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  1. Horacio Arló-Costa, Social Norms, Rational Choice and Belief Change.
    This article elaborates on foundational issues in the social sciences and their impact on the contemporary theory of belief revision. Recent work in the foundations of economics has focused on the role external social norms play in choice. Amartya Sen has argued in [Sen93] that the traditional rationalizability approach used in the theory of rational choice has serious problems accommodating the role of social norms. Sen’s more recent work [Sen96, Sen97] proposes how one might represent social norms in the theory (...)
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  2. Nomy Arpaly (2011). The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 120 (4):607-609.
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  3. Katie Atkinson & Trevor J. M. Bench-Capon (2007). Practical Reasoning as Presumptive Argumentation Using Action-Based Alternating Transition Systems. Artificial Intelligence 171 (10-15):855-874.
    In this paper we describe an approach to practical reasoning, reasoning about what it is best for a particular agent to do in a given situation, based on presumptive justifications of action through the instantiation of an argument scheme, which is then subject to examination through a series of critical questions. We identify three particular aspects of practical reasoning which distinguish it from theoretical reasoning. We next provide an argument scheme and an associated set of critical questions which is able (...)
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  4. Robert Bass, Sunk Costs.
    Decision theorists generally object to “honoring sunk costs” – that is, treating the fact that some cost has been incurred in the past as a reason for action, apart from the consideration of expected consequences. This paper critiques the doctrine that sunk costs should never be honored on three levels. As background, the rationale for the doctrine is explained. Then it is shown that if it is always irrational to honor sunk costs, then other common and uncontroversial practices are also (...)
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  5. Thomas M. Besch (2011). Kantian Constructivism, the Issue of Scope, and Perfectionism: O'Neill on Ethical Standing. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):1-20.
    Kantian constructivists accord a constitutive, justificatory role to the issue of scope: they typically claim that first-order practical thought depends for its authority on being suitably acceptable within the right scope, or by all relevant others, and some Kantian constructivists, notably Onora O'Neill, hold that our views of the nature and criteria of practical reasoning also depend for their authority on being suitably acceptable within the right scope. The paper considers whether O'Neill-type Kantian constructivism can coherently accord this key role (...)
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  6. Charles Blattberg (2005). Opponents Vs. Adversaries in Plato's "Phaedo&Quot;. History of Philosophy Quarterly 22 (2):109 - 127.
  7. Hugh Chandler, Can There Be Conflict Between Conscience and Self-Love?
    Ethical dualists hold that we have good reason to pursue our own happiness and good reason to pursue moral goodness. It would seem that there is a potential conflict here. On the other hand there have been those who deny even the possibility of conflict, whether or not there is a God and an afterlife. Rawls seems to say, or hint, that this was Butlers’ view, and Kant, according to at least one person, argued that there cannot be conflict here. (...)
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  8. Ruth Chang (2009). Voluntarist Reasons and the Sources of Normativity. In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press.
    In virtue of what does a consideration provide a practical reason? Suppose the fact that an experience is painful provides you with a reason to avoid it. In virtue of what does the fact that it’s painful have the normativity of a reason – where, in other words, does its normativity come from? As some philosophers put the question, what is the source of a reason’s normativity?
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  9. Ruth Chang (2005). Parity, Interval Value, and Choice. Ethics 115 (2):331-350.
    This paper begins with a response to Josh Gert’s challenge that ‘on a par with’ is not a sui generis fourth value relation beyond ‘better than’, ‘worse than’, and ‘equally good’. It then explores two further questions: can parity be modeled by an interval representation of value? And what should one rationally do when faced with items on a par? I argue that an interval representation of value is incompatible with the possibility that items are on a par (a mathematical (...)
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  10. Ruth Chang (2002). The Possibility of Parity. Ethics 112 (4):659-688.
    This paper argues for the existence of a fourth positive generic value relation that can hold between two items beyond ‘better than’, ‘worse than’, and ‘equally good’: namely ‘on a par’.
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  11. Ruth Chang (2001). Two Conceptions of Reasons for Action. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):447–453.
  12. Bradford Cokelet (2007). Review of Normativity and the Will by R. Jay Wallace. [REVIEW] Ethics 117 (4):790-794.
  13. Hermann Deuser & Dennis Beach (1993). Christianity—Sign Among Signs? Journal of Speculative Philosophy 7 (4):286 - 297.
