This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
34 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
  1. Will Bynoe & Nicholas K. Jones (2013). Solitude Without Souls: Why Peter Unger Hasn't Established Substance Dualism. [REVIEW] Philosophia 41 (1):109-125.
    Unger has recently argued that if you are the only thinking and experiencing subject in your chair, then you are not a material object. This leads Unger to endorse a version of Substance Dualism according to which we are immaterial souls. This paper argues that this is an overreaction. We argue that the specifically Dualist elements of Unger’s view play no role in his response to the problem; only the view’s structure is required, and that is available to Unger’s opponents. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Dan López de Sa (2014). Lewis Vs Lewis on the Problem of the Many. Synthese 191 (6):1105-1117.
    Consider a cat on a mat. On the one hand, there seems to be just one cat, but on the other there seem to be many things with as good a claim as anything in the vicinity to being a cat. Hence, the problem of the many. In his ‘Many, but Almost One,’ David Lewis offered two solutions. According to the first, only one of the many is indeed a cat, although it is indeterminate exactly which one. According to the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Patrick Greenough (2008). Indeterminate Truth. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):213-241.
    In §2-4, I survey three extant ways of making sense of indeterminate truth and find each of them wanting. All the later sections of the paper are concerned with showing that the most promising way of making sense of indeterminate truth is via either a theory of truthmaker gaps or via a theory of truthmaking gaps. The first intimations of a truthmaker–truthmaking gap theory of indeterminacy are to be found in Quine (1981). In §5, we see how Quine proposes to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. David Hershenov (2001). The Thesis of Vague Objects and Unger's Problem of the Many. Philosophical Papers 30 (1):57-67.
    Although the predominant view is that vagueness is due to our language being imprecise, the alternative idea that objects themselves do not have determinate borders has received an occasional hearing. But what has failed to be appreciated is how this idea can avoid a puzzle Peter Unger named “The Problem of the Many.”[i].
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Terry Horgan (1997). Deep Ignorance, Brute Supervenience, and the Problem of the Many. Philosophical Issues 8:229-236.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Hud Hudson (2001). A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person. Cornell University Press.
    Introduction In the first four chapters of this book, I develop and defend a monistic account of human persons according to which human persons are highly ...
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Hud Hudson (2000). Universalism, Four Dimensionalism, and Vagueness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):547-560.
  8. Mark Johnston (1992). Constitution is Not Identity. Mind 101 (401):89-106.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Geert Keil (2013). Introduction: Vagueness and Ontology. [REVIEW] Metaphysica 14 (2):149-164.
    The article introduces a special issue of the journal Metaphysica on vagueness and ontology. The conventional view has it that all vagueness is semantic or representational. Russell, Dummett, Evans and Lewis, inter alia, have argued that the notion of “ontic” or “metaphysical” vagueness is not even intelligible. In recent years, a growing minority of philosophers have tried to make sense of the notion and have spelled it out in various ways. The article gives an overview and relates the idea of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Shieva Kleinschmidt (forthcoming). Reasoning Without the Principle of Sufficient Reason. In Tyron Goldschmidt (ed.), The Philosophy of Existence: Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing? Routledge.
    According to Principles of Sufficient Reason, every truth (in some relevant group) has an explanation. One of the most popular defenses of Principles of Sufficient Reason has been the presupposition of reason defense, which takes endorsement of the defended PSR to play a crucial role in our theory selection. According to recent presentations of this defense, our method of theory selection often depends on the assumption that, if a given proposition is true, then it has an explanation, and this will (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Daniel Z. Korman (2011). Ordinary Objects. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    An encyclopedia entry which covers various revisionary conceptions of which macroscopic objects there are, and the puzzles and arguments that motivate these conceptions: sorites arguments, the argument from vagueness, the puzzles of material constitution, arguments against indeterminate identity, arguments from arbitrariness, debunking arguments, the overdetermination argument, and the problem of the many.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. D. Lewis (1993). Many but Almost One. In K. Campbell, J. Bacon & L. Reinhardt (eds.), Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays on the Philosophy of D. M. Armstrong. Cambridge University Press.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. David Lewis (1993). Many, but Almost One. In Keith Cambell, John Bacon & Lloyd Reinhardt (eds.), Ontology, Causality, and Mind: Essays on the Philosophy of D. M. Armstrong. Cambridge University Press. 23-38.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Dan López de Sa (2008). Is the Problem of the Many a Problem in Metaphysics? Noûs 42 (4):746-752.
    Kilimanjaro is a paradigmatic mountain, if any is. Consider atom Sparky, which is neither determinately part of Kilimanjaro nor determinately not part of it. Let Kilimanjaro(+) be the body of land constituted, in the way mountains are constituted by their constituent atoms, by the atoms that make up Kilimanjaro together with Sparky, and Kilimanjaro(–) the one constituted by those other than Sparky. On the one hand, there seems to be just one mountain in the vicinity of Kilimanjaro. On the other (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. E. J. Lowe (1995). The Problem of the Many and the Vagueness of Constitution. Analysis 55 (3):179 - 182.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. E. J. Lowe (1982). The Paradox of the 1,001 Cats. Analysis 42 (1):27 - 30.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Ned Markosian (1998). Brutal Composition. Philosophical Studies 92 (3):211 - 249.
    According to standard, pre-philosophical intuitions, there are many composite objects in the physical universe. There is, for example, my bicycle, which is composed of various parts - wheels, handlebars, molecules, atoms, etc. Recently, a growing body of philosophical literature has concerned itself with questions about the nature of composition.1 The main question that has been raised about composition is, roughly, this: Under what circumstances do some things compose, or add up to, or form, a single object? It turns out that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Ned Markosian (1998). Brutal Composition. Philosophical Studies 92 (3):211-249.
