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  1. Keith Allen, Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules, and the Problem of the External World.
  2. Guy Axtell (2007). Two for the Show: Anti-Luck and Virtue Epistemologies in Consonance. Synthese 158 (3):363 - 383.
    This essay extends my side of a discussion begun earlier with Duncan Pritchard, the recent author of Epistemic Luck.Pritchard’s work contributes significantly to improving the “diagnostic appeal” of a neo-Moorean philosophical response to radical scepticism. While agreeing with Pritchard in many respects, the paper questions the need for his concession to the sceptic that the neo-Moorean is capable at best of recovering “‘brute’ externalist knowledge”. The paper discusses and directly responds to a dilemma that Pritchard poses for virtue epistemologies (VE). (...)
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  3. Benjamin Bayer (2010). Quine's Pragmatic Solution to Sceptical Doubts. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (2):177-204.
    In this paper I examine a series of criticisms that have been levelled against Quine's naturalized epistemology, regarding its response to the problem of scepticism. Barry Stroud and Michael Williams, assuming that Quine wishes to refute scepticism, argue that Quine not only fails to undertake this refutation, but is also committed to theses (such as the inscrutability of reference and the underdetermination of theory by evidence) which imply versions of scepticism of their own. In Quine's defence, Roger Gibson argues that (...)
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  4. Akeel Bilgrami (2004). Scepticism and Pragmatism. In Denis McManus (ed.), Wittgenstein and Scepticism. Routledge. 56--75.
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  5. Carolyn Black (1999). Naturalistic Responses to Skepticism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 57:67-79.
    One of the many philosophical responses to scepticism is naturalism. It is explored how and to what extent it is successful in discussing these questions as they pertain external world scepticism. One interesting feature of naturalism is that it shares with scepticism the view that we lack proof and knowledge of an external world. The naturalist, however, unlike many sceptics and their more traditional disputants, doesn't think it matters. The first part of the paper contains a description of the naturalistic (...)
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  6. Cameron Boult & Duncan Pritchard (2013). Wittgensteinian Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Vertigo. Philosophia 41 (1):27-35.
    We offer an overview of what we take to be the main themes in Annalisa Coliva’s book, Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense. In particular, we focus on the ‘framework reading’ that she offers of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and its anti-sceptical implications. While broadly agreeing with the proposal that Coliva puts forward on this score, we do suggest one important supplementation to the view—viz., that this way of dealing with radical scepticism needs to be augmented with an account (...)
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  7. Tom Burke (2000). What is a Situation? History and Philosophy of Logic 21 (2):95-113.
    This paper examines the role of ?situations? in John Dewey's philosophy of logic. To do this properly it is necessary to contrast Dewey's conception of experience and mentality with views characteristic of modern epistemology. The primary difference is that, rather than treat experience as peripheral and or external to mental functions (reason, etc.), we should treat experience as a field in and as a part of which thinking takes place. Experience in this broad sense subsumes theory and fact, hypothesis and (...)
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  8. Herman Cappelen (2005). Pluralistic Skepticism: Advertisement for Speech Act Pluralism. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):15–39.
    Even though the lines of thought that support skepticism are extremely compelling, we're inclined to look for ways of blocking them because it appears to be an impossible view to accept, both for intellectual and practical reasons. One goal of this paper is to show that when skepticism is packaged right, it has few problematic implications (or at least fewer than is often assumed). It is, for example, compatible with all the following claims (when these are correctly interpreted).
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  9. F. F. Centore (1981). Hume, Reid and Scepticism. Philosophical Studies 28:212-220.
  10. Frédéric Cossutta (2003). Toward a Skeptical Criticism of Transcendental Pragmatics. Philosophy and Rhetoric 36 (4):301-329.
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  11. Terence Cuneo & René van Woudenberg (eds.) (2004). The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid. Cambridge University Press.
    Widely acknowledged as the principal architect of Scottish common sense philosophy, Thomas Reid is increasingly recognized today as one of the finest philosophers of the eighteenth century. Combining a sophisticated response to the skeptical and idealist views of his day, Reid's thought represents an important alternative to Humean skepticism, Kantian idealism and Cartesian rationalism. This work covers not only his philosophy but his scientific research and extensive historical influence.
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  12. Heiner F. Klemme Dieter Schönecker & Manfred Kuehn (eds.) (2006). “Practical Reason and Motivational Scepticism”, in Heiner F. Klemme, Manfred Kuehn, Dieter Schönecker, Eds., Moralische Motivation. Kant Und Die Alternativen. Kant-Forschungen. [REVIEW] Felix Meiner Verlag.
