 | 1 — 100 / 198 |  |
Closure of Knowledge
- Fred Adams (2005). Tracking Theories of Knowledge. Veritas 50:1-35.
- P. Baumann (2006). Information, Closure, and Knowledge: On Jäger's Objection to Dretske. Erkenntnis 64 (3):403 - 408.
- Tim Black (2008). Solving the Problem of Easy Knowledge. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):597-617.
- Michael Blome-Tillmann (2006). A Closer Look at Closure Scepticism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (3):381–390.
- Radu Bogdan (1985). Cognition and Epistemic Closure. American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1):55 - 63.
- Jochen Briesen (2010). Reconsidering Closure, Underdetermination, and Infallibilism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 80:221-234.
- Anthony Brueckner (2004). Strategies for Refuting Closure for Knowledge. Analysis 64 (4):333–335.
- Anthony Brueckner (1998). Closure and Context. Ratio 11 (1):78–82.
- Anthony L. Brueckner (1985). Skepticism and Epistemic Closure. Philosophical Topics 13 (3):89-117.
- J. Adam Carter (2011). Radical Skepticism, Closure, and Robust Knowledge. Journal of Philosophical Research 36:115-133.
- John M. Collins, Epistemic Closure Principles. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- John M. Collins (2002). Ryan on Epistemic Closure Principles. Philosophia 29 (1-4):371-376.
- Claudio de Almeida (2007). Closure, Defeasibility and Conclusive Reasons. Acta Analytica 22 (4).
- Fred Dretske (2006). Information and Closure. Erkenntnis 64 (3):409 - 413.
- Fred I. Dretske (1970). Epistemic Operators. Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
- Richard Feldman (1995). In Defence of Closure. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (181):487-494.
- Bryan Frances (1999). Contradictory Belief and Epistemic Closure Principles. Mind and Language 14 (2):203–226.
- Steven D. Hales (1995). Epistemic Closure Principles. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):185-202.
- Michael Huemer (2005). Logical Properties of Warrant. Philosophical Studies 122 (2):171 - 182.
- Michael Hughes (forthcoming). Problems for Contrastive Closure: Resolved and Regained. Philosophical Studies:-.
- Christoph Jäger, Skepticism, Information, and Closure.
- Christoph Jäger (2004). Skepticism, Information, and Closure: Dretske's Theory of Knowledge. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):187 - 201.
- Jonathan Kvanvig (2008). Contrastivism and Closure. Social Epistemology 22 (3):247 – 256.
- Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2006). Closure Principles. Philosophy Compass 1 (3):256–267.
- Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2004). ``Nozickian Epistemology and the Question of Closure&Quot. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):351-364.
- Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2008). Single Premise Deduction and Risk. Philosophical Studies 141 (2):157 - 173.
- Krista Lawlor (2005). Living Without Closure. Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):25-50.
- Steven Luper, The Epistemic Closure Principle. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Steven Luper (2006). Dretske on Knowledge Closure. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):379 – 394.
- Jennifer Nagel (2011). The Psychological Basis of the Harman-Vogel Paradox. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (5):1-28.
- Jonathan Schaffer (2007). Closure, Contrast, and Answer. Philosophical Studies 133 (2):233–255.
- Joshua Schechter (forthcoming). Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure. Philosophical Studies:-.
- Nicholas Shackel (2006). Shutting Dretske's Door. Erkenntnis 64 (3):393 - 401.
- Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre (2010). Dogmatism Repuzzled. Philosophical Studies 148 (2).
- G. C. Stine (1976). Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure. Philosophical Studies 29 (4):249--261.
- Jonathan Vogel (2004). Speaking of Knowledge. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):501–509.
- Ted A. Warfield (2004). When Epistemic Closure Does and Does Not Fail: A Lesson From the History of Epistemology. Analysis 64 (281):35–41.
- Brian Weatherson, Tracking, Closure and Conjunctions.
- Matt Weiner, Deductive Closure and the Sorites.
Knowability
- Samuel Alexander (forthcoming). An Axiomatic Version of Fitch's Paradox. Synthese.
- JC Beall (2000). Fitch's Proof, Verificationism, and the Knower Paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):241 – 247.
- John Bigelow (2005). Omnificence. Analysis 65 (287):187–196.
- Jens Christian Bjerring (forthcoming). Review of New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. History and Philosophy of Logic.
- Berit Brogaard (2009). On Keeping Blue Swans and Unknowable Facts at Bay : A Case Study on Fitch's Paradox. In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press.
- Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno, Fitch's Paradox of Knowability. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno (2006). Knowability and a Modal Closure Principle. American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (3):261-270..
- Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno (2002). Clues to the Paradoxes of Knowability: Reply to Dummett and Tennant. Analysis 62 (2):143–150.
- Berrit Brogaard & Joe Salerno (2006). Knowability and a Modal Closure Principle. American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (3):261--270.
- Rudolf Carnap (1936). Testability and Meaning. Philosophy of Science 3 (4):419-471.
