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  1. Laurynas Adomaitis (2012). Richard Gaskin: The Unity of the Proposition. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):106-111.
    Richard Gaskin’s work on the problem of the unity of the proposition (“the problem”, henceforth) has sometimes been called magisterial due to its vast historical and conceptual scope. Indeed, the author engages in lengthy discussions of the conceptions of propositions that have been overlooked by most previous investigations on the problem. Not only aspects of Frege’s and Russell’s theories of propositions that appear most problematic are subject to Gaskin’s investigation, it also includes Prabhākara semantics, the approach of Gregory of Rimini (...)
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  2. I. Angelelli & P. Pérez-Ilzarbe (eds.) (2000). Medieval and Renaissance Logic in Spain. Olms.
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  3. C. J. Ducasse (1942). Is a Fact a True Proposition?--A Reply. Journal of Philosophy 39 (5):132-136.
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  4. C. J. Ducasse (1940). Propositions, Opinions, Sentences, and Facts. Journal of Philosophy 37 (26):701-711.
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  5. Heather Dyke (2012). Propositions: Truth Vs. Existence. In James Maclaurin (ed.), Ratiois Defensor.
    I argue that there is an inherent tension in the notion of a proposition that gives us reason to doubt that there can be any single entity that plays all the roles and possesses all the features normally attributed to propositions. The tension is that some of the roles and features of propositions require them to be essentially representational, while others require them to be non-representational. I first present what I call the standard view of propositions: a series of theses (...)
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  6. Christopher Gilbert (1998). The Role of Thoughts in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Linguistics and Philosophy 21 (4):341-352.
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  7. Carl G. Hempel (1935). Some Remarks on `Facts' and Propositions. Analysis 2 (6):93-96.
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  8. Thomas Hodgson (2014). Jeffrey C. King, Scott Soames, Jeff Speaks, New Thinking About Propositions. [REVIEW] Polish Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):80-83.
  9. Richard Holton, Facts, Factives and Contra-Factives.
    Frege begins his discussion of factives in 'On Sense and Reference' with an example of a purported contra-factive, i.e. a verb that entails the falsity of the complement sentence. But the verb he cites, 'waehnen', is now obsolete, and native speakers are sceptical about whether it really was a contra-factive. Despite the profusion of factive verbs, there are no clear examples of contra-factive propositional attitude verbs in English, French or German (or indeed any other Indo-European languages). This paper attempts to (...)
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  10. Andrea Iacona (forthcoming). Two Notions of Logical Form. Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper claims that there is no such thing as the correct answer to the question of what is logical form: two significantly different notions of logical form are needed to fulfil two major theoretical roles that pertain respectively to logic and semantics. The first part of the paper outlines the thesis that a unique notion of logical form fulfils both roles, and argues that the alleged best candidate for making it true is unsuited for one of the two roles. (...)
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  11. D. K. Johnston (2004). The Natural History of Fact. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):275 – 291.
    The article provides an example of the application of the techniques and results of historical linguistics to traditional problems in the philosophy of language. It takes as its starting point the dispute about the nature of facts that arose from the 1950 Aristotelian Society debate between J. L. Austin and P. F. Strawson. It is shown that, in some cases, expressions containing the noun fact refer to actions and events; while in other cases, such expressions do not have a referring (...)
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  12. Jeffrey C. King (2002). Designating Propositions. Philosophical Review 111 (3):341-371.
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  13. Srećko Kovač & Kordula Świętorzecka (2015). Gödel's "Slingshot" Argument and His Onto-Theological System. In Kordula Świętorzecka (ed.), Gödel's Ontological Argument: History, Modifications, and Controversies. Semper 123-162.
  14. C. H. Langford (1929). Propositions Directly About Particulars. Mind 38 (150):219-225.
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  15. Kris McDaniel (2015). Propositions: Individuation and Invirtuation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):757-768.
    The pressure to individuate propositions more finely than intensionally—that is, hyper-intensionally—has two distinct sources. One source is the philosophy of mind: one can believe a proposition without believing an intensionally equivalent proposition. The second source is metaphysics: there are intensionally equivalent propositions, such that one proposition is true in virtue of the other but not vice versa. I focus on what our theory of propositions should look like when it's guided by metaphysical concerns about what is true in virtue of (...)
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  16. Marc A. Moffett (2003). Knowing Facts and Believing Propositions: A Solution to the Problem of Doxastic Shift. Philosophical Studies 115 (1):81-97.
    The Problem of Doxastic Shift may be stated as a dilemma: on the one hand, the distribution of nominal complements of the form `the that p strongly suggests that `that-clauses cannot be univocally assigned propositionaldenotations; on the other hand, facts about quantification strongly suggest that `that-clauses must be assigned univocal denotations. I argue that the Problem may be solved by defining the extension of a proposition to be a set of facts or, more generally, conditions. Given this, the logical operation (...)
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  17. María G. Navarro (2012). La interpretación como evento cognitivo expresado en razonamientos abductivos. Trans/Form/Ação 35 (3):231-252.
    The purpose of this paper is to argue that abductive reasoning is part of a cognitive process of interpreting something as being something. The paper holds two fundamental claims. First, it proposes a definition of interpretation as a type of cognitive event. Second, it is argued that in some cases the activity of interpreting is a process to search for plausible assumptions for consistent explanatory hypotheses formation. As a result of these two theses, it is concluded that logic of interpretation (...)
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  18. María G. Navarro (2009). Interpretar y argumentar. Spanish National Research Council/ Plaza & Valdés.
    Dentro de la tradición de la hermenéutica filosófica y, más específicamente, de la ontología hermenéutica del filósofo alemán H.G. Gadamer, "Interpretar y argumentar" constituye una indagación en el modelo de racionalidad propio ...
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  19. Donnchadh O'Conaill & Tuomas E. Tahko (2016). Minimal Truthmakers. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):228-244.
    A minimal truthmaker for a given proposition is the smallest portion of reality which makes this proposition true. Minimal truthmakers are frequently mentioned in the literature, but there has been no systematic account of what they are or of their importance. In this article we shall clarify the notion of a minimal truthmaker and argue that there is reason to think that at least some propositions have minimal truthmakers. We shall then argue that the notion can play a useful role (...)
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  20. Michele Paolini Paoletti (2014). Falsemakers: Something Negative About Facts. Grazer Philosophische Studien 90:169-182.
    The author argues for the existence of negative facts. The first section is devoted to an argument, grounded on truthmaker maximalism, that aims at demonstrating that negative facts must exist at least as false propositions’ falsemakers. In the second section, the author analyzes and criticizes several attempts to get rid of negative facts: the ones based on incompatibilities, absences, totality facts and polarities, as well as the ones based on various restrictions on truthmaker maximalism or on the non-acceptance of facts (...)
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  21. Terence Parsons (1993). On Denoting Propositions and Facts. Philosophical Perspectives 7:441-460.
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  22. Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe (2000). Time and Propositions in Jerónimo Pardo. In I. Angelelli & P. Pérez-Ilzarbe (eds.), Medieval and Renaissance Logic in Spain. Olms 54--251.
    From the medieval and post-medieval analyses dealing with propositions and time one gathers that their relation can be considered from various points of view. It could be said that there is not one "time" connected with a proposition, but several "times": following d'Ors, I will distinguish at least three: the time of the utterance, the time of the copula, and the time of truth. These three times of the proposition may or may not coincide. In these pages I propose to (...)
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  23. Philip L. Peterson (1982). Anaphoric Reference to Facts, Propositions, and Events. Linguistics and Philosophy 5 (2):235 - 276.
    Factive predicates (like ‘-matters’, ‘discover-’, ‘realizes-’) take NPs that refer to facts, propositional predicates (like ‘-seems’, ‘believes-’, ‘-likely’) take NPs that refer to propositions, and eventive predicates (like ‘-occurs’, ‘-take place’, ‘-causes-’) take NPs that refer to events (broadly speaking, including states, processes, conditions, ect.). Logically speaking at least two out of the three categories (facts, propositions, and events) can be eliminated. So, if all three kinds of referents turn out to be required for natural language semantics, their postulation is (...)
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  24. Pierre Pica (1986). Subject, Tense and Truth. In Jacqueline Guéron, Hans-Georg Obenauer & Jean-Yves Pollock (eds.), Grammatical Representations. Foris
    It is suggested that the notion of truth value plays a role in syntactic theory and should be incorporated in the appropriate formulation of conditions on transformations.
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  25. Bryan Pickel (2015). Are Propositions Essentially Representational? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3).
    Jeffrey King argues that nothing has truth conditions except by being taken to be true or false by rational agents. But – for good reason – King claims that propositions possess truth conditions essentially and intrinsically. I will argue that King cannot have both: if the truth conditions of a proposition depend on the reactions of rational agents, then the possession of truth conditions can't follow from the intrinsic nature or existence of the proposition. This leaves two options. Either, nothing (...)
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  26. Arthur N. Prior (1948). Facts, Propositions and Entailment. Mind 57 (225):62-68.
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  27. Ian Proops (2011). Russell on Substitutivity and the Abandonment of Propositions. Philosophical Review 120 (2):151-205.
    The paper argues that philosophers commonly misidentify the substitutivity principle involved in Russell’s puzzle about substitutivity in “On Denoting”. This matters because when that principle is properly identified the puzzle becomes considerably sharper and more interesting than it is often taken to be. This article describes both the puzzle itself and Russell's solution to it, which involves resources beyond the theory of descriptions. It then explores the epistemological and metaphysical consequences of that solution. One such consequence, it argues, is that (...)
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  28. Ian Proops (2004). Wittgenstein's Logical Atomism. Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (65):374-376.
    An article explicating Wittgenstein's logical atomism and surveying the relevant secondary literature.
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  29. F. P. Ramsey (1927). Facts and Propositions. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 7 (1):153-170.
  30. Stephen Read (2005). The Unity of the Fact. Philosophy 80 (3):317-342.
    What binds the constituents of a state of affairs together and provides unity to the fact they constitute? I argue that the fact that they are related is basic and fundamental. This is the thesis of Factualism: the world is a world of facts. I draw three corollaries: first, that the Identity of truth is mistaken, in conflating what represents (the proposition) with what is represented (the fact). Secondly, a popular interpretation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, due to Steinus, whereby false propositions (...)
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  31. Artur Rojszczak & Barry Smith (2003). Truthmakers, Truthbearers and the Objectivity of Truth. In Jaako Hintikka (ed.), Philosophy and Logic: In Search of the Polish Tradition. Kluwer
    The aim of this paper is to show that the account of objective truth taken for granted by logicians at least since the publication in 1933 of Tarski’s “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages” arose out of a tradition of philosophical thinking initiated by Bolzano and Brentano. The paper shows more specifically that certain investigations of states of affairs and other objectual correlates of judging acts, investigations carried out by Austrian and Polish philosophers around the turn of the century, (...)
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  32. Barry Smith (1989). Logic and the Sachverhalt. The Monist 72 (1):52-69.
    Those who conceive logic as a science have generally favoured one of two alternative conceptions as to what the subject-matter of this science ought to be. On the one hand is the nowadays somewhat old-fashioned-seeming view of logic as the science of judgment, or of thinking or reasoning activities in general. On the other hand is the view of logic as a science of ideal meanings, 'thoughts', or 'propositions in themselves'. There is, however, a third alternative conception, which enjoyed only (...)
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  33. Barry Smith (1981). Review of Paul Gochet, Outline of a Nominalist Theory of Propositions. [REVIEW] Grazer Philosophische Studien 14:216-217.
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  34. Barry Smith (1978). Law and Eschatology in Wittgenstein's Early Thought. Inquiry 21 (1-4):425 – 441.
    The paper investigates the role played by ethical deliberation and ethical judgment in Wittgenstein's early thought in the light of twentieth?century German legal philosophy. In particular the theories of the phenomenologists Adolf Reinach, Wilhelm Schapp, and Gerhart Husserl are singled out, as resting on ontologies which are structurally similar to that of the Tractatus: in each case it is actual and possible Sachverhalte which constitute the prime ontological category. The study of the relationship between the states of affairs depicted, e.g., (...)
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  35. Rafal Urbaniak (2009). Bogus Singular Terms and Substitution Salva Denotatione. The Reasoner 3.
    This is the third installment of a paper which deals with comparison and evaluation of the standard slingshot argument (for the claim that all true sentences, if they refer, refer to the same object) with the doxastic formulation.
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  36. Rafal Urbaniak (2009). Slingshot Arguments: Two Versions. The Reasoner 3.
    The first installment of a paper comparing the standard slingshot argument with the doxastic version.
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  37. Roger Wertheimer, Forms, Facts &Truth.
  38. Cory Wright (forthcoming). Truth, Explanation, Minimalism. Synthese:1-23.
    Minimalists about truth contend that traditional inflationary theories systematically fail to explain certain facts about truth, and that this failure licenses a ‘reversal of explanatory direction’. Once reversed, they purport that their own minimal theory adequately explains all of the facts involving truth. But minimalists’ main objection to inflationism seems to misfire, and the subsequent reversal of explanatory direction, if it can be made sense of, leaves minimalism in no better explanatory position; and even if the objection were serviceable and (...)
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