  13. John Fox (2008). What is at Issue Between Epistemic and Traditional Accounts of Truth? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):407 – 420.
    I will discuss those epistemic accounts of truth that say, roughly and at least, that the truth is what all ideally rational people, with maximum evidence, would in the long run come to believe. They have been defended on the grounds that they can solve sceptical problems that traditional accounts cannot surmount, and that they explain the value of truth in ways that traditional (and particularly, minimal) accounts cannot; they have been attacked on the grounds that they collapse into idealism. (...)
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  14. Brian Grant (2001). The Virtues of Common Sense. Philosophy 76 (2):191-209.
    I defend, in this paper, a version of a philosophy of common sense. I have use of some things from Reid's account of these matters, others from Wittgenstein's. Scepticism looms large—as do the questions of arguments for and examples of common sense. At least two different notions of common sense emerge, one of which has often been overlooked by philosophers.
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  15. Ingemund Gullv (1964). Scepticism and Absurdity. Inquiry 7 (1-4):163 – 190.
    Analytic rejections of extreme traditional views, especially scepticism, as 'absurd' in some sense of violating 'rules' of discourse, arc considered. References to linguistic and pragmatic rules are discussed and found inadequate as bases for rejecting scepticism. References to logical principles alone are found to lead into scepticism. The claim that epistemology and scepticism take for granted an inadequate theory of words like 'know', or 'knowledge', as descriptive predicates, is considered. Alternatives, construing such words as appraisive or performative, are discussed, but (...)
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  16. Ingemund Gullvåg (1964). Scepticism and Absurdity. Inquiry 7 (1-4):163-190.
    Analytic rejections of extreme traditional views, especially scepticism, as ?absurd? in some sense of violating ?rules? of discourse, arc considered. References to linguistic and pragmatic rules are discussed and found inadequate as bases for rejecting scepticism. References to logical principles alone are found to lead into scepticism. The claim that epistemology and scepticism take for granted an inadequate theory of words like ?know?, or ?knowledge?, as descriptive predicates, is considered. Alternatives, construing such words as appraisive or performative, are discussed, but (...)
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  17. Ian Hacking (1985). Rules, Scepticism, Proof, Wittgenstein. In , Exercises in Analysis: Essays by Students of Casimir Lewy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  18. Christopher Hookway (1992). Russell and the Possibility of Scepticism. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 6 (2):95 - 110.
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  19. Michael Hymers (2000). Philosophy and its Epistemic Neuroses. Westview Press.
    Philosophers have often thought that concepts such as ”knowledge” and ”truth” are appropriate objects for theoretical investigation. In a discussion which ranges widely over recent analytical philosophy and radical theory, Philosophy and Its Epistemic Neuroses takes issue with this assumption, arguing that such theoreticism is not the solution but the source of traditional problems in epistemology (How can we have knowledge of the world around us? How can we have knowledge of other minds and cultures? How can we have knowledge (...)
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  20. Mark Kingwell (1995). The Plain Truth About Common Sense: Skepticism, Metaphysics, and Irony. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 9 (3):169 - 188.
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  21. C. L. (1958). Bertrand Russell, the Passionate Sceptic. Review of Metaphysics 11 (4):698-698.
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  22. Tony Lambie (2009). Scope and the Limits of Rational Explanation. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):117-124.
    The Reason Why by Edo Pivčević is an unconventional philosophy book. The author takes the wind out of the sails of the sceptic’s argument by removing its basis. It is neither epistemology nor ontology; nor does its outcome fall into the usual categories vis à vis the real, including pragmatism. A complete system is developed through a profound examination of explanation, contrasting the conceptual approach with the unbounded naturalistic kind and its dangers, illuminating examples of the latter kind with misunderstandings (...)
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  23. Byeong D. Lee (2014). Epistemic Principles and Epistemic Circularity. Philosophia 42 (2):413-432.
    Can we show that our senses are reliable sources of information about the world? To show this, we need to establish that most of our perceptual judgments have been true. But we cannot determine these inductive instances without relying upon sense perception. Thus, it seems, we cannot establish the reliability of sense perception by means of an argument without falling into epistemic circularity. In this paper, I argue that this consequence is not an epistemological disaster. For this purpose, I defend (...)
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  24. James Lenman (1994). Beliefs About Other Minds: A Pragmatic Justification. American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (3):223-34.
