This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:See also:
100 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
1 — 50 / 100
  1. C. Anthony Anderson (ed.) (1990). Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind. Stanford: CSLI.
  2. Louise M. Antony (2001). Brain States with Attitude. In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs. Csli
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. David M. Armstrong (1975). Beliefs and Desires as Causes of Actions: A Reply to Donald Davidson. Philosophical Papers 4 (May):1-7.
  4. Lynne Rudder Baker (2002). Attitudes in Action: A Causal Account. Manuscrito 25 (3):47-78.
    This article aims to vindicate the commonsensical view that what we think affects what we do. In order to show that mental properties like believing, desiring and intending are causally explanatory, I propose a nonreductive, materialistic account that identifies beliefs and desires by their content, and that shows how differences in the contents of beliefs and desires can make causal differences in what we do.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Lynne Rudder Baker (1995). Explaining Attitudes. Cambridge University Press.
    Explaining Attitudes develops a new account of propositional attitudes - practical realism.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  6. Lynne Rudder Baker (1994). Attitudes as Nonentities. Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):175-203.
    materialist that beliefs are not immaterial soul-states, I think that the conception of beliefs as brain states is badly misguided. I hope to show that "beliefs are brain states or soul states" is a false dichotomy. I am using the phrase 'beliefs as brain states' to cover several familiar theses: the token-identity thesis, according to which beliefs are identical to brain-state tokens; nonreductive materialism, according to which beliefs are constituted by brain states (as pebbles are constituted by..
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  7. Mark Balaguer (1998). Attitudes Without Propositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):805-26.
    This paper develops a novel version of anti-platonism, called semantic fictionalism. The view is a response to the platonist argument that we need to countenance propositions to account for the truth of sentences containing `that'-clause singular terms, e.g., sentences of the form `x believes that p' and `σ means that p'. Briefly, the view is that (a) platonists are right that `that'-clauses purport to refer to propositions, but (b) there are no such things as propositions, and hence, (c) `that'-clause-containing sentences (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  8. Gerald W. Barnes (1977). Some Remarks on Belief and Desire. Philosophical Review 86 (July):340-349.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Wolfgang Barz (2005). Relationen zu Propositionen. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 59 (4):512 - 529.
    Ich versuche zu zeigen, daß die auf Frege zurückgehende These, daß Meinungen Relationen zwischen Personen und Propositionen darstellen, nicht zwangsläufig die Frage nach der Natur des Mechanismus aufwirft, der Personen mit Propositionen verbindet. Um meine Auffassung zu begründen, lasse ich zunächst eine Überlegung Revue passieren, die meines Erachtens den stärksten Beweggrund für die Einführung von Propositionen darstellt. In diesem Zusammenhang zeigt sich, daß sich die These, daß Meinungen Relationen zwischen Personen und Propositionen darstellen, auf die Struktur von Berichten über Meinungen (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. George Bealer (1998). Propositions. Mind 107 (425):1-32.
    Recent work in philosophy of language has raised significant problems for the traditional theory of propositions, engendering serious skepticism about its general workability. These problems are, I believe, tied to fundamental misconceptions about how the theory should be developed. The goal of this paper is to show how to develop the traditional theory in a way which solves the problems and puts this skepticism to rest. The problems fall into two groups. The first has to do with reductionism, specifically attempts (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (14 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   20 citations  
  11. Hanoch Ben-Yami (1997). Against Characterizing Mental States as Propositional Attitudes. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (186):84-89.
    The reason for characterizing mental states as propositional attitudes is sentence form: ‘S Vs that p’. However, many mental states are not ascribed by means of such sentences, and the sentences that ascribe them cannot be appropriately paraphrased. Moreover, even if a paraphrase were always available, that in itself would not establish the characterization. And the mental states that are ascribable by appropriate senses do not form any natural subset of mental states. A reason for the characterization relying on beliefs, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  12. Jonathan Bennett (1991). Analysis Without Noise. In R. Bogdan (ed.), Mind and Common Sense. Cambridge University Press
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  13. Jonathan Berg (2012). Direct Belief: An Essay on the Semantics, Pragmatics, and Metaphysics of Belief. De Gruyter Mouton.
    Jonathan Berg argues for the Theory of Direct Belief, which treats having a belief about an individual as an unmediated relation between the believer and the individual the belief is about. After a critical review of alternative positions, Berg uses Grice's theory of conversational implicature to provide a detailed pragmatic account of substitution failure in belief ascriptions and goes on to defend this view against objections, including those based on an unwarranted "Inner Speech" Picture of Thought. The work serves as (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  14. Steven E. Boër (1994). Propositional Attitudes and Formal Ontology. Synthese 98 (2):187 - 242.
    This paper develops — within an axiomatic theory of properties, relations, and propositions which accords them well-defined existence and identity conditions — a sententialist-functionalist account of belief as a symbolically mediated relation to a special kind of propositional entity, theproxy-encoding abstract proposition. It is then shown how, in terms of this account, the truth conditions of English belief reports may be captured in a formally precise and empirically adequate way that accords genuinely semantic status to familiar opacity data.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Donald Brownstein (1985). Individuating Propositional Attitudes. Philosophical Topics 13 (2):205-212.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Jeremy Butterfield (ed.) (1986). Language, Mind and Logic. Cambridge University Press.
    This is a collection of eleven original essays in analytical philosophy by British and American philosophers, centering on the connection between mind and language. Two themes predominate: how it is that thoughts and sentences can represent the world; and what having a thought - a belief, for instance - involves. Developing from these themes are the questions: what does having a belief require of the believer, and of the way he or she relates to the environment? In particular, does having (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  17. Leonardo Caffo (2011). Predict the Behavior: Propositional Attitudes and Philosophy of Action. Dialettica and Filosofia (2011):1-8.
    The folk Psychology frames propositional attitudes as fundamental theoretical entities for the construction of a model designed to predict the behavior of a subject. A trivial, such as grasping a pen and writing reveals - something complex - about the behavior. When I take a pen and start writing I do, trivially, because I believe that a certain object in front of me is a pen and who performs a specific function that is, in fact, that of writing. When I (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Andy Clark (1991). Radical Ascent. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 65:211-27.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Austen Clark (1994). Beliefs and Desires Incorporated. Journal of Philosophy 91 (8):404-25.
    Suppose we admit for the sake of argument that "folk" explanations of human behavior--explanations in terms of beliefs and desires--sometimes succeed. They sometimes enable us to understand and predict patterns of motion that otherwise would remain unintelligible and unanticipated. Is the only explanation for such success that folk psychology is a viable proto-scientific theory of human psychology? I shall describe an analysis which yields a negative answer to that question. It was suggested by an observation and an analogy, both of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  20. Tim Crane (forthcoming). Intentionality. Philosophical Explorations.
    Intentionality is the mind’s capacity to direct itself on things. Mental states like thoughts, beliefs, desires, hopes exhibit intentionality in the sense that they are always directed on, or at, something: if you hope, believe or desire, you must hope, believe or desire something. Hope, belief, desire and any other mental state which is directed at something, are known as intentional states. Intentionality in this sense has only a peripheral connection to the ordinary ideas of intention and intending. An intention (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  21. Mark Crimmins (1992). Context in the Attitudes. Linguistics and Philosophy 15 (2):185 - 198.
    I wish first to motivate very briefly two points about the kind of context sensitive semantics needed for attitude reports, namely that reports are about referents and about mental representations; then I will compare two proposals for treating the attitudes, both of which capture the two points in question.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  22. Marian David (2002). Content Essentialism. Acta Analytica 17 (28):103-114.
    The paper offers some preliminary and rather unsystematic reflections about the question: Do Beliefs Have Their Contents Essentially? The question looks like it ought to be important, yet it is rarely discussed. Maybe that’s because content essentialism, i.e., the view that beliefs do have their contents essentially, is simply too obviously and trivially true to deserve much discussion. I sketch a common-sense argument that might be taken to show that content essentialism is indeed utterly obvious and/or trivial. Somewhat against this, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  23. Donald Davidson (1991). What is Present to the Mind. Philosophical Issues 1:197-213.
  24. Donald Davidson (1989). What is Present to the Mind? In Grazer Philosophische Studien. Netherlands: Rodopi 197-213.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  25. Donald Davidson (1989). The Mind of Donald Davidson. Netherlands: Rodopi.
  26. David Davies (1998). On Gauging Attitudes. Philosophical Studies 90 (2):129-54.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. David Davies (1995). Davidson, Indeterminacy, and Measurement. Acta Analytica 10 (14):37-56.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Rafael De Clercq (2006). Presentism and the Problem of Cross-Time Relations. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):386-402.
    Presentism is the view that only present entities exist. Recently, several authors have asked the question whether presentism is able to account for cross-time relations, i.e., roughly, relations between entities existing at different times. In this paper I claim that this question is to be answered in the affirmative. To make this claim plausible, I consider four types of cross-time relation and show how each can be accommodated without difficulty within the metaphysical framework of presentism.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  29. Julien A. Deonna & Klaus R. Scherer (2010). The Case of the Disappearing Intentional Object: Constraints on a Definition of Emotion. Emotion Review 2 (1):44-52.
    Taking our lead from Solomon’s emphasis on the importance of the intentional object of emotion, we review the history of repeated attempts to make this object disappear. We adduce evidence suggesting that in the case of James and Schachter, the intentional object got lost unintentionally. By contrast, modern constructivists seem quite determined to deny the centrality of the intentional object in accounting for the occurrence of emotions. Griffiths, however, downplays the role objects have in emotion noting that these do not (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  30. Michael Devitt (1984). Thoughts and Their Ascription. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):385-420.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  31. M. F. Egan (1989). What's Wrong with the Syntactic Theory of Mind. Philosophy of Science 56 (December):664-74.
    Stephen Stich has argued that psychological theories that instantiate his Syntactic Theory of Mind are to be preferred to content-based or representationalist theories, because the former can capture and explain a wider range of generalizations about cognitive processes than the latter. Stich's claims about the relative merits of the Syntactic Theory of Mind are unfounded. Not only is it false that syntactic theories can capture psychological generalizations that content-based theories cannot, but a large (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  32. Reinaldo Elugardo (2001). Brain States, Causal Explanation, and the Attitudes. In Explaining Beliefs: Lynne Rudder Baker and Her Critics. Stanford: CSLI Publications
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Reinaldo Elugardo (2001). Explaining Beliefs: Lynne Rudder Baker and Her Critics. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Arthur Falk (2004). Desire and Belief: Introduction to Some Philosophical Debates. University Press of America.
    First published in 2004, this book is a rigorous textbook on the metaphysics of the mind for advanced students of philosophy, covering the background they need to understand the debates and bringing them to the frontiers of current research. It is also a monograph on the nature of de re and de se states of mind, incorporating material the author published in journals. The short file you will see is only a gateway to more than two dozen other files which (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Arthur E. Falk (2004). Desire and Belief: Introduction to Some Recent Philosophical Debates. Hamilton Books, University Press of America.
    This work examines the nature of what philosophers call de re mental attitudes, paying close attention to the controversies over the nature of these and allied...
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Neil Feit (2006). The Doctrine of Propositions, Internalism, and Global Supervenience. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):447-457.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Neil Feit & Alessandro Capone (2013). The Problem of De Se Attitudes: An Introduction to the Issues and the Essays. In Neil Feit & Alessandro Capone (eds.), Attitudes De Se: Linguistics, Epistemology, Metaphysics. CSLI Publications 1-25.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Richard H. Feldman (1986). Davidson's Theory of Propositional Attitudes. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (December):693-712.
    Donald davidson has proposed an account of indirect discourse that has been the subject of a great deal of discussion. Critics have contended that the theory saddles sentences in indirect discourse with implications they do not have, That the theory rests on an unsuitably obscure primitive notion that it cannot be extended to "de re" constructions and that it cannot be extended to sentences about other propositional attitudes such as belief. In this paper, I formulate davidson's theory more precisely than (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. J. A. Fodor (1985). Fodor's Guide to Mental Representation: The Intelligent Auntie's Vade-Mecum. Mind 94 (373):76-100.
  40. Craig French (2012). Does Propositional Seeing Entail Propositional Knowledge? Theoria 78 (2):115-127.
    In a 2010 article Turri puts forward some powerful considerations which suggest that Williamson's view of knowledge as the most general factive mental state is false. Turri claims that this view is false since it is false that if S sees that p, then S knows that p. Turri argues that there are cases in which (A) S sees that p but (B) S does not know that p. In response I offer linguistic evidence to suppose that in propositional contexts (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  41. Jane Friedman (2013). Question‐Directed Attitudes. Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):145-174.
    In this paper I argue that there is a class of attitudes that have questions (rather than propositions or something else) as contents.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  42. Gabor Forrai George Kampis (ed.) (2005). Intentionality: Past and Future. Rodopi NY.
  43. Irwin Goldstein (1981). Cognitive Pleasure and Distress. Philosophical Studies 39 (January):15-23.
    Explaining the "intentional object" some people assign pleasure, I argue that a person is pleased about something when his thoughts about that thing cause him to feel pleasure. Bernard Williams, Gilbert Ryle, and Irving Thalberg, who reject this analysis, are discussed. Being pleased (or distressed) about something is a compound of pleasure (pain) and some thought or belief. Pleasure in itself does not have an "intentional object".
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. Mitchell S. Green (2009). Speech Acts, the Handicap Principle and the Expression of Psychological States. Mind and Language 24 (2):139-163.
    Abstract: One oft-cited feature of speech acts is their expressive character: Assertion expresses belief, apology regret, promise intention. Yet expression, or at least sincere expression, is as I argue a form of showing: A sincere expression shows whatever is the state that is the sincerity condition of the expressive act. How, then, can a speech act show a speaker's state of thought or feeling? To answer this question I consider three varieties of showing, and argue that only one of them (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  45. Mitchell S. Green (1999). Attitude Ascription's Affinity to Measurement. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7 (3):323-348.
    The relation between two systems of attitude ascription that capture all the empirically significant aspects of an agents thought and speech may be analogous to that between two systems of magnitude ascription that are equivalent relative to a transformation of scale. If so, just as an objects weighing eight pounds doesnt relate that object to the number eight (for a different but equally good scale would use a different number), similarly an agents believing that P need not relate her to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  46. Alex Grzankowski (2014). Attitudes Towards Objects. Noûs 50 (1).
    This paper offers a positive account of an important but under-explored class of mental states, non-propositional attitudes such as loving one’s department, liking lattice structures, fearing Freddy Krueger, and hating Sherlock Holmes. In broadest terms, the view reached is a representationalist account guided by two puzzles. The proposal allows one to say in an elegant way what differentiates a propositional attitude from an attitude merely about a proposition. The proposal also allows one to offer a unified account of the non-propositional (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Alex Grzankowski (2013). Non‐Propositional Attitudes. Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1123-1137.
    Intentionality, or the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for things, remains central in the philosophy of mind. But the study of intentionality in the analytic tradition has been dominated by discussions of propositional attitudes such as belief, desire, and visual perception. There are, however, intentional states that aren't obviously propositional attitudes. For example, Indiana Jones fears snakes, Antony loves Cleopatra, and Jane hates the monster under her bed. The present paper explores such mental states (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  48. Alex Grzankowski (2012). Not All Attitudes Are Propositional. European Journal of Philosophy (3):374-391.
    Most contemporary philosophical discussions of intentionality start and end with a treatment of the propositional attitudes. In fact, many theorists hold that all attitudes are propositional attitudes. Our folk-psychological ascriptions suggest, however, that there are non-propositional attitudes: I like Sally, my brother fears snakes, everyone loves my grandmother, and Rush Limbaugh hates Obama. I argue that things are as they appear: there are non-propositional attitudes. More specifically, I argue that there are attitudes that relate individuals to non-propositional objects and do (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  49. Pamela Hieronymi (2006). Controlling Attitudes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74.
    I hope to show that, although belief is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, "believing at will" is impossible; one cannot believe in the way one ordinarily acts. Further, the same is true of intention: although intention is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, the features of belief that render believing less than voluntary are present for intention, as well. It turns out, perhaps surprisingly, that you can no more intend at will than believe at will.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   49 citations  
  50. Christopher S. Hill (1988). Intentionality, Folk Psychology, and Reduction. In Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives On Mind. Dordrecht: Kluwer
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 100