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Pascal's Wager
  1. Robert Anderson (1995). Recent Criticisms and Defenses of Pascal's Wager. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 37 (1):45 - 56.
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  2. Antony Aumann (2014). On the Validity of Pascal's Wager. Heythrop Journal 55 (1):86-93.
    Recent scholarship has shown that the success of Pascal’s wager rests on precarious grounds. To avoid notorious problems, it must appeal to considerations such as what probability we assign to the existence of various gods and what religion we think provides the greatest happiness in this life. Rational judgments concerning these matters are subject to change over time. Some claim that the wager therefore cannot support a steadfast commitment to God. I argue that this conclusion does not follow. By drawing (...)
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  3. P. Bartha (2007). Taking Stock of Infinite Value: Pascal's Wager and Relative Utilities. Synthese 154 (1):5 - 52.
    Among recent objections to Pascal’s Wager, two are especially compelling. The first is that decision theory, and specifically the requirement of maximizing expected utility, is incompatible with infinite utility values. The second is that even if infinite utility values are admitted, the argument of the Wager is invalid provided that we allow mixed strategies. Furthermore, Hájek (Philosophical Review 112, 2003) has shown that reformulations of Pascal’s Wager that address these criticisms inevitably lead to arguments that are philosophically unsatisfying and historically (...)
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  4. Paul Bartha (2008). Review: Pascal's Wager: Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God – Jeff Jordan. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):571–574.
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  5. Alfred W. Benn (1905). Pascal's Wager. International Journal of Ethics 15 (3):305-323.
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  6. Gregor Betz (2012). Pascals Wette. In Georg Bertram (ed.), Philosophische Gedankenexperimente – ein Lese- und Studienbuch. Reclam.
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  7. Simon Blackburn (2009). Pascal's Wager. In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. Oxford University Press.
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  8. Nick Bostrom (2009). Pascal's Mugging. Analysis 69 (3):443-445.
    In some dark alley. . . Mugger: Hey, give me your wallet. Pascal: Why on Earth would I want to do that? Mugger: Otherwise I’ll shoot you. Pascal: But you don’t have a gun. Mugger: Oops! I knew I had forgotten something. Pascal: No wallet for you then. Have a nice evening. Mugger: Wait! Pascal: Sigh. Mugger: I’ve got a business proposition for you. . . . How about you give me your wallet now? In return, I promise to come (...)
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  9. Geoffrey Brown (1984). A Defence of Pascal's Wager. Religious Studies 20 (3):465 - 479.
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  10. John Byl (1994). On Pascal's Wager and Infinite Utilities. Faith and Philosophy 11 (3):467-473.
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  11. James Cargile (1982). Pascal's Wager. In Steven M. Cahn & David Shatz (eds.), Contemporary Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press. 250-.
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  12. Alan Carter (2000). On Pascal's Wager, or Why All Bets Are Off. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):22-27.
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  13. Peter C. Dalton (1976). Pascal's Wager: The First Argument. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (2):346 - 368.
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  14. Peter C. Dalton (1975). Pascal's Wager: The Second Argument. Southern Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):31-46.
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  15. Robert Danderson (2008). Review: Pascal's Wager: Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God - by Jeff Jordan. [REVIEW] Philosophical Books 49 (1):94-96.
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  16. Volker Dieringer (2009). Is a Jamesian Wager the Only Safe Bet? On Jeff Jordan's New Book on Pascal's Wager. Archiv für Geschichte Der Philosophie 91 (2):237-247.
    In his new book on Pascal's Wager, Jeff Jordan argues that only the ‘Jamesian’ version of the wager argument, as he sees it presented in William James' essay The Will to Believe , constitutes a sound pragmatic argument in favour of theism, whereas Pascal's original wager argument is doomed to fail on various grounds. This article argues that Jordan's theory is untenable. The many-gods objection is used as an example: it is demonstrated that the Jamesian Wager argument too is powerless (...)
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  17. Antony Duff (1986). Pascal's Wager and Infinite Utilities. Analysis 46 (2):107 - 109.
  18. C. Duncan (2008). Review: Jeff Jordan: Pascal's Wager: Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God. [REVIEW] Mind 117 (468):1082-1086.
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  19. Craig Duncan (2003). Do Vague Probabilities Really Scotch Pascal's Wager? Philosophical Studies 112 (3):279 - 290.
    Alan Hájek has recently argued that certain assignments of vague probability defeat Pascals Wager. In particular, he argues that skeptical agnostics – those whose probability for God''s existence is vague over an interval containing zero – have nothing to fear from Pascal. In this paper, I make two arguments against Hájek: (1) that skeptical agnosticism is a form of dogmatism, and as such should be rejected; (2) that in any case, choice situations with vague probability assignments ought to be treated (...)
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  20. Kenny Easwaran & B. Monton (2012). Mixed Strategies, Uncountable Times, and Pascal's Wager: A Reply to Robertson. Analysis 72 (4):681-685.
    Pascal’s Wager holds that one has pragmatic reason to believe in God, since that course of action has infinite expected utility. The mixed strategy objection holds that one could just as well follow a course of action that has infinite expected utility but is unlikely to end with one believing in God. Monton (2011. Mixed strategies can’t evade Pascal’s Wager. Analysis 71: 642–45.) has argued that mixed strategies can’t evade Pascal’s Wager, while Robertson (2012. Some mixed strategies can evade Pascal’s (...)
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  21. James Franklin (1998). Two Caricatures, I: Pascal's Wager. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 44 (2):109 - 114.
    Pascal’s wager and Leibniz’s theory that this is the best of all possible worlds are latecomers in the Faith-and-Reason tradition. They have remained interlopers; they have never been taken as seriously as the older arguments for the existence of God and other themes related to faith and reason.
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  22. William Gustason (1998). Pascal's Wager and Competing Faiths. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 44 (1):31-39.
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  23. Ian Hacking (1972). The Logic of Pascal's Wager. American Philosophical Quarterly 9 (2):186 - 192.
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  24. A. Hajek (2003). Waging War on Pascal's Wager. Philosophical Review 112 (1):27-56.
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  25. Alan Hájek, Pascal's Wager. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    “Pascal's Wager” is the name given to an argument due to Blaise Pascal for believing, or for at least taking steps to believe, in God. The name is somewhat misleading, for in a single paragraph of his Pensées, Pascal apparently presents at least three such arguments, each of which might be called a ‘wager’ — it is only the final of these that is traditionally referred to as “Pascal's Wager”. We find in it the extraordinary confluence of several important strands (...)
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  26. Alan Hájek (2003). Waging War on Pascal's Wager. Philosophical Review 112 (1):27-56.
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  27. Alan Hájek (2000). Objecting Vaguely to Pascal's Wager. Philosophical Studies 98 (1-16):1 - 16.
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  28. Alan H.´jek (2000). Objecting Vaguely to Pascal's Wager. Philosophical Studies 98 (1):1-14.
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  29. Greg Janzen (2011). Pascal's Wager and the Nature of God. Sophia 50 (3):331-344.
    This paper argues that Pascal's formulation of his famous wager argument licenses an inference about God's nature that ultimately vitiates the claim that wagering for God is in one's rational self-interest. In particular, it is argued that if we accept Pascal's premises, then we can infer that the god for whom Pascal encourages us to wager is irrational. But if God is irrational, then the prudentially rational course of action is to refrain from wagering for him.
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  30. Ward E. Jones (1998). Religious Conversion, Self-Deception, and Pascal's Wager. Journal of the History of Philosophy 36 (2):167-188.
  31. Jeff Jordan (2006). Pascal's Wager: Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God. Oxford University Press.
    Is it reasonable to believe in God even in the absence of strong evidence that God exists? Pragmatic arguments for theism are designed to support belief even if one lacks evidence that theism is more likely than not. Jeff Jordan proposes that there is a sound version of the most well-known argument of this kind, Pascal's Wager, and explores the issues involved - in epistemology, the ethics of belief, decision theory, and theology.
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  32. Jeff Jordan (2002). Pascal's Wagers. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 26 (1):213–223.
    Pascal is best known among philosophers for his wager in support of Christian belief. Since Ian Hacking’s classic article on the wager, three versions of the wager have been recognized within the concise paragraphs of the Pensées. In what follows I argue that there is a fourth to be found there, a version that in many respects anticipates the argument of William James in his 1896 essay “The Will to Believe.” This fourth wager argument, I contend, differs from the better-known (...)
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  33. Jeff Jordan (1998). Pascal's Wager Revisited. Religious Studies 34 (4):419-431.
    Pascal's wager attempts to provide a prudential reason in support of the rationality of believing that God exists. The wager employs the idea that the utility of theistic belief, if true, is infinite, and in this way, the expected utility of theism swamps that of any of its rivals. Not surprisingly the wager generates more than a good share of philosophical criticism. In this essay I examine two recent objections levelled against the wager and I argue that each fails. Following (...)
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  34. Jeff Jordan (1994). The St. Petersburg Paradox and Pascal's Wager. Philosophia 23 (1-4):207-222.
  35. Jeff Jordan (1991). The Many-Gods Objection and Pascal's Wager. International Philosophical Quarterly 31 (3):309-317.
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  36. Jeffrey Jordan (1993). Pascal's Wager and the Problem of Infinite Utilities. Faith and Philosophy 10 (1):49-59.
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  37. Christoph Lumer (1997). Practical Arguments for Theoretical Theses. Argumentation 11 (3):329-340.
    Pascal‘s wager is expounded as a paradigm case of a practical,decision-theoretical argument for acting as if a proposition is true when wehave no theoretical reasons to accept or reject it (1.1.–1.2.). Thoughthe paradigm is fallacious in various respects there are valid and adequatearguments for acting as if certain propositions are true: that theoreticalentities exist, that there are material perceptual objects, that the worldis uniform across time (1.3). After this analysis of examples the author‘sgeneral approach for developing criteria for the validity (...)
