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  1. J. McKenzie Alexander (2010). Local Interactions and the Dynamics of Rational Deliberation. Philosophical Studies 147 (1):103 - 121.
    Whereas The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure supplements Evolution of the Social Contract by examining some of the earlier work’s strategic problems in a local interaction setting, no equivalent supplement exists for The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation . In this article, I develop a general framework for modeling the dynamics of rational deliberation in a local interaction setting. In doing so, I show that when local interactions are permitted, three interesting phenomena occur: (a) the attracting deliberative equilibria (...)
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  2. Ahmed Jamal Anwar (2006). Rational Behaviour: A Review of the Requirements of Instrumental Rationality. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Progress 39:11.
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  3. Horacio Arló-Costa (2005). Models of Preference Reversals and Personal Rules: Do They Require Maximizing a Utility Function with a Specific Structure? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):650-651.
    One of the reasons for adopting hyperbolic discounting is to explain preference reversals. Another is that this value structure suggests an elegant theory of the will. I examine the capacity of the theory to solve Newcomb's problem. In addition, I compare Ainslie's account with other procedural theories of choice that seem at least equally capable of accommodating reversals of preference.
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  4. Robert Audi (2004). Theoretical Rationality: Its Sources, Structure, and Scope. In Piers Rawling & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 17--44.
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  5. Gerald W. Barnes (1983). The Conclusion of Practical Reasoning. Analysis 43 (4):193 - 199.
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  6. T. Blakeley (1961). Values and Intentions. Philosophical Studies 11:271-272.
  7. Myles Brand (1987). Intentional Actions and Plans. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):213-230.
  8. R. B. Brandt (1989). Practical Rationality: A Response. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (1):125-130.
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  9. David O. Brink, Handout #6: Normative Authority and Nagelian Rationalism.
    Thomas Nagel's The Possibility of Altruism (1970) is one of the few sustained attempts to reject instrumental and prudential conceptions of practical reason and to defend the possibility of practical reason that is impartial or altruistic. Nagel makes claims about both moral motivation and practical reason, and each claim has both negative and positive constituents.
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  10. James M. Brown (1982). Action & Interpretation. Philosophical Studies 29:349-351.
  11. David Carr (1995). Roughing Out the Ground Rules: Reason and Experience in Practical Deliberation. Journal of Philosophy of Education 29 (1):137–147.
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  12. David Carr (1981). Practical Inference and the Identity of Actions. Review of Metaphysics 34 (4):645 - 661.
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  13. D. S. Clarke (1977). The Role of Practical Inferences in Deliberation. Southern Journal of Philosophy 15 (1):15-25.
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  14. Maeve Cooke & Timo Jütten (2013). The Theory of Communicative Action After Three Decades. Constellations 20 (4):516-517.
    This is the introduction to a special section on Habermas' Theory of Communicative Action, published in Constellations 20:4 (2013), and edited by Maeve Cooke and me.
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  15. Ursula Coope (2012). Why Does Aristotle Think That Ethical Virtue is Required for Practical Wisdom? Phronesis 57 (2):142-163.
    Abstract In this paper, I ask why Aristotle thinks that ethical virtue (rather than mere self-control) is required for practical wisdom. I argue that a satisfactory answer will need to explain why being prone to bad appetites implies a failing of the rational part of the soul. I go on to claim that the self-controlled person does suffer from such a rational failing: a failure to take a specifically rational kind of pleasure in fine action. However, this still leaves a (...)
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  16. Morris A. Copeland (1927). An Instrumental View of the Part-Whole Relation. Journal of Philosophy 24 (4):96-104.
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  17. H. T. Costello (1918). Hypotheses and Instrumental Logicians. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 15 (3):57-64.
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  18. George Dickie (1983). Instrumental Inference. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 42 (2):151-154.
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  19. Abraham Edel (1975). Six Requirements in Search of a Theory. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 49:150-163.
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  20. Kirsten B. Endres & Practical Reasons (2003). O Ne Main Topic in Practical Philosophy is the Question of When Someone has a Reason for a Certain Action. Most Philosophers Agree on the Necessity of a Motivational and a Justificatory Condition, but They Still Disagree About How These Conditions Can Be Fulfilled. Though These Conditions Are Important in Forming Convincing Concepts of Practical. [REVIEW] In P. Schaber & R. Huntelmann (eds.), Grundlagen der Ethik. 1--67.
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  21. Stephen Finlay (2008). Motivation to the Means. In David Chan (ed.), Moral Psychology Today: Values, Rational Choice, and the Will. 173-191.
    Rationalists including Nagel and Korsgaard argue that motivation to the means to our desired ends cannot be explained by appeal to the desire for the end. They claim that a satisfactory explanation of this motivational connection must appeal to a faculty of practical reason motivated in response to desire-independent norms of reason. This paper builds on ideas in the work of Hume and Donald Davidson to demonstrate how the desire for the end is sufficient for explaining motivation to the means. (...)
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  22. Richard Foley (1991). Audi on Practical Reasoning. Behavior and Philosophy 19 (2):59 - 72.
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  23. Corbin Fowler (1980). An Alternative to Aune's Idealized View of Practical Reasoning. Southern Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):23-36.
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  24. John Gardner, How Does Coherence Matter?
    Recently, much attention has been paid to ‘rational requirements’ and, especially, to what I call ‘rational requirements of formal coherence as such’. These requirements are satisfied just when our attitudes are formally coherent: for example, when our beliefs do not contradict each other. Nevertheless, these requirements are puzzling. In particular, it is unclear why we should satisfy them. In light of this, I explore the conjecture that there are no requirements of formal coherence. I do so by trying to construct (...)
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  25. Craig R. Goodrum (1977). The Sources and Limits of Practical Reasoning. Southern Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):293-307.
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  26. Stefan Gosepath (2002). Practical Reason: A Review of the Current Debate and Problems. [REVIEW] Philosophical Explorations 5 (3):229 – 238.
    In this review article I refer to some of the most relevant recent publications in the field of practical rationality, mainly drawing on two new anthologies by Wallace and Millgram that contain the principal arguments in the current debate, and on new books and articles by Bittner, Dancy, Nida-Rümelin and Raz. The purpose of the article is to offer an overview of the relevant positions in the current debate, to clarify the main arguments against the belief-desire model, and to situate (...)
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  27. Gilbert Harman (2004). Practical Aspects of Theoretical Rationality. In Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oup Usa.
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  28. Barbara Herman (2006). Reasoning to Obligation. Inquiry 49 (1):44 – 61.
    If, as Kant says, "the will is practical reason", we should think of willing as a mode of reasoning, and its activity represented in movement from evaluative premises to intention by way of a validity-securing principle of inference. Such a view of willing takes motive and rational choice out of empirical psychology, thereby eliminating grounds for many familiar objections to Kant's account of morally good action. The categorical imperative provides the fundamental principle of valid practical inference; however, for good willing, (...)
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  29. Barbara Herman (2001). The Scope of Moral Requirement. Philosophy and Public Affairs 30 (3):227–256.
  30. Pamela Hieronymi (2009). The Will as Reason. Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):201-220.
    I here defend an account of the will as practical reason—or, using Kant's phrase, as "reason in its practical employment"—as against a view of the will as a capacity for choice, in addition to reason, by which we execute practical judgments in action. Certain commonplaces show distance between judgment and action and thus seem to reveal the need for a capacity, in addition to reason, by which we execute judgment in action. However, another ordinary fact pushes in the other direction: (...)
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  31. Jesse Hughes (2009). An Artifact is to Use: An Introduction to Instrumental Functions. [REVIEW] Synthese 168 (1):179 - 199.
    Because much of the recent philosophical interest in functions has been motivated by their application in biology and other sciences, most of the ensuing discussions have focused on functional explanations to the neglect of the practical role of functional knowledge. This practical role is essential for understanding how users form plans involving artifacts. We introduce the concept of instrumental function which is intended to capture the features of functional claims that are relevant to practical—in particular, instrumental—reasoning. We discuss the four (...)
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  32. R. I. G. Hughes (1980). Rationality and Intransitive Preferences. Analysis 40 (3):132 - 134.
  33. Troy Jollimore (2005). Why Is Instrumental Rationality Rational? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):289 - 307.
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  34. Morton A. Kaplan (1976). Means/Ends Rationality. Ethics 87 (1):61-65.
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  35. Carlos Kling (1932). On the Instrumental Analysis of Thought. Journal of Philosophy 29 (10):259-265.
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  36. Michael Kubara (1975). Acrasia, Human Agency and Normative Psychology. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):215 - 232.
  37. Maurice Lagueux (2012). Reply to My Reviewers / Réponse À Mes Commentateurs. Dialogue 51 (3):516-530.
  38. Janet Levin (1988). Must Reasons Be Rational? Philosophy of Science 55 (2):199-217.
    This paper challenges some leading views about the conditions under which the ascription of beliefs and desires can make sense of, or provide reasons for, a creature's behavior. I argue that it is unnecessary for behavior to proceed from beliefs and desires according to the principles of logic and decision theory, or even from principles that generally get things right. I also deny that it is necessary for behavior to proceed from principles that, though perhaps subrational, are similar to those (...)
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  39. Ausonio Marras (2003). Audi on Substantive Vs Instrumental Rationality. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):194–201.
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  40. Terrance McConnell (1989). “'Ought' Implies 'Can'” and the Scope of Moral Requirements. Philosophia 19 (4):437-454.
    This paper examines two contexts in ethical theory that some have thought support the claim that attempts, rather than actions, are what are morally required of agents. In each context there is an appeal to the principle that 'ought' implies 'can'. I begin by explaining how I think appeals to this principle typically work. I conclude that not only do the contexts in question not demonstrate that moral requirements range over attempts, but also that any argument in support of that (...)
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  41. Christopher Megone (2004). Doing Things for Reasons. Philosophical Books 45 (2):149-153.
  42. Gabriel S. Mendlow (2014). Want of Care: An Essay on Wayward Action. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):299-310.
    Philosophers have taken little heed of the fact that people often act contrary to their better judgment not because they suffer a volitional infirmity like weakness of will or compulsion but instead because they care too little about what they judge best (they are unconcerned) or they care too much about something else (they are compromised). Unconcerned and compromised action, being varieties of akratic action that do not involve volitional infirmity, are phenomena worth examining not only in their own right (...)
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  43. Diana Tietjens Meyers (2004). Narrative and Moral Life. In Cheshire Calhoun (ed.), Setting the Moral Compass: Essays by Women Philosophers. Oxford University Press.
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  44. Christian Miller (2007). The Structure of Instrumental Practical Reasoning. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):1–40.
    The view to be defended in this paper is intended to be a novel and compelling model of instrumental practical reasoning, reasoning aimed at determining how to act in order to achieve a given end in a certain set of circumstances. On standard views of instrumental reasoning, the end in question is the object of a particular desire that the agent has, a desire which, when combined with the agent’s beliefs about what means are available to him or her in (...)
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  45. Paul Noordhof (1999). Moral Requirements Are Still Not Rational Requirements. Analysis 59 (3):127–136.
    Moral requirements apply to rational agents as such. But it is a conceptual truth that if agents are morally required to act in a certain way then we expect them to act in that way. Being rational, as such, must therefore suffice to ground our expectation that rational agents will do what they are morally required to do. But how could this be so? It could only be so if we think of the moral requirements that apply to agents as (...)
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  46. Orland O. Norris (1931). Some Postulates for an Instrumental Philosophy. The Monist 41 (3):407-433.
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  47. Amy Peikoff (2003). Rational Action Entails Rational Desire: A Critical Review of Searle's Rationality in Action. Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):124 – 138.
    In this paper I contest Searle's thesis that desire-independent reasons for action - 'reasons that are binding on a rational agent, regardless of desires and dispositions in his motivational set' - are inherent in the concept of rationality. Following Searle's procedure, I first address his argument that altruistic reasons for action inhere in the concept of rationality, and then examine his argument for his more general thesis. I conclude that a viable theory of rational action would be centered, not on (...)
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  48. John L. Pollock (1992). New Foundations for Practical Reasoning. Minds and Machines 2 (2):113-144.
    Practical reasoning aims at deciding what actions to perform in light of the goals a rational agent possesses. This has been a topic of interest in both philosophy and artificial intelligence, but these two disciplines have produced very different models of practical reasoning. The purpose of this paper is to examine each model in light of the other and produce a unified model adequate for the purposes of both disciplines and superior to the standard models employed by either.The philosophical (decision-theoretic) (...)
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  49. John L. Pollock, The Need for an Epistemology.
    It is argued that we cannot build a sophisticated autonomous planetary rover just by implementing sophisticated planning algorithms. Planning must be based on information, and the agent must have the cognitive capability of acquiring new information about its environment. That requires the implementation of a sophisticated epistemology. Epistemological considerations indicate that the rover cannot be assumed to have a complete probability distribution at its disposal. Its planning must be based upon “thin” knowledge of probabilities, and that has important implications for (...)
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  50. Warren S. Quinn (1990). The Puzzle of the Self-Torturer. Philosophical Studies 59 (1):79-90.
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