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  1. Sean Allen-Hermanson (2001). The Pragmatist's Troubles With Bivalence and Counterfactuals. Dialogue 40 (4):669-90.
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  2. R. Almeder (1992). Truth and the End of Inquiry. Review of Metaphysics 45 (4):874-875.
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  3. Luke Anderson (1965). The Concept of Truth in the Philosophy of William James. Rome.
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  4. James Beebe (2007). Reliabilism and Antirealist Theories of Truth. Erkenntnis 66 (3):375 - 391.
    In order to shed light on the question of whether reliabilism entails or excludes certain kinds of truth theories, I examine two arguments that purport to establish that reliabilism cannot be combined with antirealist and epistemic theories of truth. I take antirealism about truth to be the denial of the recognition-transcendence of truth, and epistemic theories to be those that identify truth with some kind of positive epistemic status. According to one argument, reliabilism and antirealism are incompatible because the former (...)
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  5. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Against Naturalism About Truth. In Kelly Clark (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Naturalism.
    The chapter distinguishes between a weak and a strong form of ontological naturalism. Strong ontological naturalism is the view that all truths can be deduced, at least in principle, from truths about physical entities at the lowest level of organization, for example, truths about the elementary particles and forces. Weak ontological naturalism is the view that only physical properties can be causally efficacious. Strong ontological naturalism entails weak ontological naturalism but not vice versa. I then argue that the existence of (...)
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  6. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Against Naturalism About Truth. In Kelly Clark (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Naturalism.
    The chapter distinguishes between a weak and a strong form of ontological naturalism. Strong ontological naturalism is the view that all truths can be deduced, at least in principle, from truths about physical entities at the lowest level of organization, for example, truths about the elementary particles and forces. Weak ontological naturalism is the view that only physical properties can be causally efficacious. Strong ontological naturalism entails weak ontological naturalism but not vice versa. I then argue that the existence of (...)
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  7. Matthew J. Brown (2015). John Dewey's Pragmatist Alternative to the Belief-Acceptance Dichotomy. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 53:62-70.
    Defenders of value-free science appeal to cognitive attitudes as part of a wedge strategy, to mark a distinction between science proper and the uses of science for decision-making, policy, etc. Distinctions between attitudes like belief and acceptance have played an important role in defending the value-free ideal. In this paper, I will explore John Dewey's pragmatist philosophy of science as an alternative to the philosophical framework the wedge strategy rests on. Dewey does draw significant and useful distinctions between different sorts (...)
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  8. Darragh Byrne (2000). Critical Notices: Horwich's Semantic Deflationism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (3):371 – 391.
  9. Marc Champagne (2016). On Alethic Functionalism’s (Absurdly?) Wide Applicability. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):29-39.
    Alethic functionalism, as propounded by Michael Lynch, is the view that there are different ways to be true, but that these differences nevertheless contain enough unity to forestall outright pluralism. This view has many virtues. Yet, since one could conceivably apply Lynch’s “one and many” strategy to other debates, I try to show how his argumentative steps can be used to solve — not just the controversy pertaining to truth — but any controversy that surrounds a “What is X?” question.
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  10. Harvey Cormier (2011). A Fairly Short Response to a Really Short Refutation. Journal of Philosophical Research 36:35-41.
    Brian Ribeiro argues that the pragmatic theory of truth massively misrepresents the actual use of the terms “true” and “truth.” Truths, he observes, can be distinguished from “illusions.” The latter misrepresent reality and the former do not. Psychologists, as they report on the way mentally healthy people commonly overestimate themselves, draw just this distinction. They tell us of many beliefs that are “adaptive” but illusory. Pragmatists cannot draw this distinction because their theory explains truth as adaptiveness. Therefore no sensible person (...)
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  11. Cesare Cozzo (1998). Epistemic Truth and Excluded Middle. Theoria 64 (2-3):243-282.
    Can an epistemic conception of truth and an endorsement of the excluded middle (together with other principles of classical logic abandoned by the intuitionists) cohabit in a plausible philosophical view? In PART I I describe the general problem concerning the relation between the epistemic conception of truth and the principle of excluded middle. In PART II I give a historical overview of different attitudes regarding the problem. In PART III I sketch a possible holistic solution.
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  12. Itala M. Loffredo DàOttaviano & Carlos Hifume (2007). Peircean Pragmatic Truth and da Costa's Quasi-Truth. In L. Magnani & P. Li (eds.), Model-Based Reasoning in Science, Technology, and Medicine. Springer 383--398.
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  13. Marian David (2004). Theories of Truth. In I. Niiniluoto, M. Sintonen & J. Wolenski (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology. Kluwer 331--414.
  14. Phillip E. Devine (1990). Truth and Pragmatism in Higher Education. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 5 (1):67-74.
  15. Michael Dummett (1983). Language and Truth. In Roy Harris (ed.), Approaches to Language. Pergamon
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  16. Michael A. E. Dummett (1978). Truth and Other Enigmas. Harvard University Press.
