Bookmark and Share

Properties

Edited by Gabriele Contessa (Carleton University)
Related categories
Subcategories:
926 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 926
Material to categorize
  1. Andreas Bartels (2013). Why Metrical Properties Are Not Powers. Synthese 190 (12):2001-2013.
    What has the dispositional analysis of properties and laws (e.g. Molnar, Powers, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003; Mumford, Laws in nature, Routledge London, 2004; Bird, Nature’s metaphysics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2007) to offer to the scientific understanding of physical properties?—The article provides an answer to this question for the case of spacetime points and their metrical properties in General Relativity. The analysis shows that metrical properties are not ‘powers’, i.e. they cannot be understood as producing the effects of spacetime on (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. William A. Bauer (2013). Dispositional Essentialism and the Nature of Powerful Properties. Disputatio 5 (35).
    Dispositional essentialism maintains that all sparse properties are essentially powerful. Two conceptions of sparse properties appear compatible with dispositional essentialism: sparse properties as pure powers or as powerful qualities. This paper compares the two views, criticizes the powerful qualities view, and then develops a new theory of pure powers, termed Point Theory. This theory neutralizes the main advantage powerful qualities appear to possess over pure powers—explaining the existence of powers during latency periods. The paper discusses the relation between powers and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Jonathan Cohen (2010). Sounds and Temporality. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 5:303-320.
    What is the relationship between sounds and time? More specifically, is there something essentially or distinctively temporal about sounds that distinguishes them from, say, colors, shapes, odors, tastes, or other sensible qualities? And just what might this distinctive relation to time consist in? Apart from their independent interest, these issues have a number of important philosophical repercussions. First, if sounds are temporal in a way that other sensible qualities are not, then this would mean that standard lists of paradigm secondary (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Sam Cowling (forthcoming). Non-Qualitative Properties. Erkenntnis.
    The distinction between qualitative properties like mass and shape and non-qualitative properties like being Napoleon and being next to Obama is important, but remains largely unexamined. After discussing its theoretical significance and cataloguing various kinds of non-qualitative properties, I survey several views about the nature of this distinction and argue that all proposed reductive analyses of this distinction are unsatisfactory. I then defend primitivism, according to which the distinction resists reductive analysis.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Douglas Edwards (2014). Properties. Polity Press.
    The world is populated with many different objects, to which we often attribute properties: we say, for example, that grass is green, that the earth is spherical, that humans are animals, and that murder is wrong. We also take it that these properties are things in their own right: there is something in which being green, or spherical, or an animal, or wrong, consists, and that certain scientific or normative projects are engaged in uncovering the essences of such properties. In (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. David Ellerman, Partitions and Objective Indefiniteness.
    Classical physics and quantum physics suggest two meta-physical types of reality: the classical notion of a objectively definite reality with properties "all the way down," and the quantum notion of an objectively indefinite type of reality. The problem of interpreting quantum mechanics (QM) is essentially the problem of making sense out of an objectively indefinite reality. These two types of reality can be respectively associated with the two mathematical concepts of subsets and quotient sets (or partitions) which are category-theoretically dual (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. John Forge (1996). Explanation and the Quantum State. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (3):203 – 215.
    Abstract This paper argues that there are good reasons to adopt a non-reductive account of states when it comes to quantum mechanics. That is to say, it is argued that there are advantages to thinking about states as sui generis, as reducible to classes of values of quantities, when it comes to the quantum domain. One reason for holding this view is that it seems to improve the prospects for explanation. In more detail, it is argued that there is an (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Brian Jonathan Garrett (2013). Douglas Ehring , Tropes: Properties, Objects and Mental Causation . Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 33 (4):279-281.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. P. Hájíček & J. Tolar (2009). Intrinsic Properties of Quantum Systems. Foundations of Physics 39 (5):411-432.
    A new realist interpretation of quantum mechanics is introduced. Quantum systems are shown to have two kinds of properties: the usual ones described by values of quantum observables, which are called extrinsic, and those that can be attributed to individual quantum systems without violating standard quantum mechanics, which are called intrinsic. The intrinsic properties are classified into structural and conditional. A systematic and self-consistent account is given. Much more statements become meaningful than any version of Copenhagen interpretation would allow. A (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Daniel M. Hausman (1999). Lessons From Quantum Mechanics. Synthese 121 (1-2):79-92.
  11. John Heil (2004). Properties and Powers. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1:223-254.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Shaughan Lavine (1991). Is Quantum Mechanics an Atomistic Theory? Synthese 89 (2):253 - 271.
    If quantum mechanics (QM) is to be taken as an atomistic theory with the elementary particles as atoms (an ATEP), then the elementary particlcs must be individuals. There must then be, for each elementary particle a, a property being identical with a that a alone has. But according to QM, elementary particles of the same kind share all physical properties. Thus, if QM is an ATEP, identity is a metaphysical but not a physical property. That has unpalatable consequences. Dropping the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Chenyang Li (1993). Natural Kinds: Direct Reference, Realism, and the Impossibility of Necessary a Posteriori Truth. Review of Metaphysics 47 (2):261-76.
  14. Mark S. Muldoon (1996). Silence Revisited: Taking the Sight Out of Auditory Qualities. Review of Metaphysics 50 (2):275-298.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Marco J. Nathan (2013). A Simulacrum Account of Dispositional Properties. Noûs 48 (3).
    This essay presents a model-theoretic account of dispositional properties, according to which dispositions are not ordinary properties of real entities; dispositions capture the behavior of abstract, idealized models. This account has several payoffs. First, it saves the simple conditional analysis of dispositions. Second, it preserves the general connection between dispositions and regularities, despite the fact that some dispositions are not grounded in actual regularities. Finally, it brings together the analysis and the explanation of dispositions under a unified framework.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Casey O'Callaghan (2010). Constructing a Theory of Sounds. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 5:247-270.
    Vision has dominated philosophical thinking about perceptual experience and the nature of its objects. Color has long been the focus of debates about the metaphysics of sensible qualities, and philosophers have struggled to articulate the conditions on the visual experience of mind-independent objects. With few notable exceptions, "visuocentrism" has shaped our understanding of the nature and functions of perception, and of our conception of its objects. The predominant line of thought from the early modern era to the present is that, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (1993). Kripke y las descripciones rígidas. Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 19 (1):109-113.
    In this paper I discuss a passage from *Naming and Necessity* where Kripke assumes that the essential properties by means of which a definite description designates are a sufficient condition of its rigidity. I put forward two examples that show the falsity of this assumption. Then I examine the non-rigid character of definite descriptions that designate by means of properties that are sufficient conditions of identity of the objects designated by those descriptions. I conclude that the properties by means of (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Franco Trivigno (2007). Plato's Introduction of Forms. Review of Metaphysics 61 (1):127-129.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Barbara Vetter (2013). 'Can' Without Possible Worlds: Semantics for Anti-Humeans. Philosophers' Imprint 13 (16).
    Metaphysicians of modality are increasingly critical of possible-worlds talk, and increasingly happy to accept irreducibly modal properties – and in particular, irreducible dispositions – in nature. The aim of this paper is to provide the beginnings of a modal semantics which uses, instead of possible-worlds talk, the resources of such an 'anti-Humean' metaphysics. One central challenge to an anti-Humean view is the context-sensitivity of modal language. I show how that challenge can be met and a systematic modal semantics provided, given (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Åsa Wikforss (2013). Bachelors, Energy, Cats and Water: Putnam on Kinds and Kind Terms. Theoria 79 (3):242-261.
    Since Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke's first attacks on traditional, descriptivist theories of natural kind terms, it has become customary to speak of the ‘Putnam-Kripke’ view of meaning and reference. This article argues that this is a mistake, and that Putnam's account of natural kind terms is importantly different from that of Kripke. In particular, Putnam has from the very start been sceptical of Kripke's modal claims, and in later papers he explicitly rejects the proposal that theoretical identity statements are (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Donald Cary Williams (1953). On the Elements of Being: I. Review of Metaphysics 7 (1):3--18.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties
  1. Ralf M. Bader (2010). Review of Vera Hoffmann-Kolss, The Metaphysics of Extrinsic Properties. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (10).
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. William A. Bauer (2011). An Argument for the Extrinsic Grounding of Mass. Erkenntnis 74 (1):81-99.
    Several philosophers of science and metaphysicians claim that the dispositional properties of fundamental particles, such as the mass, charge, and spin of electrons, are ungrounded in any further properties. It is assumed by those making this argument that such properties are intrinsic, and thus if they are grounded at all they must be grounded intrinsically. However, this paper advances an argument, with one empirical premise and one metaphysical premise, for the claim that mass is extrinsically grounded and is thus an (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Ross Cameron (2009). Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties. In Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. Routledge.
    Consider two of my properties: my mass and my weight. There seems to be an interesting distinction between the reasons for my having these two properties. I have my mass solely in virtue of how I am, whereas I have my weight in virtue of both how I am and how my surroundings are. I have my weight as a result of the gravitational pull exerted by the Earth on a thing having my mass, whereas I have my mass independently (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Ross P. Cameron (2008). Recombination and Intrinsicality. Ratio 21 (1):1–12.
    In this paper I argue that warrant for Lewis' principle of recombination presupposes warrant for a combinatorial analysis of intrinsicality, which in turn presupposes warrant for the principle of recombination. This, I claim, leads to a vicious circularity: warrant for neither doctrine can get off the ground.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. David A. Denby (2010). Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties: A Reply to Hoffmann-Kolss. Mind 119 (475):773-782.
    In response to Hoffmann-Kolss, I modify my account of the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties previously published in this journal. I also strengthen the reason I gave to think my account pins down the distinction uniquely.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. David A. Denby (2006). The Distinction Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties. Mind 115 (457):1-17.
    I propose an analysis of the metaphysically important distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties, and, in the process, provide a neglected model for the analysis of recalcitrant distinctions generally. First, I recap some difficulties with Kim's well-known (1982) proposal and its recent descendants. Then I define two independence relations among properties and state a ‘quasi-logical’ analysis of the distinction in terms of them. Unusually, my proposal is holistic, but I argue that it is in a certain kind of equilibrium and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. J. Michael Dunn (1990). Relevant Predication 2: Intrinsic Properties and Internal Relations. Philosophical Studies 60 (3):177-206.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. M. Eddon (2014). Intrinsic Explanations and Numerical Representations. In Francescotti (ed.), Companion to Intrinsic Properties. 271-290.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. M. Eddon (2011). Intrinsicality and Hyperintensionality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):314-336.
    The standard counterexamples to David Lewis’s account of intrinsicality involve two sorts of properties: identity properties and necessary properties. Proponents of the account have attempted to deflect these counterexamples in a number of ways. This paper argues that none of these moves are legitimate. Furthermore, this paper argues that no account along the lines of Lewis’s can succeed, for an adequate account of intrinsicality must be sensitive to hyperintensional distinctions among properties.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Michael Esfeld (2003). Do Relations Require Underlying Intrinsic Properties? A Physical Argument for a Metaphysics of Relations. Metaphysica: International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics 4 (1):5-25.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Carrie Figdor (2014). What's the Use of an Intrinsic Property? In Robert Francescotti (ed.), Companion to Intrinsic Properties. De Gruyter.
    Work on the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is often motivated by its use in other areas, such as intrinsic value, real vs. Cambridge change, supervenience and other topics. With the exception of Figdor 2008, philosophers have sought to articulate a global distinction -- a distinction between kinds of properties, rather than ways in which individuals have properties. I argue that global I/E distinctions are unable to do the work that allegedly motivates them, focusing on the case of intrinsic value.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Carrie Figdor (2008). Intrinsically/Extrinsically. Journal of Philosophy 105 (11):691-718.
    I separate two intrinsic/extrinsic distinctions that are often conflated: one between properties (the intrinsic/extrinsic, or I/E, distinction) and one between the ways in which properties are had by individuals (the intrinsically/extrinsically, or I-ly/E-ly, distinction). I propose an analysis of the I-ly/E-ly distinction and its relation to the I/E distinction that explains, inter alia, the puzzle of cross-classification: how it can be, for example, that the property of being square can be classified as an intrinsic property and yet individuals can be (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Robert Francescotti (2012). Understanding the Intrinsic/Extrinsic Distinction. Metascience 21 (1):91-94.
    Understanding the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-4 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9549-x Authors Robert Francescotti, Department of Philosophy, San Diego State University, 5500 Campanile Drive, San Diego, CA 92182-6044, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Robert Francescotti (1999). How to Define Intrinsic Properties. Noûs 33 (4):590-609.
    An intrinsic property, according to one important account, is a property that is had by all of one's duplicates. Instead, one might choose to characterize intrinsic properties as those that can be had in the absence of all distinct individuals. After reviewing the problems with these earlier accounts, the author presents a less problematic analysis. The goal is to clarify the rough idea that an intrinsic property is a special sort of non-relational property; having the property does not consist in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Robert Francescotti (1999). Mere Cambridge Properties. American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (4):295-308.
    The predicates 'is outgrown by Theaetetus,' 'is 300 miles west of a lemur,' and 'is such that 9 is odd' denote properties, but there is a sense in which these properties are not genuine features of the objects that have them. The fact that we find these mere-Cambridge properties odd has something to do with their relational character. But relationality in itself is not an adequate criterion for property-genuineness for there are many relational properties that do not qualify as mere-Cambridge. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Roger Harris (2010). Do Material Things Have Intrinsic Properties? Metaphysica 11 (2):105-117.
    Possession of any actual physical property depends on the ambient conditions for its bearers, irrespective of one's particular theory of dispositions. If 'self-sufficiency' makes a property intrinsic, then, because of this dependence, things in the actual world cannot have an intrinsic physical resemblance to one another or to things in other possible worlds. Criteria for the self-sufficiency of intrinsic properties based on, or implying indifference to both 'loneliness' and 'accompaniment' entail that no self-sufficient property can require its bearers to be (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Roger Harris (2010). How to Define Extrinsic Properties. Axiomathes 20 (4):461-478.
    There are, broadly, three sorts of account of intrinsicality: ‘self-sufficiency’, ‘essentiality’ and ‘pure qualitativeness’. I argue for the last of these, and urge that we take intrinsic properties of concrete objects to be all and only those shared by actual or possible duplicates, which only differ extrinsically. This approach gains support from Francescotti’s approach: defining ‘intrinsic’ in contradistinction to extrinsic properties which ‘consist in’ relations which rule out intrinsicality. I answer Weatherson’s criticisms of Francescotti, but, to answer criticisms of my (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. John Hawthorne (2001). Intrinsic Properties and Natural Relations. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):399-403.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. V. Hoffmann-Kolss (2010). Denby on the Distinction Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties. Mind 119 (475):763-772.
    In this paper, I raise an objection to the criterion of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction proposed by David Denby in his article ‘The Distinction between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties’ (2006). I show that the extrinsic property of being either red and lonely or green cannot adequately be accounted for by Denby’s criterion and argue that this difficulty points to a general problem inherent to Denby’s account.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Vera Hoffmann-Kolss (2014). Is the Intrinsic/Extrinsic Distinction Hyperintensional? In Robert Francescotti (ed.), Companion to Intrinsic Properties. de Gruyter. 157-173.
    Several authors have recently claimed that the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties is hyperintensional, i.e., that there are cointensional properties P and Q, such that P is intrinsic, while Q is extrinsic. In this paper, I aim to defend the classical view that whenever P and Q are cointensional properties, then P and Q are either both intrinsic or both extrinsic. I first argue that the standard characterization of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction involves dependence claims: intrinsic properties are those properties (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Vera Hoffmann-Kolss (2010). The Metaphysics of Extrinsic Properties. Ontos-Verlag.
    This book aims to develop a philosophical theory of extrinsic properties – of properties whose instantiation by an object does not only depend on what the object itself is like, but also on features of its environment. Various accounts of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction are analysed in detail, and it is argued that the most promising approach to defining this distinction is to consider extrinsic properties as a particular type of relational property. Moreover, it is shown that two key notions in (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. I. L. Humberstone (1996). Intrinsic/Extrinsic. Synthese 108 (2):205-267.
    Several intrinsic/extrinsic distinctions amongst properties, current in the literature, are discussed and contrasted. The proponents of such distinctions tend to present them as competing, but it is suggested here that at least three of the relevant distinctions (including here that between non-relational and relational properties) arise out of separate perfectly legitimate intuitive considerations: though of course different proposed explications of the informal distinctions involved in any one case may well conflict. Special attention is paid to the question of whether a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Michael Jacovides (2000). Cambridge Changes of Color. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2):142-164.
    Locke’s porphyry argument at 2.8.19 of the Essay has not been properly appreciated. On my reconstruction, Locke argues from the premise that porphyry undergoes a mere Cambridge change of color in different lighting conditions to the conclusion that porphyry’s colors do not belong to it as it is in itself. I argue that his argument is not quite sound, but it would be if Locke chose a different stone, alexandrite. Examining his argument teaches us something about the relation between explanatory (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Rae Langton & David Lewis (2001). Marshall and Parsons on 'Intrinsic'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):353-355.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Rae Langton & David Lewis (1998). Defining 'Intrinsic'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):333-345.
    Something could be round even if it were the only thing in the universe, unaccompanied by anything distinct from itself. Jaegwon Kim once suggested that we define an intrinsic property as one that can belong to something unaccompanied. Wrong: unaccompaniment itself is not intrinsic, yet it can belong to something unaccompanied. But there is a better Kim-style definition. Say that P is independent of accompaniment iff four different cases are possible: something accompanied may have P or lack P, something unaccompanied (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. David Lewis (2001). Redefining 'Intrinsic'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):381-398.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. David Lewis (1983). Extrinsic Properties. Philosophical Studies 44 (2):197-200.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. David Lewis & Rae Langton (2002). Comment définir « intrinsèque ». Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 4 (4):511-527.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Dan Marshall (2013). Analyses of Intrinsicality Without Naturalness. Philosophy Compass 8 (2):186-197.
    Over the last thirty years there have been a number of attempts to analyse the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. This article discusses three leading attempts to analyse this distinction that don’t appeal to the notion of nat-uralness: the duplication analysis endorsed by G. E. Moore and David Lewis, Peter Vallentyne’s analysis in terms of contractions of possible worlds, and the analysis of Gene Witmer, William Butchard and Kelly Trogdon in terms of grounding.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 926