About this topic
Summary In this category belong a range of puzzles that are analysed using probabililty and have philosophical implications. Perhaps the best known is Goodman's New Riddle of Induction (Grue), which can be seen as a strengthened version of Hume's problem of induction. The Paradox of the Ravens (the paradox of confirmation) is one of the central problems for theories of confirmation. It seems to show that obvious principles of confirmation generate the result that a white sneaker confirms that all ravens are black. The Sleeping Beauty problem concerns an agent who is woken on either one day or two, and faces the question of whether the current waking is part of the single waking or the double waking. This raises the issue of incorporating self-locating beliefs into the Bayesian framework. The Doomsday Argument purports to show that humans will die out sooner than we previously thought, based merely on our own birth rank among humans. The Monty Hall Problem is about whether you should swap doors, after tentatively choosing one of the three doors, one of which contains a prize, and finding that the door you selected does not have the prize.
Key works The New Riddle of Induction was introduced in Goodman 1954. The Paradox of the Ravens was introduced by Hosiasson-Lindenbaum 1940 and influentially discussed by Hempel 1945 I and Hempel 1945 II. Sleeping Beauty was introduced by Elga 2000, shortly followed by Lewis 2001. The Doomsday Argument was popularized largely by Leslie 1989.
Introductions The new riddle of induction and the paradox of the ravens are explained in section 5 of Vickers 2008. This Bostrom manuscript explains the Doomsday Argument and Titelbaum forthcoming gives a summary of the responses to Sleeping Beauty
  Show all references
Related categories
Subcategories:
294 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
1 — 50 / 294
Material to categorize
  1. Nick Bostrom (2002). Self-Locating Belief in Big Worlds: Cosmology's Missing Link to Observation. Journal of Philosophy 99 (12):607-623.
    Current cosmological theories say that the world is so big that all possible observations are in fact made. But then, how can such theories be tested? What could count as negative evidence? To answer that, we need to consider observation selection effects.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  2. Richard Jackson (1969). The Sleeping King. Bibliothèque d'Humanisme Et Renaissance 31 (3):525-551.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Francis J. Kovach (1985). About Beauty, A Thomistic Interpretation. Review of Metaphysics 38 (3):662-664.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Guy Lemieux (1935). Outline of the Problem of Beauty. Modern Schoolman 12 (4):93-94.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Guy Lemieux (1935). Outline of the Problem of Beauty, Conclusion. Modern Schoolman 12 (4):96-96.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Y. Liu, A. Bisazza, M. M. Botvinick, N. Chomsky, C. DiYanni, L. Feigenson, W. T. Fitch, J. I. Flombaum, U. Hahn & M. D. Hauser (2005). Leslie, AM, 153. Cognition 97:337.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Colin Lyas (1980). LESLIE, JOHN "Value and Existence". [REVIEW] Philosophy 55:275.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. R. M. Martin (1960). Review: Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction, & Forecast. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 25 (3):250-251.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Gerald J. Massey (1974). Oliver Leslie Reiser 1895-1974. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 48:179 - 180.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Mary Kate McGowan (2002). Gruesome Connections. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):21-33.
    It is widely recognized that Goodman's grue example demonstrates that the rules for induction, unlike those for deduction, cannot be purely syntactic. Ways in which Goodman's proof generalizes, however, are not widely recognized. Gruesome considerations demonstrate that neither theories of simplicity nor theories of empirical confirmation can be purely syntactic. Moreover, the grue paradox can be seen as an instance of a much more general phenomenon. All empirical investigations require semantic constraints, since purely structural constraints are inadequate. Both Russell's theory (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  11. Henry Mehlberg (1958). Review: Carl G. Hempel, A Logical Appraisal of Operationism. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 23 (3):354-356.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Martine Mespoulet (2002). From Typical Areas to Random Sampling: Sampling Methods in Russia From 1875 to 1930. Science in Context 15 (3):411-425.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Ca Miller (1984). The Poet in the Poem: A Phenomenological Analysis of Anne Sexton's: Briar Rose (Sleeping Beauty) in The Existential Coordinates of the Human Condition: Poetic, Epic, Tragic. The Literary Genre. Analecta Husserliana 18:61-73.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Richard Montague (1960). Review: Hugues Leblanc, Evidence Logique Et Degre de Confirmation. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 25 (1):86-86.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Hilde Lindemann Nelson & Daniel Callahan (2005). Before He Wakes. Hastings Center Report 35 (4):15-16.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Harold W. Noonan (1982). Reply to Leslie Stevenson1. Philosophical Books 23 (1):7-12.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. John O'Connor (1967). Differential Properties and Goodman's Riddle. Analysis 28 (2):59 -.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Temporal Horizons oj Justice (1997). A Shooting Room View Oj Doomsday, William Eckhardt. Mind 106 (421).
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. A. G. Padgett (1998). Leslie, J.-The End of the World. Philosophical Books 39:222-224.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. J. V. Pickstone (1978). Locating Dutrochet. British Journal for the History of Science 11 (1):49-64.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  21. V. T. Rajshekar (2004). Hindutva: Whipping Up Sleeping Slaves. Journal of Dharma 29 (1):73-78.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Baron Reed (2008). Fallibilism and the Lottery Paradox. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:217-225.
    Any theory of knowledge that is fallibilist—i.e., that allows for one to have knowledge that could have been false or accidentally true—faces the lottery paradox. The paradox arises from the combination of two plausible claims: first, no one can know that one’s lottery ticket will lose prior to learning that it in fact has lost, and, second, the justification one has for the belief that one’s ticket will lose is just as good as the justification one has for paradigmatic instances (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. Ruth Rubinstein (1986). Michelangelo's Lost Sleeping Cupid and Fetti's Vertumnus and Pomona. Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 49:257-259.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Oscar Seminar (2008). An Objectivist Argument for Thirdism. Analysis 68 (2):149-155.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  25. J. R. Shoenfield (1971). Review: Leslie H. Tharp, On a Set Theory of Bernays. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 36 (4):682-682.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Michael Anthony Slote (1967). Some Thoughts on Goodman's Riddle. Analysis 27 (4):128 - 132.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  27. Gary Sollazzo (1972). Barker and Achinstein on Goodman. Philosophical Studies 23 (1-2):91 - 97.
    Barker and Achinstein think that it is not possible for a predicate like grue to serve as well as a predicate like green in the role of a qualitative or non-positional predicate. Their arguments consist in a number of attempts to show that one who possesses green in his language can do things with that predicate which one who must work with grue instead cannot do. However, they succeed in showing only that a qualitative predicate is better adapted to our (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Judith Jarvis Thomson (1966). Grue. Journal of Philosophy 63 (11):289-309.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  29. Simon Johnson Williams & Nick Crossley (2008). Introduction: Sleeping Bodies. Body and Society 14 (4):1-13.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
Doomsday Argument
  1. Tom Adams (2007). Sorting Out the Anti-Doomsday Arguments: A Reply to Sowers. Mind 116 (462):269-273.
    claim that his thought experiment shows that a currently living person is not a random sample is refuted. His thought experiment is reduced to a probability model, and is shown to be identical to one previously developed by Dieks. The status of the Doomsday Argument is left unresolved, since Dieks's refutation attempt is disputed in the literature.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Mr István A. Aranyosi, The Doomsday Simulation Argument. Or Why Isn't the End Nigh, and You're Not Living in a Simulation.
    According to the Carter-Leslie Doomsday Argument, we should assign a high probability to the hypothesis that the human species will go extinct very soon. The argument is based on the application of Bayes’s theo-rem and a certain indifference principle with respect to the temporal location of our observed birth rank within the totality of birth ranks of all humans who will ever have lived. According to Bostrom’s Simulation Argument, which appeals to a weaker indifference principle than the Doomsday Argument, at (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  3. Frank Arntzenius & Cian Dorr (forthcoming). Self-Locating Priors and Cosmological Measures. In Khalil Chamcham, John Barrow, Simon Saunders & Joe Silk (eds.), The Philosophy of Cosmology. Cambridge University Press
    We develop a Bayesian framework for thinking about the way evidence about the here and now can bear on hypotheses about the qualitative character of the world as a whole, including hypotheses according to which the total population of the world is infinite. We show how this framework makes sense of the practice cosmologists have recently adopted in their reasoning about such hypotheses.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Paul Bartha & Christopher Hitchcock (1999). No One Knows the Date or the Hour: An Unorthodox Application of Rev. Bayes's Theorem. Philosophy of Science 66 (3):353.
    Carter and Leslie (1996) have argued, using Bayes's theorem, that our being alive now supports the hypothesis of an early 'Doomsday'. Unlike some critics (Eckhardt 1997), we accept their argument in part: given that we exist, our existence now indeed favors 'Doom sooner' over 'Doom later'. The very fact of our existence, however, favors 'Doom later'. In simple cases, a hypothetical approach to the problem of 'old evidence' shows that these two effects cancel out: our existence now yields no information (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  5. Paul Bartha & Christopher Hitchcock (1999). The Shooting-Room Paradox and Conditionalizing on Measurably Challenged Sets. Synthese 118 (3):403-437.