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  25. Erik Lundestad (2008). The Necessity of Pragmatism: Overcoming the Stalemate of Common Sense. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 6 (2):175-187.
    The paper argues that the relation between the philosophy of common sense and skepticism ought to be perceived of as the relation between the two horns of a dilemma. Each position, it is therefore said, is able to confront the other with a valid objection, something which implies that neither of the two positions are defensible as such. The dilemma is only resolved, it is argued, by the way in which a pragmatic approach to knowledge enables us to incorporate the (...)
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  26. Erik Lundestad (2006). The Skeptic and The Madman: The Proto‐Pragmatism of Thomas Reid. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 4 (2):125-137.
    Even though the philosophy of common sense is not justifi able as such, the assump- tion upon which it rests, namely that there are things which we are not in position to doubt is correct. The reason why Thomas Reid was unable to bring this assumption out in a justifi able manner is that his views, both on knowledge and nature, are to be considered dogmatic. American pragmatists such as Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey on the other hand, may (...)
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  27. Diego E. Machuca (2013). Review of M. Lynch, In Praise of Reason (MIT Press, 2012). [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 33 (4):308-311.
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  28. Joseph Margolis (2008). Review of Edo Pivevi, The Reason Why: A Theory of Philosophical Explanation. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (1).
    Edo Pivčević's The Reason Why is a thoroughly admirable book: absolutely straightforward and simple in argument, charmingly written, uncompromisingly legible but widely and tactfully informed, bent on asking and answering a single fundamental question usually cast as "metaphysical" or (after Kant) "epistemological", but, in Pivčević's hands, skillfully turned in what must be called a "pragmatist" direction. Careful readers may find (as I do) that the general lines of the argument are notably congruent with some of Charles Peirce's earliest accounts of (...)
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  29. Joseph Margolis (1977). Skepticism, Foundationalism, and Pragmatism. American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (2):119 - 127.
    This article formulates the grounds on which a pragmatist theory of knowledge may be favored against skepticism and foundationalism without requiring the refutation of skepticism. It explores in considerable detail some of the central positions bearing on the issue, Including views of g e moore, Bertrand russell, Roderick chisholm, Keith lehrer, Leonard nelson. It also provides a fresh characterization of pragmatism and shows the bearing of theories of truth on the justification of knowledge claims.
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  30. Anne Newstead, Showing Certainty: An Essay on Wittgenstein's Response to Scepticism.
    Coping with everyday life limits the extent of one’s scepticism. It is practically impossible to doubt the existence of the things with which one is immediately engaged and interacting. To doubt that, say, a door exists, is to step back from merely using the door (opening it) and to reflect on it in a detached, theoretical way. It is impossible to simultaneously act and live immersed in situation S while doubting that one is in S. Sceptical doubts—such as ‘Is this (...)
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  31. Robert Northcott, Innateness and Science.
    Although a huge range of definitions has accumulated in the philosophy, biology and psychology literatures, no consensus has been reached on exactly what innateness amounts to. This has helped fuel an increasing skepticism, one that views the concept as anachronistic and actually harmful to science. Yet it remains central to many life sciences, and to several public policy issues too. So it is correspondingly urgent that its philosophical underpinnings be properly cleaned up. In this paper, I present a new approach (...)
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  32. Erik J. Olsson (2005). Not Giving the Skeptic a Hearing: Pragmatism and Radical Doubt. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):98–126.
    Pragmatist responses to radical skepticism do not receive much attention in contemporary analytic epistemology. This observation is my motivation for undertaking a search for a coherent pragmatist reply to radical doubt, one that can compete, in terms of clarity and sophistication, with the currently most popular approaches, such as contextualism and relevant alternatives theory. As my point of departure I take the texts of C. S. Peirce and William James. The Jamesian response is seen to consist in the application of (...)
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  33. Stephen C. Pepper (1936). The Quest for Ignorance or the Reasonable Limits of Skepticism. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 45 (2):126-143.
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  34. Justine Pila (2009). Authorship and E-Science: Balancing Epistemological Trust and Skepticism in the Digital Environment. Social Epistemology 23 (1):1-24.
    In this essay I consider the role of authorship in balancing epistemological trust and skepticism in e-science. Drawing on studies of the diagnostic practices of doctors in British breast care units and the gate-keeping practices of a Californian publisher of (professional and amateur) horticultural works, I suggest that conventions of authorial designation have an important role to play in nurturing the skepticism essential for scientific rigor within the framework of epistemological trust that pragmatism and morality require. In so (...)