  17. Luiz H. A. Dutra (2004). A Pragmatic View of Truth. Principia 8 (2):259-277.
    This paper proposes an alternative view of the connection between knowledge and truth. Truth is traditionally seen as a semantic notion, i.e. a relation between what we say about the world and the world itself. Epistemologists and philosophers of science are therefore apt to resort to correspondence theories of truth in order to deal with the question whether our theories and beliefs are true. Correspondence theories try to define truth, but, in order to do so, they must choose a truth (...)
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  18. Jim Edwards (1996). Anti-Realist Truth and Concepts of Superassertibility. Synthese 109 (1):103 - 120.
    Crispin Wright offers superassertibility as an anti-realist explication of truth. A statement is superassertible, roughly, if there is a state of information available which warrants it and it is warranted by all achievable enlargements of that state of information. However, it is argued, Wright fails to take account of the fact that many of our test procedures are not sure fire, even when applied under ideal conditions. An alternative conception of superassertibility is constructed to take this feature into account. However, (...)
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  19. Brian Ellis (1988). Internal Realism. Synthese 76 (3):409 - 434.
    I argue in this paper that anyone who accepts the ontology of scientific realism can only accept a pragmatic theory of truth, i.e., a theory on which truth is what it is epistemically right to believe. But the combination of realism with such a theory of truth is a form of internal realism; therefore, a scientific realist should be an internal realist. The strategy of the paper is to argue that there is no adequate semantic or correspondence theory of truth (...)
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  20. Gertrude Ezorsky (1967). Pragmatic Theory of Truth. In Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. New York, Macmillan 6--427.
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  21. John Fox (2008). What is at Issue Between Epistemic and Traditional Accounts of Truth? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):407 – 420.
    I will discuss those epistemic accounts of truth that say, roughly and at least, that the truth is what all ideally rational people, with maximum evidence, would in the long run come to believe. They have been defended on the grounds that they can solve sceptical problems that traditional accounts cannot surmount, and that they explain the value of truth in ways that traditional (and particularly, minimal) accounts cannot; they have been attacked on the grounds that they collapse into idealism. (...)
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  22. Harry G. Frankfurt (1960). Meaning, Truth, and Pragmatism. Philosophical Quarterly 10 (39):171-176.
  23. Alexander George (1984). On Devitt on Dummett. Journal of Philosophy 81 (9):516-527.
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  24. F. H. George (1955). On a "Pragmatic" Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophy 52 (19):518-521.
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  25. Michael Glanzberg, Truth. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Truth is one of the central subjects in philosophy. It is also one of the largest. Truth has been a topic of discussion in its own right for thousands of years. Moreover, a huge variety of issues in philosophy relate to truth, either by relying on theses about truth, or implying theses about truth.
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  26. Pietro Gori (2013). Nietzsche on Truth: A Pragmatic View? In Renate Reschke (ed.), Nietzscheforschung. Akademie Verlag
    In this paper I deal with Nietzsche's theory of knowledge in the context of 19th century epistemology. In particular, I argue that, even though Nietzsche shows the ontological lack of content of truths (both on the theoretic and on the moral plane), he nevertheless leaves the space for a practical use of them, in a way that can be compared with William James' pragmatism. I thus deal with Nietzsche's and James' concept of "truth", and show their relationship with some outcomes (...)
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  27. Benjamin A. Gorman (2009). Review of What’s the Use of Truth? [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 29 (3):219-220.
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  28. Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.) (2006). Truth and Realism. Oxford University Press.
    Is truth objective or relative? What exists independently of our minds? The essays in this book debate these two questions, which are among the oldest of philosophical issues and have vexed almost every major philosopher, from Plato, to Kant, to Wittgenstein. Fifteen eminent contributors bring fresh perspectives, renewed energy, and original answers to debates of great interest both within philosophy and in the culture at large.
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  29. Susan Haack (1976). The Pragmatist Theory of Truth. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27 (3):231-249.
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  30. Lucas P. Halpin, Pragmatism and the Point of Inquiry.
    This essay is expository, but not exegetical. I’ll present a version of truth-rejecting pragmatism. My goal is to keep it simple, keep it clear, and portray it as a reasonable and attractive scientific view of language. We’ll work our way towards the view via series of violations of the commonsense web of belief about language, motivated by naturalism. Once truth has been rejected, it’s only natural to wonder what the point of inquiry, or science, is. Supposing there are no objective (...)
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  31. Matthew C. Halteman (2000). Agent Provocateur: A Review of Richard Rorty's Truth and Progress. [REVIEW] Books and Culture 5 (3).
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  32. M. Hand (2003). Knowability and Epistemic Truth. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):216 – 228.
