This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
76 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 76
  1. Marshall Abrams (1999). Propensities in the Propensity Interpretation of Fitness. Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (1):27-35.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. M. Albert (2007). The Propensity Theory: A Decision-Theoretic Restatement. Synthese 156 (3):587 - 603.
    Probability theory is important because of its relevance for decision making, which also means: its relevance for the single case. The propensity theory of objective probability, which addresses the single case, is subject to two problems: Humphreys’ problem of inverse probabilities and the problem of the reference class. The paper solves both problems by restating the propensity theory using (an objectivist version of) Pearl’s approach to causality and probability, and by applying a decision-theoretic perspective. Contrary to a widely held view, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Thomas Bartelborth (2011). Propensities and Transcendental Assumptions. Erkenntnis 74 (3):363-381.
    In order to comprehend the world around us and construct explaining theories for this purpose, we need a conception of physical probability, since we come across many (apparently) probabilistic phenomena in our world. But how should we understand objective probability claims? Since pure frequency approaches of probability are not appropriate, we have to use a single case propensity interpretation. Unfortunately, many philosophers believe that this understanding of probability is burdened with significant difficulties. My main aim is to show that we (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Nuel Belnap (2007). Propensities and Probabilities. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (3):593-625.
    Popper’s introduction of ‘‘propensity’’ was intended to provide a solid conceptual foundation for objective single-case probabilities. By considering the partly opposed contributions of Humphreys and Miller and Salmon, it is argued that when properly understood, propensities can in fact be understood as objective single-case causal probabilities of transitions between concrete events. The chief claim is that propensities are well-explicated by describing how they fit into the existing formal theory of branching space-times, which is simultaneously indeterministic and causal. Several problematic examples, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. John C. Bigelow (1977). Semantics of Probability. Synthese 36 (4):459--72.
  6. John C. Bigelow (1976). Possible Worlds Foundations for Probability. Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (3):299--320.
  7. David Bohm (1957/1999). Causality and Chance in Modern Physics. University of Pennsylvania Press.
    CHAPTER ONE Causality and Chance in Natural Law. INTRODUCTION IN nature nothing remains constant. Everything is in a perpetual state of transformation, ...
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. T. E. Burke (1991). A World of Propensities. Cogito 5 (3):179-180.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Richard N. Burnor (1984). What's the Matter with the Matter of Chance? Philosophical Studies 46 (3):349 - 365.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Peter Clark (2006). Problems of Determinism: Prediction, Propensity and Probability. In Wenceslao J. González & Jesus Alcolea (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives in Philosophy and Methodology of Science. Netbiblio.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Antoine Côté (2009). Simplicius and James of Viterbo on Propensities. Vivarium 47 (1):24-53.
  12. Isabelle Drouet & Francesca Merlin (forthcoming). The Propensity Interpretation of Fitness and the Propensity Interpretation of Probability. Erkenntnis:1-12.
    The paper provides a new critical perspective on the propensity interpretation of fitness, by investigating its relationship to the propensity interpretation of probability. Two main conclusions are drawn. First, the claim that fitness is a propensity cannot be understood properly: fitness is not a propensity in the sense prescribed by the propensity interpretation of probability. Second, this interpretation of probability is inessential for explanations proposed by the propensity interpretation of fitness in evolutionary biology. Consequently, interpreting the probabilistic dimension of fitness (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Antony Eagle (2004). Twenty-One Arguments Against Propensity Analyses of Probability. Erkenntnis 60 (3):371–416.
    I argue that any broadly dispositional analysis of probability will either fail to give an adequate explication of probability, or else will fail to provide an explication that can be gainfully employed elsewhere (for instance, in empirical science or in the regulation of credence). The diversity and number of arguments suggests that there is little prospect of any successful analysis along these lines.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. James H. Fetzer (2002). Propensities and Frequencies: Inference to the Best Explanation. Synthese 132 (1-2):27 - 61.
    An approach to inference to the best explanation integrating a Popperianconception of natural laws together with a modified Hempelian account of explanation, one the one hand, and Hacking's law of likelihood (in its nomicguise), on the other, which provides a robust abductivist model of sciencethat appears to overcome the obstacles that confront its inductivist,deductivist, and hypothetico-deductivist alternatives.This philosophy of scienceclarifies and illuminates some fundamental aspects of ontology and epistemology, especially concerning the relations between frequencies and propensities. Among the most important (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. J. Barretto Bastos Filho & F. Selleri (1995). Propensity, Probability, and Quantum Physics. Foundations of Physics 25 (5):701-716.
    Popper's idea of propensities constituting the physical background of predictable probabilities is reviewed and developed by introducing a suitable formalism compatible with standard probability calculus and with its frequency interpretation. Quantum statistical ensembles described as pure cases (“eigenstates”) are shown to be necessarily not homogeneous if propensities are actually at work in nature. An extension of the theory to EPR experiments with local propensities leads to a new and more general proof of Bell's theorem. No joint probabilities for incompatible observables (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Ronald N. Giere (1976). A Laplacean Formal Semantics for Single-Case Propensities. Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (3):321 - 353.
    Even those generally skeptical of propensity interpretations of probability must now grant the following two points. First, the above single-case propensity interpretation meets recognized formal conditions for being a genuine interpretation of probability. Second, this interpretation is not logically reducible to a hypothetical relative frequency interpretation, nor is it only vacuously different from such an interpretation.The main objection to this propensity interpretation must be not that it is too vague or vacuous, but that it is metaphysically too extravagant. It asserts (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Donald Gillies (2002). Causality, Propensity, and Bayesian Networks. Synthese 132 (1-2):63 - 88.
    This paper investigates the relations between causality and propensity. Aparticular version of the propensity theory of probability is introduced, and it is argued that propensities in this sense are not causes. Some conclusions regarding propensities can, however, be inferred from causal statements, but these hold only under restrictive conditions which prevent cause being defined in terms of propensity. The notion of a Bayesian propensity network is introduced, and the relations between such networks and causal networks is investigated. It is argued (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Donald Gillies (2000). Varieties of Propensity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):807-835.
    The propensity interpretation of probability was introduced by Popper ([1957]), but has subsequently been developed in different ways by quite a number of philosophers of science. This paper does not attempt a complete survey, but discusses a number of different versions of the theory, thereby giving some idea of the varieties of propensity. Propensity theories are classified into (i) long-run and (ii) single-case. The paper argues for a long-run version of the propensity theory, but this is contrasted with two single-case (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Donald Gillies (1991). A World of Propensities By Karl R. Popper Thoemmes Antiquarian Books Ltd., 64 Pp., £5.00 Paper. Philosophy 66 (257):392-.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. N. Gisin (1991). Propensities in a Non-Deterministic Physics. Synthese 89 (2):287 - 297.
    Propensities are presented as a generalization of classical determinism. They describe a physical reality intermediary between Laplacian determinism and pure randomness, such as in quantum mechanics. They are characterized by the fact that their values are determined by the collection of all actual properties. It is argued that they do not satisfy Kolmogorov axioms; other axioms are proposed.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Luke Glynn (2011). D. H. MELLOR The Matter of Chance. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (4):899-906.
    Though almost forty years have elapsed since its first publication, it is a testament to the philosophical acumen of its author that 'The Matter of Chance' contains much that is of continued interest to the philosopher of science. Mellor advances a sophisticated propensity theory of chance, arguing that this theory makes better sense than its rivals (in particular subjectivist, frequentist, logical and classical theories) of ‘what professional usage shows to be thought true of chance’ (p. xi) – in particular ‘that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. J. W. Grove (1995). Karl Popper, in Search of a Better World: Lectures and Essays From Thirty Years. Routledge, London and New York, 1992. Pp. X, 245. £25.00. Karl Popper, a World of Propensities. Thoemmes, Bristol, 1990. Pp. IX, 51. £5.99 (Paper). John R. Wettersten, the Roots of Critical Rationalism. Rodopi, Amsterdam and Atlanta, Ga, 1992. Pp. 254. $68.97. [REVIEW] Philosophy of the Social Sciences 25 (3):376-383.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Toby Handfield (2012). A Philosophical Guide to Chance: Physical Probability. Cambridge University Press.
    Contents: 1. The concept of chance; 2. The classical picture; 3. Ways the world might be; 4. Possibilities of thought; 5. Chance in phase space; 6. Possibilist theories of chance; 7. Actualist theories of chance; 8. Anti-realist theories of chance; 9. Chance in quantum physics; 10. Chance in branching worlds; 11. Time and evidence; 12. Debunking chance.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Joseph F. Hanna (1981). Single Case Propensities and the Explanation of Particular Events. Synthese 48 (3):409 - 436.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Christian Hennig (2007). Falsification of Propensity Models by Statistical Tests and the Goodness-of-Fit Paradox. Philosophia Mathematica 15 (2):166-192.
    Gillies introduced a propensity interpretation of probability which is linked to experience by a falsifying rule for probability statements. The present paper argues that general statistical tests should qualify as falsification rules. The ‘goodness-of-fit paradox’ is introduced: the confirmation of a probability model by a test refutes the model's validity. An example is given in which an independence test introduces dependence. Several possibilities to interpret the paradox and to deal with it are discussed. It is concluded that the propensity interpretation (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Carl Hoefer (2011). Time and Chance Propensities. In Craig Callender (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time. Oup Oxford.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Colin Howson (1984). Probabilities, Propensities, and Chances. Erkenntnis 21 (3):279 - 293.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Paul Humphreys (1985). Why Propensities Cannot Be Probabilities. Philosophical Review 94 (4):557-570.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Frank Jackson & Robert Pargetter (1982). Physical Probability as a Propensity. Noûs 16 (4):567-583.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. I. C. Jarvie (1991). Book Reviews : Karl R. Popper, A World of Propensities. Thoemmes, Bristol, 1990. Pp. 51. 5.00. [REVIEW] Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (3):407-409.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Lars-Göran Johansson (2009). Propensities. In Lars-Göran Johansson, Jan Österberg & Rysiek Sliwinski (eds.), Logic, Ethics and All That Jazz.Essays in honour of Jordan Howard Sobel. Uppsala University.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Lars-Göran Johansson, Jan Österberg, Rysiek Śliwiński & Jordan Howard Sobel (eds.) (2009). Logic, Ethics and All That Jazz: Essays in Honour of Jordan Howard Sobel. Dept. Of Philosophy, Uppsala University.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Henry Krips (1984). Popper, Propensities, and Quantum Theory. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (3):253-274.
  34. Review author[S.]: Henry E. Kyberg (1974). Propensities and Probabilities. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25 (4):358-375.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Henry E. Kyburg (2002). Don't Take Unnecessary Chances! Synthese 132 (1-2):9-26.
    The dominant argument for the introduction of propensities or chances as an interpretation of probability depends on the difficulty of accounting for single case probabilities. We argue that in almost all cases, the``single case'' application of probability can be accounted for otherwise. ``Propensities'' are needed only intheoretical contexts, and even there applications of probability need only depend on propensities indirectly.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Henry E. Kyburg (1976). Chance. Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (3):355-393.
  37. Christopher S. I. Mccurdy (1996). Humphrey's Paradox and the Interpretation of Inverse Conditional Propensities. Synthese 108 (1):105 - 125.
    The aim of this paper is to distinguish between, and examine, three issues surrounding Humphreys's paradox and interpretation of conditional propensities. The first issue involves the controversy over the interpretation of inverse conditional propensities — conditional propensities in which the conditioned event occurs before the conditioning event. The second issue is the consistency of the dispositional nature of the propensity interpretation and the inversion theorems of the probability calculus, where an inversion theorem is any theorem of probability that makes explicit (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. D. H. Mellor (2004). The Matter of Chance. Cambridge University Press.
    This book deals not so much with statistical methods as with the central concept of chance, or statistical probability, which statistical theories apply to nature.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. D. H. Mellor (2000). Possibility, Chance and Necessity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1):16 – 27.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. D. H. Mellor & John Watling (1969). Symposium: Chance. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 43:11 - 48.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. D. W. Miller (1996). Propensities and Indeterminism. In A. O' Hear (ed.), Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems. Cambridge University Press. 121--47.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. David Miller (1991). Single-Case Probabilities. Foundations of Physics 21 (12):1501-1516.
    The propensity interpretation of probability, bred by Popper in 1957(K. R. Popper, in Observation and Interpretation in the Philosophy of Physics,S. Körner, ed. (Butterworth, London, 1957, and Dover, New York, 1962), p. 65; reprinted in Popper Selections,D. W. Miller, ed. (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1985), p. 199) from pure frequency stock, is the only extant objectivist account that provides any proper understanding of single-case probabilities as well as of probabilities in ensembles and in the long run. In Sec. 1 of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Roberta L. Millstein (forthcoming). Probability in Biology: The Case of Fitness. In A. Hájek & C. R. Hitchcock (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    I argue that the propensity interpretation of fitness, properly understood, not only solves the explanatory circularity problem and the mismatch problem, but can also withstand the Pandora’s box full of problems that have been thrown at it. Fitness is the propensity (i.e., probabilistic ability, based on heritable physical traits) for organisms or types of organisms to survive and reproduce in particular environments and in particular populations for a specified number of generations; if greater than one generation, “reproduction” includes descendants of (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Roberta L. Millstein (2003). Interpretations of Probability in Evolutionary Theory. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1317-1328.
    Evolutionary theory (ET) is teeming with probabilities. Probabilities exist at all levels: the level of mutation, the level of microevolution, and the level of macroevolution. This uncontroversial claim raises a number of contentious issues. For example, is the evolutionary process (as opposed to the theory) indeterministic, or is it deterministic? Philosophers of biology have taken different sides on this issue. Millstein (1997) has argued that we are not currently able answer this question, and that even scientific realists ought to remain (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Peter Milne (1987). Physical Probabilities. Synthese 73 (2):329 - 359.
    A conception of probability as an irreducible feature of the physical world is outlined. Propensity analyses of probability are examined and rejected as both formally and conceptually inadequate. It is argued that probability is a non-dispositional property of trial-types; probabilities are attributed to outcomes as event-types. Brier's Rule in an objectivist guise is used to forge a connection between physical and subjective probabilities. In the light of this connection there are grounds for supposing physical probability to obey some standard set (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Peter Milne (1985). A Note on Popper, Propensities, and the Two-Slit Experiment. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (1):66-70.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. M. Mugur-Schächter (1992). Spacetime Quantum Probabilities II: Relativized Descriptions and Popperian Propensities. [REVIEW] Foundations of Physics 22 (2):235-312.
    In the first part of this work(1) we have explicated the spacetime structure of the probabilistic organization of quantum mechanics. We have shown that each quantum mechanical state, in consequence of the spacetime characteristics of the epistemic operations by which the observer produces the state to be studied and the processes of qualification of these, brings in a tree-like spacetime structure, a “quantum mechanical probability tree,” thattransgresses the theory of probabilities as it now stands. In this second part we develop (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Alfred Nordmann (1990). Persistent Propensities: Portrait of a Familiar Controversy. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 5 (4):379-399.
    Susan Mills and John Beatty's propensity interpretation of fitness encountered very different philosophical criticisms by Alexander Rosenberg and Kenneth Waters. These criticisms and the rejoinders to them are both predictable and important. They are predictable as raisingkinds of issues typically associated with disposition concepts (this is established through a systematic review of the problems generated by Carnap's dispositional interpretation of all scientific terms). They are important as referring the resolution of these issues to the development of evolutionary biology. This historical (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Belnap Nuel (2007). Propensities and Probabilities. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Mika Oksanen, Propensities and The Reliabilist Theory of Justification and Knowledge.
    In this article I want to investigate the concept of reliability employed in process reliabilist theories of justification and knowledge. What is essential to process reliabilist theories of justification is that there is a sense of the word ”justifi- cation” (a strong or an objective concept of justification) such that a belief is justified only if it is produced by a reliable process. Different versions of reliabilism may add different sufficient conditions to this to get a complete definition of justification (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 76