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Summary This category is a catch-all for papers that do not fit - or much more commonly, have aspects that do not fit - anywhere else in the taxonomy. Most papers in this category are also categorized under some heading as well. 
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  1. J. McKenzie Alexander (2010). Local Interactions and the Dynamics of Rational Deliberation. Philosophical Studies 147 (1):103 - 121.
    Whereas The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure supplements Evolution of the Social Contract by examining some of the earlier work’s strategic problems in a local interaction setting, no equivalent supplement exists for The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation . In this article, I develop a general framework for modeling the dynamics of rational deliberation in a local interaction setting. In doing so, I show that when local interactions are permitted, three interesting phenomena occur: (a) the attracting deliberative equilibria (...)
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  2. Roman Altshuler & Michael J. Sigrist (2016). Introduction. In Roman Altshuler & Michael J. Sigrist (eds.), Time and the Philosophy of Action. Routledge 1-18.
    We do things in time. Philosophy of action can capture this phenomenon in at least two ways. On one hand, it might focus on the way that temporal preferences and long-term temporal horizons affect the rationality of decisions in the present (see, e.g., Parfit 1984; Rawls 1971). Such work may focus on the way we discount the distant future, for example, or prioritize the future over the past. Approaches of this kind treat time as, in a sense, something external to (...)
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  3. Ahmed Jamal Anwar (2006). Rational Behaviour: A Review of the Requirements of Instrumental Rationality. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Progress 39:11.
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  4. Horacio Arló-Costa (2005). Models of Preference Reversals and Personal Rules: Do They Require Maximizing a Utility Function with a Specific Structure? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):650-651.
    One of the reasons for adopting hyperbolic discounting is to explain preference reversals. Another is that this value structure suggests an elegant theory of the will. I examine the capacity of the theory to solve Newcomb's problem. In addition, I compare Ainslie's account with other procedural theories of choice that seem at least equally capable of accommodating reversals of preference.
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  5. Robert Audi (2004). Theoretical Rationality: Its Sources, Structure, and Scope. In Piers Rawling & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press 17--44.
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  6. Gerald W. Barnes (1983). The Conclusion of Practical Reasoning. Analysis 43 (4):193 - 199.
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  7. James O. Bennett (1979). The Tension Between Deliberation and Action. Tulane Studies in Philosophy 28:81-92.
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  8. T. Blakeley (1961). Values and Intentions. Philosophical Studies 11:271-272.
  9. Myles Brand (1987). Intentional Actions and Plans. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):213-230.
  10. David O. Brink, Handout #6: Normative Authority and Nagelian Rationalism.
    Thomas Nagel's The Possibility of Altruism (1970) is one of the few sustained attempts to reject instrumental and prudential conceptions of practical reason and to defend the possibility of practical reason that is impartial or altruistic. Nagel makes claims about both moral motivation and practical reason, and each claim has both negative and positive constituents.
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  11. James M. Brown (1982). Action & Interpretation. Philosophical Studies 29:349-351.
  12. David Carr (1995). Roughing Out the Ground Rules: Reason and Experience in Practical Deliberation. Journal of Philosophy of Education 29 (1):137–147.
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  13. David Carr (1981). Practical Inference and the Identity of Actions. Review of Metaphysics 34 (4):645 - 661.
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  14. D. S. Clarke (1977). The Role of Practical Inferences in Deliberation. Southern Journal of Philosophy 15 (1):15-25.
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  15. Henry Clarke (2016). Wiggins on Practical Knowledge. Disputatio 8 (42):113-124.
    Wiggins’ (2012) argument against propositional accounts of knowing how is based on a development of some considerations taken from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle argued that the knowledge needed for participation in an ethos cannot be codified in propositional form so as to let it be imparted to someone who did not already have it. This is because any putative codification would be incomplete, and require that knowledge in order to extend it to novel cases. On a reasonable interpretation of his (...)
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  16. Maeve Cooke & Timo Jütten (2013). The Theory of Communicative Action After Three Decades. Constellations 20 (4):516-517.
    This is the introduction to a special section on Habermas' Theory of Communicative Action, published in Constellations 20:4 (2013), and edited by Maeve Cooke and me.
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  17. Ursula Coope (2012). Why Does Aristotle Think That Ethical Virtue is Required for Practical Wisdom? Phronesis 57 (2):142-163.
    Abstract In this paper, I ask why Aristotle thinks that ethical virtue (rather than mere self-control) is required for practical wisdom. I argue that a satisfactory answer will need to explain why being prone to bad appetites implies a failing of the rational part of the soul. I go on to claim that the self-controlled person does suffer from such a rational failing: a failure to take a specifically rational kind of pleasure in fine action. However, this still leaves a (...)
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  18. Morris A. Copeland (1927). An Instrumental View of the Part-Whole Relation. Journal of Philosophy 24 (4):96-104.
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  19. H. T. Costello (1918). Hypotheses and Instrumental Logicians. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 15 (3):57-64.
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  20. Giovanni De Grandis (2016). Practical Integration: The Art of Balancing Values, Institutions and Knowledge. Lessons From the History of British Public Health and Town Planning. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 56:92-105.
    The paper uses two historical examples, public health (1840-1880) and town planning (1945-1975) in Britain, to analyse the challenges faced by goal-driven research, an increasingly important trend in science policy, as exemplified by the prominence of calls for addressing Grand Challenges. Two key points are argued. (1) Given that the aim of research addressing social or global problems is to contribute to improving things, this research should include all the steps necessary to bring science and technology to fruition. This need (...)
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  21. George Dickie (1983). Instrumental Inference. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 42 (2):151-154.
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  22. Abraham Edel (1975). Six Requirements in Search of a Theory. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 49:150-163.
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  23. Kirsten B. Endres & Practical Reasons (2003). O Ne Main Topic in Practical Philosophy is the Question of When Someone has a Reason for a Certain Action. Most Philosophers Agree on the Necessity of a Motivational and a Justificatory Condition, but They Still Disagree About How These Conditions Can Be Fulfilled. Though These Conditions Are Important in Forming Convincing Concepts of Practical. [REVIEW] In P. Schaber & R. Huntelmann (eds.), Grundlagen der Ethik. 1--67.
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  24. James W. Felt (1987). The Acts of Our Being. New Scholasticism 61 (4):477-479.
  25. Richard Foley (1991). Audi on Practical Reasoning. Behavior and Philosophy 19 (2):59 - 72.
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  26. Corbin Fowler (1980). An Alternative to Aune's Idealized View of Practical Reasoning. Southern Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):23-36.
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  27. John Gardner, How Does Coherence Matter?
    Recently, much attention has been paid to ‘rational requirements’ and, especially, to what I call ‘rational requirements of formal coherence as such’. These requirements are satisfied just when our attitudes are formally coherent: for example, when our beliefs do not contradict each other. Nevertheless, these requirements are puzzling. In particular, it is unclear why we should satisfy them. In light of this, I explore the conjecture that there are no requirements of formal coherence. I do so by trying to construct (...)
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  28. Craig R. Goodrum (1977). The Sources and Limits of Practical Reasoning. Southern Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):293-307.
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  29. Robert Hanna (1985). Edward Pols, The Acts of Our Being Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 5 (1):20-22.
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  30. Robert Hanna (1985). Edward Pols, The Acts of Our Being. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 5:20-22.
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  31. Elizabeth Mary Evans Harlow (1986). The Agent Standpoint and the Limits of Compatibilism: A Study of Compatibilism in the Context of Contemporary Action Theory. Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada)
    This thesis examines compatibilist theories in relation to developments in the philosophy of action, beginning with the Humean "desire model" which dominated early in this century. It is argued that these "dissolutionist" forms of compatibilism failed to capture the meaning of "responsibility" and "free will" as ordinarily understood, partly because they depended on an inadequate theory of action and practical reasoning. Chapter III explores the role and meaning of "can" in compatibilist theories, arguing that the dissolutionist hypothetical analysis of "can" (...)
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  32. Gilbert Harman (2004). Practical Aspects of Theoretical Rationality. In Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. OUP Usa
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  33. Barbara Herman (2006). Reasoning to Obligation. Inquiry 49 (1):44 – 61.
    If, as Kant says, "the will is practical reason", we should think of willing as a mode of reasoning, and its activity represented in movement from evaluative premises to intention by way of a validity-securing principle of inference. Such a view of willing takes motive and rational choice out of empirical psychology, thereby eliminating grounds for many familiar objections to Kant's account of morally good action. The categorical imperative provides the fundamental principle of valid practical inference; however, for good willing, (...)
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  34. Barbara Herman (2001). The Scope of Moral Requirement. Philosophy and Public Affairs 30 (3):227–256.
  35. Jesse Hughes (2009). An Artifact is to Use: An Introduction to Instrumental Functions. [REVIEW] Synthese 168 (1):179 - 199.
    Because much of the recent philosophical interest in functions has been motivated by their application in biology and other sciences, most of the ensuing discussions have focused on functional explanations to the neglect of the practical role of functional knowledge. This practical role is essential for understanding how users form plans involving artifacts. We introduce the concept of instrumental function which is intended to capture the features of functional claims that are relevant to practical—in particular, instrumental—reasoning. We discuss the four (...)
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  36. R. I. G. Hughes (1980). Rationality and Intransitive Preferences. Analysis 40 (3):132 - 134.
  37. Paul Edward Hurley (1988). The Practical Given. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    I demonstrate that the two major ethical traditions agree that there are given desires which provide extra-rational practical reasons. Empiricist theories ground ethics in such desires, but the extra-rationality of this foundation appears to lead to stultifying subjectivism. Rationalist theories justify the appeal to an independent Kantian Reason as necessary to gain control over such desires. But the status of these desires as providing motivating reasons guarantees that such independent Reason can never be more than one among competing sources of (...)
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  38. Troy Jollimore (2005). Why Is Instrumental Rationality Rational? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):289 - 307.
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  39. Morton A. Kaplan (1976). Means/Ends Rationality. Ethics 87 (1):61-65.
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  40. Carlos Kling (1932). On the Instrumental Analysis of Thought. Journal of Philosophy 29 (10):259-265.
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  41. Dudley Knowles (1990). J. David Velleman, "Practical Reflection". Philosophical Quarterly 40 (161):524.
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  42. Michael Krausz (1980). Historical Explanation, Re-Enactment, and Practical Inference. Metaphilosophy 11 (2):143–154.
  43. Michael Kubara (1975). Acrasia, Human Agency and Normative Psychology. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):215 - 232.
  44. Maurice Lagueux (2012). Reply to My Reviewers / Réponse À Mes Commentateurs. Dialogue 51 (3):516-530.
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  45. Janet Levin (1988). Must Reasons Be Rational? Philosophy of Science 55 (2):199-217.
    This paper challenges some leading views about the conditions under which the ascription of beliefs and desires can make sense of, or provide reasons for, a creature's behavior. I argue that it is unnecessary for behavior to proceed from beliefs and desires according to the principles of logic and decision theory, or even from principles that generally get things right. I also deny that it is necessary for behavior to proceed from principles that, though perhaps subrational, are similar to those (...)
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  46. Tito Magri, Practical Sense and the Limits of Deliberation.
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  47. Ausonio Marras (2003). Audi on Substantive Vs Instrumental Rationality. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):194–201.
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  48. Terrance McConnell (1989). “'Ought' Implies 'Can'” and the Scope of Moral Requirements. Philosophia 19 (4):437-454.
    This paper examines two contexts in ethical theory that some have thought support the claim that attempts, rather than actions, are what are morally required of agents. In each context there is an appeal to the principle that 'ought' implies 'can'. I begin by explaining how I think appeals to this principle typically work. I conclude that not only do the contexts in question not demonstrate that moral requirements range over attempts, but also that any argument in support of that (...)
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  49. Christopher Megone (2004). Doing Things for Reasons. Philosophical Books 45 (2):149-153.
  50. Gabriel S. Mendlow (2014). Want of Care: An Essay on Wayward Action. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):299-310.
    Philosophers have taken little heed of the fact that people often act contrary to their better judgment not because they suffer a volitional infirmity like weakness of will or compulsion but instead because they care too little about what they judge best (they are unconcerned) or they care too much about something else (they are compromised). Unconcerned and compromised action, being varieties of akratic action that do not involve volitional infirmity, are phenomena worth examining not only in their own right (...)
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