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  35. Duncan Pritchard, Contemporary Anti-Scepticism.
    This paper examines the relevance of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty to the contemporary debate regarding the problem of radical scepticism. In particular, it considers two accounts in the recent literature which have seen in Wittgenstein’s remarks on “hinge propositions” in On Certainty the basis for a primarily epistemological anti-sceptical thesis—viz., the inferential contextualism offered by Michael Williams and the ‘unearned warrant’ thesis defended by Crispin Wright. Both positions are shown to be problematic, both as interpretations of Wittgenstein and as anti-sceptical theses. (...)
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  36. Nicholas Rescher (1977). Methodological Pragmatism: A Systems-Theoretic Approach to the Theory of Knowledge. Blackwell.
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  37. George Santayana (1955). Scepticism and Animal Faith. [New York]Dover Publications.
    Detailed presentation of American philosopher's pragmatic concept of epistemology, isolation of realms of existents and subsistents.
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  38. F. C. S. Schiller (1907). Pragmatism Versus Skepticism. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 4 (18):482-487.
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  39. Jarnes Seaton (2005). Skepticism, Romanticism and “Penitent Art”. Overheard in Seville 23 (23):9-15.
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  40. Edward Shirley (1989). The Right to Believe and Skepticism. Southwest Philosophy Review 5 (1):87-95.
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  41. Lawrence Sklar (1973). Statistical Explanation and Ergodic Theory. Philosophy of Science 40 (2):194-212.
    Some philosphers of science of an empiricist and pragmatist bent have proposed models of statistical explanation, but have then become sceptical of the adequacy of these models. It is argued that general considerations concerning the purpose of function of explanation in science which are usually appealed to by such philosophers show that their scepticism is not well taken; for such considerations provide much the same rationale for the search for statistical explanations, as these philosophers have characterized them, as they do (...)
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  42. Kenneth Stern (1963). Private Language and Skepticism. Journal of Philosophy 60 (24):745-759.
  43. Eric Thompson (2010). Pragmatic Invariantism and External World Skepticism. Southwest Philosophy Review 26 (1):35-42.
    Simply stated, Pragmatic Invariantism is the view that the practical interests of a person can influence whether that person’s true belief constitutes knowledge. My primary objective in this article is to show that Pragmatic Invariantism entails external world skepticism. Toward this end, I’ll first introduce a basic version of Pragmatic Invariantism (PI). Then I’ll introduce a sample skeptical hypothesis (SK) to the framework. From this I will show that it is extremely important that the phenomenally equivalent skeptical scenarios generated by (...)
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  44. William Throop (1998). Defeating the Skeptic. Philosophia 26 (3-4):321-336.
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  45. Mary Tiles (1987). Science and Scepticism By John Watkins London: Hutchinson, 1985, Xvii+387 Pp., £25.00. [REVIEW] Philosophy 62 (240):256-.
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  46. Roger Trigg (1981). Scepticism By Nicholas Rescher Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980, Xii + 265 Pp., £12.50. [REVIEW] Philosophy 56 (218):591-.
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  47. Nicholas Unwin (2007). Aiming at Truth. Palgrave Macmillan.
    The author argues that is not obvious what it means for our beliefs and assertions to be "truth-directed", and that we need to weaken our ordinary notion of a belief if we are to deal with radical scepticism without surrendering to idealism. Topics examined also include whether there could be alien conceptual schemes and what might happen to us if we abandoned genuine belief in place of mere pragmatic acceptance. A radically new "ecological" model of knowledge is defended.
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  48. Hamid Vahid (2011). The Concept of Entitlement and its Epistemic Relevance. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):380-399.
    Crispin Wright has recently suggested that, in addition to the notion of justification, we also possess a non-evidential notion of warrant, ‘entitlement’, that can play an important role in responding to various skeptical questions. My concern here is with the question of whether entitlement constitutes an epistemic kind of warrant. I claim Wright's argument for this thesis at most shows that entitlement has a pragmatic character. Having identified the sources of the troubles of this argument in its underlying assumptions, I (...)
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  49. John M. Vickers (2000). I Believe It, but Soon I'll Not Believe It Any More: Scepticism, Empiricism, and Reflection. Synthese 124 (2):155-174.
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  50. Andrew Ward (2000). Scepticism, Truth and Pragmatic Inquiry. Southwest Philosophy Review 17 (1):159-172.
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