    According to standard, pre-philosophical intuitions, there are many composite objects in the physical universe. There is, for example, my bicycle, which is composed of various parts - wheels, handlebars, molecules, atoms, etc. Recently, a growing body of philosophical literature has concerned itself with questions about the nature of composition.1 The main question that has been raised about composition is, roughly, this: Under what circumstances do some things compose, or add up to, or form, a single object? It turns out that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Neil McKinnon (2008). A New Problem of the Many. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230):80-97.
    Peter Unger's 'problem of the many' has elicited many responses over the past quarter of a century. Here I present a new problem of the many. This new problem, I claim, is resistant to the solutions cunently on offer for Unger's problem.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Neil McKinnon, Persistence and a New Problem of the Many.
    One winter’s Saturday Clarence wakes up. He realises he has left his umbrella at work. The office is locked, and he can’t get in. Being one of those people who punish themselves for their mistakes, he can’t bring himself to buy a replacement. He has an engagement six kilometres down the road and starts wondering whether it will rain. Normally, this would not be a problem, but his motor vehicle has broken down because he forgot to have it serviced. And (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Neil McKinnon (2002). Supervaluations and the Problem of the Many. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):320-339.
    Supervaluational treatments of vagueness are currently quite popular among those who regard vagueness as a thoroughly semantic phenomenon. Peter Unger's 'problem of the many' may be regarded as arising from the vagueness of our ordinary physical-object terms, so it is not surprising that supervaluational solutions to Unger's problem have been offered. I argue that supervaluations do not afford an adequate solution to the problem of the many. Moreover, the considerations I raise against the supervaluational solution tell also against the solution (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Trenton Merricks (2003). Maximality and Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):150-158.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. By Kristie Miller (2008). Endurantism, Diachronic Vagueness and the Problem of the Many. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):242–253.
    A plausible desideratum for an account of the nature of objects, at, and across time, is that it accommodate the phenomenon of vagueness without locating vagueness in the world. A series of arguments have attempted to show that while universalist perdurantism – which combines a perdurantist account of persistence with an unrestricted mereological account of composition – meets this desideratum, endurantist accounts do not. If endurantists reject unrestricted composition then they must hold that vagueness is ontological. But if they embrace (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Bradley Monton & Sanford Goldberg (2006). The Problem of the Many Minds. Minds and Machines 16 (4):463-470.
    It is argued that, given certain reasonable premises, an infinite number of qualitatively identical but numerically distinct minds exist per functioning brain. The three main premises are (1) mental properties supervene on brain properties; (2) the universe is composed of particles with nonzero extension; and (3) each particle is composed of continuum many point-sized bits of particle-stuff, and these points of particlestuff persist through time.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. W. V. Quine (1981). What Price Bivalence? Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):90-95.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. David H. Sanford (1993). The Problem of the Many, Many Composition Questions, and Naive Mereology. Noûs 27 (2):219-228.
    Naive mereology studies ordinary, common-sense beliefs about part and whole. Some of the speculations in this article on naive mereology do not bear directly on Peter van Inwagen's "Material Beings". The other topics, (1) and (2), both do. (1) Here is an example of Peter Unger's "Problem of the Many". How can a table be a collection of atoms when many collections of atoms have equally strong claims to be that table? Van Inwagen invokes fuzzy sets to solve this problem. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Thomas Sattig (2010). 1. The Problem of the Many. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 5:145.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Michael Tye (1996). Fuzzy Realism and the Problem of the Many. Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):215 - 225.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Peter Unger (1980). The Problem of the Many. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):411-468.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Brian Weatherson, The Problem of the Many.
    As anyone who has flown out of a cloud knows, the boundaries of a cloud are a lot less sharp up close than they can appear on the ground. Even when it seems clearly true that there is one, sharply bounded, cloud up there, really there are thousands of water droplets that are neither determinately part of the cloud, nor determinately outside it. Consider any object that consists of the core of the cloud, plus an arbitrary selection of these droplets. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Brian Weatherson, Vague Composition and the Problem of the Many.
    Assume also that it is vague, in some sense, which hairs are hairs of that cat. Then one might think that it is indeterminate in some sense which thing is the cat on the mat.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Brian Weatherson (2003). Many Many Problems. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):481–501.
    Recently four different papers have suggested that the supervaluational solution to the Problem of the Many is flawed. Stephen Schiffer (1998, 2000a, 2000b) has argued that the theory cannot account for reports of speech involving vague singular terms. Vann McGee and Brian McLaughlin (2000) say that theory cannot, yet, account for vague singular beliefs. Neil McKinnon (2002) has argued that we cannot provide a plausible theory of when precisifications are acceptable, which the supervaluational theory needs. And Roy Sorensen (2000) argues (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Robert Williams, An Argument for the Many Penultimate Draft.
    If one believes that vagueness is an exclusively representational phenomenon, one faces the problem of the many. In the vicinity of Kilimanjaro, there are many many ‘mountain candidates’ all, apparently, with more-or-less equal claim to be mountains. David Lewis has defended a radical claim: that all the billions of mountain candidates are mountains. This paper argues that the supervaluationist about vagueness should adopt Lewis’ proposal, on pain of losing their best explanation of the seductiveness of the sorites.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Robert Williams (2006). An Argument for the Many. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (1):411-419.
    If one believes that vagueness is an exclusively representational phenomenon, one faces the problem of the many. In the vicinity of Kilimanjaro, there are many many ‘mountain candidates’ all, apparently, with more-or-less equal claim to be mountains. David Lewis has defended a radical claim: that all the billions of mountain candidates are mountains. This paper argues that the supervaluationist about vagueness should adopt Lewis’ proposal, on pain of losing their best explanation of the seductiveness of the sorites.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation