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Presentism

Edited by David Ingram
Assistant editor: James Darcy (University of Otago)
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  1. Robert Merrihew Adams (1989). Reply to Kvanvig. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (2):299-301.
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  2. Robert Merrihew Adams (1986). Time and Thisness. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):315-329.
    I have argued elsewhere that there are facts, and possibilities, that are not purely qualitative. In a second paper, however, I have argued that all possibilities are purely qualitative except insofar as they involve individuals that actually exist. In particular, I have argued that there are no thisnesses of nonactual individuals (where the thisness of x is the property of being x, or of being identical with x), and that there are no singular propositions about nonactual individuals (where a singular (...)
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  3. Robert Allen (2000). Identity and Becoming. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):527-548.
    A material object is constituted by a sum of parts all of which are essential to the sum but some of which seem inessential to the object itself. Such object/sum of parts pairs include my body/its torso and appendages and my desk/its top, drawers, and legs. In these instances, we are dealing with objects and their components. But, fundamentally, we may also speak, as Locke does, of an object and its constitutive matter—a “mass of particles”—or even of that aggregate and (...)
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  4. Neil Amanson (2008). A Future for Presentism - by Craig Bourne. Philosophical Books 49 (1):65-67.
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  5. Richard T. W. Arthur, Minkowski Spacetime and the Dimensions of the Present.
    In Minkowski spacetime, because of the relativity of simultaneity to the inertial frame chosen, there is no unique world-at-an-instant. Thus the classical view that there is a unique set of events existing now in a three dimensional space cannot be sustained. The two solutions most often advanced are (i) that the four-dimensional structure of events and processes is alone real, and that becoming present is not an objective part of reality; and (ii) that present existence is not an absolute notion, (...)
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  6. Jamin Asay & Sam Baron (2014). The Hard Road to Presentism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1).
    It is a common criticism of presentism – the view according to which only the present exists – that it errs against truthmaker theory. Recent attempts to resolve the truthmaker objection against presentism proceed by restricting truthmaker maximalism (the view that all truths have truthmakers), maintaining that propositions concerning the past are not made true by anything, but are true nonetheless. Support for this view is typically garnered from the case for negative existential propositions, which some philosophers contend are exceptions (...)
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  7. St Augustine, John Bigelow, Craig Bourne, William Lane Craig, Thomas Crisp, Matthew Davidson, Rafael De Clercq, M. Oreste Fiocco, Mark Hinchliff, Simon Keller, Ernâni Magalhães, J. M. E. McTaggart, Trenton Merricks, Ulrich Meyer, L. Nathan Oaklander, Arthur Prior, Hilary Putnam & Dean Zimmerman (2010). Presentism: Essential Readings. Lexington Books.
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  8. Alex Baia (2012). Presentism and the Grounding of Truth. Philosophical Studies 159 (3):341-356.
    Many philosophers believe that truth is grounded: True propositions depend for their truth on the world. Some philosophers believe that truth’s grounding has implications for our ontology of time. If truth is grounded, then truth supervenes on being. But if truth supervenes on being, then presentism is false since, on presentism, e.g., that there were dinosaurs fails to supervene on the whole of being plus the instantiation pattern of properties and relations. Call this the grounding argument against presentism. Many presentists (...)
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  9. Y. Balashov & M. Janssen (forthcoming). Presentism and Relativity, Http:/Philsci-Archive. Pitt. Edu, Forthcoming In. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
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  10. Yuri Balashov (2007). Review of Craig Bourne, A Future for Presentism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (7).
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  11. Yuri Balashov & Michel Janssen (forthcoming). Forthcoming.“Presentism and Relativity.”. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
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  12. Yuri Balashov & Michel Janssen (2003). Critical Notice: Presentism and Relativity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54:327--46.
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  13. Yuri Balashov & Michel Janssen (2003). Presentism and Relativity. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2):327-346.
    In this critical notice we argue against William Craig's recent attempt to reconcile presentism (roughly, the view that only the present is real) with relativity theory. Craig's defense of his position boils down to endorsing a ‘neo-Lorentzian interpretation’ of special relativity. We contend that his reconstruction of Lorentz's theory and its historical development is fatally flawed and that his arguments for reviving this theory fail on many counts. 1 Rival theories of time 2 Relativity and the present 3 Special relativity: (...)
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  14. Yuri Balashov & Michel Janssen (2003). Review: Presentism and Relativity. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2):327-346.
    In this critical notice we argue against William Craig's recent attempt to reconcile presentism (roughly, the view that only the present is real) with relativity theory. Craig's defense of his position boils down to endorsing a 'neo-Lorentzian interpretation' of special relativity. We contend that his reconstruction of Lorentz's theory and its historical development is fatally flawed and that his arguments for reviving this theory fail on many counts.
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  15. Józef Bańka (1994). Tract on Time: Time in the Conceptions of Recentivism and Presentism. Wydawn. Uniwersytetu Śląskiego.
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  16. Adrian Bardon & Heather Dyke (eds.) (2013). A Companion to the Philosophy of Time. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  17. Stephen Barker & Phil Dowe (2003). Paradoxes of Multi-Location. Analysis 63 (2):106–114.
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  18. Sam Baron (2014). The Priority of the Now. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly:0-0.
    This paper motivates and develops a new theory of time: priority presentism. Priority presentism is the view according to which (i) only present entities exist fundamentally and (ii) past and future entities exist, but they are grounded in the present. The articulation of priority presentism is an exercise in applied grounding: it draws on concepts from the recent literature on ontological dependence and applies those concepts in a new way, to the philosophy of time. The result, as I will argue, (...)
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  19. Sam Baron (2013). Presentism, Truth and Supervenience. Ratio 26 (1):3-18.
    Truthmaker theory is commonly thought to pose a challenge for presentism. Presentism seems to lack the ontological and ideological resources required to adequately underwrite the truth of propositions concerning the past. That is because if presentism is true, then the past does not exist. According to the standard response to this challenge, the truth of propositions concerning the past supervenes on surrogate entities that ‘stand proxy’ for past things. I argue that in order for the standard response to the truthmaker (...)
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  20. Sam Baron (2013). Talking About the Past. Erkenntnis 78 (3):547-560.
    In this paper I consider the aboutness objection against standard truth-preserving presentism (STP). According to STP: (1) past-directed propositions (propositions that seem to be about the past) like , are sometimes true (2) truth supervenes on being and (3) the truth of past-directed propositions does not supervene on how things were, in the past. According to the aboutness objection (3) is implausible, given (1) and (2): for any proposition, P, P ought to be true in virtue of what P is (...)
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  21. Sam Baron (2013). Tensed Supervenience: A No‐Go for Presentism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (3):383-401.
    Recent attempts to resolve the truthmaker objection to presentism employ a fundamentally tensed account of the relationship between truth and being. On this view, the truth of a proposition concerning the past supervenes on how things are, in the present, along with how things were, in the past. This tensed approach to truthmaking arises in response to pressure placed on presentists to abandon the standard response to the truthmaker objection, whereby one invokes presently existing entities as the supervenience base for (...)
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  22. Sam Baron (2013). Can Indispensability‐Driven Platonists Be (Serious) Presentists? Theoria 79 (3):153-173.
    In this article I consider what it would take to combine a certain kind of mathematical Platonism with serious presentism. I argue that a Platonist moved to accept the existence of mathematical objects on the basis of an indispensability argument faces a significant challenge if she wishes to accept presentism. This is because, on the one hand, the indispensability argument can be reformulated as a new argument for the existence of past entities and, on the other hand, if one accepts (...)
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  23. Sam Baron (2012). Presentism and Causation Revisited. Philosophical Papers 41 (1):1-21.
    One of the major difficulties facing presentism is the problem of causation. In this paper, I propose a new solution to that problem, one that is compatible with intrinsic, fundamental causal relations. Accommodating relations of this kind is important because (i) according to David Lewis (2004), such relations are needed to account for causation in our world and worlds relevantly similar to our own, (ii) there is no other strategy currently available that successfully reconciles presentism with relations of this kind (...)
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  24. Jiri Benovsky (2013). The Present Vs. The Specious Present. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):193-203.
    This article is concerned with the alleged incompatibility between presentism and specious present theories of temporal experience. According to presentism, the present time is instantaneous (or, near-instantaneous), while according to specious present theories, the specious present is temporally extended—therefore, it seems that there is no room in reality for the whole of a specious present, if presentism is true. It seems then that one of the two claims—presentism or the specious present theory—has to go. I shall argue that this kind (...)
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  25. Jiri Benovsky (2009). Presentism and Persistence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (3):291-309.
    In this paper, I examine various theories of persistence through time under presentism. In Part I, I argue that both perdurantist views (namely, the worm view and the stage view) suffer, in combination with presentism, from serious difficulties and should be rejected. In Part II, I discuss the presentist endurantist view, to see that it does avoid the difficulties of the perdurantist views, and consequently that it does work, but at a price that some may consider as being very high: (...)
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  26. Jiri Benovsky (2006). Persistence Through Time and Across Possible Worlds. Ontos Verlag.
    How do ordinary objects persist through time and across possible worlds ? How do they manage to have their temporal and modal properties ? These are the questions adressed in this book which is a "guided tour of theories of persistence". The book is divided in two parts. In the first, the two traditional accounts of persistence through time (endurantism and perdurantism) are combined with presentism and eternalism to yield four different views, and their variants. The resulting views are then (...)
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  27. Michael Bergmann (1999). (Serious) Actualism and (Serious) Presentism. Noûs 33 (1):118-132.
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  28. Sara Bernstein (2014). Time Travel and the Movable Present. In John Keller (ed.), Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes from the Philosophy of Peter van Inwagen.
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  29. John Bigelow (1996). Presentism and Properties. Philosophical Perspectives 10 (Metaphysics):35-52.
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  30. John Bigelow (1991). Worlds Enough for Time. Noûs 25 (1):1-19.
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  31. Bernard Bosanquet, Shadworth H. Hodgson & G. E. Moore (1897). In What Sense, If Any, Do Past and Future Time Exist? Mind 6 (22):228-240.
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  32. Craig Bourne, A Span-Er in the Works for Presentism?
    Arthur Prior states that ‘It will be/was/is that p’ is true iff ‘p’ will be/was/is true, and that is all that needs to be said about the matter. This appears to avoid any need to invoke the existence of non-present entities and accounts for tensed truths with very little ontological cost. However, as David Lewis notes, this version of presentism gives the wrong results when applied to numerically quantified tensed propositions. I show how presentism can accommodate numerical quantification by introducing (...)
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  33. Craig Bourne (2007). Numerical Quantification and Temporal Intervals: A Span-Er in the Works for Presentism? Logique Et Analyse 199:303-316.
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  34. Craig Bourne (2006). A Theory of Presentism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):1-23.
    Most of us would want to say that it is true that Socrates taught Plato. According to realists about past facts,1 this is made true by the fact that there is, located in the past, i.e., earlier than now, at least one real event that is the teaching of Plato by Socrates. Presentists, however, in denying that past events and facts exist2 cannot appeal to such facts to make their past-tensed statements true. So what is a presentist to do?
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  35. Craig Bourne (2006). A Future for Presentism. Oxford University Press.
    How can we talk meaningfully about the past if it does not exist to be talked about? What gives time its direction? Is time travel possible? This defence of presentism - the view that only the present exists - makes an original contribution to a fast growing and exciting debate.
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  36. Katherine Brading (2014). Presentism as an Empirical Hypothesis. Philosophy of Science 80 (5):1101-1111.
    Within philosophy of physics it is broadly accepted that presentism as an empirical hypothesis has been falsified by the development of special relativity. In this article, I identify and reject an assumption common to both presentists and advocates of the block universe and then offer an alternative version of presentism that does not begin from spatiotemporal structure, which is an empirical hypothesis, and which has yet to be falsified. While some features of familiar presentism are lost, a sufficient core remains (...)