    We provide a solution to the well-known “Shooting-Room” paradox, developed by John Leslie in connection with his Doomsday Argument. In the “Shooting-Room” paradox, the death of an individual is contingent upon an event that has a 1/36 chance of occurring, yet the relative frequency of death in the relevant population is 0.9. There are two intuitively plausible arguments, one concluding that the appropriate subjective probability of death is 1/36, the other that this probability is 0.9. How are these two values (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  6. Yann Benétreau-Dupin (2015). Blurring Out Cosmic Puzzles. Philosophy of Science 82 (5):879–891.
    The Doomsday argument and anthropic reasoning are two puzzling examples of probabilistic confirmation. In both cases, a lack of knowledge apparently yields surprising conclusions. Since they are formulated within a Bayesian framework, they constitute a challenge to Bayesianism. Several attempts, some successful, have been made to avoid these conclusions, but some versions of these arguments cannot be dissolved within the framework of orthodox Bayesianism. I show that adopting an imprecise framework of probabilistic reasoning allows for a more adequate representation of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  7. Yann Benétreau-Dupin (2015). The Bayesian Who Knew Too Much. Synthese 192 (5):1527-1542.
    In several papers, John Norton has argued that Bayesianism cannot handle ignorance adequately due to its inability to distinguish between neutral and disconfirming evidence. He argued that this inability sows confusion in, e.g., anthropic reasoning in cosmology or the Doomsday argument, by allowing one to draw unwarranted conclusions from a lack of knowledge. Norton has suggested criteria for a candidate for representation of neutral support. Imprecise credences (families of credal probability functions) constitute a Bayesian-friendly framework that allows us to avoid (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  8. N. Bostrom (1999). The Doomsday Argument is Alive and Kicking. Mind 108 (431):539-551.
    A recent paper by Korb and Oliver in this journal attempts to refute the Carter-Leslie Doomsday argument. I organize their remarks into five objections and show that they all fail. Further efforts are thus called upon to find out what, if anything, is wrong with Carter and Leslie's disturbing reasoning. While ultimately unsuccessful, Korb and Oliver's objections do however in some instances force us to become clearer about what the Doomsday argument does and doesn't imply.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  9. Nick Bostrom, A Doomsday Argument Primer.
    Rarely does philosophy produce empirical predictions. The Doomsday argument is an important exception. From seemingly trivial premises it seeks to show that the risk that humankind will go extinct soon has been systematically underestimated. Nearly everybody's first reaction is that there must be something wrong with such an argument. Yet despite being subjected to intense scrutiny by a growing number of philosophers, no simple flaw in the argument has been identified.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Nick Bostrom, Beyond the Doomsday Argument: Reply to Sowers and Further Remarks.
    George Sowers tries to refute the Doomsday argument on grounds that true random sampling requires all possible samples to be equally probable the time when the sample is taken. Yet the Doomsday argument does not rely on true random sampling. It presupposes random sampling only in a metaphorical sense. After arguing that Sowers’ critique fails, I outline my own view on the matter, which is that the Doomsday argument is inconclusive and that by developing a theory of observation selection effects (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Nick Bostrom (2008). The Doomsday Argument. Think 6 (17-18):23-28.
    A recent paper by Korb and Oliver in this journal attempts to refute the Carter-Leslie Doomsday argument. I organize their remarks into five objections and show that they all fail. Further efforts are thus called upon to find out what, if anything, is wrong with Carter and Leslie’s disturbing reasoning. While ultimately unsuccessful, Korb and Oliver’s objections do however in some instances force us to become clearer about what the Doomsday argument does and doesn’t imply.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Nick Bostrom (2003). The Mysteries of Self-Locating Belief and Anthropic Reasoning. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 11 (1):59-73.
    1. How big is the smallest fish in the pond? You take your wide-meshed fishing net and catch one hundred fishes, every one of which is greater than six inches long. Does this evidence support the hypothesis that no fish in the pond is much less than six inches long? Not if your wide-meshed net can’t actually catch smaller fish...
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  13. Nick Bostrom (2002). Anthropic Bias: Observation Selection Effects in Science and Philosophy. Routledge.
    _Anthropic Bias_ explores how to reason when you suspect that your evidence is biased by "observation selection effects"--that is, evidence that has been filtered by the precondition that there be some suitably positioned observer to "have" the evidence. This conundrum--sometimes alluded to as "the anthropic principle," "self-locating belief," or "indexical information"--turns out to be a surprisingly perplexing and intellectually stimulating challenge, one abounding with important implications for many areas in science and philosophy. There are the philosophical thought experiments and paradoxes: (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   30 citations  
  14. Nick Bostrom (2001). The Doomsday Argument Adam & Eve, UN++, and Quantum Joe. Synthese 127 (3):359 - 387.
    The Doomsday argument purports to show that the risk of the human species going extinct soon has been systematically underestimated. This argument has something in common with controversial forms of reasoning in other areas, including: game theoretic problems with imperfect recall, the methodology of cosmology, the epistemology of indexical belief, and the debate over so-called fine-tuning arguments for the design hypothesis. The common denominator is a certain premiss: the Self-Sampling Assumption. We present two strands of argument in favor of this (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   15 citations  
  15. Nick Bostrom (2000). Observer-Relative Chances in Anthropic Reasoning? Erkenntnis 52 (1):93-108.
    John Leslie presents a thought experiment to show that chances are sometimes observer-relative in a paradoxical way. The pivotal assumption in his argument – a version of the weak anthropic principle – is the same as the one used to get the disturbing Doomsday argument off the ground. I show that Leslie's thought experiment trades on the sense/reference ambiguity and is fallacious. I then describe a related case where chances are observer-relative in an interesting way. But not in a paradoxical (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  16. Nick Bostrom & Milan M. Cirković (2003). The Doomsday Argument and the Self–Indication Assumption: Reply to Olum. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):83–91.
    In a recent paper in this journal, Ken Olum attempts to refute the Doomsday argument by appealing to the self-indication assumption (SIA), the idea that your very existence gives you reason to think that there are many observers. In contrast to earlier refutation attempts that use this strategy, Olum confronts and try to counter some of the objections that have been made against SIA. We argue that his defense of SIA is unsuccessful. This does not, however, mean that one has (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  17. Nick Bostrom & Milan M. Cirković (2003). The Doomsday Argument and the Self–Indication Assumption: Reply to Olum. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):83-91.
    In a recent paper in this journal, Ken Olum attempts to refute the doomsday argument by appealing to the self–indication assumption (SIA) that your very existence gives you reason to think that there are many observers. Unlike earlier users of this strategy, Olum tries to counter objections that have been made against (SIA). We argue that his defence of (SIA) is unsuccessful. This does not, however, mean that one has to accept the doomsday argument (or the other counter–intuitive results that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  18. D. J. Bradley (2012). Four Problems About Self-Locating Belief. Philosophical Review 121 (2):149-177.
    This article defends the Doomsday Argument, the Halfer Position in Sleeping Beauty, the Fine-Tuning Argument, and the applicability of Bayesian confirmation theory to the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. It will argue that all four problems have the same structure, and it gives a unified treatment that uses simple models of the cases and no controversial assumptions about confirmation or self-locating evidence. The article will argue that the troublesome feature of all these cases is not self-location but selection effects.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  19. D. J. Bradley (2005). No Doomsday Argument Without Knowledge of Birth Rank: A Defense of Bostrom. Synthese 144 (1):91 - 100.
    The Doomsday Argument says we should increase our subjective probability that Doomsday will occur once we take into account how many humans have lived before us. One objection to this conclusion is that we should accept the Self-Indication Assumption (SIA): Given the fact that you exist, you should (other things equal) favor hypotheses according to which many observers exist over hypotheses on which few observers exist. Nick Bostrom argues that we should not accept the SIA, because it can be used (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Darren Bradley (2007). Bayesianism And Self-Locating Beliefs. Dissertation, Stanford University
    How should we update our beliefs when we learn new evidence? Bayesian confirmation theory provides a widely accepted and well understood answer – we should conditionalize. But this theory has a problem with self-locating beliefs, beliefs that tell you where you are in the world, as opposed to what the world is like. To see the problem, consider your current belief that it is January. You might be absolutely, 100%, sure that it is January. But you will soon believe it (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Darren Bradley & Branden Fitelson (2003). Monty Hall, Doomsday and Confirmation. Analysis 63 (277):23–31.
    We give an analysis of the Monty Hall problem purely in terms of confirmation, without making any lottery assumptions about priors. Along the way, we show the Monty Hall problem is structurally identical to the Doomsday Argument.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (13 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
1 — 50 / 294