    The author uses Eco's The Name of the Rose to pose the problem of the relation between the infinite aesthetic play of semiotics and pragmatic moral responsibility for human conduct. This problem is addressed through Peirce's semiotic theory, which not only links signs to objects, but situates them in an interpretant relation that is formative of human conduct. Religion is advanced as the paradigm of this relation; a "categorial semiotic" where concrete symbolic acts move beyond nominalism through real experience of (...)
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  14. Hector Ferreiro (2009). Reconstrucción del sistema de la voluntad en la filosofía de Hegel. Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía 35 (2):331-361.
    Hegel develops his theory of will simultaneously in two different contexts of his work: on one side, in the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, the corresponding Berlin lessons and in texts which can be considered as incipient versions of the Encyclopedia; on the other hand, in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right, the lessons based on them and in previous texts on the Philosophy of Right in which Hegel exposes his theory of subjective will. Now, the systematic structure and (...)
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  15. Guy Fletcher (2011). Review of Ben Eggleston, Dale Miller & David Weinstein (Eds.), John Stuart Mill and the Art of Life. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  16. David Forman (2012). Principled and Unprincipled Maxims. Kant-Studien 103 (3):318-336.
    Kant frequently speaks as if all voluntary actions arise from our maxims as the subjective principles of our practical reason. But, as Michael Albrecht has pointed out, Kant also occasionally speaks as if it is only the rare person of “character” who acts according to principles or maxims. I argue that Kant’s seemingly contradictory claims on this front result from the fact that there are two fundamentally different ways that maxims of action can figure in the deliberation of the agent: (...)
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  17. Paul Franco & Leslie Marsh (eds.) (2012). A Companion to Michael Oakeshott. Penn State.
    Michael Oakeshott has long been recognized as one of the most important political philosophers of the twentieth century, but until now no single volume has been able to examine all the facets of his wide-ranging philosophy with sufficient depth, expertise, and authority. The essays collected here cover all aspects of Oakeshott’s thought, from his theory of knowledge and philosophies of history, religion, art, and education to his reflections on morality, politics, and law. The volume provides an authoritative and synoptic guide (...)
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  18. Nadeem J. Z. Hussain (2004). Review: Discussion: "The Guise of a Reason". [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 121 (3):263 - 275.
    Contribution to a book symposium on David Velleman's THE POSSIBILITY OF PRACTICAL REASON. In this book, Velleman argues that agency is compatible with a causal conception of the world, since the role of the agent can be played in this conception by an aim of self-knowledge instantiated in the mechanisms governing mental states. This article argues (i) that he must show what at the causal level plays the role of the agent's awareness of the normative guise of reasons and (ii) (...)
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  19. Christine James (2009). Language and Emotional Knowledge: A Case Study on Ability and Disability in Williams Syndrome. Biosemiotics 2 (2):151-167.
    Williams Syndrome provides a striking test case for discourses on disability, because the characteristics associated with Williams Syndrome involve a combination of “abilities” and “disabilities”. For example, Williams Syndrome is associated with disabilities in mathematics and spatial cognition. However, Williams Syndrome individuals also tend to have a unique strength in their expressive language skills, and are socially outgoing and unselfconscious when meeting new people. Children with Williams are said to be typically unafraid of strangers and show a greater interest in (...)
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  20. Adam Kadlac (2010). The Constitution of Agency – Christine Korsgaard. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):427-429.
  21. Stéphane Lemaire (2012). A Gate-Based Account of Intentions. Dialectica 66 (1):45-67.
    In this paper, I propose a reductive account of intentions which I call a gate-based reductive account. In contrast with other reductive accounts, however, the reductive basis of this account is not limited to desires, beliefs and judgments. I suggest that an intention is a complex state in which a predominant desire toward a plan is not inhibited by a gate mechanism whose function is to assess the comparison of our desires given the stakes at hand. To vindicate this account, (...)
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  22. Hallvard Lillehammer (2013). The Companions in Guilt Strategy. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics.
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  23. Hallvard Lillehammer (1999). Normative Antirealism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):201-225.
