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  1. B. W. A. (1980). Nominalism and Realism. Review of Metaphysics 33 (3):615-616.
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  2. D. M. Armstrong (2003). Gonzalo Roderiguez-Pereyra, Resemblance Nominalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):285-285.
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  3. D. M. Armstrong (2003). Review of Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra's Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):285 – 286.
    Book Information Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. By Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2002. Pp. xii + 238. £35.
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  4. D. M. Armstrong (1991). Arda Denkel's Resemblance Nominalism. Philosophical Quarterly 41 (165):478-482.
    Arda Denkel, in "Real Resemblances," argues for a moderate Nominalism where substances objectively have properties and relations, the latter being particulars, but dependent particulars, grouped into classes by objective relations of resemblance. This view is contrasted unfavorably with the view that properties and relations are universals instantiated by particulars. It is conceded that Denkel's scheme has much to commend it. But it is argued that the universals view has much more to be said for it than Denkel allows, and that (...)
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  5. D. M. Armstrong (1980). Against Ostrich Nominalism: A Reply to Michael Devitt. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61.
    In my reply to michael devitt, It is argued, First, That quine fails to appreciate the force of plato's "one over many" argument for universals. It is argued, Second, That quine's failure springs in part at least from his doctrine of ontological commitment: from the view that predicates need not be treated with ontological seriousness. Finally, An attempt is made to blunt the force of devitt's contention that realists cannot give a coherent explanation of the way that universals stand to (...)
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  6. James Bardis (2016). It Was the 15th of December. Jpeg Cover-Dubai2016 ISSN: 2189-1036 – The IAFOR International Conference on Education – Dubai – 2016 Official Conference Proceedings.
    A reflection on the merits of an a priori poeto-epistemology in relation to tacitly held assumptions about the a fortiori validity of computational logic to transcend the limits of contradiction and infinite regression and establish a valid ontology.
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  7. Jean Baudrillard (1983). Simulations. Semiotext(E).
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  8. Alexander Bird (2003). Resemblance Nominalism and Counterparts. Analysis 63 (3):221–228.
    In his (2002) Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra provides a powerful articulation of the claim that Resemblance Nominalism provides the best answer to the so-called Problem of Universals. Resemblance Nominalism has not been popular for some time, and one influential reason for this is the widespread belief that Resemblance Nominalism cannot dispense with all universals. The realist critics appeal to what is known as Russell’s Regress (cf. Russell 1997). If properties are to be explained in terms of one object’s resembling another, then this (...)
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  9. Ben Blumson, Similarity Spaces.
    In this paper I argue that the analysis of natural properties as convex subsets of a metric space in which the distances are degrees of dissimilarity is incompatible with both the definition of degree of dissimilarity as number of natural properties not in common and the definition of degree of dissimilarity as proportion of natural properties not in common, since in combination with either it entails that every property is a natural property, which is absurd. I suggest it follows that (...)
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  10. Ben Blumson, Two Conceptions of Similarity.
    There are at least two traditional conceptions of numerical degree of similarity. According to the first, the degree of dissimilarity between two particulars is their distance apart in a metric space. According to the second, the degree of similarity between two particulars is a function of the number of (sparse) properties they have in common and not in common. This paper argues that these two conceptions are logically independent, but philosophically inconsonant.
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  11. Franz Brentano (1933/1981). The Theory of Categories. Martinus Nijhoff.
  12. Franz Brentano (1933). Kategorienlehre. Meiner.
    Dem durch Kant verschütteten Verständnis der aristotelischen Kategorienlehre brach schon Brentanos erste Schrift 'Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles' Bahn. Zu ihrem Thema kehrt er in den hier vereinten Diktaten aus seinem letzten Jahrzehnt zurück.
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  13. Jeffrey E. Brower (2015). Aquinas on the Problem of Universals. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2).
  14. Terrell Dailey Burnham (1966). Brentano's Argument for Reismus. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 20:446-459.
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  15. Francesco F. Calemi (forthcoming). Linceo e la presbiopia ontologica. Considerazioni sul nominalismo di Achille Varzi. Isonomía. Revista de Teoría y Filosofía Del Derecho.
    According to Varzi's nominalism properties are typical examples of ontological hallucinations. In this brief paper I'll focus on an interesting argument that Varzi puts forward against the Realists’ tenet according to which predicates have properties as ontological correlates. I’ll argue that even if Varzi's argument is not convincing, the metalinguistic nominalism he espouses has sufficient resources to meet the realists' challenge concerning the phenomenon of predication. Furthermore, I'll make some methodological remarks about the relationship holding between the «dot quote» analysis (...)
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  16. Francesco F. Calemi (2014). L’argomento dell’uno sui molti. Il dilemma dello struzzo. Rivista di Estetica 57:219-240.
    The purpose of this paper is to defend the so-called Ostrich Nominalism against the influential criticism that has been put forward by David M. Armstrong. First, I reconstruct Armstrong’s “One over Many” argument for universals (§§ 1-2), reviewing his main reasons for rejecting the foremost kinds of nominalism (§ 3). I then argue that Ostrich Nominalism has been underrated by Armstrong (§ 4) and that, consequently, his strategy for dealing with it results in misleading and elusive conclusions. I conclude that (...)
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  17. Francesco F. Calemi (2012). Dal nominalismo al platonismo. Il problema degli universali nella filosofia contemporanea. Mimesis.
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  18. James Cargile (2003). On Russell's Argument Against Resemblance Nominalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):549 – 560.
    Russell famously argued that Resemblance Nominalism leads to a vicious infinite regress in attempting to avoid admitting universals. Saying that a number of things are white only in that they resemble a particular white thing leaves a number of resemblances to that white thing, each of them constituting the holding of the same relation to the paradigm, qualifying that resemblance relation as a universal. Trying to dismiss that new universal by appeal to resemblances between those first resemblances only leads to (...)
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  19. L. Cesalli (2007). Le Réalisme Propositionnel: Sémantique Et Ontologie des Propositions Chez Jean Duns Scot, Gauthier Burley, Richard Brinkley Et Jean Wyclif. Vrin.
    On s'est dès lors efforcé de contextualiser cette thèse et d'en préciser le sens, aboutissant à un double résultat : premièrement, les signifiés propositionnels ne sont ni des entités abstraites (platoniciennes), ni des complexes ...
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  20. Andrew Chignell (1997). Ockham on Mind-World Relations: What Sort of Nominalism? Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 14 (1):11-28.
    (Warning: juvenalia from a grad student journal!). On whether Ockham's nominalism is really nominalistic and whether it faces some of the same problems as later nominalisms. -/- .
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  21. Charles Chihara (2008). 4. Quine's Lecture on Nominalism From the Perspective of a Nominalist. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 4 4:79.
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  22. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2003). Brentano's Late Ontology. Brentano Studien 10:221-236.
    In the present paper I want to give an interpretation of Brentano's late, nominalistic ontology. There are two aspects of this theory: the conception of individual properties containing their substances, presented mainly in the fragments collected in Brentano's Theory of Categories and the conceptualistic reduction virtually involved in Brentano's definition of truth.
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  23. Ralph Withington Church (1952). An Analysis of Resemblance. Allen & Unwin.
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  24. Justin Clarke-Doane, Platonic Semantics.
    If anything is taken for granted in contemporary metaphysics, it is that platonism with respect to a discourse of metaphysical interest, such as fictional or mathematical discourse, affords a better account of the semantic appearances than nominalism, other things being equal. This belief is often motivated by the intuitively stronger one that the platonist can take the semantic appearances “at face-value” while the nominalist must resort to apparently ad hoc and technically problematic machinery in order to explain those appearances away. (...)
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  25. C. F. Delaney (1991). Properties as Process. Review of Metaphysics 45 (1):147-149.
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  26. David A. Denby (2001). Determinable Nominalism. Philosophical Studies 102 (3):297--327.
    I present, motivate, and defend a theory of properties. Its novel feature is that it takes entire determinables-together-with-their-determinates as its units of analysis. This, I argue, captures the relations of entailment and exclusion among properties, solves the problem of extensionality, and points the way towards an actualist analysis of modality.
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  27. Michael Devitt (1980). Ostrich Nominalism or Mirage Realism? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61:433-449.
    In "nominalism and realism" armstrong carefully demolishes various nominalist responses to plato's "one over many" problem but simply dismissed the quinean response as "ostrich nominalism". The paper argues that plato's problem is pseudo. So to ignore it is not to behave like an ostrich. Rather to adopt realism because of this problem that isn't there is to be a "mirage realist." there are some good reasons that lead armstrong to realism but he is largely a mirage realist. Quine does not (...)
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  28. C. Dorr (2005). Review: Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. [REVIEW] Mind 114 (454):457-461.
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  29. Cian Dorr (2008). There Are No Abstract Objects. In Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Blackwell
    I explicate and defend the claim that, fundamentally speaking, there are no numbers, sets, properties or relations. The clarification consists in some remarks on the relevant sense of ‘fundamentally speaking’ and the contrasting sense of ‘superficially speaking’. The defence consists in an attempt to rebut two arguments for the existence of such entities. The first is a version of the indispensability argument, which purports to show that certain mathematical entities are required for good scientific explanations. The second is a speculative (...)
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  30. Cian Dorr (2005). Review of Resemblance Nominalism by Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra. Mind 114:457-461.
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  31. Michael Dummett (1956). Nominalism. Philosophical Review 65 (4):491-505.
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  32. Rolf A. Eberle (1970). Nominalistic Systems. Dordrecht,Reidel.
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  33. Andy Egan (2004). Second-Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):48-66.
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  34. Andy Egan (2004). Second-Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):48 – 66.
    Problems about the accidental properties of properties motivate us--force us, I think--not to identify properties with the sets of their instances. If we identify them instead with functions from worlds to extensions, we get a theory of properties that is neutral with respect to disputes over counterpart theory, and we avoid a problem for Lewis's theory of events. Similar problems about the temporary properties of properties motivate us--though this time they probably don't force us--to give up this theory as well, (...)
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  35. Aldo Fasolo (2006). The Nature of Resemblance. In Giovanni Boniolo & Gabriele De Anna (eds.), Evolutionary Ethics and Contemporary Biology. Cambridge University Press 56.
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  36. Gail Fine (1990). Book Review. The Ascent From Nominalism. T Penner. [REVIEW] Noûs 25 (1):126-32.
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  37. Paul Forster (2011). Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism. Cambridge University Press.
    Machine generated contents note: List of abbreviations; Preface; 1. Nominalism as demonic doctrine; 2. Logic, philosophy and the special sciences; 3. Continuity and the problem of universals; 4. Continuity and meaning: Peirce's pragmatic maxim; 5. Logical foundations of Peirce's pragmatic maxim; 6. Experience and its role in inquiry; 7. Scientific method as self-corrective - Peirce's view of the problem of knowledge; 8. The unity of Peirce's theories of truth; 9. Order from chaos: Peirce's evolutionary cosmology; 10. A universe of chance: (...)
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  38. Alfred J. Freddoso (1978). Abailard on Collective Realism. Journal of Philosophy 75 (10):527-538.
    In the Logica Ingredientibus Abailard attacks the theory according to which universals are collections of individuals. This paper argues that Abailard's principal objection to this 'collective realism', viz, that it conflates universals with integral wholes, is actually quite strong, though it is generally overlooked by recent commentators. For implicit in this objection is the claim that the collective realist cannot provide a satisfactory account of predication. The reason for this is that integral wholes are not uniquely decomposable. In support of (...)
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  39. E. J. Furlong (1967). Resemblance and Identity. Philosophical Books 8 (2):5-7.
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  40. Robert K. Garcia (2015). Is Trope Theory a Divided House? In Gabriele Galluzzo Michael Loux (ed.), The Problem of Universals in Contemporary Philosophy. Cambridge University Press 133-155.
    In this paper I explore Michael Loux’s important distinction between “tropes” and “tropers”. First, I argue that the distinction throws into relief an ambiguity and discrepancy in the literature, revealing two fundamentally different versions of trope theory. Second, I argue that the distinction brings into focus unique challenges facing each of the resulting trope theories, thus calling into question an alleged advantage of trope theory—that by uniquely occupying the middle ground between its rivals, trope theory is able to recover and (...)
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  41. Robert K. Garcia (2015). Two Ways to Particularize a Property. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (4):635-652.
    Trope theory is an increasingly prominent contender in contemporary debates about the existence and nature of properties. But it suffers from ambiguity concerning the nature of a trope. Disambiguation reveals two fundamentally different concepts of a trope: modifier tropes and module tropes. These types of tropes are unequally suited for metaphysical work. Modifier tropes have advantages concerning powers, relations, and fundamental determinables, whereas module tropes have advantages concerning perception, causation, character-grounding, and the ontology of substance. Thus, the choice between modifier (...)
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  42. Peter Thomas Geach (1953). Quine on Classes and Properties. Philosophical Review 62 (3):409-412.
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  43. Sophie Gibb (2007). Is the Partial Identity Account of Property Resemblance Logically Incoherent? Dialectica 61 (4):539-558.
    According to the partial identity account of resemblance, exact resemblance is complete identity and inexact resemblance is partial identity. In this paper, I examine Arda Denkel's (1998) argument that this account of resemblance is logically incoherent as it results in a vicious regress. I claim that although Denkel's argument does not succeed, a modified version of it leads to the conclusion that the partial identity account is plausible only if the constituents of every determinate property are ultimately quantitative in nature.
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  44. Paul Giladi (2014). Ostrich Nominalism and Peacock Realism: A Hegelian Critique of Quine. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (5):734-751.
    My aim in this paper is to offer a Hegelian critique of Quine’s predicate nominalism. I argue that at the core of Hegel’s idealism is not a supernaturalist spirit monism, but a realism about universals, and that while this may contrast to the nominalist naturalism of Quine, Hegel’s position can still be defended over that nominalism in naturalistic terms. I focus on the contrast between Hegel’s and Quine’s respective views on universals, which Quine takes to be definitive of philosophical naturalism. (...)
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  45. Philip Goff (2008). A Non-Eliminative Understanding of Austere Nominalism. European Journal of Philosophy 16 (1):43–54.
    How do we account for resemblance between concrete particular objects? What is it about reality which makes a sentence such as the following true? (1) x and y are both spherical Realists about properties claim that, at a fundamental level, this sentence is true because x and y both exemplify the property of sphericity. Michael Loux favours this account of resemblance. Nevertheless, Loux concedes that austere nominalism, which I understand to be the view that nothing exists over and above particular (...)
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  46. Nelson Goodman & W. V. Quine (1947). Steps Toward a Constructive Nominalism. Journal of Symbolic Logic 12 (4):105-122.
  47. Ghislain Guigon (2015). Coextension and Identity. In Ghislain Guigon & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), Nominalism About Properties: New Essays. Routledge 135-155.
    This chapter is concerned with the coextension difficulty for nominalist theories of properties that reject tropes alongside universals. After carefully explaining the coextension difficulty and describing the theories it targets, the chapter describes different solutions to the difficulty. These solutions differ with respect to how much involved they are into a dualist approach to coextension. A dualist approach to a case of coextension consists in agreeing with the realist that the relevant ascriptions of properties are numerically distinct. A monist approach (...)
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  48. Ghislain Guigon & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.) (forthcoming). Nominalism About Properties. Routledge.
    Nominalism, which has its origins in the Middle Ages and continues into the Twenty-First Century, is the doctrine that there are no universals. This book is unique in bringing together essays on the history of nominalism and essays that present a systematic discussion of nominalism. It introduces the reader to the distinction between particulars and universals, to the difficulties posed by this distinction, and to the main motivations for the rejection of universals. It also describes the main varieties of nominalism (...)
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  49. Ghislain Guigon & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.) (2015). Nominalism About Properties: New Essays. Routledge.
    Nominalism, which has its origins in the Middle Ages and continues into the Twenty-First Century, is the doctrine that there are no universals. This book is unique in bringing together essays on the history of nominalism and essays that present a systematic discussion of nominalism. It introduces the reader to the distinction between particulars and universals, to the difficulties posed by this distinction, and to the main motivations for the rejection of universals. It also describes the main varieties of nominalism (...)
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  50. Ghislain Guigon & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.) (2015). Nominalism About Properties: New Essays. Routledge.
    Nominalism, which has its origins in the Middle Ages and continues into the Twenty-First Century, is the doctrine that there are no universals. This book is unique in bringing together essays on the history of nominalism and essays that present a systematic discussion of nominalism. It introduces the reader to the distinction between particulars and universals, to the difficulties posed by this distinction, and to the main motivations for the rejection of universals. It also describes the main varieties of nominalism (...)
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