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  1. Christopher Buford (2005). DeRose and the Comparative Account of Epistemic Closure. Facta Philosophica 7 (2):255-259.
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  2. Tyler Burge (1984). Epistemic Paradox. Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):5-29.
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  3. Massimiliano Carrara & Davide Fassio, Reductionism and Perfectibility of Science.
    Nicholas Rescher, in The Limits of Science (1984), argued that: «perfected science is a mirage; complete knowledge a chimera» . He reached the above conclusion from a logical argument known as Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability. The argument, starting from the assumption that every truth is knowable, proves that every truth is also actually known and, given that some true propositions are not actually known, it concludes, by modus tollens, that there are unknowable truths. Prima facie, this argument seems to seriously (...)
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  4. Jan Derry (2007). What Is It to Be a Human Knower? Philosophy Now 63:10-11.
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  5. Jim Edwards (1997). Is Tennant Selling Truth Short? Analysis 57 (2):152–158.
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  6. Paul Égré (2005). The Knower Paradox in the Light of Provability Interpretations of Modal Logic. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 14 (1):13-48.
    This paper propounds a systematic examination of the link between the Knower Paradox and provability interpretations of modal logic. The aim of the paper is threefold: to give a streamlined presentation of the Knower Paradox and related results; to clarify the notion of a syntactical treatment of modalities; finally, to discuss the kind of solution that modal provability logic provides to the Paradox. I discuss the respective strength of different versions of the Knower Paradox, both in the framework (...)
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  7. Fred Feldman (1989). The Paradox of the Knower. Philosophical Studies 55 (1):93 - 100.
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  8. Danilo Marcondes de Souza Filho (2002). The Maker’s Knowledge Principle and the Limits of Science. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 76:229-237.
    This paper starts with an analysis of the maker’s knowledge principle as one of the main characteristics of Modern epistemology. We start by showing that maker’s knowledge can be understood in two ways: 1) a negative sense, as a way of establishing limits to human knowledge: we can only know what we create; and 2) a positive sense, as legitimizing human knowledge: we effectively know what we create. We proceed then to examine the roots of the maker’s knowledge principle in (...)
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  9. Richard Greene (2007). A Worry About Safety. Southwest Philosophy Review 23 (1):155-161.
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  10. Patrick Grim (1993). Operators in the Paradox of the Knower. Synthese 94 (3):409 - 428.
    Predicates are term-to-sentence devices, and operators are sentence-to-sentence devices. What Kaplan and Montague's Paradox of the Knower demonstrates is that necessity and other modalities cannot be treated as predicates, consistent with arithmetic; they must be treated as operators instead. Such is the current wisdom.A number of previous pieces have challenged such a view by showing that a predicative treatment of modalities neednot raise the Paradox of the Knower. This paper attempts to challenge the current wisdom in another way (...)
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  11. Patrick Grim (1988). Truth, Omniscience, and the Knower. Philosophical Studies 54 (1):9 - 41.
    Let us sum up.The paradox of the Knower poses a direct and formal challenge to the coherence of common notions of knowledge and truth. We've considered a number of ways one might try to meet that challenge: propositional views of truth and knowledge, redundancy or operator views, and appeal to hierarchy of various sorts. Mere appeal to propositions or operators, however, seems to be inadequate to the task of the Knower, at least if unsupplemented by an auxiliary recourse to hierarchy. (...)
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  12. Theodore Guleserian (2007). Gregory W. Fitch, 1948-2007. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 81 (2):172 -.
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  13. Bob Hale (2000). Transmission and Closure. Noûs 34 (s1):172 - 190.
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  14. Jan Heylen (2015). Closure of A Priori Knowability Under A Priori Knowable Material Implication. Erkenntnis 80 (2):359-380.
    The topic of this article is the closure of a priori knowability under a priori knowable material implication: if a material conditional is a priori knowable and if the antecedent is a priori knowable, then the consequent is a priori knowable as well. This principle is arguably correct under certain conditions, but there is at least one counterexample when completely unrestricted. To deal with this, Anderson proposes to restrict the closure principle to necessary truths and Horsten suggests to restrict it (...)
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  15. Leon Horsten (2009). An Argument Concerning the Unknowable. Analysis 69 (2):240-242.
    Williamson has forcefully argued that Fitch's argument shows that the domain of the unknowable is non-empty. And he exhorts us to make more inroads into the land of the unknowable. Concluding his discussion of Fitch's argument, he writes: " Once we acknowledge that [the domain of the unknowable] is non-empty, we can explore more effectively its extent. … We are only beginning to understand the deeper limits of our knowledge. " I shall formulate and evaluate a new argument concerning the (...)
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  16. Christoph Jäger (2016). Epistemic Authority, Preemptive Reasons, and Understanding. Episteme 13 (2):167-185.
    One of the key tenets of Linda Zagzebski’s book "Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief" (2012) is the Preemption Thesis. It says that, when an agent learns that an epistemic authority believes that p, the epistemically rational response for her is to adopt the authority’s belief and to replace all of her previous reasons relevant to whether p by the reason that the authority believes that p. I argue that such a “Hobbesian (...)
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  17. Jela Krečič (2009). Fantazma V Kinu: Problem Filmske Reprezentacije Skozi Filmske Manifeste in Filmski Anti-Manifest. Problemi 4.
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  18. Keith Lehrer (2000). Sensitivity, Indiscernibility and Knowledge. Noûs 34 (s1):33 - 37.
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  19. Bernard Linsky (1994). G. W. Fitch's Paleontology. Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):189 - 193.
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  20. David Manley (2007). Safety, Content, Apriority, Self-Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 104 (8):403-423.
    This essay motivates a revised version of the epistemic condition of safety and then employs the revision to (i) challenge traditional conceptions of apriority, (ii) refute ‘strong privileged access’, and (iii) resolve a well-known puzzle about externalism and self-knowledge.
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  21. Ruth Barcan Marcus (1988). F.B. Fitch 1908-1987. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 61 (3):551 - 553.
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  22. Colin McGinn (1981). Reply to Tennant. Analysis 41 (3):120 - 122.
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  23. Peter Murphy (2005). Closure Failures for Safety. Philosophia 33 (1-4):331-334.
    Ernest Sosa and others have proposed a safety condition on knowledge: If S knows p, then in the nearest (non-actual) worlds in which S believes p, p is true.1 Colloquially, this is the idea that knowing requires not being easily mistaken. Here, I will argue that like another condition requiring a counterfactual relation between a subject’s belief and the world, viz. Robert Nozick’s sensitivity condition, safety leads, in certain cases, to the unacceptable result that knowledge is not closed under known (...)
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  24. John R. Myhill (1949). Note on an Idea of Fitch. Journal of Symbolic Logic 14 (3):175-176.
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  25. Sam Nico (2002). Closure. Philosophy Now 37:45-46.
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  26. Douglas Odegard (1978). A Knower's Evidence. American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (2):123 - 128.
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  27. Douglas Odegard (1976). Conclusive Reasons and Knowledge. Mind 85 (338):239-241.
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  28. Doris Olin (1987). On an Epistemic Paradox. Analysis 47 (4):216 - 217.
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  29. Christopher Peacocke (1980). A Reply to Tennant. Analysis 40 (1):8 - 9.
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  30. Michael Picard (2007). This is Not a Book.
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  31. Duncan Pritchard (2000). Closure and Context. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):275 – 280.
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  32. Carlo Proietti & Gabriel Sandu (2010). Fitch's Paradox and Ceteris Paribus Modalities. Synthese 173 (1):75 - 87.
    The paper attempts to give a solution to the Fitch’s paradox though the strategy of the reformulation of the paradox in temporal logic, and a notion of knowledge which is a kind of ceteris paribus modality. An analogous solution has been offered in a different context to solve the problem of metaphysical determinism.
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  33. Mark Richard (2000). On an Argument of Williamson's. Analysis 60 (266):213–217.
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  34. R. M. Sainsbury (1995). Vagueness, Ignorance, and Margin for Error. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):589-601.
  35. Matthew R. Silliman & David K. Johnson (2000). The Anti-Theorist's Paradox. Social Philosophy Today 15:199-208.
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  36. Luper-Foy Steven (ed.) (1987). The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics. Rowman & Littlefield.
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  37. Jing Tong (2011). Are Back-Tracking FDCs Deliberationally Useful? Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (2):113-121.
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  38. Zbigniew Tworak (2011). Paradoks znawcy (The Knower Paradox). Filozofia Nauki 3.
    The Knower Paradox is an element of the class of paradoxes of self-reference. It demonstrates that any theory Ó which (1) extends Robinson arithmetic Q, (2) includes a unary knowledge predicate K, and (3) contains certain elementary epistemic principles involving K is inconsistent. In this paper I present different versions of the Knower Paradox (both in the framework of the first-order arithmetic and in the modal logic). There are several solutions of the paradox. Some of them I discuss in detail, (...)
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  39. T. Upile, C. Fisher, W. Jerjes, M. El Maaytah, A. Searle, D. Archer, L. Michaels, P. Rhys-Evans, C. Hopper, D. Howard & A. Wright, The Uncertainty of the Surgical Margin in the Treatment of Head and Neck Cancer.
    We discuss our surgical philosophy concerning the subtle interplay between the size of the surgical margin taken and the resultant morbidity from ablative oncological. procedures, which is ever more evident in the treatment of head and neck malignancy. The extent of tissue resection is determined by the "trade off" between cancer control and the perioperative, functional and aesthetic morbidity and mortality of the surgery. We also discuss our dilemmas concerning recent minimally invasive endoscopic microsurgical. techniques for the trans-oral laser removal. (...)
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  40. Douglas Walton (2006). Rules for Reasoning From Knowledge and Lack of Knowledge. Philosophia 34 (3):355-376.
    In this paper, the traditional view that argumentum ad ignorantiam is a logical fallacy is challenged, and lessons are drawn on how to model inferences drawn from knowledge in combination with ones drawn from lack of knowledge. Five defeasible rules for evaluating knowledge-based arguments that apply to inferences drawn under conditions of lack of knowledge are formulated. They are the veridicality rule, the consistency of knowledge rule, the closure of knowledge rule, the (...)
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  41. Friedel Weinert (1994). The Correspondence Principle and the Closure of Theories. Erkenntnis 40 (3):303 - 323.
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  42. Alan Weir (1985). Rejoinder to Tennant. Analysis 45 (2):68 - 72.
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  43. By Dennis Whitcomb (2008). Factivity Without Safety. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):143–149.
    I summarize Timothy Williamson's theory of knowledge, construct some counterexamples to it, and try to diagnose the problem in virtue of which those counterexamples arise. Then I consider possible responses. It turns out that only one of those responses is tenable, and that that response renders Williamson's theory a continuous piece of, rather than a radical paradigmatic break from, recent mainstream work in the theory of knowledge.
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  44. Timothy Williamson, Probability and Danger. Amherst Lecture in Philosophy.
    What is the epistemological structure of situations where many small risks amount to a large one? Lottery and preface paradoxes and puzzles about quantum-mechanical blips threaten the idea that competent deduction is a way of extending our knowledge . Seemingly, everyday knowledge involves small risks, and competently deducing the conjunction of many such truths from them yields a conclusion too risky to constitute knowledge. But the dilemma between scepticism and abandoning MPC is false. In extreme cases, objectively improbable truths are (...)
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  45. Timothy Williamson (2000). Margins for Error: A Reply. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):76-81.
    I address Peter Mott's 'Margins for Error and the Sorites Paradox' , pp. 494–503). Mott criticizes my account of inexact knowledge, on which it satisfies margin for error principles of the form 'If one knows in a given case, one avoids false belief in sufficiently similar cases'. Mott's arguments are shown to be fallacious because they ignore the fact that our knowledge of inexact knowledge is itself inexact. In the examples discussed, the first-level inexact knowledge is perceptual. Since my defense (...)
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  46. Timothy Williamson (1987). On Knowledge of the Unknowable. Analysis 47 (3):154-158.
    If it is an unknown truth that p, it is an unknowable truth that it is an unknown truth that p . It follows, by classical logic, that if all truths are knowable then all truths are known. This hardish fact makes life difficult for the verificationist who wishes to assert that all truths are knowable, but to deny that all truths are known. He might try rejecting classical logic . Dorothy Edgington has recently suggested a different way out . (...)
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  47. Renata Ziemińska (2002). Nozick o wiedzy i sceptycyzmie. Filozofia Nauki 1.
    Nozick is the author of the conditional definition of knowledge where two subjunctive conditionals replace internalistic notion of justification. If you know that p, you have true belief that p and also in the close possible worlds you would accept p when p is true and you would not accept p when p is false. Nozick agrees with skeptics that we do not know that we are not brains in the vat. But he claims that we do know all the (...)
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Closure of Knowledge
  1. Fred Adams (2005). Tracking Theories of Knowledge. Veritas: Revista de Filosofia da PUCRS 50 (4):1-35.
    As teorias epistemológicas do rastreamento sustentam que o conhecimento é uma relação real entre o agente cognitivo e seu ambiente. Os estados cognitivos de um agente epistêmico fazem o rastreamento da verdade das proposições que são objeto de conhecimento ao embasarem a crença em indicadores confiáveis da verdade (evidência, razões, ou métodos de formação de crença). A novidade nessa abordagem é que se dá pouca ênfase no tipo de justificação epistêmica voltada ao fornecimento de procedimentos de decisão doxástica ou regras (...)
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  2. Fred Adams, John A. Barker & Julia Figurelli (2012). Towards Closure on Closure. Synthese 188 (2):179-196.
    Tracking theories of knowledge are widely known to have the consequence that knowledge is not closed. Recent arguments by Vogel and Hawthorne claim both that there are no legitimate examples of knowledge without closure and that the costs of theories that deny closure are too great. This paper considers the tracking theories of Dretske and Nozick and the arguments by Vogel and Hawthorne. We reject the arguments of Vogel and Hawthorne and evaluate the costs of closure denial for tracking theories (...)
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  3. Patrick Allo (2013). The Many Faces of Closure and Introspection. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):91-124.
    In this paper I present a more refined analysis of the principles of deductive closure and positive introspection. This analysis uses the expressive resources of logics for different types of group knowledge, and discriminates between aspects of closure and computation that are often conflated. The resulting model also yields a more fine-grained distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge, and places Hintikka’s original argument for positive introspection in a new perspective.
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