One can think of belief in a binary way--you either believe something or you don't. One can also think of belief as something that comes in degrees--you can believe something to a number of different degrees. It has been popular in formal epistemology to think of beliefs in the latter way, as things which come in degrees, and to further maintain that such degrees of belief should should satisfy the probability axioms. Given this picture, it has been debated whether there are other normative constraints on what an agent's degrees of belief should be like. The probabilistic principles discussed in this area are largely proposals about what these further normative constraints on degrees of belief should be like.
|Key works||A classic description and defense of conditionalization can be found in Urbach & Howson 1993. An influential and critical discussion of Indifference Principles can be found in Van Fraassen 1989. Important discussions and applications of scoring rules are given in Oddie 1997 and Joyce 1998. An early and influential discussion of chance-credence principles is given by Lewis 1980. Reflection Principles were introduced and defended in Fraassen 1984 and van Fraassen 1995. Influential discussions of direct inference principles are given in Kyburg 1974 and Pollock 1990.|
|Introductions||Good introductory discussions that cover many of the principles discussed in this section can be found in a number of places, including Urbach & Howson 1993, Strevens manuscript and Weisberg 2011.|
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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