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Closure of Knowledge
- Fred Adams (2005). Tracking Theories of Knowledge. Veritas 50 (4):1-35.
- P. Baumann (2006). Information, Closure, and Knowledge: On Jäger's Objection to Dretske. Erkenntnis 64 (3):403 - 408.
- Tim Black (2008). Solving the Problem of Easy Knowledge. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):597-617.
- Michael Blome-Tillmann (2006). A Closer Look at Closure Scepticism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (3):381–390.
- Radu Bogdan (1985). Cognition and Epistemic Closure. American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1):55 - 63.
- Jochen Briesen (2010). Reconsidering Closure, Underdetermination, and Infallibilism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 80:221-234.
- Anthony Brueckner (2004). Strategies for Refuting Closure for Knowledge. Analysis 64 (4):333–335.
- Anthony Brueckner (1998). Closure and Context. Ratio 11 (1):78–82.
- Anthony L. Brueckner (1985). Skepticism and Epistemic Closure. Philosophical Topics 13 (3):89-117.
- J. Adam Carter (2011). Radical Skepticism, Closure, and Robust Knowledge. Journal of Philosophical Research 36:115-133.
- John M. Collins, Epistemic Closure Principles. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- John M. Collins (2002). Ryan on Epistemic Closure Principles. Philosophia 29 (1-4):371-376.
- C. B. Cross (2012). The Paradox of the Knower Without Epistemic Closure -- Corrected. Mind 121 (482):457-466.
- Charles B. Cross (2004). More on the Paradox of the Knower Without Epistemic Closure. Mind 113 (449):109-114.
- Charles B. Cross (2001). The Paradox of the Knower Without Epistemic Closure. Mind 110 (438):319-333.
- Claudio de Almeida (2007). Closure, Defeasibility and Conclusive Reasons. Acta Analytica 22 (4).
- Fred Dretske (2006). Information and Closure. Erkenntnis 64 (3):409 - 413.
- Fred Dretske (2005). Is Knowledge Closed Under Known Entailment? The Case Against Closure. In Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
- Fred I. Dretske (1970). Epistemic Operators. Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
- Richard Feldman (1995). In Defence of Closure. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (181):487-494.
- Bryan Frances (1999). Contradictory Belief and Epistemic Closure Principles. Mind and Language 14 (2):203–226.
- Steven D. Hales (1995). Epistemic Closure Principles. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):185-202.
- Wesley H. Holliday (forthcoming). Epistemic Closure and Epistemic Logic I: Relevant Alternatives and Subjunctivism. Journal of Philosophical Logic.
- Wesley H. Holliday (2012). Epistemic Logic, Relevant Alternatives, and the Dynamics of Context. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 7415:109-129.
- Michael Huemer (2005). Logical Properties of Warrant. Philosophical Studies 122 (2):171 - 182.
- Michael Hughes (2013). Problems for Contrastive Closure: Resolved and Regained. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):577-590.
- Christoph Jäger, Skepticism, Information, and Closure.
- Christoph Jäger (2004). Skepticism, Information, and Closure: Dretske's Theory of Knowledge. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):187 - 201.
- Mark Jago (forthcoming). The Problem of Rational Knowledge. Erkenntnis.
- Peter Klein (2004). ``Closure Matters: Skepticism and Easy Knowledge". Philosophical Issues 14:165--184.
- Peter Klein (1995). ``Skepticism and Closure: Why the Evil Genius Argument Fails". Philosophical Topics 23 (1):213--236.
- Jonathan Kvanvig (2008). Contrastivism and Closure. Social Epistemology 22 (3):247 – 256.
- Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2008). ``Closure and Alternative Possibilities&Quot. In John Greco (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2006). Closure Principles. Philosophy Compass 1 (3):256–267.
- Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2006). ``Epistemic Closure Principles&Quot. Philosophy Compass 1:256-267.
- Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2004). ``Nozickian Epistemology and the Question of Closure&Quot. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):351-364.
- Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2008). Single Premise Deduction and Risk. Philosophical Studies 141 (2):157 - 173.
- Krista Lawlor (2005). Living Without Closure. Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):25-50.
- Steven Luper, The Epistemic Closure Principle. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Steven Luper (2006). Dretske on Knowledge Closure. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):379 – 394.
- Guido Melchior (2010). Knowledge-Closure and Inferential Knowledge. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (30):259-285.
- Jennifer Nagel (2011). The Psychological Basis of the Harman-Vogel Paradox. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (5):1-28.
- Geoff Pynn (2013). The Bayesian Explanation of Transmission Failure. Synthese 190 (9):1519-1531.
- Jonathan Schaffer (2007). Closure, Contrast, and Answer. Philosophical Studies 133 (2):233–255.
- Joshua Schechter (2013). Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):428-452.
- William Seager, Uncertain Knowledge and Reflective Epistemology.
- Nicholas Shackel (2006). Shutting Dretske's Door. Erkenntnis 64 (3):393 - 401.
- Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre (forthcoming). Epistemic Closure Under Deductive Inference: What is It and Can We Afford It? Synthese.
- Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre (2010). Dogmatism Repuzzled. Philosophical Studies 148 (2).
- Martin Smith (forthcoming). Two Notions of Epistemic Risk. Erkenntnis.
- G. C. Stine (1976). Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure. Philosophical Studies 29 (4):249--261.
- Jonathan Vogel (2004). Speaking of Knowledge. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):501–509.
- Jonathan Vogel (1990). ``Are There Counterexamples to the Closure Principle?". In Michael David Roth & Glenn Ross (eds.), Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Skepiticism. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- Ted A. Warfield (2004). When Epistemic Closure Does and Does Not Fail: A Lesson From the History of Epistemology. Analysis 64 (281):35–41.
- Brian Weatherson, Tracking, Closure and Conjunctions.
- Matt Weiner, Deductive Closure and the Sorites.
- Jonathan Weisberg (2012). The Bootstrapping Problem. Philosophy Compass 7 (9):597-610.
Knowability
- Samuel Alexander (forthcoming). An Axiomatic Version of Fitch's Paradox. Synthese.
- Samuel Alexander (2012). A Purely Epistemological Version of Fitch's Paradox. The Reasoner 6 (4):59-60.
- J. C. Beall (2009). Knowability and Possible Epistemic Oddities. In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press.
- JC Beall (2000). Fitch's Proof, Verificationism, and the Knower Paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):241 – 247.
- Jose Luis Bermudez (2009). Truth, Indefinite Extensibility, and Fitch's Paradox. In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press.
- John Bigelow (2005). Omnificence. Analysis 65 (287):187–196.
- Jens Christian Bjerring (forthcoming). Review of New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. [REVIEW] History and Philosophy of Logic.
- Berit Brogaard (2009). On Keeping Blue Swans and Unknowable Facts at Bay : A Case Study on Fitch's Paradox. In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press.
- Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno, Fitch's Paradox of Knowability. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno (2008). Knowability, Possibility and Paradox. In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno (2006). Knowability and a Modal Closure Principle. American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (3):261-270.
- Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno (2002). Clues to the Paradoxes of Knowability: Reply to Dummett and Tennant. Analysis 62 (2):143–150.
- Otavio Bueno (2009). Fitch's Paradox and the Philosophy of Mathematics. In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press.
- Johnw Burgess (2009). Can Truth Out? In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press.
- Rudolf Carnap (1936). Testability and Meaning. Philosophy of Science 3 (4):419-471.
- Massimiliano Carrara & Davide Fassio (2011). Why Knowledge Should Not Be Typed: An Argument Against the Type Solution to the Knowability Paradox. Theoria 77 (2):180-193.
- David Chalmers (2012). Constructing the World. Oxford University Press.
- David J. Chalmers (2011). Actuality and Knowability. Analysis 71 (3):411-419.
- Roy T. Cook (2006). Knights, Knaves and Unknowable Truths. Analysis 66 (289):10–16.
- Cesare Cozzo (1994). What Can We Learn From the Paradox of Knowability? Topoi 13 (2):71--78.
- Cesare Cozzo (1994). ``What We Can Learn From the Paradox of Knowability&Quot. Topoi 13:71-78.
- W. Dean & H. Kurokawa (forthcoming). From the Knowability Paradox to the Existence of Proofs. Synthese.
- David DeVide & Tim Kenyon (2003). ``Analogues of Knowability&Quot. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81:481-495.
- David DeVidi & Tim Kenyon (2003). Analogues of Knowability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):481 – 495.
- David DeVidi & Graham Solomon (2001). Knowability and Intuitionistic Logic. Philosophia 28 (1-4):319-334.
- Igor Douven (2007). Fitch's Paradox and Probabilistic Antirealism. Studia Logica 86 (2):149 - 182.
- Igor Douven (2005). A Principled Solution to Fitch's Paradox. Erkenntnis 62 (1):47 - 69.
- Michael Dummett (2009). Fitch's Paradox of Knowability. In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press.
- Michael Dummett (2001). Victor's Error. Analysis 61 (1):1–2.
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