    The so-called knowability paradox results from Fitch's argument that if there are any unknown truths, then there are unknowable truths. This threatens recent versions of semantical antirealism, the central thesis of which is that truth is epistemic. When this is taken to mean that all truths are knowable, antirealism is thus committed to the conclusion that no truths are unknown. The correct antirealistic response to the paradox should be to deny that the fundamental thesis of the epistemic nature of truth (...)
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  33. C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss & A. W. Burks (1931). The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Harvard University Press.
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  34. Glen Hoffmann (2008). Truth, Superassertability, and Conceivability. Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (3):287-299.
    The superassertability theory of truth, inspired by Crispin Wright (1992, 2003), holds that a statement is true if and only if it is superassertable in the following sense: it possesses warrant that cannot be defeated by any improvement of our information. While initially promising, the superassertability theory of truth is vulnerable to a persistent difficulty highlighted by James Van Cleve (1996) and Terrence Horgan (1995) but not properly fleshed out: it is formally illegitimate in a similar sense that unsophisticated epistemic (...)
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  35. Nancy J. Holland (1995). Convergence on Whose Truth?: Feminist Philosophy and the "Masculine Intellect" of Pragmatism. Journal of Social Philosophy 26 (2):170-183.
  36. P. Horwich (1994). Theories of Truth. Dartmouth.
  37. Andrew Howat (2005). Pragmatism, Truth and Response-Dependence. Facta Philosophica 7 (2):231-253.
    Mark Johnston claims the pragmatist theory of truth is inconsistent with the way we actually employ and talk about that concept. He is, however, sympathetic enough to attempt to rescue its respectable core using ‘response-dependence’, a revisionary form of which he advocates as a method for clarifying various philosophically significant concepts. But Johnston has misrepresented pragmatism; it does not require rescuing, and as I show here, his ‘missing explanation argument’ against pragmatism therefore fails. What Johnston and other critics including Putnam (...)
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  38. William James (1978). Pragmatism, a New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking ; the Meaning of Truth, a Sequel to Pragmatism. Harvard University Press.
  39. William James (1908). The Meaning of the Word 'Truth'. Mind 17 (67):455-456.
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  40. William James (1907). Pragmatism. Dover Publications.
    Noted psychologist and philosopher develops his own brand of pragmatism, based on theories of C. S. Peirce. Emphasis on "radical empiricism," versus the transcendental and rationalist tradition. One of the most important books in American philosophy. Note.
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  41. William James (1907). Pragmatism's Conception of Truth. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 4 (6):141-155.
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  42. William James, Meaning of Truth.
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  43. R. L. Kirkham (1992). Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction. MIT Press.
  44. Kamala Kumari (1987). Notion of Truth in Buddhism and Pragmatism. Capital Pub. House.
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  45. Catherine Legg (2014). Charles Peirce's Limit Concept of Truth. Philosophy Compass 9 (3):204-213.
    This entry explores Charles Peirce's account of truth in terms of the end or ‘limit’ of inquiry. This account is distinct from – and arguably more objectivist than – views of truth found in other pragmatists such as James and Rorty. The roots of the account in mathematical concepts is explored, and it is defended from objections that it is (i) incoherent, (ii) in its faith in convergence, too realist and (iii) in its ‘internal realism’, not realist enough.
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  46. S. Levine (2010). Habermas, Kantian Pragmatism, and Truth. Philosophy and Social Criticism 36 (6):677-695.
    In his book Truth and Justification Habermas replaces his long-held discourse-theoretic conception of truth with what he calls a pragmatic theory of truth. Instead of taking truth to originate in the communicative interactions between subjects, this new theory ties truth to the action contexts of the lifeworld, contexts where the existence of the world is ratified in practice. This, Habermas argues, overcomes the relativism and contextualism endemic to the linguistic turn. This article has two goals: (1) to chart in detail (...)
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  47. Tony Lloyd, Knowledge of False Propositions.
    'Everything you know is wrong' is, for the most part, held to be a contradiction. If a proposition is false then you do not know it, if you know it then it isn't wrong. I disagree. The statements 'I know P', 'he knows P' or 'it is known that P', to the extent that they imply truth imply a different kind of truth from the conventional correspondence-truth. The 'truth' implied is broadly in line with the Pragmatist view of truth. I (...)
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  48. M. P. Lynch (2001). The Nature of Truth: From the Classic to the Contemporary. The MIT Press.
  49. Ian MacKenzie (1995). Pragmatism, Rhetoric and History. Poetics Today 16 (2):283-99.
    Does Richard Rorty’s notion of pragmatism account for patently false arguments such as those of the so-called revisionists, who pretend that the Nazi gas chambers never existed? Is it enough merely to announce that someone who proposes such arguments is simply “not one of us,” or is a member of another “interpretive community,” or that anything can be made to look good or bad by being redescribed and that the only answer to a redescription is a re-redescription? This essay concludes (...)
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  50. Colin McLear (2016). Review of Robert Brandom, From Empiricism to Expressivism. [REVIEW] Ethics 126 (3):808–816.
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