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  1. Barbara Abbott, Presuppositions, Negation, and Existence.
    Last year (2005) marked the 100th anniversary of the publication of Russell’s classic ‘On denoting’. It should not cast any shadow on that great work to note that the problems it provided solutions to are still the subject of controversy. Two of those problems involved noun phrases (NPs) which fail to denote. Russell’s examples (1a) and (1b) (1) a. The king of France is bald. b. The king of France is not bald. are puzzling because they have the form of (...)
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  2. Barbara Abbott, Where Have Some of the Presuppositions Gone?
    Some presuppositions seem to be weaker than others in the sense that they can be more easily neutralized in some contexts. For example some factive verbs, most notably epistemic factives like know, be aware, and discover, are known to shed their factivity fairly easily in contexts such as are found in (1). (1) a. …if anyone discovers that the method is also wombat-proof, I’d really like to know! b. Mrs. London is not aware that there have ever been signs erected (...)
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  3. Barbara Abbott (2008). Presuppositions and Common Ground. Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (5):523-538.
    This paper presents problems for Stalnaker’s common ground theory of presupposition. Stalnaker (Linguist and Philos 25:701–721, 2002) proposes a 2-stage process of utterance interpretation: presupposed content is added to the common ground prior to acceptance/rejection of the utterance as a whole. But this revision makes presupposition difficult to distinguish from assertion. A more fundamental problem is that the common ground theory rests on a faulty theory of assertion—that the essence of assertion is to present the content of an utterance as (...)
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  4. Márta Abrusán (2011). Predicting the Presuppositions of Soft Triggers. Linguistics and Philosophy 34 (6):491-535.
    The central idea behind this paper is that presuppositions of soft triggers arise from the way our attention structures the informational content of a sentence. Some aspects of the information conveyed are such that we pay attention to them by default, even in the absence of contextual information. On the other hand, contextual cues or conversational goals can divert attention to types of information that we would not pay attention to by default. Either way, whatever we do not pay attention (...)
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  5. Kelly Alberts (1987). Intentionality and First Person Reference. Philosophy Research Archives 13:613-636.
    Roderick Chisholm contrasts semantic theories that presuppose “the primacy of the intentional” with those that presuppose “the primacy of the linguistic”. In The First Person he attempts to develop an analysis of first person singular reference that presupposes the primacy of the intentional. In this paper I attempt to develop a semantics of first person singular reference (what I call ‘I-reference’) that presupposes the primacy of the linguistic. I do three things in the paper. First, I criticize Chisholm’s (and Frege’s) (...)
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  6. Mahrad Almotahari & Ephraim Glick (2011). Context, Content, and Epistemic Transparency. Mind 119 (476):1067-1086.
    We motivate the idea that presupposition is a transparent attitude. We then explain why epistemic opacity is not a serious problem for Robert Stalnaker's theory of content and conversation. We conclude with critical remarks about John Hawthorne and Ofra Magidor's alternative theory.
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  7. Luis Alonso-Ovallea, Maximize Presupposition and Two Types of Definite Competitors.
    Indefinites impose an anti-uniqueness condition on their domain of quantification. The sentence in (1), for instance, cannot be felicitously uttered when it is taken for granted that John has only one friend (Hawkins 1978, 1991, Heim 1991).
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  8. Jay David Atlas (1977). Negation, Ambiguity, and Presupposition. Linguistics and Philosophy 1 (3):321 - 336.
    In this paper I argue for the Atlas-Kempson Thesis that sentences of the form The A is not B are not ambiguous but rather semantically general (Quine), non-specific (Zwicky and Sadock), or vague (G. Lakoff). This observation refutes the 1970 Davidson-Harman hypothesis that underlying structures, as full semantic representations, are logical forms. It undermines the conception of semantical presupposition, removes a support for the existence of truth-value gaps for presuppositional sentences (the remaining arguments for which are viciously circular), and lifts (...)
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  9. A. J. Baker (1956). Presupposition and Types of Clause. Mind 65 (259):368-378.
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  10. P. Balasubramanian (1984). The Concept of Presupposition: A Study. Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras.
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  11. David I. Beaver (forthcoming). Presupposition. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  12. David Beaver & Emiel Krahmer (2001). A Partial Account of Presupposition Projection. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 10 (2):147-182.
    In this paper it is shown how a partial semantics for presuppositions can be given which is empirically more satisfactory than its predecessors, and how this semantics can be integrated with a technically sound, compositional grammar in the Montagovian fashion. Additionally, it is argued that the classical objection to partial accounts of presupposition projection, namely that they lack “flexibility,” is based on a misconception. Partial logics can give rise to flexible predictions without postulating any ad hoc ambiguities. Finally, it is (...)
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  13. Sigrid Beck (2006). Focus on Again. Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (3):277 - 314.
    This paper examines the effect that focus has on repetitive versus restitutive again. It is argued that a pragmatic explanation of the effect is the right strategy. The explanation builds largely on a standard focus semantics. To this we add an anaphoric analysis of again’s presupposition and a detailed analysis of the alternatives triggered when focus falls on again.
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  14. Max Black (1952). Definition, Presupposition, and Assertion. Philosophical Review 61 (4):532-550.
  15. Michael Blome-Tillmann (2009). Knowledge and Presuppositions. Mind 118 (470):241 - 294.
    The paper explicates a new way to model the context-sensitivity of 'knows', namely a way that suggests a close connection between the content of 'knows' in a context C and what is pragmatically presupposed in C. After explicating my new approach in the first half of the paper and arguing that it is explanatorily superior to standard accounts of epistemic contextualism, the paper points, in its second half, to some interesting new features of the emerging account, such as its compatibility (...)
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  16. Susanne Bobzien (2012). How to Give Someone Horns – Paradoxes of Presupposition in Antiquity. Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 15:159-84.
    ABSTRACT: This paper discusses ancient versions of paradoxes today classified as paradoxes of presupposition and how their ancient solutions compare with contemporary ones. Sections 1-4 air ancient evidence for the Fallacy of Complex Question and suggested solutions, introduce the Horn Paradox, consider its authorship and contemporary solutions. Section 5 reconstructs the Stoic solution, suggesting the Stoics produced a Russellian-type solution based on a hidden scope ambiguity of negation. The difference to Russell’s explanation of definite descriptions is that in the Horn (...)
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  17. Andrea Bonomi (1977). Existence, Presupposition and Anaphoric Space. Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):239 - 267.
    The following paper deals with the notion of existence, especially as concerns natural languages. In Section 1, starting from some quite obvious examples drawn from logic, I sketch the problem of the existential presupposition usually ascribed to noun phrases. My opinion is that the point of view frequently adopted in this case is unduly restrictive, for the existence which is believed to be presupposed here is actual existence. Accordingly, I emphasize the need for having a weaker notion of existential presupposition, (...)
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  18. Berit Brogaard, Comments on Philippe Schlenker's Be Articulate! A Pragmatic Theory of Presupposition Projection.
    “When a speaker says something of the form A and B, he may take it for granted that A (or at least that his audience recognizes that he accepts that A) after he has said it. The proposition that A will be added to the background of common assumptions before the speaker asserts that B. Now suppose that B expresses a proposition that would, for some reason, be inappropriate to assert except in a context where A, or something entailed by (...)
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  19. Noel Burton-Roberts (1989). The Limits to Debate: A Revised Theory of Semantic Presupposition. Cambridge University Press.
    Exponents and critics of semantic presupposition have almost invariably based their discussion on the ('Standard') definition of presupposition implied by Frege and Strawson. In this study Noel Burton-Roberts argues convincingly against this definition, that leads it to a three-valued semantics. He presents a very simple semantic definition which is weaker, more general and leads to a semantics more easily interpreted as two-valued with gaps. The author shows that a wide range of intuitive facts that eluded the Standard definition follow directly (...)
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  20. Robyn Carston (1998). Negation, `Presupposition' and the Semantics/ Pragmatics Distinction. Journal of Linguistics 34:309-350.
    A cognitive pragmatic approach is taken to some long-standing problem cases of negation, the so-called presupposition denial cases. It is argued that a full account of the processes and levels of representation involved in their interpretation typically requires the sequential pragmatic derivation of two different propositions expressed. The first is one in which the presupposition is preserved and, following the rejection of this, the second involves the echoic (metalinguistic) use of material falling in the scope of the negation. The semantic (...)
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  21. Nate Charlow (forthcoming). Presupposition and the a Priori. Philosophical Studies.
    This paper argues for and explores the implications of the following epistemological principle for knowability a priori (with ‘Ka’ abbreviating ‘it is knowable a priori that’). (AK) For all p, q such that p semantically presupposes p: if Kap, then Kaq. -/- Well-known arguments for the contingent a priori and a priori knowledge of logical truth founder when the semantic presuppositions of the putative items of knowledge are made explicit. Likewise, certain kinds of analytic truth turn out to carry semantic (...)
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  22. Emmanuel Chemla & Philippe Schlenker (2012). Incremental Vs. Symmetric Accounts of Presupposition Projection: An Experimental Approach. Natural Language Semantics 20 (2):177-226.
    The presupposition triggered by an expression E is generally satisfied by information that comes before rather than after E in the sentence or discourse. In Heim’s classic theory (1983), this left-right asymmetry is encoded in the lexical semantics of dynamic connectives and operators. But several recent analyses offer a more nuanced approach, in which presupposition satisfaction has two separate components: a general principle (which varies from theory to theory) specifies under what conditions a presupposition triggered by an expression E is (...)
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  23. Millard Clements (1964). Mythology and Psychological Presupposition. Educational Theory 14 (3):224-228.
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  24. F. H. Donnell (1972). A Note About Presupposition. Mind 81 (321):123-124.
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  25. Tim Fernando, Conservative Generalized Quantifiers and Presupposition.
    Conservativity in generalized quantifiers is linked to presupposition filtering, under a propositions-as-types analysis extended with dependent quantifiers. That analysis is underpinned by modeltheoretically interpretable proofs which inhabit propositions they prove, thereby providing objects for quantification and hooks for anaphora.
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  26. Tim Fernando, Three Processes in Natural Language Interpretation.
    To address complications involving ambiguity, presupposition and implicature, three processes underlying natural language interpretation are isolated: translation, entailment and attunement. A meta-language integrating these processes is outlined, elaborating on a proof-theoretic approach to presupposition.
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  27. B. O. G. (1976). Presupposition and the Delimitation of Semantics. The Review of Metaphysics 29 (4):738-739.
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  28. Christopher Gauker (2008). Against Accommodation: Heim, van der Sandt, and the Presupposition Projection Problem. Noûs 42 (1):171 - 205.
    This paper criticizes the dominant approaches to presupposition projection and proposes an alternative. Both the update semantics of Heim and the discourse representation theory of van der Sandt have problems in explicating the presuppositions of disjunctions. Moreover, Heim's approach is committed to a conception of accommodation that founders on the problem of informative presuppositions, and van der Sandt's approach is committed to a conception of accommodation that generates over-interpretations of utterances. The present approach borrows Karttunen's idea that instead of associating (...)
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  29. Christopher Gauker (1998). What is a Context of Utterance? Philosophical Studies 91 (2):149-172.
    For many purposes in pragmatics one needs to appeal to a context of utterance conceived as a set of sentences or propositions. The context of utterance in this sense is often defined as the set of assumptions that the speaker supposes he or she shares with the hearer. I argue by stages that this is a mistake. First, if contexts must be defined in terms of shared assumptions, then it would be preferable to define the context as the set of (...)
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  30. Bart Geurts, Propositions and Rigidity in Layered Drt.
    • names and indexicals are directly referential/rigid designators • wide-scope behavior w.r.t. operators • not synonymous with the description giving their ‘descriptive meaning’, as shown by Kripke-Kaplan examples (1) and (2).
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  31. Bart Geurts (1998). Presuppositions and Anaphors in Attitude Contexts. Linguistics and Philosophy 21 (6):545-601.
    This paper consists of two main parts and a coda. In the first part I present the ''binding theory'' of presupposition projection, which is the framework that I adopt in this paper (Section 1.1). I outline the main problems that arise in the interplay between presuppositions and anaphors on the one hand and attitude reports on the other (Section 1.2), and discuss Heim''s theory of presuppositions in attitude contexts (Section 1.3).In the second part of the paper I present my own (...)
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  32. Bart Geurts (1996). Local Satisfaction Guaranteed: A Presupposition Theory and its Problems. Linguistics and Philosophy 19 (3):259 - 294.
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  33. Michael Glanzberg (2005). Presuppositions, Truth Values, and Expressing Propositions. In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth. Oxford University Press.
    Philosophers like to talk about propositions. There are many reasons for this. Perhaps the most common is that philosophers are sometimes more interested in the content of a thought or utterance than in the particular sentence or utterance that might express it on some occasion. Propositions are offered as these contents.
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  34. Michael Glanzberg & Susanna Siegel (2006). Presupposition and Policing in Complex Demonstratives. Noûs 40 (1):1–42.
    In this paper, we offer a theory of the role of the nominal in complex demonstrative expressions, such as 'this dog' or 'that glove with a hole in it'.
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  35. Patrick Greenough (2008). Indeterminate Truth. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):213-241.
    In §2-4, I survey three extant ways of making sense of indeterminate truth and find each of them wanting. All the later sections of the paper are concerned with showing that the most promising way of making sense of indeterminate truth is via either a theory of truthmaker gaps or via a theory of truthmaking gaps. The first intimations of a truthmaker–truthmaking gap theory of indeterminacy are to be found in Quine (1981). In §5, we see how Quine proposes to (...)
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  36. Allan Hazlett (2012). Factive Presupposition and the Truth Condition on Knowledge. Acta Analytica 27 (4):461-478.
    In “The Myth of Factive Verbs” (Hazlett 2010), I had four closely related goals. The first (pp. 497-99, p. 522) was to criticize appeals to ordinary language in epistemology. The second (p. 499) was to criticize the argument that truth is a necessary condition on knowledge because “knows” is factive. The third (pp. 507-19) – which was the intended means of achieving the first two – was to defend a semantics for “knows” on which <S knows p> can be true (...)
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  37. Laurie Hollings (1980). Presupposition and Theories of Meaning. Mind 89 (354):274-281.
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  38. R. H. Kane (1972). Presupposition and Entailment. Mind 81 (323):401-404.
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  39. Paul Kay (1992). The Inheritance of Presuppositions. Linguistics and Philosophy 15 (4):333 - 379.
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  40. Manfred Kerber & Michael Kohlhase (2012). Reasoning Without Believing: On the Mechanisation of Presuppositions and Partiality. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 22 (4):295 - 317.
    (2012). Reasoning without believing: on the mechanisation of presuppositions and partiality. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics: Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 295-317. doi: 10.1080/11663081.2012.705962.
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  41. Nathan Klinedinst & Daniel Rothschild (2012). Connectives Without Truth Tables. Natural Language Semantics 20 (2):137-175.
    There are certain uses of and and or that cannot be explained by their normal meanings as truth-functional connectives, even with sophisticated pragmatic resources. These include examples such as The cops show up, and a fight will break out (‘If the cops show up, a fight will break out’), and I have no friends, or I would throw a party (‘I have no friends. If I did have friends, I would throw a party.’). We argue that these uses are indeed (...)
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  42. Saul A. Kripke (2009). Presupposition and Anaphora: Remarks on the Formulation of the Projection Problem. Linguistic Inquiry 40 (3):367-386.
    Writers on presupposition, and on the ‘‘projection problem’’ of determining the presuppositions of compound sentences from their component clauses, traditionally assign presuppositions to each clause in isolation. I argue that many presuppositional elements are anaphoric to previous discourse or contextual elements. In compound sentences, these can be other clauses of the sentence. We thus need a theory of presuppositional anaphora, analogous to the corresponding pronominal theory.
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  43. Brent G. Kyle (2013). How Are Thick Terms Evaluative? Philosophers' Imprint 13 (1):1-20.
    Ethicists are typically willing to grant that thick terms (e.g. ‘courageous’ and ‘murder’) are somehow associated with evaluations. But they tend to disagree about what exactly this relationship is. Does a thick term’s evaluation come by way of its semantic content? Or is the evaluation pragmatically associated with the thick term (e.g. via conversational implicature)? In this paper, I argue that thick terms are semantically associated with evaluations. In particular, I argue that many thick concepts (if not all) conceptually entail (...)
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  44. Charles Landesman (1972). Discourse and its Presuppositions. New Haven,Yale University Press.
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  45. Alex Lascarides, The Semantics and Pragmatics of Presupposition.
    In this paper, we offer a novel analysis of presuppositions, paying particular attention to the interaction between the knowledge resources that are required to interpret them. The analysis has two main features. First, we capture an analogy between presuppositions, anaphora and scope ambiguity (cf. van der Sandt, 1992), by utilising semantic underspecification (cf. Reyle, 1993). Second, resolving this underspecification requires reasoning about how the presupposition is rhetorically connected to the discourse context. This has several consequences. First, since pragmatic information plays (...)
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  46. Peter Lasersohn (2007). Expressives, Perspective and Presupposition. Theoretical Linguistics 33 (2):223-230.
    I compare Potts’ use of a ‘‘judge’’ parameter in semantic interpretation with the use of a similar parameter in Lasersohn (2005). The latter technique portrays the content of expressives as constant across speakers, while Pott’s technique does not. The idea that the content of expressives is a kind of presupposition is also briefly defended, and a technical problem in the ‘‘dynamics’’ of Pott’s formalism is pointed out.
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  47. Peter Lasersohn (1993). Existence Presuppositions and Background Knowledge. Journal of Semantics 10 (2):113-122.
    Argues that the intuition of a truth value gap in cases of presupposition failure depends on the discourse information state, and in particular whether sufficient information is in the common ground to preclude the truth of the sentence on independent grounds; formalizes this analysis in a semantics using data lattices.
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  48. Donald S. Lee (1972). Distinguishing Presupposition In Epistemology. Tulane Studies in Philosophy 21:85-100.
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  49. David Lewis (1979). Scorekeeping in a Language Game. Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.
  50. Ofra Magidor (2010). Natural Language and How We Use It: Psychology, Pragmatics, and Presupposition. Analysis 70 (1):160-174.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  51. Emar Maier (2009). Proper Names and Indexicals Trigger Rigid Presuppositions. Journal of Semantics 26:253-315.
    I provide a novel semantic analysis of proper names and indexicals, combining insights from the competing traditions of referentialism, championed by Kripke and Kaplan, and descriptivism, introduced by Frege and Russell, and more recently resurrected by Geurts and Elbourne, among others. From the referentialist tradition, I borrow the proof that names and indexicals are not synonymous to any definite description but pick their referent from the context directly. From the descriptivist tradition, I take the observation that names, and to some (...)
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  52. Scott Martin & Carl Pollard (2012). A Higher-Order Theory of Presupposition. Studia Logica 100 (4):727-751.
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  53. Friederike Moltmann (2006). Presuppositions and Quantifier Domains. Synthese 149 (1):179 - 224.
    In this paper, I will argue for a new account of presuppositions which is based on double indexing as well as minimal representational contexts providing antecedent material for anaphoric presuppositions, rather than notions of context defined in terms of the interlocutors’ pragmatic presuppositions or the information accumulated from the preceding discourse. This account applies in particular to new phenomena concerning the presupposition of quantifier domains. But it is also intended to be an account of presuppositions in general. The account differs (...)
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  54. Mark Moyer (2008). Why We Shouldn't Swallow Worm Slices: A Case Study in Semantic Accommodation. Noûs 42 (1):109–138.
    A radical metaphysical theory typically comes packaged with a semantic theory that reconciles those radical claims with common sense. The metaphysical theory says what things exist and what their natures are, while the semantic theory specifies, in terms of these things, how we are to interpret everyday language. Thus may we “think with the learned, and speak with the vulgar.” This semantic accommodation of common sense, however, can end up undermining the very theory it is designed to protect. This paper (...)
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  55. Humphrey Palmer (1985). Presupposition & Transcendental Inference. St. Martin's.
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  56. Anna Papafragou, When English Proposes What Greek Presupposes: The Cross-Linguistic Encoding of Motion Events.
    How do we talk about events we perceive? And how tight is the connection between linguistic and nonlinguistic representations of events? To address these questions, we experimentally compared motion descriptions produced by children and adults in two typologically distinct languages, Greek and English. Our findings confirm a well-known asymmetry between the two languages, such that English speakers are overall more likely to include manner of motion information than Greek speakers. However, mention of manner of motion in Greek speakers’ descriptions increases (...)
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  57. Hazel Pearson, Presupposition Accommodation in Local Contexts: Why Global Accommodation is Not Enough.
    It is a somewhat vexed question whether presuppositions are always accommodated into the global context of utterance of the sentence, or whether they may sometimes be accommodated into a local context - the context of some subsentential constituent. Von Fintel (2008) argues that there is no local accommodation. He shows that presuppositions in the scope of universally quantified sentences, which have traditionally been handled via local accommodation (eg Heim 1983), can be accounted for by assuming that conversational participants select a (...)
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  58. Stanley Peters (1979). A Truth-Conditional Formulation of Karttunen's Account of Presupposition. Synthese 40 (2):301-316.
    Karttunen's seminal 1973 article Presuppositions of compound sentences, lays the groundwork for the elegant and fruitful theory of this subject which he subsequently presented in (1974). In (1973, pp. 185–8), however, he fallaciously argued that the regularities he discovered concerning the behavior of and, or, and if ... then in English cannot be embodied in any three-valued logic giving a truth-functional interpretation to these connectives. The present paper refutes Karttunen's argument by exhibiting an interpretation with the desired properties, and shows (...)
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  59. Ted Peters (1974). The Nature and Role of Presupposition. International Philosophical Quarterly 14 (2):209-222.
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  60. John F. Post (1979). Presupposition, Bivalence, and the Possible Liar. Philosophia 8 (4):645-650.
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  61. John F. Post (1972). Referential Presupposition. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (2):160 – 167.
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  62. Murali Ramachandran, Descriptions and Presuppositions: Strawson Vs. Russell.
    A Russellian theory of (definite) descriptions takes an utterance of the form ‘The F is G’ to express a purely general proposition that affirms the existence of a (contextually) unique F: there is exactly one F [which is C] and it is G. Strawson, by contrast, takes the utterer to presuppose in some sense that there is exactly one salient F, but this is not part of what is asserted; rather, when the presupposition is not met, the utterance simply fails (...)
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  63. Olga Ramirez (2012). ‘BOGHOSSIAN's BLIND REASONING’, CONDITIONALIZATION AND THICK CONCEPTS A FUNCTIONAL MODEL. Ethics in Progress Quarterly 3 (1):31-52.
    Boghossian’s (2003) proposal to conditionalize concepts as a way to secure their legitimacy in disputable cases applies well, not just to pejoratives – on whose account Boghossian first proposed it – but also to thick ethical concepts. It actually has important advantages when dealing with some worries raised by the application of thick ethical terms, and the truth and facticity of corresponding statements. In this paper, I will try to show, however, that thick ethical concepts present a specific case, whose (...)
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  64. Nicholas Rescher (1961). On the Logic of Presupposition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 21 (4):521-527.
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  65. George W. Roberts (1969). A Problem About Presupposition. Mind 78 (310):270-271.
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  66. Daniel Rothschild (2011). Explaining Presupposition Projection with Dynamic Semantics. Semantics and Pragmatics 4 (3):1-43.
    Presents a version of dynamic semantics for a language with presuppositions that predicts basic facts about presupposition projection in a non-stipulative way.
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  67. Daniel Rothschild (2008). Presupposition Projection and Logical Equivalence. Noûs 42 (1):473 - 497.
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  68. Daniel Rothschild, Transparency Theory and its Dynamic Alternatives: Commentary on “Be Articulate”.
    “Be Articulate: A Pragmatic Theory of Presupposition Projection” is a remarkable paper in at least two respects: First, it is the only broadly Gricean treatment of presuppositions that generates precise and accurate predictions about the pattern of presupposition projection. Schlenker proposes that presuppositions arise as a result of a pragmatic prohibition against using one short construction to express two independent meanings. This basic idea is quite an old one.1 But no one has ever elaborated this pragmatic story in a way (...)
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  69. D. Seyfort Ruegg (1985). Purport, Implicature and Presupposition: Sanskrit Abhiprāya and Tibetan Dgo [(N)\Dot]\Dot Ns Pa/Dgo [(N)\Dot]\Dot Ns Gži as Hermeneutical Concepts. Journal of Indian Philosophy 13 (4).
  70. Gillian Russell (forthcoming). Language, Locations and Presupposition. Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations.
    Could it ever be right to say that a language—as opposed to a speaker of the language—makes, or presupposes or somehow commits itself to certain claims? Such as that certain kinds of objects exist, or that things are a certain way? It can be tempting to think not, to think that languages are just the neutral media through which speakers make claims. Yet certain, surprisingly diverse, phenomena—analyticity, racial epithets, object-involving direct reference, arithmetic, and semantic paradoxes like the Liar—have pushed philosophers (...)
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  71. Kjell Johan Saeboe (1996). Anaphoric Presuppositions and Zero Anaphora. Linguistics and Philosophy 19 (2):187 - 209.
    The purpose of this paper is to use an anaphoric notion of presupposition for solving the problem of zero argument anaphora. Since Shopen (1973) it has been known that many missing arguments have an anaphoric interpretation, but it has not been known how this interpretation arises. I argue that these arguments are involved in presuppositions. On an anaphoric account of presuppositions as in van der Sandt (1992) or Kamp and Roßdeutscher (1992), it can be shown that the zero arguments acquire (...)
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  72. P. Schlenker (2010). Presuppositions and Local Contexts. Mind 119 (474):377-391.
    In the last thirty years, the problem of presupposition projection has been taken to provide a decisive argument for a dynamic approach to meaning, one in which expressions are not evaluated with respect to the ‘global’ context of utterance, but rather with respect to a ‘local context’ obtained by updating the global one with expressions that occur earlier in the sentence. The computation of local contexts is taken by dynamic analyses to follow from a generalization of the notion of belief (...)
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  73. Philippe Schlenker, Presupposition.
    (2-week course at the New York-St. Petersburg Institute of Cognitive and Cultural Studies, July 2007).
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  74. Philippe Schlenker, Be Articulate: A Pragmatic Theory of Presupposition Projection.
    Abstract: In the 1980s, the analysis of presupposition projection contributed to a ‘dynamic turn’ in semantics: the classical notion of meanings as truth conditions was replaced with a dynamic notion of meanings as Context Change Potentials (Heim 1983). We argue that this move was misguided, and we offer an alternative in which presupposition projection follows from the combination of a fully classical semantics and a new pragmatic principle, which we call Be Articulate. This principle requires that a meaning pp’ conceptualized (...)
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  75. Philippe Schlenker, Expressive Presuppositions.
    Potts (2005, 2007) has argued that expressives such as honky must be analyzed using an entirely new dimension of meaning. We explore a more conservative theory in which expressives are presuppositional expressions [Macià 2002] that are indexical and attitudinal (and sometimes shiftable): they predicate something of the mental state of the agent of the context (and this need not always be the agent of the actual context). Following Stalnaker’s recent work on informative presuppositions (2002), we argue that the presuppositions triggered (...)
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  76. Philippe Schlenker, Presupposition.
    (2-week course at the New York-St. Petersburg Institute of Cognitive and Cultural Studies, July 2007).
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  77. Philippe Schlenker (2012). Maximize Presupposition and Gricean Reasoning. Natural Language Semantics 20 (4):391-429.
    Recent semantic research has made increasing use of a principle, Maximize Presupposition, which requires that under certain circumstances the strongest possible presupposition be marked. This principle is generally taken to be irreducible to standard Gricean reasoning because the forms that are in competition have the same assertive content. We suggest, however, that Maximize Presupposition might be reducible to the theory of scalar implicatures. (i)First, we consider a special case: the speaker utters a sentence with a presupposition p which is not (...)
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  78. Philippe Schlenker (2010). Local Contexts and Local Meanings. Philosophical Studies 151:115--142.
    Stalnaker ( 1978 ) made two seminal claims about presuppositions. The most influential one was that presupposition projection is computed by a pragmatic mechanism based on a notion of ‘local context’ . Due to conceptual and technical difficulties, however, the latter notion was reinterpreted in purely semantic terms within ‘dynamic semantics’ (Heim 1983 ). The second claim was that some instances of presupposition generation should also be explained in pragmatic terms . But despite various attempts, the definition of a precise (...)
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  79. Philippe Schlenker (2007). Anti-Dynamics: Presupposition Projection Without Dynamic Semantics. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 16 (3):325--356.
    Heim 1983 suggested that the analysis of presupposition projection requires that the classical notion of meanings as truth conditions be replaced with a dynamic notion of meanings as Context Change Potentials. But as several researchers (including Heim herself) later noted, the dynamic framework is insufficiently predictive: although it allows one to state that, say, the dynamic effect of F and G is to first update a Context Set C with F and then with G (i.e., C[F and G] = C[F][G]), (...)
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  80. Anders Johan Schoubye (forthcoming). Ghosts, Murderers, and the Semantics of Descriptions. Noûs.
    It is widely agreed that sentences containing a non-denoting description embedded in the scope of a propositional attitude verb have true de dicto interpretations, and Russell’s (1905) analysis of definite descriptions is often praised for its simple analysis of such cases, cf. e.g. Neale (1990). However, several people, incl. Elbourne (2005, 2009), Heim (1991), and Kripke (2005), have contested this by arguing that Russell’s analysis yields incorrect predictions in non-doxastic attitude contexts. Heim and Elbourne have subsequently argued that once certain (...)
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  81. David S. Schwarz (1977). On Pragmatic Presupposition. Linguistics and Philosophy 1 (2):247 - 257.
    I argue that (a) the phenomenon characteristic of pragmatic presupposition, is distinct from (b) the phenomenon characteristic of semantic presupposition, and that there are sentences exhibiting (a) alone. I apply this to Stalnaker's defense of van Fraassen's theory of semantic presupposition against Karttunen. I show that, since Stalmaker fails to distinguish (a) from (b), this defense amounts to an unsuccessful attempt to explain pragmatically the supposed instances of (b) in Karttunen's counter-examples. I observe that, given the distinction between (a) and (...)
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  82. David S. Schwarz (1976). Referring, Singular Terms, and Presupposition. Philosophical Studies 30 (1):63 - 74.
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  83. Wilfrid Sellars (1954). Presupposing. Philosophical Review 63 (2):197-215.
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  84. Mandy Simons, Presupposition Without Common Ground.
    In this paper, I review a number of arguments in favor of treating many of the central cases of presupposition as the result of conversational inference, rather than as lexically specified properties of particular expressions. I then argue that, despite the standard assumption to the contrary, the view of presupposition as constraints on the common ground is not consistent with the provision of a conversational account of particular presuppositional constraints. The argument revolves crucially around the workings of accommodation. I then (...)
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  85. Mandy Simons, Observations on Embedding Verbs, Evidentiality, and Presupposition.
    This paper discusses the semantically parenthetical use of clauseembedding verbs such as see, hear, think, believe, discover and know. When embedding verbs are used in this way, the embedded clause carries the main point of the utterance, while the main clause serves some discourse function. Frequently, this function is evidential, with the parenthetical verb carrying information about the source and reliability of the embedded claim, or about the speaker’s emotional orientation to it. Other functions of parenthetical uses of verbs are (...)
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  86. Mandy Simons, On the Conversational Basis of Some Presuppositions.
    The current literature on presupposition focuses almost exclusively on the projection problem: the question of how and why the presuppositions of atomic clauses are projected to complex sentences which embed them. Very little attention has been paid to the question of how and why these presuppositions arise at all. As Kay (1992, p.335) observes, “treatments of the presupposition inheritance problem almost never deal with the reasons that individual words and constructions give rise, in the first place, to the particular presuppositions (...)
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  87. Mandy Simons, Presupposing.
    The basic linguistic phenomenon of presupposition is commonplace and intuitive, little different from the relation described by the word presuppose in its everyday usage. In ordinary language, when we say that someone presupposes something, we mean that they assume it, or take it for granted. The term is used in the same way when we talk of a speaker presupposing something, although typically we are interested in those assumptions which are revealed by what the speaker says. To begin with the (...)
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  88. Mandy Simons (2006). Foundational Issues in Presupposition. Philosophy Compass 1 (4):357–372.
    Unsurprisingly, the negation of sentence (1), shown in (3), does not share this entailment. Neither does the yes/no question formed from this sentence. Similarly, if we add a possibility modal to the sentence, or construct a conditional of which (1) is the antecedent, the resulting sentences do not share the entailment of the original, as we see from the examples below.
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  89. Mandy Simons (2003). Presupposition and Accommodation: Understanding the Stalnakerian Picture. Philosophical Studies 112 (3):251 - 278.
    This paper offers a critical analysis ofStalnaker''s work on presupposition (Stalnaker1973, 1974, 1979, 1999, 2002). The paperexamines two definitions of speakerpresupposition offered by Stalnaker – the familiar common ground view, and the earlier,less familiar, dispositional account – and howStalnaker relates this notion to the linguisticphenomenon of presupposition. Special attentionis paid to Stalnaker''s view of accommodation. Iargue that given Stalnakers views,accommodation is not rightly seen as driven bythe presuppositional requirements ofutterances, but only by the interests ofspeakers in eliminating perceived differencesamong presuppositions. (...)
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  90. Mandy Simons, Presupposition and Cooperation.
    Since linguists began extensive work on presupposition in the 1970's, a long and heterogeneous list has been compiled of expressions, expression types and constructions that give rise to presuppositions. In the current literature, the principal (but by no means sole) diagnostic for presupposition typically appealed to is the tendency of the particular element of meaning to project, i.e. to escape the scope of operators such as negation, the question operator, or modals. An important intuition also routinely appealed to is that (...)
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  91. Scott Soames, Kripke on Presupposition and Anaphora.
    The publication of Kripke (2009), originally delivered as a lecture at Princeton University in 1990, was long in coming. Widely circulated since then, some aspects of the original manuscript are now well known by many working on presupposition. The published paper differs from the manuscript in clarifying certain points, tying up loose ends, answering some previously open questions, and incorporating a modest revision or two. That would be reason enough to review it here. More important is an assessment of what (...)
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  92. Scott Soames (2009). Philosophical Essays: Natural Language: What It Means and How We Use It. Princeton University Press.
    The origins of these essays -- Introduction -- Presupposition -- A projection problem for speaker presupposition -- Language and linguistic competence -- Linguistics and psychology -- Semantics and psychology -- Semantics and semantic competence -- The necessity argument -- Truth, meaning, and understanding -- Truth and meaning in perspective -- Semantics and pragmatics -- Naming and asserting -- The gap between meaning and assertion : why what we literally say often differs from what our words literally mean -- Drawing the (...)
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  93. Scott Soames (1982). How Presuppositions Are Inherited: A Solution to the Projection Problem. Linguistic Inquiry 13:483-545.
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  94. Elliott Sober (1986). Explanatory Presupposition. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (2):143 – 149.
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  95. Jennifer Spenader (2003). Factive Presuppositions, Accommodation and Information Structure. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 12 (3):351-368.
    There are three ways to refer to a fact from the complement of afactive verb: (1) Via abstract object anaphoric reference, or, witha full sentential complement that will be interpreted either (2) asa bound presupposition or (3) as triggering a presupposition of afact that will have to be accommodated. Spoken corpus examplesreveal that these three possibilities differ in relation to thetype of information they tend to contribute, and this has twoeffects. First, the information status of the fact and its role (...)
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  96. Robert Stalnaker (2008). A Response to Abbott on Presupposition and Common Ground. Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (5):539-544.
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  97. Robert Stalnaker (2002). Common Ground. Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5-6):701-721.
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  98. Robert Stalnaker (1974). Pragmatic Presuppositions. In Robert Stalnaker (ed.), Context and Content. Oxford University Press.
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  99. Robert C. Stalnaker (1970). Pragmatics. Synthese 22 (1-2):272--289.
  100. Andreas Stokke (forthcoming). Lying and Asserting. Journal of Philosophy.
    The paper argues that the correct definition of lying is that to lie is to assert something one believes to be false, where assertion is understood in terms of the notion of the common ground of a conversation. It is shown that this definition makes the right predictions for a number of cases involving irony, joking, and false implicature. In addition, the proposed account does not assume that intending to deceive is a necessary condition on lying, and hence counts so-called (...)
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