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  37. Katherine Brading, Physically Locating the Present: A Case of Reading Physics as a Contribution to Philosophy.
    In this paper I argue that reading history of physics as a contribution to history of philosophy is important for contemporary philosophy of physics. My argument centers around a particular case: special relativity versus presentism. By means of resources drawn from reading aspects of Newton's work as contributions to philosophy, I argue that there is in physics an alternative way to approach what we mean by "present" such that (without adding any preferred foliation or anything like that) presentism remains an (...)
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  38. Ben Bradley (2004). When is Death Bad for the One Who Dies? Noûs 38 (1):1–28.
    Epicurus seems to have thought that death is not bad for the one who dies, since its badness cannot be located in time. I show that Epicurus’ argument presupposes Presentism, and I argue that death is bad for its victim at all and only those times when the person would have been living a life worth living had she not died when she did. I argue that my account is superior to competing accounts given by Thomas Nagel, Fred Feldman and (...)
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  39. Berit Brogaard (2012). Transient Truths: An Essay in the Metaphysics of Propositions. OUP USA.
    Transient Truths provides the first book-length exposition and defense of the opposing view, temporalism: these are contents that can change their truth-values along with changes in the world.
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  40. Berit Brogaard (2007). Span Operators. Analysis 67 (1):72–79.
    I. Tensed Plural Quantifiers Presentists typically assent to a range of tensed statements, for instance, that there were dinosaurs, that there was a president named Lincoln, and that my future grandchildren will be on their way to school.1 Past- and future-tensed claims are dealt with by introducing primitive, intensional tense operators, for instance, it has been 12 years ago that, it was the case when I was born that, and it will be the case that (Prior 1968). For example, ‘there (...)
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  41. Berit Brogaard (2006). Tensed Relations. Analysis 66 (3):194-202.
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  42. Berit Brogaard (2000). Presentist Four-Dimensionalism. The Monist 83 (3):341-356.
    Four-dimensionalism is the thesis that everyday objects, such as you and me, are space-time worms that persist through time by having temporal parts none of which is identical to the object itself. Objects are aggregates or sums of such temporal parts. The main virtue of fourdimensionalism is that it solves—or does away with—the problem of identity through change.1 The main charge raised against it is that it is inconsistent with the thesis according to which there is change in the world.2 (...)
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  43. Jeffrey E. Brower (2010). Aristotelian Endurantism: A New Solution to the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics. Mind 119 (476):883 - 905.
    It is standardly assumed that there are three — and only three — ways to solve problem of temporary intrinsics: (a) embrace presentism, (b) relativize property possession to times, or (c) accept the doctrine of temporal parts. The first two solutions are favoured by endurantists, whereas the third is the perdurantist solution of choice. In this paper, I argue that there is a further type of solution available to endurantists, one that not only avoids the usual costs, but is structurally (...)
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  44. J. Butterfield (1984). Seeing the Present. Mind 93 (370):161-176.
  45. Jeremy Butterfield (1998). Seeing the Present. In Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), Questions of Time and Tense. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 161-176.
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  46. Jeremy Butterfield (1984). Prior's Conception Of Time. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 84:193-209.
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  47. Craig Callender, Time's Ontic Voltage.
    Philosophy of time, as practiced throughout the last hundred years, is both language- and existence-obsessed. It is language-obsessed in the sense that the primary venue for attacking questions about the nature of time—in sharp contrast to the primary venue for questions about space—has been philosophy of language. Although other areas of philosophy have long recognized that there is a yawning gap between language and the world, the message is spreading slowly in philosophy of time.[1] Since twentieth-century analytic philosophy as a (...)
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  48. Claudio Calosi (2014). Metaphysics of Time in Spacetime. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-8.
    I give a new and more general argument against presentism within relativistic spacetimes. This argument is untouched by different recent proposals designed to save presentism in a relativistic setting.
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  49. Ross Cameron, How Can You Know You're Present?
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  50. Ross Cameron (2013). Changing Truthmakers: Reply to Tallant and Ingram. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 8:362.
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