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  1. Marshall Abrams (1999). Propensities in the Propensity Interpretation of Fitness. Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (1):27-35.
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  2. M. Albert (2007). The Propensity Theory: A Decision-Theoretic Restatement. Synthese 156 (3):587 - 603.
    Probability theory is important because of its relevance for decision making, which also means: its relevance for the single case. The propensity theory of objective probability, which addresses the single case, is subject to two problems: Humphreys’ problem of inverse probabilities and the problem of the reference class. The paper solves both problems by restating the propensity theory using (an objectivist version of) Pearl’s approach to causality and probability, and by applying a decision-theoretic perspective. Contrary to a widely held view, (...)
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  3. Andre Ariew (2009). What Fitness Can't Be. Erkenntnis 71 (3):289 - 301.
    Recently advocates of the propensity interpretation of fitness have turned critics. To accommodate examples from the population genetics literature they conclude that fitness is better defined broadly as a family of propensities rather than the propensity to contribute descendants to some future generation. We argue that the propensity theorists have misunderstood the deeper ramifications of the examples they cite. These examples demonstrate why there are factors outside of propensities that determine fitness. We go on to argue for the more general (...)
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  4. Stephen Barker (2009). Leaving Things to Take Their Chances : Cause and Disposition Grounded in Chance. In Toby Handfield (ed.), Dispositions and Causes. Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press ;
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  5. Thomas Bartelborth (2011). Propensities and Transcendental Assumptions. Erkenntnis 74 (3):363-381.
    In order to comprehend the world around us and construct explaining theories for this purpose, we need a conception of physical probability, since we come across many (apparently) probabilistic phenomena in our world. But how should we understand objective probability claims? Since pure frequency approaches of probability are not appropriate, we have to use a single case propensity interpretation. Unfortunately, many philosophers believe that this understanding of probability is burdened with significant difficulties. My main aim is to show that we (...)
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  6. Nuel Belnap (2007). Propensities and Probabilities. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (3):593-625.
    Popper’s introduction of ‘‘propensity’’ was intended to provide a solid conceptual foundation for objective single-case probabilities. By considering the partly opposed contributions of Humphreys and Miller and Salmon, it is argued that when properly understood, propensities can in fact be understood as objective single-case causal probabilities of transitions between concrete events. The chief claim is that propensities are well-explicated by describing how they fit into the existing formal theory of branching space-times, which is simultaneously indeterministic and causal. Several problematic examples, (...)
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  7. John C. Bigelow (1977). Semantics of Probability. Synthese 36 (4):459--72.
  8. John C. Bigelow (1976). Possible Worlds Foundations for Probability. Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (3):299--320.
  9. David Bohm (1957/1999). Causality and Chance in Modern Physics. University of Pennsylvania Press.
    CHAPTER ONE Causality and Chance in Natural Law. INTRODUCTION IN nature nothing remains constant. Everything is in a perpetual state of transformation, ...
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  10. Hilary O. Box (2003). Characteristics and Propensities of Marmosets and Tamarins: Implications for Studies of Innovation. In Simon M. Reader & Kevin N. Laland (eds.), Animal Innovation. OUP Oxford
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  11. T. E. Burke (1991). A World of Propensities. Cogito 5 (3):179-180.
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  12. Richard N. Burnor (1984). What's the Matter with the Matter of Chance? Philosophical Studies 46 (3):349 - 365.
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  13. Peter Clark (2006). Problems of Determinism: Prediction, Propensity and Probability. In Wenceslao J. González & Jesus Alcolea (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives in Philosophy and Methodology of Science. Netbiblio
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  14. Antoine Côté (2009). Simplicius and James of Viterbo on Propensities. Vivarium 47 (1):24-53.
    The paper examines Simplicius's doctrine of propensities in his commentary on Aristotle's Categories and follows its application by the late thirteenth century theologian and philosopher James of Viterbo to problems relating to the causes of volition, intellection and natural change. Although he uses Aristotelian terminology and means his doctrine to conflict minimally with those of Aristotle, James's doctrine of propensities really constitutes an attempt to provide a technically rigorous dressing to his Augustinian and Boethian convictions. Central to James's procedure is (...)
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  15. Lane DesAutels (forthcoming). Toward a Propensity Interpretation of Stochastic Mechanism for the Life Sciences. Synthese:1-33.
    In what follows, I suggest that it makes good sense to think of the truth of the probabilistic generalizations made in the life sciences as metaphysically grounded in stochastic mechanisms in the world. To further understand these stochastic mechanisms, I take the general characterization of mechanism offered by MDC :1–25, 2000) and explore how it fits with several of the going philosophical accounts of chance: subjectivism, frequentism, Lewisian best-systems, and propensity. I argue that neither subjectivism, frequentism, nor a best-system-style interpretation (...)
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  16. Isabelle Drouet & Francesca Merlin (forthcoming). The Propensity Interpretation of Fitness and the Propensity Interpretation of Probability. Erkenntnis:1-12.
    The paper provides a new critical perspective on the propensity interpretation of fitness, by investigating its relationship to the propensity interpretation of probability. Two main conclusions are drawn. First, the claim that fitness is a propensity cannot be understood properly: fitness is not a propensity in the sense prescribed by the propensity interpretation of probability. Second, this interpretation of probability is inessential for explanations proposed by the propensity interpretation of fitness in evolutionary biology. Consequently, interpreting the probabilistic dimension of fitness (...)
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  17. Antony Eagle (2004). Twenty-One Arguments Against Propensity Analyses of Probability. Erkenntnis 60 (3):371–416.
    I argue that any broadly dispositional analysis of probability will either fail to give an adequate explication of probability, or else will fail to provide an explication that can be gainfully employed elsewhere (for instance, in empirical science or in the regulation of credence). The diversity and number of arguments suggests that there is little prospect of any successful analysis along these lines.
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  18. James H. Fetzer (2010). Propensities and Frequencies. In Ellery Eells & James H. Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science. Springer 323--351.
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  19. James H. Fetzer (2002). Propensities and Frequencies: Inference to the Best Explanation. Synthese 132 (1-2):27 - 61.
    An approach to inference to the best explanation integrating a Popperianconception of natural laws together with a modified Hempelian account of explanation, one the one hand, and Hacking's law of likelihood (in its nomicguise), on the other, which provides a robust abductivist model of sciencethat appears to overcome the obstacles that confront its inductivist,deductivist, and hypothetico-deductivist alternatives.This philosophy of scienceclarifies and illuminates some fundamental aspects of ontology and epistemology, especially concerning the relations between frequencies and propensities. Among the most important (...)
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  20. James H. Fetzer (1974). A Single Case Propensity Theory of Explanation. Synthese 28 (2):171 - 198.
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  21. J. Barretto Bastos Filho & F. Selleri (1995). Propensity, Probability, and Quantum Physics. Foundations of Physics 25 (5):701-716.
    Popper's idea of propensities constituting the physical background of predictable probabilities is reviewed and developed by introducing a suitable formalism compatible with standard probability calculus and with its frequency interpretation. Quantum statistical ensembles described as pure cases (“eigenstates”) are shown to be necessarily not homogeneous if propensities are actually at work in nature. An extension of the theory to EPR experiments with local propensities leads to a new and more general proof of Bell's theorem. No joint probabilities for incompatible observables (...)
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  22. Ronald N. Giere (1979). Propensity and Necessity. Synthese 40 (3):439 - 451.
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  23. Ronald N. Giere (1976). A Laplacean Formal Semantics for Single-Case Propensities. Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (3):321 - 353.
    Even those generally skeptical of propensity interpretations of probability must now grant the following two points. First, the above single-case propensity interpretation meets recognized formal conditions for being a genuine interpretation of probability. Second, this interpretation is not logically reducible to a hypothetical relative frequency interpretation, nor is it only vacuously different from such an interpretation.The main objection to this propensity interpretation must be not that it is too vague or vacuous, but that it is metaphysically too extravagant. It asserts (...)
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  24. Donald Gillies (2002). Causality, Propensity, and Bayesian Networks. Synthese 132 (1-2):63 - 88.
    This paper investigates the relations between causality and propensity. Aparticular version of the propensity theory of probability is introduced, and it is argued that propensities in this sense are not causes. Some conclusions regarding propensities can, however, be inferred from causal statements, but these hold only under restrictive conditions which prevent cause being defined in terms of propensity. The notion of a Bayesian propensity network is introduced, and the relations between such networks and causal networks is investigated. It is argued (...)
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  25. Donald Gillies (2000). Varieties of Propensity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):807-835.
    The propensity interpretation of probability was introduced by Popper ([1957]), but has subsequently been developed in different ways by quite a number of philosophers of science. This paper does not attempt a complete survey, but discusses a number of different versions of the theory, thereby giving some idea of the varieties of propensity. Propensity theories are classified into (i) long-run and (ii) single-case. The paper argues for a long-run version of the propensity theory, but this is contrasted with two single-case (...)
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  26. Donald Gillies (1991). A World of Propensities By Karl R. Popper Thoemmes Antiquarian Books Ltd., 64 Pp., £5.00 Paper. Philosophy 66 (257):392-.
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  27. N. Gisin (1991). Propensities in a Non-Deterministic Physics. Synthese 89 (2):287 - 297.
    Propensities are presented as a generalization of classical determinism. They describe a physical reality intermediary between Laplacian determinism and pure randomness, such as in quantum mechanics. They are characterized by the fact that their values are determined by the collection of all actual properties. It is argued that they do not satisfy Kolmogorov axioms; other axioms are proposed.
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  28. Luke Glynn (2011). D. H. MELLOR The Matter of Chance. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (4):899-906.
    Though almost forty years have elapsed since its first publication, it is a testament to the philosophical acumen of its author that 'The Matter of Chance' contains much that is of continued interest to the philosopher of science. Mellor advances a sophisticated propensity theory of chance, arguing that this theory makes better sense than its rivals (in particular subjectivist, frequentist, logical and classical theories) of ‘what professional usage shows to be thought true of chance’ (p. xi) – in particular ‘that (...)
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  29. I. J. Good (1984). Causal Propensity: A Review. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:829 - 850.
    The causal propensity of an event F to cause another event E is explicated as the weight of evidence against F if E does not occur, given the state of the universe just before F occurred. This definition, first given in 1961, is sharpened, defended, and applied to several examples. In this definition the concept of weight of evidence in favor of a proposition, provided by another one, is to be understood in a technical sense that is intended to capture (...)
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  30. J. W. Grove (1995). Karl Popper, in Search of a Better World: Lectures and Essays From Thirty Years. Routledge, London and New York, 1992. Pp. X, 245. £25.00. Karl Popper, a World of Propensities. Thoemmes, Bristol, 1990. Pp. IX, 51. £5.99 (Paper). John R. Wettersten, the Roots of Critical Rationalism. Rodopi, Amsterdam and Atlanta, Ga, 1992. Pp. 254. $68.97. [REVIEW] Philosophy of the Social Sciences 25 (3):376-383.
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  31. Toby Handfield (2012). A Philosophical Guide to Chance: Physical Probability. Cambridge University Press.
    Contents: 1. The concept of chance; 2. The classical picture; 3. Ways the world might be; 4. Possibilities of thought; 5. Chance in phase space; 6. Possibilist theories of chance; 7. Actualist theories of chance; 8. Anti-realist theories of chance; 9. Chance in quantum physics; 10. Chance in branching worlds; 11. Time and evidence; 12. Debunking chance.
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  32. Joseph F. Hanna (1981). Single Case Propensities and the Explanation of Particular Events. Synthese 48 (3):409 - 436.
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  33. A. O' Hear (ed.) (1996). Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems. Cambridge University Press.
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  34. Christian Hennig (2007). Falsification of Propensity Models by Statistical Tests and the Goodness-of-Fit Paradox. Philosophia Mathematica 15 (2):166-192.
    Gillies introduced a propensity interpretation of probability which is linked to experience by a falsifying rule for probability statements. The present paper argues that general statistical tests should qualify as falsification rules. The ‘goodness-of-fit paradox’ is introduced: the confirmation of a probability model by a test refutes the model's validity. An example is given in which an independence test introduces dependence. Several possibilities to interpret the paradox and to deal with it are discussed. It is concluded that the propensity interpretation (...)
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  35. Carl Hoefer (2011). Time and Chance Propensities. In Craig Callender (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time. OUP Oxford
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  36. Colin Howson (1984). Probabilities, Propensities, and Chances. Erkenntnis 21 (3):279 - 293.
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  37. Paul Humphreys (2004). Some Considerations on Conditional Chances. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (4):667-680.
    Four interpretations of single-case conditional propensities are described and it is shown that for each a version of what has been called ‘Humphreys' Paradox’ remains, despite the clarifying work of Gillies, McCurdy and Miller. This entails that propensities cannot be a satisfactory interpretation of standard probability theory. Introduction The basic issue The formal paradox Values of conditional propensities Interpretations of propensities McCurdy's response Miller's response Other possibilities 8.1 Temporal evolution 8.2 Renormalization 8.3 Causal influence Propensities to generate frequencies Conclusion.
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  38. Paul Humphreys (1992). Chapter Three. Cause and Chance. In The Chances of Explanation: Causal Explanation in the Social, Medical, and Physical Sciences. Princeton University Press 61-97.
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  39. Paul Humphreys (1985). Why Propensities Cannot Be Probabilities. Philosophical Review 94 (4):557-570.
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  40. Frank Jackson & Robert Pargetter (1982). Physical Probability as a Propensity. Noûs 16 (4):567-583.
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  41. I. C. Jarvie (1991). Book Reviews : Karl R. Popper, A World of Propensities. Thoemmes, Bristol, 1990. Pp. 51. 5.00. [REVIEW] Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (3):407-409.
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  42. Lars-Göran Johansson (2009). Propensities. In Lars-Göran Johansson, Jan Österberg & Rysiek Sliwinski (eds.), Logic, Ethics and All That Jazz.Essays in honour of Jordan Howard Sobel. Uppsala University
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  43. Lars-Göran Johansson, Jan Österberg, Rysiek Śliwiński & Jordan Howard Sobel (eds.) (2009). Logic, Ethics and All That Jazz: Essays in Honour of Jordan Howard Sobel. Dept. Of Philosophy, Uppsala University.
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  44. Henry Krips (1984). Popper, Propensities, and Quantum Theory. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (3):253-274.
  45. Review author[S.]: Henry E. Kyberg (1974). Propensities and Probabilities. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25 (4):358-375.
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  46. Henry E. Kyburg (2002). Don't Take Unnecessary Chances! Synthese 132 (1-2):9-26.
    The dominant argument for the introduction of propensities or chances as an interpretation of probability depends on the difficulty of accounting for single case probabilities. We argue that in almost all cases, the``single case'' application of probability can be accounted for otherwise. ``Propensities'' are needed only intheoretical contexts, and even there applications of probability need only depend on propensities indirectly.
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  47. Henry E. Kyburg (1976). Chance. Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (3):355-393.
  48. Daniel Lambright (2012). Objective Chances in a Deterministic World. Dissertation, Bates College
    Determinism is the thesis that the state of the world at any time uniquely determines the state of the world at all future times. Our best scientific theories seem inconclusive as to whether our world is deterministic. Our world could very well be either partially or completely deterministic. But determinism is not as innocuous as it seems; the truth of determinism seems to come into conflict with many intuitive concepts. One such concept is objective chance. Our intuitive notions of objective (...)
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  49. Christopher S. I. Mccurdy (1996). Humphrey's Paradox and the Interpretation of Inverse Conditional Propensities. Synthese 108 (1):105 - 125.
    The aim of this paper is to distinguish between, and examine, three issues surrounding Humphreys's paradox and interpretation of conditional propensities. The first issue involves the controversy over the interpretation of inverse conditional propensities — conditional propensities in which the conditioned event occurs before the conditioning event. The second issue is the consistency of the dispositional nature of the propensity interpretation and the inversion theorems of the probability calculus, where an inversion theorem is any theorem of probability that makes explicit (...)
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  50. D. H. Mellor (2004). The Matter of Chance. Cambridge University Press.
    This book deals not so much with statistical methods as with the central concept of chance, or statistical probability, which statistical theories apply to nature.
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