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  1. Gunnar Björnsson (2011). Towards a Radically Pragmatic Theory of If-Conditionals. In K. P. Turner (ed.), Making Semantics Pragmatic (CRiSPI, Vol. 24). Emerald.
    It is generally agreed that constructions of the form “if P, Q” are capable of conveying a number of different relations between antecedent and consequent, with pragmatics playing a central role in determining these relations. Controversy concerns what the conventional contribution of the if-clause is, how it constrains the pragmatic processes, and what those processes are. In this essay, I begin to argue that the conventional contribution of if-clauses to semantics is exhausted by the fact that these clauses introduce a (...)
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  2. Gunnar Björnsson, Comments on Lycan's ‘Conditional-Assertion Theories of Conditionals’. Philosophical Communications.
    The overall strategy of Lycan’s paper is to distinguish three kinds of conditional assertion theories, and then to show, in order, how they are variously afflicted by a set of problems. The three kinds of theory were the Quine-Rhinelander theory (or the Simple Illocutionary theory), The Semanticized Quine-Rhinelander, and the No Truth Value theory (or NTV). This strategy offers considerable clarity, but it comes at a cost, for what I take to be the best version of a conditional assertion theory (...)
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  3. Joseph S. Fulda (2012). Austinian Ifs Revisited – And Squared Away with the Equivalence Thesis and the Theory of Conditional Elements. RASK 36:51-71.
    This paper deals with Austinian ifs of every stripe within classical logic. It is argued that they are truth-functional and the theory of conditional elements is used. Ellipsis is key. Corrects an error in Fulda (2010) in translation and therefore scope. -/- The PDF is made available gratis by the Publisher.
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  4. Joseph S. Fulda (2010). The Full Theory of Conditional Elements: Enumerating, Exemplifying, and Evaluating Each of the Eight Conditional Elements. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 25 (4):459-477.
    This paper presents a unified, more-or-less complete, and largely pragmatic theory of indicative conditionals as they occur in natural language, which is entirely truth-functional and does not involve probability. It includes material implication as a special—and the most important—case, but not as the only case. The theory of conditional elements, as we term it, treats if-statements analogously to the more familiar and less controversial other truth-functional compounds, such as conjunction and disjunction.
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  5. Hector Hernandez Ortiz & Joseph S. Fulda (2012). Strengthening the Antecedent, Concessive Conditionals, Conditional Rhetorical Questions, and the Theory of Conditional Elements. Journal of Pragmatics 44 (3):328-331.
    Extends the theory of conditional elements in three ways. The critical way, primarily due to the senior author, is the solution to the fallacy of the strengthened antecedent within classical logic.
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  6. Daniel Nolan, Is Stalnaker Inconsistent About Indicative Conditionals?
    Robert Stalnaker’s formal semantics for his indicative conditional (which his 1975 paper takes over from his 1968 paper and Stalnaker and Thomason 1968) validate modus ponens, as one might expect. But they do so at the cost of a tension between his philosophical remarks in his 1975 paper and his formal constraints. Stalnaker commits himself to the following: he defines a “context set” as “the possible worlds not ruled out by the presupposed background information” (Stalnaker 1975 p 142). He later (...)
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  7. Robert Stalnaker (2009). Conditional Propositions and Conditional Assertions. In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.
  8. Robert Stalnaker (1975). Indicative Conditionals. Philosophia 5 (3):269-286.