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  1. C. Anthony Anderson (ed.) (1990). Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind. Stanford: CSLI.
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  2. Louise M. Antony (2001). Brain States with Attitude. In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs. Csli.
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  3. David M. Armstrong (1975). Beliefs and Desires as Causes of Actions: A Reply to Donald Davidson. Philosophical Papers 4 (May):1-7.
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  4. Lynne Rudder Baker (2002). Attitudes in Action: A Causal Account. Manuscrito 25 (3):47-78.
    This article aims to vindicate the commonsensical view that what we think affects what we do. In order to show that mental properties like believing, desiring and intending are causally explanatory, I propose a nonreductive, materialistic account that identifies beliefs and desires by their content, and that shows how differences in the contents of beliefs and desires can make causal differences in what we do.
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  5. Lynne Rudder Baker (1995). Explaining Attitudes. Cambridge University Press.
    Explaining Attitudes develops a new account of propositional attitudes - practical realism.
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  6. Lynne Rudder Baker (1994). Attitudes as Nonentities. Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):175-203.
    materialist that beliefs are not immaterial soul-states, I think that the conception of beliefs as brain states is badly misguided. I hope to show that "beliefs are brain states or soul states" is a false dichotomy. I am using the phrase 'beliefs as brain states' to cover several familiar theses: the token-identity thesis, according to which beliefs are identical to brain-state tokens; nonreductive materialism, according to which beliefs are constituted by brain states (as pebbles are constituted by..
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  7. Mark Balaguer (1998). Attitudes Without Propositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):805-26.
    This paper develops a novel version of anti-platonism, called semantic fictionalism. The view is a response to the platonist argument that we need to countenance propositions to account for the truth of sentences containing `that'-clause singular terms, e.g., sentences of the form `x believes that p' and `σ means that p'. Briefly, the view is that (a) platonists are right that `that'-clauses purport to refer to propositions, but (b) there are no such things as propositions, and hence, (c) `that'-clause-containing sentences (...)
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  8. Gerald W. Barnes (1977). Some Remarks on Belief and Desire. Philosophical Review 86 (July):340-349.
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  9. George Bealer (1998). Propositions. Mind 107 (425):1-32.
    Recent work in philosophy of language has raised significant problems for the traditional theory of propositions, engendering serious skepticism about its general workability. These problems are, I believe, tied to fundamental misconceptions about how the theory should be developed. The goal of this paper is to show how to develop the traditional theory in a way which solves the problems and puts this skepticism to rest. The problems fall into two groups. The first has to do with reductionism, specifically attempts (...)
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  10. Hanoch Ben-Yami (1997). Against Characterizing Mental States as Propositional Attitudes. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (186):84-89.
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  11. Jonathan Bennett (1991). Analysis Without Noise. In R. Bogdan (ed.), Mind and Common Sense. Cambridge University Press.
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  12. Jonathan Berg (2012). Direct Belief: An Essay on the Semantics, Pragmatics, and Metaphysics of Belief. De Gruyter Mouton.
    Jonathan Berg argues for the Theory of Direct Belief, which treats having a belief about an individual as an unmediated relation between the believer and the individual the belief is about. After a critical review of alternative positions, Berg uses Grice's theory of conversational implicature to provide a detailed pragmatic account of substitution failure in belief ascriptions and goes on to defend this view against objections, including those based on an unwarranted "Inner Speech" Picture of Thought. The work serves as (...)
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  13. Steven E. Boër (1994). Propositional Attitudes and Formal Ontology. Synthese 98 (2):187 - 242.
    This paper develops — within an axiomatic theory of properties, relations, and propositions which accords them well-defined existence and identity conditions — a sententialist-functionalist account of belief as a symbolically mediated relation to a special kind of propositional entity, theproxy-encoding abstract proposition. It is then shown how, in terms of this account, the truth conditions of English belief reports may be captured in a formally precise and empirically adequate way that accords genuinely semantic status to familiar opacity data.
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  14. Donald Brownstein (1985). Individuating Propositional Attitudes. Philosophical Topics 13 (2):205-212.
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  15. Jeremy Butterfield (ed.) (1986). Language, Mind and Logic. Cambridge University Press.
    This is a collection of eleven original essays in analytical philosophy by British and American philosophers, centering on the connection between mind and language. Two themes predominate: how it is that thoughts and sentences can represent the world; and what having a thought - a belief, for instance - involves. Developing from these themes are the questions: what does having a belief require of the believer, and of the way he or she relates to the environment? In particular, does having (...)
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  16. Andy Clark (1991). Radical Ascent. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 65:211-27.
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  17. Austen Clark (1994). Beliefs and Desires Incorporated. Journal of Philosophy 91 (8):404-25.
    Suppose we admit for the sake of argument that "folk" explanations of human behavior--explanations in terms of beliefs and desires--sometimes succeed. They sometimes enable us to understand and predict patterns of motion that otherwise would remain unintelligible and unanticipated. Is the only explanation for such success that folk psychology is a viable proto-scientific theory of human psychology? I shall describe an analysis which yields a negative answer to that question. It was suggested by an observation and an analogy, both of (...)
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  18. T. Crane, Intentionality.
    Intentionality is the mind’s capacity to direct itself on things. Mental states like thoughts, beliefs, desires, hopes (and others) exhibit intentionality in the sense that they are always directed on, or at, something: if you hope, believe or desire, you must hope, believe or desire something. Hope, belief, desire and any other mental state which is directed at something, are known as intentional states. Intentionality in this sense has only a peripheral connection to the ordinary ideas of intention and intending. (...)
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  19. Marian David (2002). Content Essentialism. Acta Analytica 17 (28):103-114.
    The paper offers some preliminary and rather unsystematic reflections about the question: Do Beliefs Have Their Contents Essentially? The question looks like it ought to be important, yet it is rarely discussed. Maybe that’s because content essentialism, i.e., the view that beliefs do have their contents essentially, is simply too obviously and trivially true to deserve much discussion. I sketch a common-sense argument that might be taken to show that content essentialism is indeed utterly obvious and/or trivial. Somewhat against this, (...)
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  20. Donald Davidson (1991). What is Present to the Mind. Philosophical Issues 1:197-213.
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  21. Donald Davidson (1989). The Mind of Donald Davidson. Netherlands: Rodopi.
  22. Donald Davidson (1989). What is Present to the Mind? In The Mind of Donald Davidson. Netherlands: Rodopi.
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  23. David Davies (1998). On Gauging Attitudes. Philosophical Studies 90 (2):129-54.
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  24. David Davies (1995). Davidson, Indeterminacy, and Measurement. Acta Analytica 10 (14):37-56.
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  25. Rafael De Clercq (2006). Presentism and the Problem of Cross-Time Relations. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):386-402.
    Presentism is the view that only present entities exist. Recently, several authors have asked the question whether presentism is able to account for cross-time relations, i.e., roughly, relations between entities existing at different times. In this paper I claim that this question is to be answered in the affirmative. To make this claim plausible, I consider four types of cross-time relation and show how each can be accommodated without difficulty within the metaphysical framework of presentism.
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  26. Julien A. Deonna & Klaus R. Scherer (2010). The Case of the Disappearing Intentional Object: Constraints on a Definition of Emotion. Emotion Review 2 (1):44-52.
    Taking our lead from Solomon’s emphasis on the importance of the intentional object of emotion, we review the history of repeated attempts to make this object disappear. We adduce evidence suggesting that in the case of James and Schachter, the intentional object got lost unintentionally. By contrast, modern constructivists (in particular Barrett) seem quite determined to deny the centrality of the intentional object in accounting for the occurrence of emotions. Griffiths, however, downplays the role objects have in emotion noting that (...)
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  27. Michael Devitt (1984). Thoughts and Their Ascription. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):385-420.
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  28. M. F. Egan (1989). What's Wrong with the Syntactic Theory of Mind. Philosophy of Science 56 (December):664-74.
    Stephen Stich has argued that psychological theories that instantiate his Syntactic Theory of Mind are to be preferred to content-based or representationalist theories, because the former can capture and explain a wider range of generalizations about cognitive processes than the latter. Stich's claims about the relative merits of the Syntactic Theory of Mind are unfounded. Not only is it false that syntactic theories can capture psychological generalizations that content-based theories cannot, but a large class of behavioral regularities, readily explained by (...)
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  29. Reinaldo Elugardo (2001). Explaining Beliefs: Lynne Rudder Baker and Her Critics. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
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  30. Reinaldo Elugardo (2001). Brain States, Causal Explanation, and the Attitudes. In Explaining Beliefs: Lynne Rudder Baker and Her Critics. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
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  31. Arthur Falk (2004). Desire and Belief: Introduction to Some Philosophical Debates. University Press of America.
    First published in 2004, this book is a rigorous textbook on the metaphysics of the mind for advanced students of philosophy, covering the background they need to understand the debates and bringing them to the frontiers of current research. It is also a monograph on the nature of de re and de se states of mind, incorporating material the author published in journals. The short file you will see is only a gateway to more than two dozen other files which (...)
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  32. Arthur E. Falk (2004). Desire and Belief: Introduction to Some Recent Philosophical Debates. Hamilton Books, University Press of America.
    This work examines the nature of what philosophers call de re mental attitudes, paying close attention to the controversies over the nature of these and allied...
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  33. Neil Feit (2010). Selfless Desires and the Property Theory of Content. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):489-503.
    The property theory of content takes the content of each cognitive attitude (each belief, desire, and so on) to be a property to which the subject of the attitude is related in the appropriate psychological way. This view is motivated by standard cases of de se belief and other attitudes. In this paper, I consider a couple of related objections to the property theory of content. Both objections have to do with the possible non-existence of the subject. More specifically, the (...)
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  34. Neil Feit (2006). The Doctrine of Propositions, Internalism, and Global Supervenience. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):447-457.
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  35. Richard H. Feldman (1986). Davidson's Theory of Propositional Attitudes. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (December):693-712.
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  36. J. A. Fodor (1985). Fodor's Guide to Mental Representation: The Intelligent Auntie's Vade-Mecum. Mind 94 (373):76-100.
  37. Craig French (2012). Does Propositional Seeing Entail Propositional Knowledge? Theoria 78 (2):115-127.
    In a 2010 article Turri puts forward some powerful considerations which suggest that Williamson's view of knowledge as the most general factive mental state is false. Turri claims that this view is false since it is false that if S sees that p, then S knows that p. Turri argues that there are cases in which (A) S sees that p but (B) S does not know that p. In response I offer linguistic evidence to suppose that in propositional contexts (...)
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  38. Irwin Goldstein (1981). Cognitive Pleasure and Distress. Philosophical Studies 39 (January):15-23.
    Explaining the "intentional object" some people assign pleasure, I argue that a person is pleased about something when his thoughts about that thing cause him to feel pleasure. Bernard Williams, Gilbert Ryle, and Irving Thalberg, who reject this analysis, are discussed. Being pleased (or distressed) about something is a compound of pleasure (pain) and some thought or belief. Pleasure in itself does not have an "intentional object".
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  39. Mitchell S. Green (2009). Speech Acts, the Handicap Principle and the Expression of Psychological States. Mind and Language 24 (2):139-163.
    Abstract: One oft-cited feature of speech acts is their expressive character: Assertion expresses belief, apology regret, promise intention. Yet expression, or at least sincere expression, is as I argue a form of showing: A sincere expression shows whatever is the state that is the sincerity condition of the expressive act. How, then, can a speech act show a speaker's state of thought or feeling? To answer this question I consider three varieties of showing, and argue that only one of them (...)
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  40. Mitchell S. Green (1999). Attitude Ascription's Affinity to Measurement. International Journal Of Philosophical Studies 7 (3):323-348.
    The relation between two systems of attitude ascription that capture all the empirically significant aspects of an agents thought and speech may be analogous to that between two systems of magnitude ascription that are equivalent relative to a transformation of scale. If so, just as an objects weighing eight pounds doesnt relate that object to the number eight (for a different but equally good scale would use a different number), similarly an agents believing that P need not relate her to (...)
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  41. Alex Grzankowski (forthcoming). Attitudes Without Propositions. European Journal of Philosophy.
    Most contemporary philosophical discussions of intentionality start and end with a treatment of the propositional attitudes. In fact, many theorists hold (tacitly if not explicitly) that all attitudes are propositional attitudes. Our folk-psychological ascriptions suggest, however, that there are non-propositional attitudes: I like Sally, my brother fears snakes, everyone loves my grandmother, and Rush Limbaugh hates Obama. I argue that things are as they appear: there are non-propositional attitudes. More specifically, I argue that there are attitudes that relate individuals to (...)
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  42. Alex Grzankowski (2012). Not All Attitudes Are Propositional. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4).
    Most contemporary philosophical discussions of intentionality start and end with a treatment of the propositional attitudes. In fact, many theorists hold (tacitly if not explicitly) that all attitudes are propositional attitudes. Our folk-psychological ascriptions suggest, however, that there are non-propositional attitudes: I like Sally, my brother fears snakes, everyone loves my grandmother, and Rush Limbaugh hates Obama. I argue that things are as they appear: there are non-propositional attitudes. More specifically, I argue that there are attitudes that relate individuals to (...)
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  43. Pamela Hieronymi (2006). Controlling Attitudes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74.
    I hope to show that, although belief is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, "believing at will" is impossible; one cannot believe in the way one ordinarily acts. Further, the same is true of intention: although intention is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, the features of belief that render believing less than voluntary are present for intention, as well. It turns out, perhaps surprisingly, that you can no more intend at will than believe at will.
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  44. Christopher S. Hill (1988). Intentionality, Folk Psychology, and Reduction. In Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives On Mind. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
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  45. I. L. Humberstone (1992). Direction of Fit. Mind 101 (401):59-83.
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  46. Henry Jackman, Truth, Rationality, and Humanity.
    When we interpret someone in terms of their beliefs and desires, we are doing something other than merely describing them, but it is far from clear what this something else is. As Dennett puts it, while there is a growing consensus about the "not-purely-descriptive nature of intentional attribution," there remains considerable disagreement over which norms govern the play of this "dramatic interpretation game." This paper will discuss three candidates for specifying the content of these norms, truth, rationality and humanity. It (...)
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  47. Dale Jacquette (1990). Intentionality and Stich's Theory of Brain Sentence Syntax. Philosophical Quarterly 40 (159):169-82.
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  48. Benjamin Jarvis (2012). Norms of Intentionality: Norms That Don't Guide. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):1-25.
    More than ever, it is in vogue to argue that no norms either play a role in or directly follow from the theory of mental content. In this paper, I present an intuitive theory of intentionality (including a theory of mental content) on which norms are constitutive of the intentional properties of attitude and content in order to show that this trend is misguided. Although this theory of intentionality—the teleological theory of intentional representation—does involve a commitment to representational norms, these (...)
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  49. Mikhail Kissine (2007). Direction of Fit. Logique Et Analyse 198 (57):113-128.
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  50. Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Brentano's Simple Attitudes. In Alex Gzrankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Attitudes.
    According to what I will refer to as the ‘received view,’ at least some intentional states are propositional attitudes, construed as relations to propositions (§1). The received view faces some extraordinary difficulties (§2). In this paper, I propose that these difficulties may be avoided if we adopt the radically different view of intentional states developed by Franz Brentano. Brentano’s view is different from the received view in two crucial respects. First, according to Brentano every intentional state is an objectual attitude (...)
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  51. Jennie Louise (2009). Correct Responses and the Priority of the Normative. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):345 - 364.
    The ‘Wrong Kind of Reason’ problem for buck-passing theories (theories which hold that the normative is explanatorily or conceptually prior to the evaluative) is to explain why the existence of pragmatic or strategic reasons for some response to an object does not suffice to ground evaluative claims about that object. The only workable reply seems to be to deny that there are reasons of the ‘wrong kind’ for responses, and to argue that these are really reasons for wanting, trying, or (...)
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  52. J. S. MacKenzie (1916). Laws of Thought. Mind 25 (99):289-307.
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  53. Joseph Margolis (1977). Cognitive Agents, Mental States, and Internal Representation. Behaviorism 5:63-74.
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  54. Robert J. Matthews (1994/2010). The Measure of Mind. Mind 103 (410):131-46.
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  55. Mark McEvoy (2003). A Defense of Propositional Functionalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:421-436.
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  56. Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.) (2001). Explaining Beliefs. University of Chicago Press.
  57. Ruth G. Millikan (1986). Thoughts Without Laws: Cognitive Science with Content. Philosophical Review 95 (January):47-80.
  58. Michelle Montague (2007). Against Propositionalism. Noûs 41 (3):503–518.
    'Propositionalism' is the widely held view that all intentional mental relations-all intentional attitudes-are relations to propositions or something proposition-like. Paradigmatically, to think about the mountain is ipso facto to think that it is F, for some predicate 'F'. It seems, however, many intentional attitudes are not relations to propositions at all: Mary contemplates Jonah, adores New York, misses Athens, mourns her brother. I argue, following Brentano, Husserl, Church and Montague among others, that the way things seem is the way they (...)
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  59. Adam Morton (1988). The Explanatory Depth of Propositional Attitudes. Philosophical Perspectives 2:67-80.
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  60. Paul K. Moser (1990). Physicalism and Intentional Attitudes. Behavior and Philosophy 18 (2):33-41.
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  61. Reinhard Muskens (1993). Propositional Attitudes. In R. E. Asher & J. M. Y. Simpson (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Pergamon Press.
    Verbs such as know, believe, hope, fear, regret and desire are commonly taken to express an attitude that one may bear towards a proposition and are therefore called verbs of propositional attitude. Thus in (1) below the agent Cathy is reported to have a certain attitude.
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  62. A. Orenstein & Petr Kotatko (eds.) (2000). Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine. Kluwer Academic Print on Demand.
    The essays in this collection are by some of the leading figures in their fields and they touch on the most recent turnings in Quine's work.
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  63. Herbert R. Otto (ed.) (1988). Perspectives On Mind. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
    INTRODUCTION Phenomenology and analytic philosophy have skirmished often, but seldom in ways conducive to dialectical progress. ...
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  64. Christopher Peacocke (1983). Between Instrumentalism and Brain-Writing. In Christopher Peacocke (ed.), Sense and Content. Oxford University Press.
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  65. Michael W. Pelczar (2007). Forms and Objects of Thought. Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (1):97-122.
    It is generally assumed that if it is possible to believe that p without believing that q, then there is some difference between the object of the thought that p and the object of the thought that q. This assumption is challenged in the present paper, opening the way to an account of epistemic opacity that improves on existing accounts, not least because it casts doubt on various arguments that attempt to derive startling ontological conclusions from seemingly innocent epistemic premises.
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  66. John Perry (1986). Circumstantial Attitudes and Benevolent Cognition. In Jeremy Butterfield (ed.), Language, Mind and Logic. Cambridge University Press.
    From: _Language, Mind and Logic_, edited by Jeremy Butter?eld. 123.
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  67. Jeffrey S. Poland & Barbara Von Eckardt (2000). In Defense of the Standard View. Protosociology 14:312-331.
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  68. Kevin Possin (1986). The Case Against Stich's Syntactic Theory of Mind. Philosophical Studies 49 (May):405-18.
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  69. Ian Pratt (1993). Analysis and the Attitudes. In Steven J. Wagner & Richard Warner (eds.), Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal. University of Notre Dame Press.
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  70. Francois Recanati (2000). Opacity and the Attitudes. In A. Orenstein & Petr Kotatko (eds.), Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine.
  71. Lisbeth Rechtin & William L. Todd (1974). Propositional Attitudes and Self-Reference. Philosophia 4 (April-July):271-295.
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  72. Indrek Reiland (2012). Propositional Attitudes and Mental Acts. Thought 1 (3):239-245.
    Peter Hanks and Scott Soames have recently developed similar views of propositional attitudes on which they consist at least partly of being disposed to perform mental acts. Both think that to believe a proposition is at least partly to be disposed to perform the primitive propositional act: one the performance of which is part of the performance of any other propositional act. However, they differ over whether the primitive act is the forceless entertaining or the forceful judging. In this paper (...)
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  73. Mark E. Richard (1990). Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them. New York: Cambridge University Press.
    This book makes a stimulating contribution to the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. It begins with a spirited defense of the view that propositions are structured and that propositional structure is "psychologically real." The author then develops a subtle view of propositions and attitude ascription. The view is worked out in detail with attention to such topics as the semantics of conversations, iterated attitude ascriptions, and the role of propositions as bearers of truth. Along the way important issues (...)
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  74. Philip Robbins (2004). To Structure, or Not to Structure? Synthese 139 (1):55-80.
    Some accounts of mental content represent the objects of belief as structured, using entities that formally resemble the sentences used to express and report attitudes in natural language; others adopt a relatively unstructured approach, typically using sets or functions. Currently popular variants of the latter include classical and neo-classical propositionalism, which represent belief contents as sets of possible worlds and sets of centered possible worlds, respectively; and property self-ascriptionism, which employs sets of possible individuals. I argue against their contemporary proponents (...)
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  75. Margaret M. Rooney (1980). What Do We Hope For: Some Puzzles Involving Propositional Hoping. Grazer Philosophische Studien 11:75-92.
    In at least some cases of future directed propositional hoping, facts about the hoper become puzzling if one supposes that the object of hoping is a future tensed proposition. These facts are easily explained by the alternative suppostion that the hoper accepts a future tensed proposition but bears the hopingattitude toward a disjunctively tensed proposition. Parallel remarks apply to past directed and present directed prepositional hoping. Thus, at least some instances of hoping have as their objects disjunctively tensed rather than (...)
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  76. Don Ross (1986). Stich, Fodor and the Status of Belief. Eidos 5 (December):119-141.
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  77. Dan Ryder (2009). Review of Radu J. Bogdan, Predicative Minds: The Social Ontogeny of Propositional Thinking. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (8).
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  78. Eric Saidel (1998). Beliefs, Desires, and the Ability to Learn. American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (1):21-37.
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  79. Timothy Schroeder (2006). Propositional Attitudes. Philosophy Compass 1 (1):65-73.
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  80. J. Schwartz (1992). Propositional Attitude Psychology as an Ideal Type. Topoi 11 (1):5-26.
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  81. George A. Sher (1977). Armstrong and the Interdependence of the Mental. Philosophical Quarterly 27 (July):227-235.
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  82. D. M. Smith (1994). Toward a Perspicuous Characterization of Intentional States. Philosophical Studies 74 (1):103-20.
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  83. Robert Stalnaker (1984). Inquiry. Cambridge University Press.
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  84. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2011). Against Essential Mental Normativity Again. Dialogue 50 (02):333-346.
    In a recent paper (2008), I presented two arguments against the thesis that intentional states are essentially normative. In this paper, I defend those arguments from two recent responses, one from Nick Zangwill in his (2010), and one from Daniel Laurier in the present volume, and offer improvements of my arguments in light of Laurier’s criticism.
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  85. Stephen P. Stich (1984). Relativism, Rationality, and the Limits of Intentional Ascription. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
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  86. John Turri (2012). A Puzzle About Withholding. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):355-364.
    This paper presents a puzzle about justification and withholding. The puzzle arises in a special case where experts advise us to not withhold judgment. My main thesis is simply that the puzzle is genuinely a puzzle, and so leads us to rethink some common assumptions in epistemology, specifically assumptions about the nature of justification and doxastic attitudes. Section 1 introduces the common assumptions. Section 2 presents the puzzle case. Section 3 assesses the puzzle case. Section 4 explains the choice we're (...)
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  87. Neil Van Leeuwen (2013). Review of Kristin Andrews' Do Apes Read Minds? Toward a New Folk Psychology. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 4.
    Kristin Andrews proposes a new framework for thinking about folk psychology, which she calls Pluralistic Folk Psychology. Her approach emphasizes kinds of psychological prediction and explanation that don't rest on propositional attitude attribution. Here I review some elements of her theory and find that, although the approach is very promising, there's still work to be done before we can conclude that the manners of prediction and explanation she identifies don't involve implicit propositional attitude attribution.
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  88. Steven J. Wagner & Richard Warner (eds.) (1993). Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal. University of Notre Dame Press.
  89. Alan Zaitchik (1981). Reply to Professor Fodor on Physicalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (December):294-295.
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