- Massimiliano Carrara & Davide Fassio (2011). Why Knowledge Should Not Be Typed: An Argument Against the Type Solution to the Knowability Paradox. Theoria 77 (2):180-193.
- David J. Chalmers (2011). Actuality and Knowability. Analysis 71 (3):411-419.
- Roy T. Cook (2006). Knights, Knaves and Unknowable Truths. Analysis 66 (289):10–16.
- Cesare Cozzo (1994). What Can We Learn From the Paradox of Knowability? Topoi 13 (2):71--78.
- David De Vidi & Graham Solomon (2001). Knowability and Intuitionistic Logic. Philosophia 28 (1-4).
- W. Dean & H. Kurokawa (forthcoming). From the Knowability Paradox to the Existence of Proofs. Synthese.
- David DeVidi & Tim Kenyon (2003). Analogues of Knowability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):481 – 495.
- Igor Douven (2007). Fitch's Paradox and Probabilistic Antirealism. Studia Logica 86 (2):149 - 182.
- Igor Douven (2005). A Principled Solution to Fitch's Paradox. Erkenntnis 62 (1):47 - 69.
- Michael Dummett (2001). Victor's Error. Analysis 61 (1):1–2.
- Dorothy Edgington (1985). The Paradox of Knowability. Mind 94 (376):557-568.
- Eva Ejerhed & Sten Lindström (1997). Logic, Action, and Cognition: Essays in Philosophical Logic. Kluwer Academic.
- Michael Fara (2010). Knowability and the Capacity to Know. Synthese 173 (1).
- Frederic B. Fitch (1963). A Logical Analysis of Some Value Concepts. Journal of Symbolic Logic 28 (2):135-142.
- Salvatore Florio & Julien Murzi (2009). The Paradox of Idealization. Analysis 69 (3):461-469.
- Pierdaniele Giaretta (2009). The Paradox of Knowability From a Russellian Perspective. Prolegomena 8 (2):141-158.
- Volker Halbach (2008). On a Side Effect of Solving Fitch's Paradox by Typing Knowledge. Analysis 68 (2):114-120.
- M. Hand (2003). Knowability and Epistemic Truth. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):216 – 228.
- Michael Hand (2010). Antirealism and Universal Knowability. Synthese 173 (1).
- Michael Hand & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1999). Tennant on Knowability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4):422 – 428.
- W. D. Hart & Colin McGinn (1976). Knowledge and Necessity. Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (2):205 - 208.
- Vincent Hendricks (2008). New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Robert G. Hudson (2009). Faint-Hearted Anti-Realism and Knowability. Philosophia 37 (3).
- Mark Jago (2010). Closure on Knowability. Analysis 70 (4):648-659.
- Mark Jago (2010). Joe Salerno (Ed): New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 19 (3).
- C. S. Jenkins (2009). The Mystery of the Disappearing Diamond. In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press.
- C. S. Jenkins (2007). Anti-Realism and Epistemic Accessibility. Philosophical Studies 132 (3):525 - 551.
- C. S. Jenkins (2006). Review: The Knowability Paradox. Mind 115 (460):1141-1147.
- Tim Kenyon (1999). Truth, Knowability, and Neutrality. Noûs 33 (1):103-117.
- Jonathan Kvanvig (2010). ``The Incarnation and the Knowability Paradox&Quot. Synthese 173 (1):89-105.
- Jonathan Kvanvig (2009). Restriction Strategies for Knowability : Some Lessons in False Hope. In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press.
- Jonathan Kvanvig (1999). Tennant on Knowability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4):422-428.
- Jonathan Kvanvig (1995). The Knowability Paradox and the Prospects for Anti-Realism. Noûs 29 (4):481-500.
- Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2006). The Knowability Paradox. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sten Lindström (1997). Situations, Truth and Knowability: A Situation-Theoretic Analysis of a Paradox by Fitch. In Eva Ejerhed & Sten Lindström (eds.), Logic, Action and Cognition: Essays in Philosophical Logic. Kluwer.
- Peter Marton (2006). Verificationists Versus Realists: The Battle Over Knowability. Synthese 151 (1):81 - 98.
- Joseph Melia (1991). Anti-Realism Untouched. Mind 100 (3):341-342.
- Julien Murzi (2010). Knowability and Bivalence: Intuitionistic Solutions to the Paradox of Knowability. Philosophical Studies 149 (2).
- Robert Nozick (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Harvard University Press.
- Peter Pagin (1994). Knowledge of Proofs. Topoi 13 (2):93-100.
- Rafał Palczewski (2007). Distributed Knowability and Fitch's Paradox. Studia Logica 86 (3):455--478.
- Alexander Paseau (2009). How to Type: Reply to Halbach. Analysis 69 (2):280-286.
- Philip Percival (2007). Review of Jonathan L. Kvanvig, The Knowability Paradox. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (3).
 | 1 — 100 / 198 |  |
|
Off-campus access
Using PhilPapers from home?
Click here to configure this browser for off-campus access.
Monitor this page
Be alerted of all new items appearing on this page. Choose how you want to monitor it:
Email
|
RSS feed
|
|