to Lewis’s account of counterfactuals. A coin is to be tossed twice. I bet on ‘Two heads’, and I win. Common sense says that (1) is false. But Lewis’s theory says that it is true. (1) If at least one head had come up, I would have won.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  53. Michael McDermott (2003). Closeness of Worlds. Acta Analytica 18 (1-2):227-230.
    An objection is presented to Lewis’s analysis of counterfactual conditionals in terms of relative closeness of possible worlds. The objection depends on no special assumptions about the ‘closer-than’ relation. The argument also casts doubt on Lewis’s claim that Antecedent Strengthening fails for counterfactuals.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  54. Aidan McGlynn (2012). The Problem of True-True Counterfactuals. Analysis 72 (2):276-285.
    Early commentators on David Lewis's account of counterfactuals noted that certain examples suggest that some counterfactuals with true antecedents and true consequents are false. Lewis's account has the consequence that all such counterfactuals are true, leaving us to choose between explaining away our intuitions about the examples in question or offering an alternative to Lewis's account. Here I argue that a simple modification of the familiar Lewisian truth conditions yields the intuitively correct verdicts about these examples, and so we can (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  55. Michael Morreau (2010). It Simply Does Not Add Up: Trouble with Overall Similarity. Journal of Philosophy 107 (9):469-490.
    Comparative overall similarity lies at the basis of a lot of recent metaphysics and epistemology. It is a poor foundation. Overall similarity is supposed to be an aggregate of similarities and differences in various respects. But there is no good way of combining them all.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  56. Paul Noordhof (2005). Morgenbesser's Coin, Counterfactuals and Independence. Analysis 65 (287):261–263.
    In assessing counterfactuals, should we consider circumstances which match the actual circumstances in all probablistically independent fact or all causally independent fact? Jonathan Schaffer argues the latter and claims that the former approach, advanced by me, cannot deal with the case of Morgenbesser’s coin. More generally, he argues that, where there is a difference between the two, his account yields our intuitive verdicts about the truth of counterfactuals where mine does not (Schaffer 2004: 307, n. 16). In this brief note, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  57. Robert Northcott (2009). On Lewis, Schaffer and the Non-Reductive Evaluation of Counterfactuals. Theoria 75 (4):336-343.
    Jonathan Schaffer (2004 ) proposes an ingenious amendment to David Lewis's semantics for counterfactuals. This amendment explicitly invokes the notion of causal independence, thus giving up Lewis's ambitions for a reductive counterfactual account of causation. But in return, it rescues Lewis's semantics from extant counterexamples. I present a new counterexample that defeats even Schaffer's amendment. Further, I argue that a better approach would be to follow the causal modelling literature and evaluate counterfactuals via an explicit postulated causal structure. This alternative (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  58. Donald Nute (1976). David Lewis and the Analysis of Counterfactuals. Noûs 10 (3):355-361.
  59. Donald Nute (1975). Counterfactuals and the Similarity of Words. Journal of Philosophy 72 (21):773-778.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  60. Alan Penczek (1997). Counterfactuals with True Components. Erkenntnis 46 (1):79-85.
    One criticism of David Lewis''s account of counterfactuals is that it sometimes assigns the wrong truth-value to a counterfactual when both antecedent and consequent happen to be true. Lewis has suggested a possible remedy to this situation, but commentators have found this to be unsatisfactory. I suggest an alternative solution which involves a modification of Lewis''s truth conditions, but which confines itself to the resources already present in his account. This modification involves the device of embedding one counterfactual within another. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  61. Philip Percival (1999). A Note on Lewis on Counterfactual Dependence in a Chancy World. Analysis 59 (3):165–173.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  62. I. B. Phillips (2010). Stuck in the Closet: A Reply to Ahmed. Analysis 71 (1):86-91.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  63. Ian Phillips (2007). Morgenbesser Cases and Closet Determinism. Analysis 67 (293):42–49.
    Sidney Morgenbesser brought to attention cases of the following form: (MC1) Chump tosses an indeterministic coin and, whilst it is in mid-air, calls heads. The coin lands tails, and Chump loses. His betting was causally independent of the coin’s fall. Chump seems right to say: ‘If I had bet tails, I would have won.’1 (MC2).
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  64. Tomasz Placek, Comparative Similarity in Branching Space-Times.
    My aim in this paper is to investigate the notions of comparative similarity definable in the framework of branching space-times. A notion of this kind is required to give a rigorous Lewis-style semantics of space-time counterfactuals, which is the task undertaken by Thomas Muller (PITT-PHIL-SCI00000509, this archive). In turn, the semantical analysis is needed to decide whether the recently proposed proofs of the non-locality of quantum mechanics are correct. From among the three notions of comparative similarity I select two which (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  65. John L. Pollock (1976). The 'Possible Worlds' Analysis of Counterfactuals. Philosophical Studies 29 (6):469 - 476.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  66. Alexander R. Pruss (2007). Conjunctions, Disjunctions and Lewisian Semantics for Counterfactuals. Synthese 156 (1):33 - 52.
    Consider the reasonable axioms of subjunctive conditionals (1) if p q 1 and p q 2 at some world, then p (q 1 & q 2) at that world, and (2) if p 1 q and p 2 q at some world, then (p 1 ∨ p 2) q at that world, where p q is the subjunctive conditional. I show that a Lewis-style semantics for subjunctive conditionals satisfies these axioms if and only if one makes a certain technical assumption (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  67. Alexander R. Pruss (2003). David Lewis's Counterfactual Arrow of Time. Noûs 37 (4):606–637.
    David Lewis (1979) has argued that according to his possible worlds analysis of counterfactuals, “backtracking” counterfactuals of the form “If event A were to happen at tA, then event B would happen at tB” where tB precedes tA, are usually false if B does not actually happen at tB. On the other..
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  68. Murali Ramachandran, Re-Thinking Lewis's Analysis of Counterfactuals.
    This paper considers six comparatively neglected problems for David Lewis’s (1973; 1979) account of counterfactual conditionals (counterfactuals). Four, we shall see, can be tackled without major compromises. The remaining two objections, however, do demand a re-appraisal of Lewis’s project. One casts doubt on the account’s explanatory virtues and drives a wedge between what a counterfactual statement..
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  69. David H. Sanford (1998). Topological Trees: G H von Wright's Theory of Possible Worlds. In TImothy Childers (ed.), The Logica Yearbook. Acadamy of Sciences of the Czech Republic.
    In several works on modality, G. H. von Wright presents tree structures to explain possible worlds. Worlds that might have developed from an earlier world are possible relative to it. Actually possible worlds are possible relative to the world as it actually was at some point. Many logically consistent worlds are not actually possible. Transitions from node to node in a tree structure are probabilistic. Probabilities are often more useful than similarities between worlds in treating counterfactual conditionals.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  70. Jonathan Schaffer (2004). Counterfactuals, Causal Independence and Conceptual Circularity. Analysis 64 (4):299–308.
    David Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals remains the standard view. Yet counter-examples have emerged, which suggest a need to invoke causal independence, and thus threaten conceptual circularity. I will review some of these counter-examples (§§1–2), illustrate how causal independence proves useful (§3), and suggest that any resulting circularity is unproblematic (§4).
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  71. Eugene Schlossberger (1978). Similarity and Counterfactuals. Analysis 38 (2):80 - 82.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  72. Martin Smith (2007). Ceteris Paribus Conditionals and Comparative Normalcy. Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (1):97 - 121.
    Our understanding of subjunctive conditionals has been greatly enhanced through the use of possible world semantics and, more precisely, by the idea that they involve variably strict quantification over possible worlds. I propose to extend this treatment to ceteris paribus conditionals – that is, conditionals that incorporate a ceteris paribus or ‘other things being equal’ clause. Although such conditionals are commonly invoked in scientific theorising, they traditionally arouse suspicion and apprehensiveness amongst philosophers. By treating ceteris paribus conditionals as a species (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  73. Robert Stalnaker (1968). ``A Theory of Conditionals&Quot. In Studies in Logical Theory. Oxford: Blackwell.
  74. Robert C. Stalnaker (1981). A Defense of Conditional Excluded Middle. In William Harper, Robert C. Stalnaker & Glenn Pearce (eds.), Ifs. Reidel.
  75. Robert C. Stalnaker (1970). Probability and Conditionals. Philosophy of Science 37 (1):64-80.
    The aim of the paper is to draw a connection between a semantical theory of conditional statements and the theory of conditional probability. First, the probability calculus is interpreted as a semantics for truth functional logic. Absolute probabilities are treated as degrees of rational belief. Conditional probabilities are explicitly defined in terms of absolute probabilities in the familiar way. Second, the probability calculus is extended in order to provide an interpretation for counterfactual probabilities--conditional probabilities where the condition has zero probability. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  76. William B. Starr, A Uniform Theory of Conditionals.
    A uniform theory of conditionals is one which compositionally captures the behavior of both indicative and subjunctive conditionals without positing ambiguities. This paper raises new problems for the closest thing to a uniform analysis in the literature (Stalnaker 1975) and develops a new theory which solves them. I also show that this new analysis provides an improved treatment of three much-discussed phenomena (the import-export equivalence, reverse Sobel-sequences and disjunctive antecedents). While these results concern central issues in the study of conditionals, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  77. Eric Swanson (2011). Conditional Excluded Middle Without the Limit Assumption. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):301-321.
  78. Eric Swanson (2010). On Scope Relations Between Quantifiers and Epistemic Modals. Journal of Semantics 27 (4):529-540.
    This paper presents and discusses a range of counterexamples to the common view that quantifiers cannot take scope over epistemic modals. Some of the counterexamples raise problems for ‘force modifier’ theories of epistemic modals. Some of the counterexamples raise problems for Robert Stalnaker’s theory of counterfactuals, according to which a special kind of epistemic modal must be able to scope over a whole counterfactual. Finally, some of the counterexamples suggest that David Lewis must countenance ‘would’ counterfactuals in which a covert (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  79. Pavel Tichý (1976). A Counterexample to the Stalnaker-Lewis Analysis of Counterfactuals. Philosophical Studies 29 (4):271 - 273.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  80. Michael Tooley (2003). The Stalnaker-Lewis Approach to Counterfactuals. Journal of Philosophy 100 (7):371 - 377.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  81. Michael Tooley (2003). The Stalnaker-Lewis Approach to Counterfactuals. Journal of Philosophy 100 (7):371 - 377.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  82. Michael Tooley (2002). Backward Causation and the Stalnaker-Lewis Approach to Counterfactuals. Analysis 62 (3):191–197.
  83. Alessandro Torza (2012). 'Identity' Without Identity. Mind 121 (481):67-95.
    I introduce and defend the semantic notion of counterfactual identity, distinguishing it from the metaphysical notion of transworld identity. After showing that Lewis's counterpart theory misconstrues counterfactual identity facts, I outline and motivate a ‘Leibnizian counterpart theory’ where the notion of counterfactual identity is adequately modelled. Finally, I show that counterfactual identity can be characterized without relying on some implausible features of Lewis's theory of conditionals.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  84. Raymond Turner (1981). Counterfactuals Without Possible Worlds. Journal of Philosophical Logic 10 (4):453 - 493.
  85. Jean-Paul Vessel (2003). Counterfactuals for Consequentialists. Philosophical Studies 112 (2):103 - 125.
    That all subjunctive conditionals with true antecedents and trueconsequents are themselves also true is implied by every plausibleand popularly endorsed account. But I am wary of endorsing thisimplication. I argue that all presently endorsed accounts fail tocapture the nature of certain subjunctive conditionals in contextsof consequentialist reasoning. I attempt to show that we must allowfor the possibility that some subjunctive conditionals with trueantecedents and true consequents are false, if we are to believethat certain types of straightforward consequentialist reasoningare coherent. I (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  86. Lee Walters (2011). Reply to Ahmed. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):123-133.
    I reply to Ahmed's rejection (2011) of my argument (Walters 2009) that all counterfactuals with true antecedents and consequents are themselves true.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  87. Lee Walters (2009). Morgenbesser's Coin and Counterfactuals with True Components. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):365-379.
    Is A & C sufficient for the truth of ‘if A were the case, C would be the case’? Jonathan Bennett thinks not, although the counterexample he gives is inconsistent with his own account of counterfactuals. In any case, I argue that anyone who accepts the case of Morgenbesser's coin, as Bennett does, should reject Bennett’s counterexample. Moreover, I show that the principle underlying his counterexample is unmotivated and indeed false. More generally, I argue that Morgenbesser’s coin commits us to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  88. Ken Warmbrod (1981). An Indexical Theory of Conditionals. Dialogue, Canadian Philosophical Review 20 (4):644-664.
  89. Ryan Wasserman (2006). The Future Similarity Objection Revisited. Synthese 150 (1):57 - 67.
    David Lewis has long defended an analysis of counterfactuals in terms of comparative similarity of possible worlds. The purpose of this paper is to reevaluate Lewis’s response to one of the oldest and most familiar objections to this proposal, the future similarity objection.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  90. Brian Weatherson (2001). Indicative and Subjunctive Conditionals. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):200-216.
    This paper presents a new theory of the truth conditions for indicative conditionals. The theory allows us to give a fairly unified account of the semantics for indicative and subjunctive conditionals, though there remains a distinction between the two classes. Put simply, the idea behind the theory is that the distinction between the indicative and the subjunctive parallels the distinction between the necessary and the a priori. Since that distinction is best understood formally using the resources of two-dimensional modal logic, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  91. Joan Weiner (1979). Counterfactual Conundrum. Noûs 13 (4):499-509.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  92. J. Robert G. Williams, Chancy Counterfactuals, Redux: Response to Dodd.
    Chancy counterfactuals are a headache. Dylan Dodd (2009) presents an interesting argument against a certain general strategy for accounting for them, instances of which are found in the appendices to Lewis (1979) and in Williams (2008). I will argue (i) that Dodd’s understates the counterintuitiveness of the conclusions he can reach; (ii) that the counterintuitiveness can be thought of as an instance of more general oddities arising when we treat vagueness and indeterminacy in a classical setting; and (iii) the underlying (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  93. Robert Williams (2008). Chances, Counterfactuals, and Similarity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):385-420.
    John Hawthorne in a recent paper takes issue with Lewisian accounts of counterfactuals, when relevant laws of nature are chancy. I respond to his arguments on behalf of the Lewisian, and conclude that while some can be rebutted, the case against the original Lewisian account is strong.I develop a neo-Lewisian account of what makes for closeness of worlds. I argue that my revised version avoids Hawthorne’s challenges. I argue that this is closer to the spirit of Lewis’s first (non-chancy) proposal (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  94. Jessica M. Wilson (forthcoming). Hume's Dictum and Natural Modality: Counterfactuals. In Alastair Wilson (ed.), Asymmetries of Time and Chance.
    Why believe Hume's Dictum, according to which there are, roughly speaking, no necessary connections between wholly distinct entities? Schaffer ('Quiddistic Knowledge', 2009) suggests that HD, at least as applied to causal or nomological connections, is motivated as required by the best account of (the truth) of counterfactuals---namely, a similarity-based possible worlds account, where the operative notion of similarity requires 'miracles'---more specifically, worlds where entities of the same type that actually exist enter into different laws. The main cited motivations for such (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  95. John Woods, Making Too Much of Possible Worlds.
    A possible worlds treatment of the normal alethic modalities was, after classical model theory, logic’s most significant semantic achievement in the century just past.[1] Kripke’s groundbreaking paper appeared in 1959 and, in the scant few succeeding years, its principal analytical tool, possible worlds, was adapted to serve a range of quite different-seeming purposes – from nonnormal logics,[2] to epistemic and doxastic logics[3], deontic[4] and temporal logics[5] and, not much later, the logic of counterfactual conditionals.[6] In short order, possible worlds acquired (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation