This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
34 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
  1. Lara Buchak (2012). Can It Be Rational to Have Faith? In Jacob Chandler & Victoria Harrison (eds.), Probability in the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press. 225.
    This paper provides an account of what it is to have faith in a proposition p, in both religious and mundane contexts. It is argued that faith in p doesn’t require adopting a degree of belief that isn’t supported by one’s evidence but rather it requires terminating one’s search for further evidence and acting on the supposition that p. It is then shown, by responding to a formal result due to I.J. Good, that doing so can be rational in a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Eleonora Cresto (2010). Belief and Contextual Acceptance. Synthese 177 (1):41-66.
    I develop a strategy for representing epistemic states and epistemic changes that seeks to be sensitive to the difference between voluntary and involuntary aspects of our epistemic life, as well as to the role of pragmatic factors in epistemology. The model relies on a particular understanding of the distinction between full belief and acceptance , which makes room for the idea that our reasoning on both practical and theoretical matters typically proceeds in a contextual way. Within this framework, I discuss (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Nikolaus Dalbauer & Andreas Hergovich (2013). Is What is Worse More Likely?—The Probabilistic Explanation of the Epistemic Side-Effect Effect. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (4):639-657.
    One aim of this article is to explore the connection between the Knobe effect and the epistemic side-effect effect (ESEE). Additionally, we report evidence about a further generalization regarding probability judgments. We demonstrate that all effects can be found within German material, using ‘absichtlich’ [intentionally], ‘wissen’ [know] and ‘wahrscheinlich’ [likely]. As the explanations discussed with regard to the Knobe effect do not suffice to explicate the ESEE, we survey whether the characteristic asymmetry in knowledge judgments is caused by a differing (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. S. DeVito (1997). A Gruesome Problem for the Curve-Fitting Solution. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):391-396.
    This paper is a response to Forster and Sober's [1994] solution to the curve-fitting problem. If their solution is correct, it will provide us with a solution to the New Riddle of Induction as well as provide a basis for choosing realism over conventionalism. Examining this solution is also important as Forster and Sober incorporate it in much of their other philosophical work (see Forster [1995a, b, 1994] and Sober [1996, 1995, 1993]). I argue that Forster and Sober's solution is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Scott DeVito (1997). A Gruesome Problem for the Curve-Fitting Solution. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):391-396.
    This paper is a response to Forster and Sober's [1994] solution to the curve-fitting problem. If their solution is correct, it will provide us with a solution to the New Riddle of Induction as well as provide a basis for choosing realism over conventionalism. Examining this solution is also important as Forster and Sober incorporate it in much of their other philosophical work (see Forster [1995a, b, 1994] and Sober [1996, 1995, 1993]). I argue that Forster and Sober's solution is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Mandeep K. Dhami & David R. Mandel (2012). Forecasted Risk Taking in Youth: Evidence for a Bounded-Rationality Perspective. Synthese 189 (S1):161-171.
    This research examined whether youth's forecasted risk taking is best predicted by a compensatory (namely, subjective expected utility) or non-compensatory (e.g., single-factor) model. Ninety youth assessed the importance of perceived benefits, importance of perceived drawbacks, subjective probability of benefits, and subjective probability of drawbacks for 16 risky behaviors clustered evenly into recreational and health/safety domains. In both domains, there was strong support for a noncompensatory model in which only the perceived importance of the benefits of engaging in a risky behavior (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. M. Fattorosi-Barnaba & G. Amati (1987). Modal Operators with Probabilistic Interpretations, I. Studia Logica 46 (4):383 - 393.
    <span class='Hi'></span> We present a class of normal modal calculi PFD,<span class='Hi'></span> whose syntax is endowed with operators M r <span class='Hi'></span>(and their dual ones,<span class='Hi'></span> L r)<span class='Hi'></span>, one for each r <span class='Hi'></span>[0,1]<span class='Hi'></span>: if a is sentence,<span class='Hi'></span> M r is to he read the probability that a is true is strictly greater than r and to he evaluated as true or false in every world of a F-restricted probabilistic kripkean model.<span class='Hi'></span> Every such a model is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Malcolm Forster & Elliott Sober (1994). How to Tell When Simpler, More Unified, or Less Ad Hoc Theories Will Provide More Accurate Predictions. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1):1-35.
    Traditional analyses of the curve fitting problem maintain that the data do not indicate what form the fitted curve should take. Rather, this issue is said to be settled by prior probabilities, by simplicity, or by a background theory. In this paper, we describe a result due to Akaike [1973], which shows how the data can underwrite an inference concerning the curve's form based on an estimate of how predictively accurate it will be. We argue that this approach throws light (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. MR Forster (1999). Model Selection in Science: The Problem of Language Variance. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (1):83-102.
    Recent solutions to the curve-fitting problem, described in Forster and Sober ([1995]), trade off the simplicity and fit of hypotheses by defining simplicity as the paucity of adjustable parameters. Scott De Vito ([1997]) charges that these solutions are 'conventional' because he thinks that the number of adjustable parameters may change when the hypotheses are described differently. This he believes is exactly what is illustrated in Goodman's new riddle of induction, otherwise known as the grue problem. However, the 'number of adjustable (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Joseph S. Fulda (1992). The Mathematical Pull of Temptation. Mind 101 (402):305-307.
    Argues that the mathematical structure of a tempting or, more generally, risk-taking situation may prove far more dispositive of the choice made than either character or the lure/pull of the subject/object of temptation/risk-taking. -/- Briefly discusses some implications of this.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Gebhard Geiger (1995). Why Are There No Objective Values? Journal for General Philosophy of Science 26 (1):35-62.
    Using the mathematical frameworks of economic preference ranking, subjective probability, and rational learning through empirical evidence, the epistemological implications of teleological ethical intuitionism are pointed out to the extent to which the latter is based on cognitivist and objectivist concepts of value. The notions of objective value and objective norm are critically analysed with reference to epistemological criteria of intersubjectively shared valuative experience. It is concluded that one cannot meaningfully postulate general material theories of morality that could be tested, confirmed (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Theodore Hailperin (2007). Quantifier Probability Logic and the Confirmation Paradox. History and Philosophy of Logic 28 (1):83-100.
    Exhumation and study of the 1945 paradox of confirmation brings out the defect of its formulation. In the context of quantifier conditional-probability logic it is shown that a repair can be accomplished if the truth-functional conditional used in the statement of the paradox is replaced with a connective that is appropriate to the probabilistic context. Description of the quantifier probability logic involved in the resolution of the paradox is presented in stages. Careful distinction is maintained between a formal logic language (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Ned Hall (1999). How to Set a Surprise Exam. Mind 108 (432):647-703.
    The professor announces a surprise exam for the upcoming week; her clever student purports to demonstrate by reductio that she cannot possibly give such an exam. Diagnosing his puzzling argument reveals a deeper puzzle: Is the student justified in believing the announcement? It would seem so, particularly if the upcoming 'week' is long enough. On the other hand, a plausible principle states that if, at the outset, the student is justified in believing some proposition, then he is also justified in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Franz Huber (2006). Ranking Functions and Rankings on Languages. Artificial Intelligence 170:462-471.
    The Spohnian paradigm of ranking functions is in many respects like an order-of-magnitude reverse of subjective probability theory. Unlike probabilities, however, ranking functions are only indirectly—via a pointwise ranking function on the underlying set of possibilities W —defined on a field of propositions A over W. This research note shows under which conditions ranking functions on a field of propositions A over W and rankings on a language L are induced by pointwise ranking functions on W and the set of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Marcus Hutter (2010). A Complete Theory of Everything (Will Be Subjective). Algorithms 3 (4):329-350.
    Increasingly encompassing models have been suggested for our world. Theories range from generally accepted to increasingly speculative to apparently bogus. The progression of theories from ego- to geo- to helio-centric models to universe and multiverse theories and beyond was accompanied by a dramatic increase in the sizes of the postulated worlds, with humans being expelled from their center to ever more remote and random locations. Rather than leading to a true theory of everything, this trend faces a turning point after (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Benjamin Jantzen, Piecewise Versus Total Support: How to Deal with Background Information in Likelihood Arguments.
    According to the dominant interpretation of the likelihood approach to hypothesis ranking, likelihoods are supposed to be conditioned on the available background information. In doing so, background information about the manner in which evidence was obtained can obliterate the value of that evidence for discriminating amongst hypotheses. I argue that this interpretation conflates two distinct questions concerning the support offered by evidence, and derive appropriate expressions for addressing each.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Yusuke Kaneko (2012). Carnap’s Thought on Inductive Logic. Philosophy Study 2 (11).
    Although we often see references to Carnap’s inductive logic even in modern literatures, seemingly its confusing style has long obstructed its correct understanding. So instead of Carnap, in this paper, I devote myself to its necessary and sufficient commentary. In the beginning part (Sections 2-5), I explain why Carnap began the study of inductive logic and how he related it with our thought on probability (Sections 2-4). Therein, I trace Carnap’s thought back to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus as well (Section 5). In (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Yusuke Kaneko (2012). The Confirmation of Singular Causal Statements by Carnap’s Inductive Logic. Logica Year Book 2011.
    The aim of this paper is to apply inductive logic to the field that, presumably, Carnap never expected: legal causation. Legal causation is expressible in the form of singular causal statements; but it is distinguished from the customary concept of scientific causation, because it is subjective. We try to express this subjectivity within the system of inductive logic. Further, by semantic complement, we compensate a defect found in our application, to be concrete, the impossibility of two-place predicates (for causal relationship) (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Herbert Keuth (1973). On Prior Probabilities of Rejecting Statistical Hypotheses. Philosophy of Science 40 (4):538-546.
    Meehl's statement "in most psychological research, Improved power of a statistical design leads to a prior probability approaching 1/2 of finding a significant difference in the theoretically predicted direction" (philosophy of science, Volume 34, Pages 103-115), Is without foundation. The computation of prior probabilities of accepting or rejecting a hypothesis presupposes knowledge of the prior probabilities that this hypothesis or any of its conceivable alternatives are true. As we do not have such knowledge, We cannot give any numerical values of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. I. A. Kieseppä (2001). Statistical Model Selection Criteria and the Philosophical Problem of Underdetermination. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (4):761 - 794.
    I discuss the philosophical significance of the statistical model selection criteria, in particular their relevance for philosophical problems of underdetermination. I present an easily comprehensible account of their simplest possible application and contrast it with their application to curve-fitting problems. I embed philosophers' earlier discussion concerning the situations in which the criteria yield implausible results into a more general framework. Among other things, I discuss a difficulty which is related to the so-called subfamily problem, and I show that it has (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. I. A. Kieseppa (2001). Statistical Model Selection Criteria and the Philosophical Problem of Underdetermination. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (4):761-794.
    I discuss the philosophical significance of the statistical model selection criteria, in particular their relevance for philosophical of underdetermination. I present an easily comprehensible account of their simplest possible application and contrast it with their application to curve-fitting problems. I embed philosophers' earlier discussion concerning the situations in which the criteria yield implausible results into a more general framework. Among other things, I discuss a difficulty which is related to the so-called subfamily problem, and I show that it has analogies (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Jan Komorowski, Lech T. Polkowski & Andrzej Skowron (1997). Towards a Rough Mereology-Based Logic for Approximate Solution Synthesis. Part. Studia Logica 58 (1):143-184.
    We are concerned with formal models of reasoning under uncertainty. Many approaches to this problem are known in the literature e.g. Dempster-Shafer theory [29], [42], bayesian-based reasoning [21], [29], belief networks [29], many-valued logics and fuzzy logics [6], non-monotonic logics [29], neural network logics [14]. We propose rough mereology developed by the last two authors [22-25] as a foundation for approximate reasoning about complex objects. Our notion of a complex object includes, among others, proofs understood as schemes constructed in order (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Wang-Yen Lee (2013). Akaike's Theorem and Weak Predictivism in Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (4):594-599.
  24. G.�Nter Menges (1970). On Subjective Probability and Related Problems. Theory and Decision 1 (1):40-60.
  25. Niki Pfeifer & Gernot D. Kleiter, Syllogistic Reasoning with Intermediate Quantifiers.
    n S are P ”) is proposed for evaluating the rationality of human syllogistic reasoning. Some relations between intermediate quantifiers and probabilistic interpretations are discussed. The paper concludes by the generalization of the atmosphere, matching and conversion hypothesis to syllogisms with intermediate quanti- fiers. Since our experiments are currently still running, most of the paper is theoretical and intended to stimulate psychological studies.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Martin Smith, Justification, Normalcy and Evidential Probability.
    NOTE: This paper is a reworking of some aspects of a previous paper of mine – ‘What else justification could be’ published in Noûs in 2010. I’m currently in the process of writing a book developing and defending some of the ideas from this paper. What follows will, I hope, fall into place as one of the chapters of this book – though it is still very much at the draft stage. Comments are welcome. -/- My concern in this paper (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Roy A. Sorensen (1983). Subjective Probability and Indifference. Analysis 43 (1):15 -.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Jan Sprenger, Surprise and Evidence in Statistical Model Checking.
    There is considerable confusion about the role of p-values in statistical model checking. To clarify that point, I introduce the distinction between measures of surprise and measures of evidence which come with different epistemological functions. I argue that p-values, often understood as measures of evidence against a null model, do not count as proper measures of evidence and are closer to measures of surprise. Finally, I sketch how the problem of old evidence may be tackled by acknowledging the epistemic role (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Soshichi Uchii, Sherlock Holmes and Probabilistic Induction.
    In this paper, (1) I argue that Sherlock Holmes was a good logician according to the standard of his day, and (2) I try to show what his method of reasoning was. Now, (2) is a harder task than (1), because we have to identify the essential features of his method of reasoning. In order to show this, I have not only to examine what Holmes says he is doing, but also to look at the methods of scientific reasoning recommended (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Johan van Benthem, Jelle Gerbrandy & Barteld Kooi (2009). Dynamic Update with Probabilities. Studia Logica 93 (1):67-96.
    Current dynamic-epistemic logics model different types of information change in multi-agent scenarios. We generalize these logics to a probabilistic setting, obtaining a calculus for multi-agent update with three natural slots: prior probability on states, occurrence probabilities in the relevant process taking place, and observation probabilities of events. To match this update mechanism, we present a complete dynamic logic of information change with a probabilistic character. The completeness proof follows a compositional methodology that applies to a much larger class of dynamic-probabilistic (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Brian Weatherson (2003). From Classical to Intuitionistic Probability. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 44 (2):111-123.
    We generalize the Kolmogorov axioms for probability calculus to obtain conditions defining, for any given logic, a class of probability functions relative to that logic, coinciding with the standard probability functions in the special case of classical logic but allowing consideration of other classes of "essentially Kolmogorovian" probability functions relative to other logics. We take a broad view of the Bayesian approach as dictating inter alia that from the perspective of a given logic, rational degrees of belief are those representable (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Brian Weatherson, Smith on Justification and Probability.
    Call Justificatory Probabilism (hereafter, JP) the thesis that there is some (classical) probability function Pr such that for an agent S with evidence E, the degree to which they are justified in believing a hypothesis H is given by Pr(H|E). As stated, the thesis is fairly ambiguous, though none of the disambiguations are obviously true. Indeed, several of them are obviously false. If JP is a thesis about how justified agents are in fully believing propositions, it is trivially false. I’m (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Elia Zardini (2012). Luminosity and Vagueness. Dialectica 66 (3):375-410.
  34. Chunlai Zhou (2010). Probability Logic of Finitely Additive Beliefs. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 19 (3):247-282.
    Probability logics have been an active topic of investigation of beliefs in type spaces in game theoretical economics. Beliefs are expressed as subjective probability measures. Savage’s postulates in decision theory imply that subjective probability measures are not necessarily countably additive but finitely additive. In this paper, we formulate a probability logic Σ + that is strongly complete with respect to this class of type spaces with finitely additive probability measures, i.e. a set of formulas is consistent in Σ + iff (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation