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  1. Gunnar Björnsson (2011). Towards a Radically Pragmatic Theory of If-Conditionals. In K. P. Turner (ed.), Making Semantics Pragmatic (CRiSPI, Vol. 24). Emerald
    It is generally agreed that constructions of the form “if P, Q” are capable of conveying a number of different relations between antecedent and consequent, with pragmatics playing a central role in determining these relations. Controversy concerns what the conventional contribution of the if-clause is, how it constrains the pragmatic processes, and what those processes are. In this essay, I begin to argue that the conventional contribution of if-clauses to semantics is exhausted by the fact that these clauses introduce a (...)
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  2. Gunnar Björnsson, Comments on Lycan's ‘Conditional-Assertion Theories of Conditionals’. Philosophical Communications.
    The overall strategy of Lycan’s paper is to distinguish three kinds of conditional assertion theories, and then to show, in order, how they are variously afflicted by a set of problems. The three kinds of theory were the Quine-Rhinelander theory (or the Simple Illocutionary theory), The Semanticized Quine-Rhinelander, and the No Truth Value theory (or NTV). This strategy offers considerable clarity, but it comes at a cost, for what I take to be the best version of a conditional assertion theory (...)
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  3. Joseph S. Fulda (2012). Austinian Ifs Revisited – And Squared Away with the Equivalence Thesis and the Theory of Conditional Elements. RASK 36:51-71.
    This paper deals with Austinian ifs of every stripe within classical logic. It is argued that they are truth-functional and the theory of conditional elements is used. Ellipsis is key. Corrects an error in Fulda (2010) in translation and therefore scope. -/- The PDF is made available gratis by the Publisher.
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  4. Joseph S. Fulda (2010). The Full Theory of Conditional Elements: Enumerating, Exemplifying, and Evaluating Each of the Eight Conditional Elements. Acta Analytica 25 (4):459-477.
    This paper presents a unified, more-or-less complete, and largely pragmatic theory of indicative conditionals as they occur in natural language, which is entirely truth-functional and does not involve probability. It includes material implication as a special—and the most important—case, but not as the only case. The theory of conditional elements, as we term it, treats if-statements analogously to the more familiar and less controversial other truth-functional compounds, such as conjunction and disjunction.
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  5. Hector Hernandez Ortiz & Joseph S. Fulda (2012). Strengthening the Antecedent, Concessive Conditionals, Conditional Rhetorical Questions, and the Theory of Conditional Elements. Journal of Pragmatics 44 (3):328-331.
    Extends the theory of conditional elements in three ways. The critical way, primarily due to the senior author, is the solution to the fallacy of the strengthened antecedent within classical logic.
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  6. Justin Khoo (2013). A Note on Gibbard's Proof. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):153-164.
    A proof by Allan Gibbard (Ifs: Conditionals, beliefs, decision, chance, time. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1981) seems to demonstrate that if indicative conditionals have truth conditions, they cannot be stronger than material implication. Angelika Kratzer's theory that conditionals do not denote two-place operators purports to escape this result [see Kratzer (Chic Linguist Soc 22(2):1–15, 1986, 2012)]. In this note, I raise some trouble for Kratzer’s proposed method of escape and then show that her semantics avoids this consequence of Gibbard’s proof by denying (...)
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  7. Daniel Nolan, Is Stalnaker Inconsistent About Indicative Conditionals?
    Stalnaker's 1975 motivates an account of the truth conditions of indicative conditionals that seems in tension with the truth-conditions he offers. This paper discusses how best to resolve this tension.
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  8. Murali Ramachandran (2015). How and Why I Arrived at a Topsy-Turvy Account of Even-Ifs. South African Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):193-98.
    This note begins by retracing my roundabout route to a well-known, but widely dismissed, view of Even-if conditionals (Even-Ifs), namely, that they affirm their consequents, i.e. that [Even if A, C] entails [C]. The route also explains my reluctance to give up on that view in the face of prima facie overwhelming, countervailing linguistic evidence — evidence which has led most philosophers of conditionals to the rival view that Even-Ifs entail the corresponding Ifs: i.e. that [Even if A, C] entails (...)
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  9. Niels Skovgaard-Olsen (forthcoming). Motivating a Relevance the Relevance Approach to Conditionals. Mind & Language.
    The aim is to theoretically motivate a relevance approach to (indicative) conditionals in a comparative discussion of the main alternatives. In particular, it will be argued that a relevance approach to conditionals is better motivated than the suppositional theory currently enjoying wide endorsement. In the course of this discussion, an argument will be presented of why failures of the epistemic relevance of the antecedent for the consequent should be counted as genuine semantic defects (as opposed to be relegated to pragmatics). (...)
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  10. Robert Stalnaker (2009). Conditional Propositions and Conditional Assertions. In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press
  11. Robert Stalnaker (1975). Indicative Conditionals. Philosophia 5 (3):269-286.
  12. Ingrid van Canegem-Ardijns (2010). The Indefeasibility of the Inference That If Not-A, Then Not-C. Journal of Pragmatics 42 (1):1-15.
    Content and, to a lesser degree, epistemic or inferential conditionals regularly invite conditional perfection as a non-monotonic inference or conversational implicature. Conditional perfection (henceforth CP) is the natural language tendency to perfect conditionals (if A then C) into their corresponding biconditionals (if and only if A, then C) through the mediation of an if not-A, then not-C conditional. In the literature there is some controversy regarding the pragmatic principle by which CP is derived, but there seems to be silent agreement (...)
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