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  38. William G. Lycan & George N. Schlesinger (1988). You Bet Your Life: Pascal’s Wager Defended. In Joel Feinberg (ed.), Reason and Responsibility. Wadsworth.
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  39. J. J. MacIntosh (2000). Is Pascal's Wager Self-Defeating? Sophia 39 (2):1-30.
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  40. Jack MacIntosh (2008). Pascal's Wager. Dialogue 47 (3/4):708-710.
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  41. Jack MacIntosh (2008). Pascal's Wager: Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God Jeff Jordan Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006, X + 227 Pp., £35.00. [REVIEW] Dialogue 47 (3-4):708-.
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  42. Michael Martin (1983). Pascal's Wager as an Argument for Not Believing in God. Religious Studies 19 (1):57 - 64.
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  43. Peter Millican (1989). The Devil's Advocate. Cogito 3 (3):193-207.
    Over the centuries, many different arguments have been used to support the belief in God. These range from the abstruse and theoretical, such as Anselm’s famous Ontological Argument, to the relatively downto-earth and practical, such as Pascal’s Wager; but nearly all of them share a common weakness on which I intend to focus. I shall claim that the theistic arguments typically take for granted that in order to establish the existence of God they have only to establish the existence of (...)
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  44. Bradley Monton (2011). Mixed Strategies Can't Evade Pascal's Wager. Analysis 71 (4):642-645.
    I defend Pascal's Wager from a particular way of evading it, the mixed strategy approach. The mixed strategies approach suggests that Pascal's Wager does not obligate one to believe in God, because one can get the same infinite expected utility from other strategies besides the strategy of believing in God. I will show that while there's nothing technically wrong with the mixed strategy approach, rationality requires it to be applied in such a way that Pascal's Wager doesn't lose any force.
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  45. Gregory Mougin & Elliott Sober (1994). Betting Against Pascal's Wager. Noûs 28 (3):382-395.
    Only one traditional objection to Pascal's wager is telling: Pascal assumes a particular theology, but without justification. We produce two new objections that go deeper. We show that even if Pascal's theology is assumed to be probable, Pascal's argument does not go through. In addition, we describe a wager that Pascal never considered, which leads away from Pascal's conclusion. We then consider the impact of these considerations on other prudential arguments concerning what one should believe, and on the more general (...)
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  46. Virgil Martin Nemoianu (2010). The Insufficiency of the Many Gods Objection to Pascal's Wager. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 84 (3):513-530.
    Perhaps the best known criticism of Pascal’s wager is the many Gods objection. As so often with anglophone criticisms of Pascal, the many Gods objectiontypically treats the wager in isolation from the rest of Pascal’s thought. In this case, the truncated reading has issued in the view that Pascal was indifferent toor ignorant of the possibility that Gods other than the one described by Catholic theology might exist. This view is false. Even a cursory glance beyond the wagerfragment reveals that (...)
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  47. Larimore Reid Nicholl (1978). Pascal's Wager: The Bet is Off. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 39 (2):274-280.
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  48. Graham Oppy (1996). Pascal's Wager is a Possible Bet (but Not a Very Good One): Reply to Harmon Holcomb III. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 40 (2):101 - 116.
    In "To Bet The Impossible Bet", Harmon Holcomb III argues: (i) that Pascal's wager is structurally incoherent; (ii) that if it were not thus incoherent, then it would be successful; and (iii) that my earlier critique of Pascal's wager in "On Rescher On Pascal's Wager" is vitiated by its reliance on "logicist" presuppositions. I deny all three claims. If Pascal's wager is "incoherent", this is only because of its invocation of infinite utilities. However, even if infinite utilities are admissible, the (...)
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  49. Graham Oppy (1991). On Rescher on Pascal's Wager. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 30 (3):159 - 168.
    In Pascal's Wager: A Study Of Practical Reasoning In Philosophical Theology ,[1] Nicholas Rescher aims to show that, contrary to received philosophical opinion, Pascal's Wager argument is "the vehicle of a fruitful and valuable insight--one which not only represents a milestone in the development of an historically important tradition of thought but can still be seen as making an instructive contribution to philosophical theology".[2] In particular, Rescher argues that one only needs to adopt a correct perspective in order to see (...)
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  50. Lawrence Pasternack (2013). The Many Gods Objection to Pascal's Wager: A Decision Theoretic Response. Philo 15 (2):158-178.
    The Many Gods Objection (MGO) is widely viewed as a decisive criticism of Pascal’s Wager. By introducing a plurality of hypotheses with infinite expected utility into the decision matrix, the wagerer is left without adequate grounds to decide between them. However, some have attempted to rebut this objection by employing various criteria drawn from the theological tradition. Unfortunately, such defenses do little good for an argument that is supposed to be an apologetic aimed at atheists and agnostics. The purpose of (...)
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