The Buddhist concept of skillful means , as introduced inMahāyāna sūtras, exposes a new awareness of the gap between text and meaning. Although the term is sometimes taken to point to the Buddha's pedagogical skills, this interpretation ignores the provocative use of the term in Mahāyāna texts. Treating skillful means as a universal Buddhist concept also fails to explain why and for what purpose it first became predominant in the Mahāyāna. Looking at the use of skillful means in the Lotus (...) Sūtra and in the Skill in Means Sūtra reveals a hermeneutic device aimed at criticizing an existing corpus of Buddhist literature. As such, skillful means is used to demonstrate that the old doctrine and the life of the Buddha contained fictitious features and were nothing but skillful means. This indicates a growing awareness of a gap between literal expressions and their hidden meaning that can only arise after some kind of religious corpus has been established. (shrink)

What should you do when you discover that someone firmly disagrees with you on some claim? Suppose you know that someone has seen all your evidence and you’ve seen all hers. Suppose further that you know that both of you have evaluated that common body of evidence for about the same length of time. You also know that she’s about as clever, thorough, and open-minded as you are, both generally and with respect to the issues at hand. You know that (...) you have about the same relevant biases. At this point, before you find out her opinion on some claim P relevant to the topic, you fully admit that you can’t think of any epistemic advantage you have over her when it comes to the topic in question; you admit that she’s just as likely to get P’s truth-value right as you are (whether or not you’re right about that won’t matter). Let’s say that under these conditions she is your recognized epistemic peer with regard to P (I’ll relax some of these conditions below). And then after learning all this about her you find out that she thinks P is false, whereas you had already concluded to yourself that P is true. (shrink)

In this paper, we claim that the disambiguation ofreferring expressions in discourse can be formulated in terms automatedreasoners can address. Specifically, we show that consistency,informativity and minimality are criteria which (i) can be implementedusing automated reasoning tools and (ii) can be used to disambiguatenoun-noun compounds, metonymy and definite descriptions.

As Grice defined it, a speaker conversationally implicates that p only if the speaker expects the hearer to recognize that the speaker thinks that p. This paper argues that in the sorts of cases that Grice took as paradigmatic examples of conversational implicature there is in fact no need for the hearer to consider what the speaker might thus have in mind. Instead, the hearer might simply make an inference from what the speaker literally says and the situation in which (...) the utterance takes place. In addition, a number of sources of the illusion of conversational implicatures in Grice's sense are identified and diagnosed. (shrink)

: This essay introduces a way of reading the Mengzi (Mencius) that complicates how we understand what Mengzi is recorded as saying. A pragmatic-strategic reading of the Mengzi is developed here, according to which Mengzi attends to and operates under important pragmatic constraints on speech. Based on a close reading of key passages, it is argued that truth-telling and descriptive accuracy are less important to Mengzi than guiding people along the Confucian path. This reading has implications for our understanding of (...) Mengzi’s philosophical positions and his methods of argumentation, as well as for our understanding of philosophical activity in general. (shrink)

Abstract: Despite all the critical scrutiny they have received recently, contextualist views in philosophy are still not well understood. Neither contextualists nor their opponents have been entirely clear about what contextualist theses amount to and what they are based on. In this article I show that there are actually two kinds of contextualist view that rest on two very different semantic phenomena, namely, semantic incompleteness and semantic indeterminacy . I explain how contextualist approaches can be used to dissolve certain debates (...) in philosophy. According to such approaches, the same philosophical thesis can be correctly endorsed in some contexts and correctly denied in others: it is thus pointless to seek a context-independent solution to debates about this thesis. My purpose is not to defend particular contextualist views but to lay out the general framework on which they rest: this allows us to see more clearly the similarities and differences among contextualist views defended in various areas of philosophy. (shrink)

Most cognitive theories agree that a listener of a sports broadcast on radio usually imagines the scene described; the concept `mental image' appears in a specific sort of explanations. In contrast to this conception, it is argued that this concept should rather be understood as part of a certain kind of grounding explanations of the radio listener's understanding. This particular conception is based on the distinction between `specification' and `implementation' as found in the theory of abstract data types. Its application (...) to the field of spatial concepts leads to a computational system (ANTLIMA) which exemplifies how the expression `mental image' could be used while explaining a speaker's ability to control the resolvability of ambiguities in an objective report of what the speaker sees. (shrink)

The central problem for pragmatics is that sentence meaning vastly underdetermines speaker’s meaning. The goal of pragmatics is to explain how the gap between sentence meaning and speaker’s meaning is bridged. This paper defends the broadly Gricean view that pragmatic interpretation is ultimately an exercise in mind-reading, involving the inferential attribution of intentions. We argue, however, that the interpretation process does not simply consist in applying general mind-reading abilities to a particular (communicative) domain. Rather, it involves a dedicated comprehension module, (...) with its own special principles and mechanisms. We show how such a metacommunicative module might have evolved, and what principles and mechanisms it might contain. (shrink)

This article deals with the relationship between language and thought, focusing on the question of whether language can be a vehicle of thought, as, for example, Peter Carruthers has claimed. We develop and examine a powerful argument—the "argument from explicitness"—against this cognitive role of language. The premises of the argument are just two: (1) the vehicle of thought has to be explicit, and (2) natural languages are not explicit. We explain what these simple premises mean and why we should believe (...) they are true. Finally, we argue that even though the argument from explicitness shows that natural language cannot be a vehicle of thought, there is a cognitive function for language. (shrink)