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  1. Andrew Alexandra (1992). Should Hobbes's State of Nature Be Represented as a Prisoner's Dilemma? Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):1-16.
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  2. Chrisoula Andreou (2006). Environmental Damage and the Puzzle of the Self-Torturer. Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (1):95–108.
  3. Christian W. Bach & Conrad Heilmann (2011). Agent Connectedness and Backward Induction. International Game Theory Review 13 (2):195-208.
    We conceive of a player in dynamic games as a set of agents, which are assigned the distinct tasks of reasoning and node-specific choices. The notion of agent connectedness measuring the sequential stability of a player over time is then modeled in an extended type-based epistemic framework. Moreover, we provide an epistemic foundation for backward induction in terms of agent connectedness. Besides, it is argued that the epistemic independence assumption underlying backward induction is stronger than usually presumed.
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  4. Robert L. Birmingham (1969). The Prisoner's Dilemma and Mutual Trust: Comment. Ethics 79 (2):156-158.
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  5. Max Black (1990). Perplexities: Rational Choice, the Prisoner's Dilemma, Metaphor, Poetic Ambiguity, and Other Puzzles. Cornell University Press.
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  6. Luc Bovens (1997). The Backward Induction Argument for the Finite Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Surprise Exam Paradox. Analysis 57 (3):179–186.
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  7. Rob Boyd, Evolutionary Dynamics of the Continuous Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.
    The iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) has been widely used in the biological and social sciences to model dyadic cooperation. While most of this work has focused on the discrete prisoner’s dilemma, in which actors choose between cooperation and defection, there has been some analysis of the continuous IPD, in which actors can choose any level of cooperation from zero to one. Here, we analyse a model of the continuous IPD with a limited strategy set, and show that a generous strategy (...)
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  8. Tomislav Bracanovic (2002). The Referee's Dilemma. The Ethics of Scientific Communities and Game Theory. Prolegomena 1 (1):55-74.
    This article argues that various deviations from the basic principles of the scientific ethos – primarily the appearance of pseudoscience in scientific communities – can be formulated and explained using specific models of game theory, such as the prisoner’s dilemma and the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. The article indirectly tackles the deontology of scientific work as well, in which it is assumed that there is no room for moral skepticism, let alone moral anti-realism, in the ethics of scientific communities. Namely, on (...)
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  9. Randall K. Campbell (1989). The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Symmetry Argument for Cooperation. Analysis 49 (2):60 - 65.
    Several philosophers have discussed informal versions of a "symmetry argument" that seems to show that two rational maximizers will cooperate when they are in a prisoner's dilemma. I present a more precise version of that argument and I argue that it is valid only if some crucial statements are misinterpreted as material conditionals instead of being interpreted correctly as subjunctive conditionals.
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  10. Richmond Campbell & Lanning Snowden (eds.) (1985). Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation: Prisoner's Dilemma and Newcomb's Problem. University of British Columbia Press.
    1 Background for the Uninitiated RICHMOND CAMPBELL Paradoxes are intrinsically fascinating. They are also distinctively ...
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  11. John W. Carroll (2000). The Backward Induction Argument. Theory and Decision 48 (1):61-84.
    The backward induction argument purports to show that rational and suitably informed players will defect throughout a finite sequence of prisoner's dilemmas. It is supposed to be a useful argument for predicting how rational players will behave in a variety of interesting decision situations. Here, I lay out a set of assumptions defining a class of finite sequences of prisoner's dilemmas. Given these assumptions, I suggest how it might appear that backward induction succeeds and why it is actually fallacious. Then, (...)
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  12. John W. Carroll (1999). Decision-Theoretic Finitely Iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas. Analysis 59 (264):249–256.
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  13. John W. Carroll (1988). Iterated N-Player Prisoner's Dilemma Games. Philosophical Studies 53 (3):411 - 415.
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  14. Gustavo Cevolani & Roberto Festa (forthcoming). L'€™ingranaggio della cooperazione. Teorie dei giochi, cooperazione spontanea e produzione di beni pubblici. In Carlo Lottieri & Daniele Velo Dalbrenta (eds.), La città volontaria. IBL Libri.
    A survey of some game-theoretic accounts of the emergence and evolution of spontaneuous cooperation in social and public-good dilemmas.
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  15. Gustavo Cevolani & Roberto Festa (2012). Giochi di altruismo. L'approccio evoluzionistico alla cooperazione umana. In Matt Ridley (ed.), Le Origini della Virtù. IBL Libri. 7--38.
    This is the introductory essay to the Italian translation of Matt Ridley's "The origins of virtue", surveying the game-theoretic and evolutionary approaches to the emergence and evolution of cooperation and altruism.
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  16. Gustavo Cevolani & Roberto Festa (2011). Giochi di anarchia. Beni pubblici, teoria dei giochi e anarco-liberalismo. Nuova Civiltà Delle Macchine 29 (1-2):163-180.
    The paper focuses on Anthony de Jasay's "anarcho-liberalism" as based oon his game-theoretic approach to the problem of public goods provision.
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  17. Nick Chater, Game Relativity: How Context Influences Strategic Decision Making.
    Existing models of strategic decision making typically assume that only the attributes of the currently played game need be considered when reaching a decision. The results presented in this article demonstrate that the so-called “cooperativeness” of the previously played prisoner’s dilemma games influence choices and predictions in the current prisoner’s dilemma game, which suggests that games are not considered independently. These effects involved reinforcement-based assimilation to the previous choices and also a perceptual contrast of the present game with preceding games, (...)
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  18. Robert A. Curtis (1989). The Success of Hyperrational Utility Maximizers in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma: A Response to Sobel. Dialogue 28 (02):265-.
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  19. Peter Danielson (2002). Learning to Cooperate: Reciprocity and Self-Control. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):256-257.
    Using a simple learning agent, we show that learning self-control in the primrose path experiment does parallel learning cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma. But Rachlin's claim that “there is no essential difference between self-control and altruism” is too strong. Only iterated prisoner's dilemmas played against reciprocators are reduced to self-control problems. There is more to cooperation than self-control and even altruism in a strong sense.
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  20. Peter Danielson (ed.) (1998). Modeling Rationality, Morality, and Evolution. Oxford University Press.
    This collection focuses on questions that arise when morality is considered from the perspective of recent work on rational choice and evolution. Linking questions like "Is it rational to be moral?" to the evolution of cooperation in "The Prisoners Dilemma," the book brings together new work using models from game theory, evolutionary biology, and cognitive science, as well as from philosophical analysis. Among the contributors are leading figures in these fields, including David Gauthier, Paul M. Churchland, Brian Skyrms, Ronald de (...)
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  21. Peter Danielson (1995). Prisoner's Dilemma Popularized: Game Theory and Ethical Progress. Dialogue 34 (02):295-.
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  22. Govert Den Hartogh (1993). The Rationality of Conditional Cooperation. Erkenntnis 38 (3):405-427.
    InMorals by Agreement, David Gauthier (1986) argues that it is rational to intend to cooperate, even in single-play Prisoner's Dilemma games, provided (1) your co-player has a similar intention; (2) both intentions can be revealed to the other player. To this thesis four objections are made. (a) In a strategic decision the parameters on which the argument relies cannot be supposed to be given. (b) Of each pair ofa-symmetric intentions at least one is not rational. But it is impossible to (...)
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  23. Daniel Eggers (2011). Hobbes and Game Theory Revisited: Zero-Sum Games in the State of Nature. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):193-226.
    The aim of this paper is to critically review the game-theoretic discussion of Hobbes and to develop a game-theoretic interpretation that gives due attention both to Hobbes's distinction between “moderates” and “dominators” and to what actually initiates conflict in the state of nature, namely, the competition for vital goods. As can be shown, Hobbes's state of nature contains differently structured situations of choice, the game-theoretic representation of which requires the prisoner's dilemma and the assurance game and the so-called assurance dilemma. (...)
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  24. Leon Felkins, The Prisoner's Dilemma.
    The "Prisoner's Dilemma" game has been extensively discussed in both the public and academic press. Thousands of articles and many books have been written about this disturbing game and its apparent representation of many problems of society. The origin of the game is attributed to Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher. I quote from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Puzzles with this structure were devised and discussed by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher in 1950, as part of the Rand CorporationÂ’s investigations (...)
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  25. Maarten Franssen (1994). Constrained Maximization Reconsidered — an Elaboration and Critique of Gauthier's Modelling of Rational Cooperation in a Single Prisoner's Dilemma. Synthese 101 (2):249 - 272.
    Gauthier's argument for constrained maximization, presented inMorals by Agreement, is perfected by taking into account the possibility of accidental exploitation and discussing the limitations on the values of the parameters which measure the translucency of the actors. Gauthier's argument is nevertheless shown to be defective concerning the rationality of constrained maximization as a strategic choice. It can be argued that it applies only to a single actor entering a population of individuals who are themselves not rational actors but simple rule-followers. (...)
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  26. Sidney Gendin (1989). Prisoners' Dilemma for Prisoners. Criminal Justice Ethics 8 (1):23-25.
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  27. Kevin Gibson (2003). Games Students Play: Incorporating the Prisoner's Dilemma in Teaching Business Ethics. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 48 (1):53-64.
    The so-called "Prisoner''s Dilemma" is often referred to in business ethics, but probably not well understood. This article has three parts: (1) I claim that models derived from game theory are significant in the field for discussions of prudential ethics and the practical decisions managers make; (2) I discuss using them as a practical pedagogical exercise and some of the lessons generated; (3) more speculatively, I suggest that they are useful in discussions of corporate personhood.
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  28. Daniel R. Gilbert Jr (1996). The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Prisoners of the Prisoner's Dilemma. Business Ethics Quarterly 6 (2):165-178.
    The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a popular device used by researchers to analyze such institutions as business and the modem corporation. This popularity is not deserved under a certain condition that is widespread in college education. If we, as management educators, take seriouslyour parts in preparing our students to participate in the institutions of a democratic society, then the Prisoner’s Dilemma-as clever a rhetoricaldevice as it is-is an unacceptable means to that end. By posing certain questions about the prisoners in the (...)
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  29. Margaret P. Gilbert (2006). Rationality in Collective Action. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):3-17.
    Collective action is interpreted as a matter of people doing something together, and it is assumed that this involves their having a collective intention to do that thing together. The account of collective intention for which the author has argued elsewhere is presented. In terms that are explained, the parties are jointly committed to intend as a body that such-and-such. Collective action problems in the sense of rational choice theory—problems such as the various forms of coordination problem and the (...)
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  30. M. Godman, M. Nagatsu & M. Salmela (2014). The Social Motivation Hypothesis for Prosocial Behavior. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (5):563-587.
    Existing economic models of prosociality have been rather silent in terms of proximate psychological mechanisms. We nevertheless identify the psychologically most informed accounts and offer a critical discussion of their hypotheses for the proximate psychological explanations. Based on convergent evidence from several fields of research, we argue that there nevertheless is a more plausible alternative proximate account available: the social motivation hypothesis. The hypothesis represents a more basic explanation of the appeal of prosocial behavior, which is in terms of anticipated (...)
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  31. David Gordon (1984). Is the Prisoner's Dilemma an Insoluble Problem? Mind 93 (369):98-100.
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  32. Jeremy R. Gray & Todd S. Braver (2002). Cognitive Control in Altruism and Self-Control: A Social Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):260-260.
    The primrose path and prisoner's dilemma paradigms may require cognitive (executive) control: The active maintenance of context representations in lateral prefrontal cortex to provide top-down support for specific behaviors in the face of short delays or stronger response tendencies. This perspective suggests further tests of whether altruism is a type of self-control, including brain imaging, induced affect, and dual-task studies.
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  33. Patrick Grim, Undecidability in the Spatialized Prisoner's Dilemma: Some Philosophical Implications.
    A version of this paper was presented at the IEEE International Conference on Computational Intelligence, combined meeting of ICNN, FUZZ-IEEE, and ICEC, Orlando, June-July, 1994, and an earlier form of the result is to appear as "The Undecidability of the Spatialized Prisoner's Dilemma" in Theory and Decision . An interactive form of the paper, in which figures are called up as evolving arrays of cellular automata, is available on DOS disk as Research Report #94-04i . An expanded version appears as (...)
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  34. Patrick Grim (2000). Evolution of Communication in Perfect and Imperfect Worlds. World Futures 56 (2):179-197.
    We extend previous work on cooperation to some related questions regarding the evolution of simple forms of communication. The evolution of cooperation within the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma has been shown to follow different patterns, with significantly different outcomes, depending on whether the features of the model are classically perfect or stochastically imperfect (Axelrod 1980a, 1980b, 1984, 1985; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Nowak and Sigmund, 1990, 1992; Sigmund 1993). Our results here show that the same holds for communication. Within a simple (...)
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  35. Patrick Grim (1997). The Undecidability of the Spatialized Prisoner's Dilemma. Theory and Decision 42 (1):53-80.
    In the spatialized Prisoner's Dilemma, players compete against their immediate neighbors and adopt a neighbor's strategy should it prove locally superior. Fields of strategies evolve in the manner of cellular automata (Nowak and May, 1993; Mar and St. Denis, 1993a,b; Grim 1995, 1996). Often a question arises as to what the eventual outcome of an initial spatial configuration of strategies will be: Will a single strategy prove triumphant in the sense of progressively conquering more and more territory without opposition, or (...)
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  36. Ebbe Groes, Hans Jørgen Jacobsen, Birgitte Sloth & Torben Tranaes (1998). Nash Equilibrium with Lower Probabilities. Theory and Decision 44 (1):37-66.
    We generalize the concept of Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for strategic form games to allow for ambiguity in the players' expectations. In contrast to other contributions, we model ambiguity by means of so-called lower probability measures or belief functions, which makes it possible to distinguish between a player's assessment of ambiguity and his attitude towards ambiguity. We also generalize the concept of trembling hand perfect equilibrium. Finally, we demonstrate that for certain attitudes towards ambiguity it is possible to explain (...)
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  37. Jonathan Grose & Cedric Paternotte (2013). Social Norms: Repeated Interactions, Punishment, and Context Dependence. Public Reason 5 (1):3-13.
  38. Ishtiyaque Haji (1992). Evolution, Altruism, and the Prisoner's Dilemma. Biology and Philosophy 7 (2):161-175.
    I first argue against Peter Singer's exciting thesis that the Prisoner's Dilemma explains why there could be an evolutionary advantage in making reciprocal exchanges that are ultimately motivated by genuine altruism over making such exchanges on the basis of enlightened long-term self-interest. I then show that an alternative to Singer's thesis — one that is also meant to corroborate the view that natural selection favors genuine altruism, recently defended by Gregory Kavka, fails as well. Finally, I show that even granting (...)
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  39. Ishtiyaque Haji (1991). Escaping or Avoiding the Prisoner's Dilemma? Dialogue 30 (1-2):153-.
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  40. John C. Harsanyi (1977). Morality and the Prisoner's Dilemma Problem: Comments on Baier's Paper. Erkenntnis 11 (1):441 - 446.
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  41. Govert Den Hartogh (1993). The Rationality of Conditional Cooperation. Erkenntnis 38 (3):405 - 427.
    In "Morals by Agreement," David Gauthier (1986) argues that it is rational to intend to cooperate, even in single-play Prisoner's Dilemma games, provided (1) your co-player has a similar intention; (2) both intentions can be revealed to the other player. To this thesis four objections are made. (a) In a strategic decision the parameters on which the argument relies cannot be supposed to be given. (b) Of each pair of a-symmetric intentions at least one is not rational. But it is (...)
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  42. Esther Hauk (2003). Multiple Prisoner's Dilemma Games with(Out) an Outside Option: An Experimental Study. Theory and Decision 54 (3):207-229.
    Experiments in which subjects play simultaneously several finite two-person prisoner's dilemma supergames with and without an outside option reveal that: (i) an attractive outside option enhances cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game, (ii) if the payoff for mutual defection is negative, subjects' tendency to avoid losses leads them to cooperate; while this tendency makes them stick to mutual defection if its payoff is positive, (iii) subjects use probabilistic start and endeffect behavior.
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  43. Douglas D. Heckathorn (1991). Extensions of the Prisoner's Dilemma Paradigm: The Altruist's Dilemma and Group Solidarity. Sociological Theory 9 (1):34-52.
    Many recent studies of norm emergence employ the "prisoner's dilemma" (PD) paradigm, which focuses on the free-rider problem that can block the cooperation required for the emergence of social norms. This paper proposes an expansion of the PD paradigm to include a closely related game termed the "altruist's dilemma" (AD). Whereas egoistic behavior in the PD leads to collectively irrational outcomes, the opposite is the case in the AD: altruistic behavior (e.g., following the Golden Rule) leads to collectively irrational outcomes, (...)
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  44. Robert Hoffmann (1999). The Independent Localisations of Interaction and Learning in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Theory and Decision 47 (1):57-72.
    The results of a series of computer simulations demonstrate how the introduction of separate spatial dimensions for agent interaction and learning respectively affects the possibility of cooperation evolving in the repeated prisoner's dilemma played by populations of boundedly-rational agents. In particular, the localisation of learning promotes the emergence of cooperative behaviour, while the localisation of interaction has an ambiguous effect on it.
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  45. S. L. Hurley (1994). A New Take From Nozick on Newcomb's Problem and Prisoners' Dilemma. Analysis 54 (2):65 - 72.
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  46. Susan Hurley (2003). The Limits of Individualism Are Not the Limits of Rationality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):164-165.
    Individualism fixes the unit of rational agency at the individual, creating problems exemplified in Hi-Lo and Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) games. But instrumental evaluation of consequences does not require a fixed individual unit. Units of agency can overlap, and the question of which unit should operate arises. Assuming a fixed individual unit is hard to justify: It is natural, and can be rational, to act as part of a group rather than as an individual. More attention should be paid to how (...)
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  47. Harvey S. James Jr & Jeffrey P. Cohen (2004). Does Ethics Training Neutralize the Incentives of the Prisoner's Dilemma? Evidence From a Classroom Experiment. Journal of Business Ethics 50 (1):53 - 61.
    Teaching economics has been shown to encourage students to defect in a prisoner's dilemma game. However, can ethics training reverse that effect and promote cooperation? We conducted an experiment to answer this question. We found that students who had the ethics module had higher rates of cooperation than students without the ethics module, even after controlling for communication and other factors expected to affect cooperation. We conclude that the teaching of ethics can mitigate the possible adverse incentives of the prisoner's (...)
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  48. Magnus Jiborn & Wlodek Rabinowicz (2003). Reconsidering the Foole's Rejoinder: Backward Induction in Indefinitely Iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas. Synthese 136 (2):135 - 157.
    According to the so-called “Folk Theorem” for repeated games, stable cooperative relations can be sustained in a Prisoner’s Dilemma if the game is repeated an indefinite number of times. This result depends on the possibility of applying strategies that are based on reciprocity, i.e., strategies that reward cooperation with subsequent cooperation and punish defectionwith subsequent defection. If future interactions are sufficiently important, i.e., if the discount rate is relatively small, each agent may be motivated to cooperate by fear of retaliation (...)
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  49. Ruth Jonathan (1990). State Education Service or Prisoner's Dilemma: The 'Hidden Hand' as Source of Education Policy. Educational Philosophy and Theory 22 (1):16–24.
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  50. Gregory S. Kavka (1993). Internal Prisoner's Dilemma Vindicated. Economics and Philosophy 9 (01):171-.
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