  24. Paul Litton, Responsibility Status of the Psychopath: On Moral Reasoning and Rational Self-Governance.
    Responsibility theorists frequently discuss psychopathy because it challenges various accounts of the capacities required for appropriate ascriptions of moral and legal responsibility. As often described, the psychopath has the capacity to reason practically but lacks the capacity to grasp and control himself in light of moral considerations. As portrayed, then, the psychopath resides in the area of disagreement between two philosophical camps: (i) theorists who put forth the general capacity for practical reasoning or rational self-governance as sufficient for an agent (...)
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  25. Piotr T. Makowski (2007). Nowa filozofia moralności. Hybris 5.
  26. Nicholas Maxwell (2013). Does Philosophy Betray Both Reason and Humanity? Changed Without the Author's Knowledge To: 'Knowledge or Wisdom?'. The Philosophers' Magazine (62):17-18.
    A bad philosophy of inquiry, built into the intellectual/institutional structure of universities round the world, betrays both reason and humanity.
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  27. John Michael McGuire (2012). Side-Effect Actions, Acting for a Reason, and Acting Intentionally. Philosophical Explorations 15 (3):317 - 333.
    What is the relation between acting intentionally and acting for a reason? While this question has generated a considerable amount of debate in the philosophy of action, on one point there has been a virtual consensus: actions performed for a reason are necessarily intentional. Recently, this consensus has been challenged by Joshua Knobe and Sean Kelly, who argue against it on the basis of empirical evidence concerning the ways in which ordinary speakers of the English language describe and explain certain (...)
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  28. Alfred R. Mele (2002). Review of Searle's Rationality in Action. [REVIEW] Mind 111 (444):905-909.
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  29. Alfred R. Mele (1991). Akratic Action and the Practical Role of Better Judgment. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72:33-47.
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  30. Elijah Millgram (2006). Review of Reasonably Vicious, by Candace Vogler. [REVIEW] European Journal of Philosophy 14 (3):430–434.
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  31. Javier Muguerza (2004). Ethics and Perplexity: Toward a Critique of Dialogical Reason. Rodopi.
    Javier Muguerza’s Ethics and Perplexity makes a highly original contribution to the debate over dialogical reason. The work opens with a letter that establishes a parallel between Ethics and Perplexity and Maimonides’s classic Guide of the Perplexed. It concludes with an interview that repeatedly strikes sparks on Spanish philosophy’s emergence from its “long quarantine,” as Muguerza puts it. These informal pieces—witty, informative, conversational—orbit the nucleus of the work: a formidable critique of dialogical reason. The result is a volume by turns (...)
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  32. Anselm Muller (2011). Backward-Looking Rationality and the Unity of Practical Reason. In Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention. Harvard University Press.
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  33. Sarah K. Paul (2013). The Conclusion of Practical Reasoning: The Shadow Between Idea and Act. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):287-302.
    There is a puzzle about how to understand the conclusion of a successful instance of practical reasoning. Do the considerations adduced in reasoning rationalize the particular doing of an action, as Aristotle is sometimes interpreted as claiming? Or does reasoning conclude in the formation of an attitude – an intention, say – that has an action-type as its content? This paper attempts to clarify what is at stake in that debate and defends the latter view against some of its critics.
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  34. Douglas W. Portmore, Acts, Attitudes, and Rational Choice.
    In this paper, I argue that we have obligations not only to perform certain actions, but also to have certain attitudes (such as desires, beliefs, and intentions), and this despite the fact that we rarely, if ever, have direct voluntary control over our attitudes. Moreover, I argue that whatever obligations we have with respect to actions derive from our obligations with respect to attitudes. More specifically, I argue that an agent is obligated to perform an action if and only if (...)
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  35. Douglas W. Portmore, Chapter 3: The Teleological Conception of Practical Reasons.
    This is Chapter 3 of my Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. In this chapter, I defend the teleological conception of practical reasons, which holds that the reasons there are for and against performing a given act are wholly determined by the reasons there are for and against preferring its outcome to those of its available alternatives, such that, if S has most reason to perform x, all things considered, then, of all the outcomes that S could bring about, S (...)
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  36. Douglas W. Portmore (2011). The Teleological Conception of Practical Reasons. Mind 120 (477):117 - 153.
    It is through our actions that we affect the way the world goes. Whenever we face a choice of what to do, we also face a choice of which of various possible worlds to actualize. Moreover, whenever we act intentionally, we act with the aim of making the world go a certain way. It is only natural, then, to suppose that an agent's reasons for action are a function of her reasons for preferring some of these possible worlds to others, (...)
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  37. Lubomira Radoilska (forthcoming). Akrasia and Ordinary Weakness of Will. Topicos.
    In this article, I develop an Aristotelian account of akrasia as a primary failure of intentional agency in contrast to a phenomenon I refer to as ‘ordinary weakness of will’: I argue that ordinary weakness of will is best understood as a secondary failure of intentional agency, that to tackle akrasia.
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  38. Peter Railton (2009). Practical Competence and Fluent Agency. In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press. 81--115.
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  39. Andrew Reisner (2013). Is the Enkratic Principle a Requirement of Rationality? Organon F 20 (4):436-462.
    In this paper I argue that the enkratic principle in its classic formulation may not be a requirement of rationality. The investigation of whether it is leads to some important methodological insights into the study of rationality. I also consider the possibility that we should consider rational requirements as a subset of a broader category of agential requirements.
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  40. Andrew Reisner (2009). Unifying the Requirements of Rationality. Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):243-260.
    This paper looks at the question of what form the requirements of practical rationality take. One common view is that the requirements of rationality are wide-scope, and another is that they are narrow-scope. I argue that the resolution to the question of wide-scope versus narrow-scope depends to a significant degree on what one expects a theory of rationality to do. In examining these expectations, I consider whether there might be a way to unify requirements of both forms into a single (...)
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  41. Simon Robertson (2011). Epistemic Constraints on Practical Normativity. Synthese 181 (Supp.1):81-106.
    What is the relation between what we ought to do, on the one hand, and our epistemic access to the ought-giving facts, on the other? In assessing this, it is common to distinguish ‘objective’ from ‘subjective’ oughts. Very roughly, on the objectivist conception what an agent ought to do is determined by ought-giving facts in such a way that does not depend on the agent’s beliefs about, or epistemic access to, those facts; whereas on the subjectivist conception, what an agent (...)
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  42. Simon Robertson (2009). Introduction: Normativity, Reasons, Rationality. In , Spheres of Reason. Oxford University Press.
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  43. Markus E. Schlosser (2011). Review of "Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity", by Christine M. Korsgaard, 2009. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242):212-214.
  44. G. F. Schueler (2010). Review of Sergio Tenenbaum (Ed.), Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (11).
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  45. G. F. Schueler (2004). Review of Rudiger Bittner: Doing Things for Reasons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):495-497.
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  46. G. F. Schueler (1989). The Idea of a Reason for Acting. Mellen.
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  47. Michael J. Shaffer (2012). Not-Exact-Truths, Pragmatic Encroachment and the Epistemic Norm of Practical Reasoning. Logos and Episteme 3:239-259.
    Recently a number of variously motivated epistemologists have argued that knowledge is closely tied to practical matters. On the one hand, radical pragmatic encroachment is the view that facts about whether an agent has knowledge depend on practical factors and this is coupled to the view that there is an important connection between knowledge and action. On the other hand, one can argue for the less radical thesis only that there is an important connection between knowledge and practical reasoning. So, (...)
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  48. Scott Shapiro (2007). How Rules Affect Practical Reasoning. In Bruno Verbeek (ed.), Reasons and Intentions. Ashgate Pub. Ltd..
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  49. Nathaniel Sharadin (forthcoming). Reasons Wrong and Right. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    The fact that someone is generous is a reason to admire them. The fact that someone will pay you to admire them is also a reason to admire them. But there is a difference in kind between these two reasons: the former seems to be the `right' kind of reason to admire, whereas the latter seems to be the `wrong' kind of reason to admire. The Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem is the problem of explaining the difference between the `right' (...)
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  50. Robert Keith Shaw & Ashish Malik (2011). The Phenomenology of Union Decision-Making: A New Way to Enquire Into Reality. In Proceedings of the Australia and New Zealand Academy of Management Conference, 2011. ANZAM.
    This paper inaugurates a discussion about the phenomenology of union decision-making. Phenomenology provides a new lens that may enable us to gain penetrating insights into how unions function in the fractious world of human resources management. The present paper is preliminary to any fieldwork that may be undertaken. Its main purposes are to identify theory that could be the foundation of further practical work, relate recent work in the phenomenology of management to union practices and to propose directions of enquiry. (...)
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