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  1. Dualism in Animal Psychology.Grace Andrus de Laguna & Joel Katzav - 2023 - In Joel Katzav, Dorothy Rogers & Krist Vaesen (eds.), Knowledge, Mind and Reality: An Introduction by Early Twentieth-Century American Women Philosophers. Springer. pp. 199-207.
    This chapter is Grace Andrus de Laguna's discussion of Margaret Floy Washburn’s The Animal Mind.
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  2. Description, Language, Other Minds, Reduction, and Phenomenology.Timur Uçan - 2023 - Philosophy Study 13 (9):395-408.
    How to think a unique and determinative turn in analytic philosophy of mind? To answer this question this article first presents an attempt to render clear that analytic phenomenology, by contrast with conceptions of phenomenology of the XXth century, beneficially dispenses with several methodological and conceptual assumptions that were assumed to be compulsory, as phenomenological reduction, a notion of synthesis, and a philosophical notion of the a priori. It then presents some eventual difficulties to the achievement of a phenomenological turn (...)
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  3. Rejecting the Given: Neurath and Carnap on Methodological Solipsism.Thomas Uebel - 2021 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 11 (1):1-26.
    This paper investigates how the doctrine of the epistemological given—long associated with empiricism and positivism and also informing Carnap’s first major work in 1928—was challenged and overcome by Neurath and Carnap in subsequent years. Particular attention is paid to the controversial issue of how precisely the dialectic between Neurath and Carnap played out: whether Neurath’s argumentation correctly engaged with Carnap’s actual positions, whether Carnap’s change of positions in turn fully engaged with Neurath’s challenge, and what all this may tell us (...)
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  4. Carnap and Wittgenstein on Psychological Sentences: 1928–1932. Some Further Aspects of the Priority-Dispute Over Physicalism.Gergely Ambrus - 2020 - In Denis Fisette, Guillaume Fréchette & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), Franz Brentano and Austrian Philosophy. Cham: Springer. pp. 353-386.
    The question of how physicalism originated is a complex one, to which we cannot expect an unambiguous answer. The major reason for this is that there were different formulations of the doctrine, which makes it near impossible to identify the inventor of physicalism. Nonetheless, the received view is that the main actors were Neurath and Carnap: Neurath proposed his versions of physicalism earlier, but it was Carnap who first published an elaborated formulation of the metalinguistic doctrine according to which the (...)
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  5. Wittgenstein on Solipsism in the 1930s: Private Pains, Private Languages, and Two Uses of ‘I’.Tim Button - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82:205-229.
    In the early-to-mid 1930s, Wittgenstein investigated solipsism via the philosophy of language. In this paper, I want to reopen Wittgenstein's ‘grammatical’ examination of solipsism.Wittgenstein begins by considering the thesis that only I can feel my pains. Whilst this thesis may tempt us towards solipsism, Wittgenstein points out that this temptation rests on a grammatical confusion concerning the phrase ‘my pains’. In Section 1, I unpack and vindicate his thinking. After discussing ‘my pains’, Wittgenstein makes his now famous suggestion that the (...)
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  6. Sensations, Natural Properties, and the Private Language Argument.William Child - 2018 - In Kevin Cahill & Thomas Raleigh (eds.), Wittgenstein and Naturalism. Abingdon: Routledge. pp. 79-95.
    Wittgenstein’s philosophy involves a general anti-platonism about properties or standards of similarity. On his view, what it is for one thing to have the same property as another is not dictated by reality itself; it depends on our classificatory practices and the standards of similarity they embody. Wittgenstein’s anti-platonism plays an important role in the private language sections and in his discussion of the conceptual problem of other minds. In sharp contrast to Wittgenstein’s views stands the contemporary doctrine of natural (...)
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  7. The Boundary between Mind and Machine.Dingzhou Fei - 2018 - Journal of Human Cognition 2 (1):5-15.
    The mind-body problem is one of the important topics in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Following the analytical tradition of linguistic and logical analysis, we focus on two aspects of the mind- body problem: one is around Gödel's incompleteness theorem, and the other is on cognitive logic, especially on the question of whether Epistemological Arithmetic and machines are private. In the former case, in response to the popular view that the Gödel Incompleteness Theorem supports dualism in the mind-body problem, (...)
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  8. Phenomenal Privacy, Similarity and Communicability.Thomas Raleigh - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.
    The idea that there are features of or in our conscious experience that are, in some important sense, private has both a long history in philosophy and a large measure of intuitive attraction. Once this idea is in place, it will be very natural to assume that one can think and judge about one’s own private features. And it is then only a small step to the idea that we might communicate such thoughts and judgements about our respective private features (...)
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  9. The Private Language Argument and a Second-Person Approach to Mindreading.Joshua Johnson - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (4):75--86.
    I argue that if Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument is correct, then both Theory Theory and Simulation Theory are inadequate accounts of how we come to know other minds since both theories assume the reality of a private language. Further, following the work of a number of philosophers and psychologists, I defend a ‘Second-Person Approach’ to mindreading according to which it is possible for us to be directly aware of at least some of the mental states of others. Because it is (...)
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  10. Solipsism and the Solitary Language User.Irwin Goldstein - 2007 - Philosophical Papers 36 (1):35-47.
    A person skeptical about other minds supposes it is possible in principle that there are no minds other than his. A person skeptical about an external world thinks it is possible there is no world external to him. Some philosophers think a person can refute the skeptic and prove that his world is not the solitary scenario the skeptic supposes might be realized. In this paper I examine one argument that some people think refutes solipsism. The argument, from Wittgenstein, is (...)
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  11. Are emotions feelings? A further look at hedonic theories of emotions.Irwin Goldstein - 2002 - Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):21-33.
    Many philosophers sharply distinguish emotions from feelings. Emotions are not feelings, and having an emotion does not necessitate having some feeling, they think. In this paper I reply to a set of arguments people use sharply to distinguish emotions from feelings. In response to these people, I endorse and defend a hedonic theory of emotion that avoids various anti-feeling objections. Proponents of this hedonic theory analyze an emotion by reference to forms of cognition (e.g., thought, belief, judgment) and a pleasant (...)
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  12. Wittgenstein: Making Sense of Other Minds.Mark R. Addis - 1999 - Ashgate.
    The difficulties about other minds are deep and of central philosophical importance. This text explores attempts to apply Wittgenstein's concept of criteria in explaining how we can know other minds and their properties. It is shown that the use of criteria for this purpose is misguided.
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  13. On being with others: Heidegger, Derrida, Wittgenstein.Simon Glendinning - 1998 - New York: Routledge.
    On Being With Others is an outstanding and compelling work that uncovers one of the key questions in philosophy: how can we claim to have knowledge of minds other than our own? Simon Glendinning's fascinating analysis of this problem argues that it has polarized debate to such an extent that we do not know how to meet Wittgenstein's famous challenge that "to see the behavior of a living thing is to see its soul". This book sets out to discover whether (...)
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  14. Intersubjectivity in Wittgenstein and Freud: Other minds and the foundations of psychiatry.Joseph Loizzo - 1997 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 18 (4).
    Intersubjectivity, the cooperation of two or more minds, is basic to human behavior, yet eludes the grasp of psychiatry. This paper traces the dilemma to the problem of other minds assumed with the epistemologies of modern science. It presents the solution of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, known for his treatment of other minds in terms of human agreement in language.Unlike recent studies of Wittgenstein's psychology, this one reviews the Philosophical Investigations' private language argument, the crux of his mature views on mind. (...)
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  15. Ontology, epistemology, and private ostensive definition.Irwin Goldstein - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):137-147.
    People see five kinds of views in epistemology and ontology as hinging on there being words a person can learn only by private ostensive definitions, through direct acquaintance with his own sensations: skepticism about other minds, 2. skepticism about an external world, 3. foundationalism, 4. dualism, and 5. phenomenalism. People think Wittgenstein refuted these views by showing, they believe, no word is learnable only by private ostensive definition. I defend these five views from Wittgenstein’s attack.
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  16. The development of Wittgenstein's views about the other minds problem.M. R. M. Ter Hark - 1991 - Synthese 87:227-253.
  17. Meaning, use and privacy.Edward Craig - 1982 - Mind 91 (364):541-564.
  18. Other Minds. [REVIEW]Douglas C. Long - 1975 - Teaching Philosophy 1 (2):190-192.
    D. C. Long’s review of a monograph Godfrey Vesey prepared on the problem of our knowledge of other minds for the Open University series on problems of philosophy. Vesey discusses philosophers’ disenchantment with the traditional argument from analogy as a solution to the problem. This has been fostered by Wittgensteinian objections to the idea that psychological words get their meaning by reference to our own “private” experiences. Vesey similarly argues for the thesis that a person cannot be said to understand (...)
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  19. Private languages and other minds.William J. Mclaughlin - 1970 - Personalist 51 (3):338-354.
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  20. Other Minds and the Uses of Language.Dwight Van de Vate - 1966 - American Philosophical Quarterly 3 (3):250-254.
  21. The philosophical concept of a human body.Douglas C. Long - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (July):321-337.
    I argue in this paper that philosophers have not clearly introduced the concept of a body in terms of which the problem of other minds and its solutions have been traditionally stated; that one can raise fatal objections to attempts to introduce this concept; and that the particular form of the problem of other minds which is stated in terms of the concept is confused and requires no solution. The concept of a "body" which may or may not be the (...)
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