Related categories
Siblings:
139 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
1 — 50 / 139
  1. Louise M. Antony (2003). Who's Afraid of Disjunctive Properties? Philosophical Issues 13 (1):1-21.
  2. Paul Audi (2012). Properties, Powers, and the Subset Account of Realization. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):654-674.
    According to the subset account of realization, a property, F, is realized by another property, G, whenever F is individuated by a non-empty proper subset of the causal powers by which G is individuated (and F is not a conjunctive property of which G is a conjunct). This account is especially attractive because it seems both to explain the way in which realized properties are nothing over and above their realizers, and to provide for the causal efficacy of realized properties. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  3. Derek Ball (2011). Property Identities and Modal Arguments. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (13).
    Physicalists about the mind are committed to claims about property identities. Following Kripke's well-known discussion, modal arguments have emerged as major threats to such claims. This paper argues that modal arguments can be resisted by adopting a counterpart theoretic account of modal claims, and in particular modal claims involving properties. Thus physicalists have a powerful motive to adopt non-Kripkean accounts of the metaphysics of modality and the semantics of modal expressions.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  4. Elizabeth Barnes (2005). Vagueness in Sparseness: A Study in Property Ontology. Analysis 65 (288):315–321.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  5. Sam Baron, Richard Copley-Coltheart, Raamy Majeed & Kristie Miller (2013). What is a Negative Property? Philosophy 88 (1):33-54.
    This paper seeks to differentiate negative properties from positive properties, with the aim of providing the groundwork for further discussion about whether there is anything that corresponds to either of these notions. We differentiate negative and positive properties in terms of their functional role, before drawing out the metaphysical implications of proceeding in this fashion. We show that if the difference between negative and positive properties tabled here is correct, then negative properties are metaphysically contentious entities, entities that many philosophers (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  6. William A. Bauer (2012). Four Theories of Pure Dispositions. In Alexander Bird, Brian Ellis & Howard Sankey (eds.), Properties, Powers, and Structures: Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism. Routledge 139-162.
    The dispositional properties encountered in everyday experience seem to have causal bases in other properties, e.g., the microstructure of a vase is the causal basis of its fragility. In contrast, the Pure Dispositions Thesis maintains that some dispositions require no causal basis. This thesis faces the Problem of Being: without a causal basis, there appears to be no grounds for the existence of pure dispositions. This paper establishes criteria for evaluating the problem, critically examines four theories of the being of (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. George Bealer (1995). Property. In Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press 657-658.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. George Bealer (1994). Property Theory: The Type-Free Approach V. The Church Approach. Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (2):139 - 171.
    In a lengthy review article, C. Anthony Anderson criticizes the approach to property theory developed in Quality and Concept (1982). That approach is first-order, type-free, and broadly Russellian. Anderson favors Alonzo Church’s higher-order, type-theoretic, broadly Fregean approach. His worries concern the way in which the theory of intensional entities is developed. It is shown that the worries can be handled within the approach developed in the book but they remain serious obstacles for the Church approach. The discussion focuses on: (1) (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  9. George Bealer (1989). On the Identification of Properties and Propositional Functions. Linguistics and Philosophy 12 (1):1 - 14.
    Arguments are given against the thesis that properties and propositional functions are identical. The first shows that the familiar extensional treatment of propositional functions -- that, for all x, if f(x) = g(x), then f = g -- must be abandoned. Second, given the usual assumptions of propositional-function semantics, various propositional functions (e.g., constant functions) are shown not to be properties. Third, novel examples are given to show that, if properties were identified with propositional functions, crucial fine-grained intensional distinctions would (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  10. George Bealer (1983). Completeness in the Theory of Properties, Relations, and Propositions. Journal of Symbolic Logic 48 (2):415-426.
    Higher-order theories of properties, relations, and propositions are known to be essentially incomplete relative to their standard notions of validity. It turns out that the first-order theory of PRPs that results when first-order logic is supplemented with a generalized intensional abstraction operation is complete. The construction involves the development of an intensional algebraic semantic method that does not appeal to possible worlds, but rather takes PRPs as primitive entities. This allows for a satisfactory treatment of both the modalities and the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  11. George Bealer (1979). Theories of Properties, Relations, and Propositions. Journal of Philosophy 76 (11):634-648.
    This is the only complete logic for properties, relations, and propositions (PRPS) that has been formulated to date. First, an intensional abstraction operation is adjoined to first-order quantifier logic, Then, a new algebraic semantic method is developed. The heuristic used is not that of possible worlds but rather that of PRPS taken at face value. Unlike the possible worlds approach to intensional logic, this approach yields a logic for intentional (psychological) matters, as well as modal matters. At the close of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  12. George Bealer & Uwe Monnich (2003). Property Theories. In Dov Gabbay & Frans Guenthner (eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Volume 10. Kluwer 143-248.
    Revised and reprinted; originally in Dov Gabbay & Franz Guenthner (eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Volume IV. Kluwer 133-251. -- Two sorts of property theory are distinguished, those dealing with intensional contexts property abstracts (infinitive and gerundive phrases) and proposition abstracts (‘that’-clauses) and those dealing with predication (or instantiation) relations. The first is deemed to be epistemologically more primary, for “the argument from intensional logic” is perhaps the best argument for the existence of properties. This argument is presented in the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  13. George Bealer & Uwe Mönnich (1989). Property Theories. In Dov Gabbay & Franz Guenthner (eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Volume IV. Kluwer 133-251.
    Revised and reprinted in Handbook of Philosophical Logic, volume 10, Dov Gabbay and Frans Guenthner (eds.), Dordrecht: Kluwer, (2003). -- Two sorts of property theory are distinguished, those dealing with intensional contexts property abstracts (infinitive and gerundive phrases) and proposition abstracts (‘that’-clauses) and those dealing with predication (or instantiation) relations. The first is deemed to be epistemologically more primary, for “the argument from intensional logic” is perhaps the best argument for the existence of properties. This argument is presented in the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  14. Alexander Bird (2007). Nature's Metaphysics: Laws and Properties. Oxford University Press.
    Professional philosophers and advanced students working in metaphysics and the philosophy of science will find this book both provocative and stimulating.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   106 citations  
  15. Ben Blumson, Distance and Dissimilarity.
    This paper considers whether an analogy between distance and dissimilarlity supports the thesis that degree of dissimilarity is distance in a metric space. A straightforward way to justify the thesis would be to define degree of dissimilarity as a function of number of properties in common and not in common. But, infamously, this approach has problems with infinity. An alternative approach would be to prove representation and uniqueness theorems, according to which if comparative dissimilarity meets certain qualitative conditions, then it (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Ben Blumson, Two Conceptions of Similarity.
    There are at least two traditional conceptions of numerical degree of similarity. According to the first, the degree of dissimilarity between two particulars is their distance apart in a metric space. According to the second, the degree of similarity between two particulars is a function of the number of (sparse) properties they have in common and not in common. This paper argues that these two conceptions are logically independent, but philosophically inconsonant.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Ben Blumson, The Metaphysical Significance of the Ugly-Duckling Theorem.
    According to Satosi Watanabe's "theorem of the ugly duckling", the number of predicates satisfied by any two different particulars is a constant, which does not depend on the choice of the two particulars. If the number of predicates satisfied by two particulars is their number of properties in common, and the degree of resemblance between two particulars is a function of their number of properties in common, then it follows that the degree of resemblance between any two different particulars is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Ben Blumson (2014). Pictures and Properties. In Resemblance and Representation. Open Book Publishers 179-198.
    It’s a platitude that a picture is realistic to the degree to which it resembles what it represents (in relevant respects). But if properties are abundant and degrees of resemblance are proportions of properties in common, then the degree of resemblance between different particulars is constant (or undefined), which is inconsonant with the platitude. This paper argues this problem should be resolved by revising the analysis of degrees of resemblance in terms of proportion of properties in common, and not by (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Andrew Botterell (1998). Mellor on Negative Properties. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (193):523-526.
    DH Mellor has argued that there can be no negative, disjunctive, or conjunctive properties. This argument has been criticized by Alex Oliver on the grounds that it rests on a contentious identity criterion for facts, but it seems to me that a simpler criticism is available. According to this criticism, the problem with Mellor's argument is that it trades on an ambiguity in the semantics of the phrase "the fact that", according to which "the fact that" can be understood as (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Phillip Bricker (1996). Properties. In Donald Borchert (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement. SImon and Schuster Macmillan
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  21. Jeffrey Brower (2001). Relations Without Polyadic Properties: Albert the Great on the Nature and Ontological Status of Relations. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 83 (3):225-257.
    I think it would be fair to say that, until about 1900, philosophers were generally reluctant to admit the existence of what are nowadays called polyadic properties.1 It is important to recognize, however, that this reluctance on the part of pre-twentieth-century philosophers did not prevent them from theorizing about relations. On the contrary, philosophers from the ancient through the modern period have had much to say about both the nature and the ontological status of relations. In this paper I examine (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  22. Jeffrey E. Brower (2015). Aquinas on the Problem of Universals. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2).
  23. Jeffrey E. Brower (1998). Abelard's Theory of Relations: Reductionism and the Aristotelian Tradition. Review of Metaphysics 51 (3):605-631.
  24. Eyja M. Brynjarsdóttir (2010). Is Relativity a Requirement for Mind-Dependence? In François Recanati, Isidora Stojanovic & Neftali Villanueva (eds.), Context-Dependence, Perspective and Relativity. Mouton de Gruyter 317–332.
  25. Eyja M. Brynjarsdóttir (2008). Response-Dependence of Concepts Is Not for Properties. American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (4):377 - 386.
  26. F. Buyse (2015). The Distinction Between Primary Properties and Secondary Qualities in Galileo's Natural Philosophy. Cahiers du Séminaire Québécois En Philosophie Moderne / Working Papers of the Quebec Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy 1:20-45.
    In Il Saggiatore (1623), Galileo makes a strict distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Although this distinction continues to be debated in philosophical literature up to this very day, Galileo's views on the matter, as well as their impact on his contemporaries and other philosophers, have yet to be sufficiently documented. The present paper helps to clear up Galileo's ideas on the subject by avoiding some of the misunderstandings that have arisen due to faulty translations of his work. In particular, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Albert Casullo (1984). Conjunctive Properties Revisited. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):289 – 291.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Anjan Chakravartty (2003). The Dispositional Essentialist View of Properties and Laws. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (4):393 – 413.
    One view of the nature of properties has been crystallized in recent debate by an identity thesis proposed by Shoemaker. The general idea is that there is for behaviour. Well-known criticisms of this approach, however, remain unanswered, and the details of its connections to laws nothing more to being a particular causal property than conferring certain dispositions of nature and the precise ontology of causal properties stand in need of development. This paper examines and defends a dispositional essentialist account of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  29. Roderick M. Chisholm (1952). Ducasse's Theory of Properties and Qualities. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 13 (1):42-56.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2005). Internal, External and Intra-Individual Relations. Axiomathes 15 (4):487-512.
    In this paper I argue that there are in fact external relations in Russell’s sense. The level at which we are forced to acknowledge them is, however, not the level of relations between concrete individual objects. All relations of this kind, which I will call “inter-individual” relations, can be construed as supervenient on the monadic properties of their terms. But if we pursue our ontological analysis a little bit deeper and consider the internal structure of a concrete individual, then we (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Nino Cocchiarella (1972). Properties as Individuals in Formal Ontology. Noûs 6 (2):165-187.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  32. Irving M. Copi (1958). Objects, Properties, and Relations in the Tractatus. Mind 67 (266):145-165.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  33. David M. Cornell (2016). Taking Monism Seriously. Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2397-2415.
    Monism is the view that there is only a single material object in existence: the world. According to this view, therefore, the ordinary objects of common sense—cats and hats, cars and stars, and so on—do not actually exist; there is only the world. Because of this, monism is routinely dismissed in the contemporary literature as being absurd and obviously false. It is simply obvious that there is a plurality of material things, thus it is simply obvious that monism is false, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Charles B. Cross (2002). Armstrong and the Problem of Converse Relations. Erkenntnis 56 (2):215 - 227.
    In A World of States of Affairs(Cambridge University Press, 1997) David Armstrong offers acomprehensive metaphysics based on the thesis that the world consistsof states of affairs. Among the entities postulated by Armstrong's theory are relations, including non-symmetrical relations, and whileArmstrong does not agree with Russell that all relations have adirection or definite order among their places, he does explicitlyacknowledge that the slots of a non-symmetrical relation have adefinite order or direction. I first show that non-symmetricalrelations pose a problem for Armstrong's (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  35. Troy Cross (2012). Goodbye, Humean Supervenience. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 7:129-153.
    Reductionists about dispositions must either say the natural properties are all dispositional or individuate properties hyperintensionally. Lewis stands in as an example of the sort of combination I think is incoherent: properties individuated by modal profile + categoricalism.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Anthony Dardis (2008). Mental Causation: The Mind-Body Problem. Columbia University Press.
    Anthony Dardis shows how to unravel the knot. He traces its early appearance in the history of philosophical inquiry, specifically in the work of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and T. H. Huxley.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  37. Xabier de Donato Rodríguez & Marek Polanski (2006). Superveniencia, propiedades maximales y teoría de modelos (Supervenience, Maximal Properties, and Model Theory). Theoria 21 (3):257-276.
    En el presente artículo, se examinan y discuten dos argumentos con consecuencias reduccionistas debidos a Jaegwon Kim y a Theodore Sider respectivamente. De acuerdo con el argumento de Kim, la superveniencia fuerte implicaría la coexistencia necesaria de propiedades (es decir, tal y como normalmente se interpreta, la reducción). De acuerdo con el de Sider, ocurriría lo mismo con la superveniencia global. Uno y otro hacen un uso esencial de sendas nociones de propiedad maximal, las cuales son discutidas aquí a la (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Joseph Diekemper (2015). The Ontology of Thisness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):49-71.
    This paper seeks to give an account of what it is for an individual to instantiate thisness (i.e. primitive individual essence). Thisnesses are peculiar entities, and even those who endorse their existence and instantiation by objects/entities, have said very little about how an individual and its thisness are related. My approach will be to seek out a model for the instantiation of thisness by canvassing broadly Aristotelian accounts of the substance/attribute relation, and then by making appropriate modifications to the most (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  39. John Dilworth (2003). A Representationalist Approach to Generality. Philo 6 (1):216-234.
    There are no unicorns, but there are representations of them, hence motivating an explanation of discourse about the property 'unicorn' in terms of discourse about representations of unicorns. I show how to extend this strategy to apply to any kind or property terms. References to property instances may be explained as references to comprehensive representations of them, which represent all of the (supposed) properties of such an instance--unlike 'ordinary' representations, which are distinctive in that they represent only some limited subset (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. T. Scott Dixon & Cody Gilmore (2016). Speaks's Reduction of Propositions to Properties: A Benacerraf Problem. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):275-284.
    Speaks defends the view that propositions are properties: for example, the proposition that grass is green is the property being such that grass is green. We argue that there is no reason to prefer Speaks's theory to analogous but competing theories that identify propositions with, say, 2-adic relations. This style of argument has recently been deployed by many, including Moore and King, against the view that propositions are n-tuples, and by Caplan and Tillman against King's view that propositions are facts (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Cian Dorr (forthcoming). To Be F Is To Be G. In John Hawthorne & Jason Turner (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives 30: Metaphysics.
    This paper is an investigation of the general logic of "identifications", claims such as 'To be a vixen is to be a female fox', 'To be human is to be a rational animal', and 'To be just is to help one's friends and harm one's enemies', many of which are of great importance to philosophers. I advocate understanding such claims as expressing higher-order identity, and discuss a variety of different general laws which they might be thought to obey. [New version: (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. Dennis Earl (2006). Concepts and Properties. Metaphysica 7 (1):67-85.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. Andy Egan (2004). Second-Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):48 – 66.
    Problems about the accidental properties of properties motivate us--force us, I think--not to identify properties with the sets of their instances. If we identify them instead with functions from worlds to extensions, we get a theory of properties that is neutral with respect to disputes over counterpart theory, and we avoid a problem for Lewis's theory of events. Similar problems about the temporary properties of properties motivate us--though this time they probably don't force us--to give up this theory as well, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  44. Michael Esfeld (ed.) (2006). John Heil: Symposium on His Ontological Point of View. Ontos.
    The volume covers a number of the most hotly debated issues in today's metaphysics and moves the discussion on in several important aspects.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  45. Harty Field (2004). The Consistency of the Naïve Theory of Properties. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):78 - 104.
    If properties are to play a useful role in semantics, it is hard to avoid assuming the naïve theory of properties: for any predicate Θ(x), there is a property such that an object o has it if and only if Θ(o). Yet this appears to lead to various paradoxes. I show that no paradoxes arise as long as the logic is weakened appropriately; the main difficulty is finding a semantics that can handle a conditional obeying reasonable laws without engendering paradox. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  46. J. N. Findlay (1936). Relational Properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 14 (3):176 – 190.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Kit Fine (1977). Properties, Propositions and Sets. Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):135 - 191.
  48. Sharon R. Ford (2007). An Analysis of Properties in John Heil’s "From an Ontological Point of View". In G. Romano & Malatesti (eds.), From an Ontological Point of View, Swif Philosophy of Mind Review, Symposium. Swif Philosophy of Mind Review
    In this paper I argue that the requirement for the qualitative is theory-dependent, determined by the fundamental assumptions built into the ontology. John Heil’s qualitative, in its role as individuator of objects and powers, is required only by a theory that posits a world of distinct objects or powers. Does Heil’s ‘deep’ view of the world, such that there is only one powerful object require the qualitative as individuator of objects and powers? The answer depends on whether it is possible (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. Peter Forrest (1990). New Problems with Repeatable Properties and with Change. Noûs 24 (4):543-556.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  50. Bryan Frances (1996). Plato's Response to the Third Man Argument in the Paradoxical Exercise of the Parmenides. Ancient Philosophy 16 (1):47-64.
    An analysis of the Third Man Argument, especially in light of Constance Meinwald's book Plato's Parmenides. I argue that her solution to the TMA fails. Then I present my own theory as to what Plato's solution was.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
1 — 50 / 139