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Summary This category includes discussions of possible worlds that do not fit under the other subcategories of possible worlds
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  1. Ralf M. Bader (2012). The Non-Transitivity of the Contingent and Occasional Identity Relations. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):141-152.
    This paper establishes that the occasional identity relation and the contingent identity relation are both non-transitive and as such are not properly classified as identity relations. This is achieved by appealing to cases where multiple fissions and fusions occur simultaneously. These cases show that the contingent and occasional identity relations do not even satisfy the time-indexed and world-indexed versions of the transitivity requirement and hence are non-transitive relations.
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  2. Lynne Rudder Baker (1985). Was Leibniz Entitled to Possible Worlds? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (1):57-74.
    Leibniz has enjoyed a prominent place in the history of thought about possible worlds.' I shall argue that on the feading interpretation of Leibniz's account of contingency — an ingenious interpretation with ample textual support — possible worlds may be invoked by Leibniz only on pain of inconsistency. Leibnizian contingency, as reconstructed in detail by Robert C. Sleigh, Jr.,z will be shown to preclude propositions with different truth-values in different possible worlds.
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  3. T. Baldwin, Sets Whose Members Might Not Exist + Essentialism Possible Worlds.
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  4. Ruth Barcan Marcus (1985). Possibiha and Possible Worlds. Grazer Philosophische Studien 25:107-133.
    Four questions are raised about the semantics of Quantified Modal Logic (QML). Does QML admit possible objects, i.e. possibilia? Is it plausible to admit them? Can sense be made of such objects? Is QML committed to the existence of possibilia?The conclusions are that QML, generalized as in Kripke, would seem to accommodate possibilia, but they are rejected on philosophical and semantical grounds. Things must be encounterable, directly nameable and a part of the actual order before they may plausibly enter into (...)
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  5. Hanoch Ben-Yami (2010). Could Sherlock Holmes Have Existed? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):175-181.
    In Naming and Necessity Kripke argued against the possible existence of fictional characters. I show that his argument is invalid, analyze the confusion it involves, and explain why the view that fictional characters could not have existed is implausible.
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  6. Karen Bennett (2005). Book Review. Possible Worlds. John Divers. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):282-85.
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  7. Jiri Benovsky (2006). Persistence Through Time and Across Possible Worlds. Ontos Verlag.
    How do ordinary objects persist through time and across possible worlds ? How do they manage to have their temporal and modal properties ? These are the questions adressed in this book which is a "guided tour of theories of persistence". The book is divided in two parts. In the first, the two traditional accounts of persistence through time (endurantism and perdurantism) are combined with presentism and eternalism to yield four different views, and their variants. The resulting views are then (...)
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  8. Jiri Benovsky (2005). Branching Versus Divergent Possible Worlds. Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):12-20.
    David Lewis' modal counterpart theory falls prey to the famous Saul Kripke's objection, and this is mostly due to his 'static' ontology (divergence) of possible worlds. This paper examines a genuinely realist but different, branching ontology of possible worlds and a new definition of the counterpart relation, which attempts to provide us with a better account of de re modality, and to meet satisfactorily Kripke's claim, while being also ontologically more 'parsimonious'.
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  9. Sandy Berkovski (2011). Possible Worlds: A Neo-Fregean Alternative. Axiomathes 21 (4):531-551.
    I outline a neo-Fregean strategy in the debate on the existence of possible worlds. The criterion of identity and the criterion of application are formulated. Special attention is paid to the fact that speakers do not possess proper names for worlds. A broadly Quinean solution is proposed in response to this difficulty.
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  10. Francesco Berto (2010). Impossible Worlds and Propositions: Against the Parity Thesis. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):471-486.
    Accounts of propositions as sets of possible worlds have been criticized for conflating distinct impossible propositions. In response to this problem, some have proposed to introduce impossible worlds to represent distinct impossibilities, endorsing the thesis that impossible worlds must be of the same kind; this has been called the parity thesis. I show that this thesis faces problems, and propose a hybrid account which rejects it: possible worlds are taken as concrete Lewisian worlds, and impossibilities are represented as set-theoretic constructions (...)
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  11. Gregor Betz (2010). What’s the Worst Case? The Methodology of Possibilistic Prediction. Analyse & Kritik 32 (1):87-106.
    Frank Knight (1921) famously distinguished the epistemic modes of certainty, risk, and uncertainty in order to characterize situations where deterministic, probabilistic or possibilistic foreknowledge is available. Because our probabilistic knowledge is limited, i.e. because many systems, e.g. the global climate, cannot be described and predicted probabilistically in a reliable way, Knight's third category, possibilistic foreknowledge, is not simply swept by the probabilistic mode. This raises the question how to justify possibilistic predictionsincluding the identication of the worst case. The development of (...)
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  12. Phillip Bricker (1991). Plenitude of Possible Structures. Journal of Philosophy 88 (11):607-619.
    Which mathematical structures are possible, that is, instantiated by the concrete inhabitants of some possible world? Are there worlds with four-dimensional space? With infinite-dimensional space? Whence comes our knowledge of the possibility of structures? In this paper, I develop and defend a principle of plenitude according to which any mathematically natural generalization of possible structure is itself possible. I motivate the principle pragmatically by way of the role that logical possibility plays in our inquiry into the world.
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  13. Otávio Bueno, Christopher Menzel & Edward N. Zalta (2013). Worlds and Propositions Set Free. Erkenntnis (4):1-24.
    The authors provide an object-theoretic analysis of two paradoxes in the theory of possible worlds and propositions stemming from Russell and Kaplan. After laying out the paradoxes, the authors provide a brief overview of object theory and point out how syntactic restrictions that prevent object-theoretic versions of the classical paradoxes are justified philosophically. The authors then trace the origins of the Russell paradox to a problematic application of set theory in the definition of worlds. Next the authors show that an (...)
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  14. Rodrigo Neira Castaño (2013). " Possibility", de Michael Jubien. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):179-183.
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  15. Troy Thomas Catterson (2003). Essentialism and Individuation in Modal Logic. Dissertation, Boston University
    This dissertation addresses the problem of trans-world identity in possible worlds semantics, and argues that essentialism does not provide a satisfactory solution to it. If one takes possible worlds semantics seriously as a viable elucidation of the logic of the metaphysical modalities, one must also take a realistic stance toward possible worlds. But then, contrary to Kripke, Plantinga, Van Inwagen, and others, there is a problem with trans-world identity; the real problem being, not the problem of identifying individuals across possible (...)
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  16. David J. Chalmers (2011). The Nature of Epistemic Space. In Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press
    There are many ways the world might be, for all I know. For all I know, it might be that there is life on Jupiter, and it might be that there is not. It might be that Australia will win the next Ashes series, and it might be that they will not. It might be that my great-grandfather was my great-grandmother's second cousin, and it might be that he was not. It might be that copper is a compound, and it (...)
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  17. Roderick M. Chisholm (1967). Identity Through Possible Worlds: Some Questions. Noûs 1 (1):1-8.
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  18. María Cocco & Eduardo Dib (1998). Geometría Y Alteridad en Kant. Dianoia 44 (44):137-150.
    En su ópera prima, antes de concebir la filosofía crítica, Kant manifestó su entusiasmo por una geometría de todos los tipos posibles de espacio, y no sólo del espacio conocido. Como el filósofo atribuye cada espacio a un mundo posible distinto, la "geometría suprema", como la denominó, en realidad sería el nombre genérico para un conjunto de geometrías diversas que describen espacios igualmente diversos. En ese conjunto genérico se encuentra la geometría de Euclides, y cabe preguntarse si acaso entre las (...)
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  19. Sam Cowling (2011). The Limits of Modality. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):473-495.
    It is commonly assumed that all propositions have modal profiles and therefore bear their truth-values either contingently or necessarily. I argue against this commonly assumed view and in defence of amodalism, according to which certain true propositions are neither necessarily nor contingently true, but only true simpliciter. I consider three arguments against ‘possible-worlds theories’, which hold that modal concepts are to be analysed in terms of possible worlds. Although each of these arguments targets a different version of possible-worlds theory, these (...)
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  20. M. J. Cresswell (1973). Physical theories and possible worlds. Logique Et Analyse 16 (63):495.
    Formalized physical theories are not, as a rule, stated in intensional languages. Yet in talking about them we often treat them as if they were. We say for instance: 'Consider what would happen if instead of p's being true q were. In such a case r would be likely.' If we say this sort of thing, p, q and r appear to stand for the meanings of sentences of the theory, but meanings in some intensional sense. Now it is very (...)
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  21. Heather Dyke (2006). Review of Jiri Benovsky, Persistence Through Time, and Across Possible Worlds. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (9).
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  22. Heather Dyke (1998). Real Times and Possible Worlds. In Robin le Poidevin (ed.), Questions of time and tense. Oxford University Press 93--117.
    There are ways in which the new tenseless theory of time is analogous to David Lewis’s modal realism. The new tenseless theory gives an indexical analysis of temporal terms such as ‘now’, while Lewis gives and indexical analysis of ‘actual’. For the new tenseless theory, all times are equally real; for Lewis, all worlds are equally real. In this paper I investigate this apparent analogy between these two theories, and ask whether a proponent of one is committed, by parity of (...)
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  23. David Efird (2008). What is the Principle of Recombination? Dialectica 62 (4):483-494.
    In this paper, we give a precise characterization of the principle of recombination and argue that it need not be subject to any restrictions.
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  24. Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.) (2009). Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.
    The ten new essays in this volume explore various answers to these questions, including those offered by contextualism, relativism, and expressivism.
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  25. Eva-Maria Engelen (1999). Das Feststehende bestimmt das Mögliche. Semantische Untersuchungen zu Möglichkeitsurteilen. Frommann-Holzboog.
    Ziel dieses systematischen Ansatz ist es eine Antwort auf die Frage der Wahrheitswertzuschreibung für irreale Konditionalsätze zu geben. Die große philosophische Fragestellung, die damit verfolgt wird, betrifft das Verhältnis von Sprache und Welt, Wirklichkeit und Möglichkeit. Am Ende wird geklärt inwiefern logische Strukturen einen Weltbezug haben. Damit ist ein Vorschlag der Naturalisierung der Normativität der Semantik verbunden. Außer sprachphilosophischen Überlegungen werden auch erkenntnistheoretische und wissenschaftstheoretische Überlegungen angestellt. -/- Inhaltsverzeichnis -/- Vorwort 7 -/- Einführung 8 -/- I. Tatsachen I -/- 1. (...)
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  26. Gregory W. Fitch (1979). Analyticity and Necessity in Leibniz. Journal of the History of Philosophy 17 (1):29-42.
  27. Graeme Forbes (1985). The Metaphysics of Modality. Clarendon Press.
    Analytic philosophy has recently demonstrated a revived interest in metaphysical problems about possibility and necessity. Graeme Forbes here provides a careful description of the logical background of recent work in this area for those who may be unfamiliar with it, moving on to d discuss the distinction between modality de re and modality de dicto and the ontological commitments of possible worlds semantics. In addition, Forbes offers a unified theory of the essential properties of sets, organisms, artefacts, substances, and events, (...)
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  28. Peter Forrest (1982). Occam's Razor and Possible Worlds. The Monist 65 (4):456--464.
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  29. Rod Girle (2003). Possible Worlds. Acumen.
    Ever since Saul Kripke and others developed a semantic interpretation for modal logic, 'possible worlds' has been a much debated issue in contemporary metaphysics. To propose the idea of a possible world that differs in some way from our actual world - for example a world where the grass is red or where no people exist - can help us to analyse and understand a wide range of philosophical concepts, such as counterfactuals, properties, modality, and of course, the notions of (...)
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  30. Dominic Gregory (2006). Functionalism About Possible Worlds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):95 – 115.
    Various writers have proposed that the notion of a possible world is a functional concept, yet very little has been done to develop that proposal. This paper explores a particular functionalist account of possible worlds, according to which pluralities of possible worlds are the bases for structures which provide occupants for the roles which analyse our ordinary modal concepts. It argues that the resulting position meets some of the stringent constraints which philosophers have placed upon accounts of possible worlds, while (...)
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  31. Dominic Gregory (2005). Keeping Semantics Pure. Noûs 39 (3):505–528.
    There are numerous contexts in which philosophers and others use model-theoretic methods in assessing the validity of ordinary arguments; consider, for example, the use of models built upon 'possible worlds' in examinations of modal arguments. But the relevant uses of model-theoretic techniques may seem to assume controversial semantic or metaphysical accounts of ordinary concepts. So, numerous philosophers have suggested that standard uses of model-theoretic methods in assessing the validity of modal arguments commit one to accepting that modal claims are to (...)
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  32. Ghislain Guigon (2015). Coextension and Identity. In Ghislain Guigon & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), Nominalism About Properties: New Essays. Routledge 135-155.
    This chapter is concerned with the coextension difficulty for nominalist theories of properties that reject tropes alongside universals. After carefully explaining the coextension difficulty and describing the theories it targets, the chapter describes different solutions to the difficulty. These solutions differ with respect to how much involved they are into a dualist approach to coextension. A dualist approach to a case of coextension consists in agreeing with the realist that the relevant ascriptions of properties are numerically distinct. A monist approach (...)
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  33. Aviv Hoffmann (2011). It's Not the End of the World: When a Subtraction Argument for Metaphysical Nihilism Fails. Analysis 71 (1):44-53.
    Metaphysical nihilism is the thesis that there could have been no concrete objects. Thomas Baldwin (1996) offers an argument for metaphysical nihilism. The premisses of the argument purport to provide a procedure of subtraction that can be iterated until we reach a world where no concrete objects exist. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (1997) finds fault with Baldwin’s argument, modifies it, and claims to have proved metaphysical nihilism. My primary aim is to show that Rodriguez-Pereyra’s alleged proof rests on a false assumption. The (...)
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  34. Aviv Hoffmann (2002). Actualism, Singular Propositions, and Possible Worlds: Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality. Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
    My dissertation consists of three essays in the Metaphysics of Modality: In "A Puzzle about Truth and Singular Propositions," I consider two theses that seem to be true and then an argument for the conclusion that they form an inconsistent pair. One thesis is that a proposition that is singular with respect to a given object implies that the object exists. This is so because the proposition predicates something of the object. The other thesis is that some propositions are true (...)
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  35. Lloyd Humberstone (2005). Modality. In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford University Press
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  36. Andrea Iacona (2007). Not Everything is Possible. Logic Journal of the IGPL 15 (3):233-237.
    This paper makes a point about the interpretation of the simplest quantified modal logic, that is, quantified modal logic with a single domain. It is commonly assumed that the domain in question is to be understood as the set of all possibile objects. The point of the paper is that this assumption is misguided.
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  37. Guido Imaguire & Dale Jacquette (eds.) (2010). Possible Worlds: Logic, Semantics and Ontology. Philosophia.
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  38. Dale Jacquette (2014). Against Logically Possible World-Relativized Existence. Metaphysica 15 (1).
    The thesis that entities exist in, at, or in relation to logically possible worlds is criticized. The suggestion that actually nonexistent fictional characters might nevertheless exist in nonactual merely logically possible worlds runs afoul of the most general transworld identity requirements. An influential philosophical argument for the concept of world-relativized existence is examined in Alvin Plantinga’s formal development and explanation of modal semantic relations. Despite proposing an attractive unified semantics of alethic modality, Plantinga’s argument is rejected on formal grounds as (...)
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  39. Michael Jubien (2009). Possibility. Oxford University Press.
    Possibility offers a new analysis of the metaphysical concepts of possibility and necessity, one that does not rely on any sort of "possible worlds." The analysis proceeds from an account of the notion of a physical object and from the positing of properties and relations. It is motivated by considerations about how we actually speak of and think of objects. Michael Jubien discusses several closely related topics, including different purported varieties of possible worlds, the doctrine of "essentialism," natural kind terms (...)
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  40. Daisuke Kachi (1998). The Ontology of Many-Worlds : Modality and Time. In Http://Www.Bu.Edu/Wcp/MainOnto.Htm.
    There are two types of theories regarding many worlds: one is modal, while the other is temporal. The former regards reality as consisting of many possible worlds, while the latter holds that reality consists of many momentary worlds, which are usually called moments. I compare these two theories, paying close attention to the concept of transworld identity and compare trans-possible world identity with trans-momentary world identity (or transmoment identity). I characterize time from the point of many-worlds view, believing this to (...)
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  41. David Kaplan (1995). A Problem in Possible Worlds Semantics. In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Diana Raffman & Nicholas Asher (eds.), Modality, Morality and Belief: Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus. Cambridge University Press 41-52.
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  42. Wojciech Krysztofiak (1991). Phenomenology, Possible Worlds and Negation. Husserl Studies 8 (3):205-220.
  43. Nils Kürbis (2015). Review of Bob Hale's Necessary Beings. [REVIEW] Disputatio (40).
    Review of Bob Hale's "Necessary Beings: An Essay on Ontology, Modality, and the Relations Between Them". Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013, ISBN 9780199669578.
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  44. Shen-yi Liao (2012). What Are Centered Worlds? Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):294-316.
    David Lewis argues that centered worlds give us a way to capture de se, or self-locating, contents in philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. In recent years, centered worlds have also gained other uses in areas ranging widely from metaphysics to ethics. In this paper, I raise a problem for centered worlds and discuss the costs and benefits of different solutions. My investigation into the nature of centered worlds brings out potentially problematic implicit commitments of the theories that employ (...)
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  45. Michael J. Loux (ed.) (1979). The Possible and the Actual: Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality. Cornell University Press.
    Preface In these days, an anthology on the topic of possible worlds hardly needs justification. No issue has given rise to as much literature in the past ...
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  46. Laureano Luna (2012). Cómo Hacer Metafísica a Partir de la Lógica. Thémata. Revista de Filosofía 45:261-274.
    We offer a number of arguments for or against particular metaphysical theses. All of them are based in phenomena or results in mathematical logic, broadly conceived, and are offered as exemplification of the possibility of arguing in metaphysics from such results.
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  47. Ari Maunu (2002). Natural Kind Terms Are Similar to Proper Names in Being World-Independent. Philosophical Writings 19:51-68.
    According to the New Theory of Reference, proper names (and indexicals) and natural kind terms are semantically similar to each other but crucially different from definite descriptions and “ordinary” predicates, respectively. New Theorists say that a name, unlike a definite description, is a directly referential nondescriptional rigid designator, which refers “without a mediation of the content” and is not functional (i.e. lacks a Carnapian intension). Natural kind terms, such as ‘horse’ and ‘water’, are held to have similar distinctions, in contrast (...)
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  48. Ari Maunu (1999). Worldlessness, Determinism and Free Will. Dissertation, University of Turku (Finland)
    I have three main objectives in this essay. First, in chapter 2, I shall put forward and justify what I call worldlessness, by which I mean the following: All truths (as well as falsehoods) are wholly independent of any circumstances, not only time and place but also possible worlds. It follows from this view that whatever is actually true must be taken as true with respect to every possible world, which means that all truths are (in a sense) necessary. However, (...)
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  49. Paul McNamara (1990). Leibniz on Creation, Contingency and Pe-Se Modality. Studia Leibnitiana 22 (1):29-47.
    Leibniz' first problem with contingency stems from his doctrine of divine creation (not his later doctrine of truth) and is solved via his concepts of necessity per se, etc. (not via his later concept of infinite analysis). I scrutinize some of the earliest texts in which the first problem and its solution occur. I compare his "per se modal concepts" with his concept of analysis and with the traditional concept of metaphysical necessity. I then identify and remove the main obstacle (...)
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  50. Christopher Menzel, Possible Worlds. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This article includes a basic overview of possible world semantics and a relatively comprehensive overview of three central philosophical conceptions of possible worlds: Concretism (represented chiefly by Lewis), Abstractionism (represented chiefly by Plantinga), and Combinatorialism (represented chiefly by Armstrong).
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