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  1. Stephen Barker (2011). Truth-Bearers and the Unsaid. In Ken Turner (ed.), Making Semantics Pragmatic. CUP
    I argue that conventional implicatures embed in logical compounds, and are non-truth-conditional contributors to sentence meaning. This, I argue has significant implications for how we understand truth, truth-conditional content, and truth-bearers.
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  2. Stephen J. Barker (2007). Semantics Without the Distinction Between Sense and Force. In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning, and Mind. Cambridge University Press
    At the heart of semantics in the 20th century is Frege’s distinction between sense and force. This is the idea that the content of a self-standing utterance of a sentence S can be divided into two components. One part, the sense, is the proposition that S’s linguistic meaning and context associates with it as its semantic interpretation. The second component is S’s illocutionary force. Illocutionary forces correspond to the three basic kinds of sentential speech acts: assertions, orders, and questions. Forces (...)
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  3. Arvid Båve (2009). A Deflationary Theory of Reference. Synthese 169 (1):51 - 73.
    The article first rehearses three deflationary theories of reference, (1) disquotationalism, (2) propositionalism (Horwich), and (3) the anaphoric theory (Brandom), and raises a number of objections against them. It turns out that each corresponds to a closely related theory of truth, and that these are subject to analogous criticisms to a surprisingly high extent. I then present a theory of my own, according to which the schema “That S(t) is about t” and the biconditional “S refers to x iff S (...)
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  4. George Bealer (1998). Propositions. Mind 107 (425):1-32.
    Recent work in philosophy of language has raised significant problems for the traditional theory of propositions, engendering serious skepticism about its general workability. These problems are, I believe, tied to fundamental misconceptions about how the theory should be developed. The goal of this paper is to show how to develop the traditional theory in a way which solves the problems and puts this skepticism to rest. The problems fall into two groups. The first has to do with reductionism, specifically attempts (...)
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  5. George Bealer (1994). Toward a New Theory of Content. In R. Casati, B. Smith & G. White (eds.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Holder-Pichler-Tempsky 179-92.
    The purpose of this paper is to lay out the algebraic approach to propositions and then to show how it can be implemented in new solutions to Frege's puzzle and a variety of related puzzles about content.
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  6. George Bealer (1993). Universals. Journal of Philosophy 60 (1):5-32.
    Presented here is an argument for the existence of universals. Like Church's translation- test argument, the argument turns on considerations from intensional logic. But whereas Church's argument turns on the fine-grained informational content of intensional sentences, this argument turns on the distinctive logical features of 'that'-clauses embedded within modal contexts. And unlike Church's argument, this argument applies against truth-conditions nominalism and also against conceptualism and in re realism. So if the argument is successful, it serves as a defense of full (...)
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  7. George Bealer (1989). Fine-Grained Type-Free Intensionality. In Gennero Chierchia, Barbara H. Partee & Raymond Turner (eds.), Properties, Types, and Meaning, Volume 1. Kluwer Academic Publishers 177-230.
    Commonplace syntactic constructions in natural language seem to generate ontological commitments to a dazzling array of metaphysical categories - aggregations, sets, ordered n-tuples, possible worlds, intensional entities, ideal objects, species, intensive and extensive quantities, stuffs, situations, states, courses of events, nonexistent objects, intentional and discourse objects, general objects, plural objects, variable objects, arbitrary objects, vague kinds and concepts, fuzzy sets, and so forth. But just because a syntactic construction in some natural language appears to invoke a new category of entity, (...)
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  8. George Bealer (1983). Completeness in the Theory of Properties, Relations, and Propositions. Journal of Symbolic Logic 48 (2):415-426.
    Higher-order theories of properties, relations, and propositions are known to be essentially incomplete relative to their standard notions of validity. It turns out that the first-order theory of PRPs that results when first-order logic is supplemented with a generalized intensional abstraction operation is complete. The construction involves the development of an intensional algebraic semantic method that does not appeal to possible worlds, but rather takes PRPs as primitive entities. This allows for a satisfactory treatment of both the modalities and the (...)
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  9. George Bealer (1982). Quality and Concept. Oxford University Press.
    This study provides a unified theory of properties, relations, and propositions (PRPs). Two conceptions of PRPs have emerged in the history of philosophy. The author explores both of these traditional conceptions and shows how they can be captured by a single theory.
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  10. George Bealer (1979). Theories of Properties, Relations, and Propositions. Journal of Philosophy 76 (11):634-648.
    This is the only complete logic for properties, relations, and propositions (PRPS) that has been formulated to date. First, an intensional abstraction operation is adjoined to first-order quantifier logic, Then, a new algebraic semantic method is developed. The heuristic used is not that of possible worlds but rather that of PRPS taken at face value. Unlike the possible worlds approach to intensional logic, this approach yields a logic for intentional (psychological) matters, as well as modal matters. At the close of (...)
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  11. Corine Besson (2016). Trenton Merricks Propositions. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2016.
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  12. Jean-Yves Béziau (2007). Sentence, Proposition and Identity. Synthese 154 (3):371 - 382.
    In this paper we discuss the distinction between sentence and proposition from the perspective of identity. After criticizing Quine, we discuss how objects of logical languages are constructed, explaining what is Kleene’s congruence—used by Bourbaki with his square—and Paul Halmos’s view about the difference between formulas and objects of the factor structure, the corresponding boolean algebra, in case of classical logic. Finally we present Patrick Suppes’s congruence approach to the notion of proposition, according to which a whole hierarchy of congruences (...)
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  13. Alexander Paul Bozzo (2011). Functions or Propositional Functions? [REVIEW] Russell 30 (2):161-8.
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  14. João Branquinho (2000). On the Individuation of Fregean Propositions. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000:17-27.
    The aim of the paper is to sketch a principle of individuation that is intended to serve the Fregean notion of a proposition, a notion I take for granted. A salient feature of Fregean propositions, i.e. complexes of modes of presentation of objects, is that they are fine-grained items, so fine-grained that even synonymous sentences might express different Fregean propositions. My starting point is the principle labelled by Gareth Evans the Intuitive Criterion of Difference for Thoughts, which states that it (...)
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  15. Rachael Briggs & Mark Jago (2012). Propositions and Same-Saying: Introduction. Synthese 189 (1):1-10.
    Philosophers often talk about the things we say, or believe, or think, or mean. The things are often called ‘propositions’. A proposition is what one believes, or thinks, or means when one believes, thinks, or means something. Talk about propositions is ubiquitous when philosophers turn their gaze to language, meaning and thought. But what are propositions? Is there a single class of things that serve as the objects of belief, the bearers of truth, and the meanings of utterances? How do (...)
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  16. Berit Brogaard (2012). Transient Truths: An Essay in the Metaphysics of Propositions. OUP Usa.
    Transient Truths provides the first book-length exposition and defense of the opposing view, temporalism: these are contents that can change their truth-values along with changes in the world.
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  17. Berit Brogaard (2008). Sea Battle Semantics. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):326–335.
    The assumption that the future is open makes well known problems for traditional semantics. According to a commonly held intuition, today's occurrence of the sentence 'There will be a sea battle tomorrow', while truth-valueless today, will have a determinate truth-value by tomorrow night. Yet given traditional semantics, sentences that are truth-valueless now cannot later 'become' true. Relativistic semantics has been claimed to do a better job of accommodating intuitions about future contingents than non-relativistic semantics does. However, intuitions about future contingents (...)
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  18. Susan Brower-Toland (2013). Can God Know More? A Case Study in the Later Medieval Debate About Propositions. In Charles Bolyard & Rondo Keele (eds.), Later Medieval Metaphysics: Ontology, Language, and Logic. Fordham University Press 161-187.
    This paper traces a rather peculiar debate between William Ockham, Walter Chatton, and Robert Holcot over whether it is possible for God to know more than he knows. Although the debate specifically addresses a theological question about divine knowledge, the central issue at stake in it is a purely philosophical question about the nature and ontological status of propositions. The theories of propositions that emerge from the discussion appear deeply puzzling, however. My aim in this paper is to show that (...)
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  19. Herman Cappelen & John Hawthorne (2011). Reply to Lasersohn, MacFarlane, and Richard. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 156 (3):417-419.
    Reply to Lasersohn, MacFarlane, and Richard.
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  20. Massimiliano Carrara & Elisabetta Sacchi (eds.) (2006). Propositions: Semantic and Ontological Issues. Rodopi.
    This special issue of GPS collects 11 papers , by leading philosophers and young researchers, which tackle more or less from close the topic of propositions by trying to provide the reader with a cross-section of the ongoing debate in this area. The raised issues range over the semantics, the ontology, the epistemology, and the philosophy of mathematics and stimulate the reader to reflect on crucial problems such as the following: are propositions objects? In the positive case, what kind of (...)
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  21. Richard Cartwright (1962). Propositions. In R. J. Butler (ed.), Analytical Philosophy, First Series. Basil Blackwell
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  22. Richard L. Cartwright (2005). Remarks on Propositional Functions. Mind 114 (456):915-927.
    Peter Geach has said that Russell's use of ‘propositional function’ is ‘hopelessly confused and inconsistent’. Geach is right, and attempts to say what exactly a Russellian propositional function is, or is supposed to be, are bound to end in frustration. Nevertheless, it may be worthwhile to pursue an account of propositional functions that accommodates a good deal of what Russell says about them and that can provide some of what he expected of them.
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  23. Richard L. Cartwright (1968). Propositions Again. Noûs 2 (3):229-246.
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  24. David J. Chalmers (2011). Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account. Noûs 45 (4):595-639.
    When I say ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’, I seem to express a proposition. And when I say ‘Joan believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus’, I seem to ascribe to Joan an attitude to the same proposition. But what are propositions? And what is involved in ascribing propositional attitudes?
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  25. O. Chateaubriand (2004). The Nature of Propositions: Reply to Jairo José da Silva. Manuscrito 27 (1):147-157.
    In §1 I reply to Jairo’s objections to my account of truth and falsity showing that my account of falsity does not imply that false sentences refer to something. In §2 I argue that Jairo’s main objection to my account of propositions as abstract properties is based on a misunderstanding concerning the purpose of this account. In §3 I examine Jairo’s suggestion that contradictory sentences can be said to describe possible states of affairs.
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  26. Gennaro Chierchia (1994). Intensionality and Context Change. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 3 (2):141-168.
    It is arguably desirable to have a theory of meaning that (i) does not identify propositions with sets of worlds, (ii) enables to capture the dynamic character of semantic interpretation and (iii) provides the basis for a semantic program that incorporates and extends the achievements of Montague semantics. A theory of properties and propositions that meets these desiderata is developed and several applications to the semantic analysis of natural languages are explored.
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  27. Alonzo Church (1951). The Need for Abstract Entities in Semantic Analysis. Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80 (1):100-112.
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  28. Tadeusz Ciecierski (2011). A Problem with Structured Propositions. In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Philosophical and Formal Approaches to Linguistic Analysis. Ontos-Verlag 81.
    The paper shows that the paradox of the totality of propositions rest on assumptions characteristic of some theories of structured contents (like Jeffrey King's "new account of structured propositions").
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  29. Tadeusz Ciecierski (2009). The Multiple-Proposition Approach Reconsidered. Logique Et Analyse 208 (208):423-440.
    The paper contains a critical analysis of pluripropositionalism (or: multiple proposition approach), the view defended in recent years by authors such as Eros Corazza, Kepa Korta and John Perry.
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  30. Robin Cooper, Austinian Propositions Davidsonian Events and Perception Complements.
    Intuitively Austinian propositions are propositions that tell us something about a situation In this paper we will consider Austinian propositions and the associated notion that situations support infons which are to be found in situation theory and situation semantics We will try to tease out the consequences of taking the Austinian approach advocated in situation semantics as opposed to a very similar approach originally proposed by Davidson That is that event predicates where events are to be generally conceived so as (...)
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  31. Eros Corazza (2012). Same-Saying, Pluri-Propositionalism, and Implicatures. Mind and Language 27 (5):546-569.
    In combining a pluri‐propositionalist framework concerning alleged conventional implicatures, and a pluri‐propositionalist framework distinguishing various levels of content associated with a single utterance, I defend a Grice‐inspired model of communication. In so doing, I rely on the distinction between what is said, i.e. what is semantically encoded, and what is pragmatically implicated. I show how the notion of same‐saying plays a central role in dealing with problems pertaining to communication insofar as it permits us to posit a stability of content (...)
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  32. Tim Crane (1992). Numbers and Propositions: Reply to Melia. Analysis 52 (4):253-256.
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  33. Tim Crane (1990). An Alleged Analogy Between Numbers and Propositions. Analysis 50 (4):224-230.
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  34. M. J. Cresswell (2008). Does Every Proposition Have a Unique Contradictory? Analysis 68 (298):112–114.
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  35. Jairo da Silva (2004). On the Nature of the Proposition. Manuscrito 27 (1):141-146.
    I present here my criticism of Chateaubriand’s account of propositions as having an identifying character with respect to reality. I claim that propositions are better understood as pictures of possible states-of-affairs, and that this account is more natural considering the acts of judgment that are at the origin of propositions. I also present a possible way of understanding the notion of a possible state-of-affairs that takes care of the seemingly absurd case of necessarily false, but meaningful propositions.
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  36. Raphael Demos (1918). A Discussion of Modal Propositions and Propositions of Practice. Mind 27 (105):77-85.
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  37. Harry Deutsch (2013). Resolution of Some Paradoxes of Propositions. Analysis 74 (1):26-34.
    Solutions to Russell’s paradox of propositions and to Kaplan’s paradox are proposed based on an extension of von Neumann’s method of avoiding paradox. It is shown that Russell’s ‘anti-Cantorian’ mappings can be preserved using this method, but Kaplan’s mapping cannot. In addition, several versions of the Epimenides paradox are discussed in light of von Neumann’s method.
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  38. Cian Dorr (2005). Propositions and Counterpart Theory. Analysis 65 (3):210–218.
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  39. Eli Dresner (2006). A Measurement Theoretic Account of Propositions. Synthese 153 (1):1 - 22.
    In the first section of this paper I review Measurement Theoretic Semantics – an approach to formal semantics modeled after the application of numbers in measurement, e.g., of length. In the second section it is argued that the measurement theoretic approach to semantics yields a novel, useful conception of propositions. In the third section the measurement theoretic view of propositions is compared with major other accounts of propositional content.
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  40. Walter Edelberg (1994). Propositions, Circumstances, Objects. Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (1):1 - 34.
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  41. George Englebretsen (1972). True Sentences and True Propositions. Mind 81 (323):451-452.
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  42. T. Fernando, Regular Relations for Temporal Propositions.
    Relations computed by finite-state transducers are applied to interpret temporal propositions in terms of strings representing finite contexts or situations. Carnap–Montague intensions mapping indices to extensions are reformulated as relations between strings that can serve as indices and extensions alike. Strings are related according to information content, temporal span and granularity, the bounds on which reflect the partiality of natural language statements. That partiality shapes not only strings-as-extensions (indicating what statements are about) but also strings-as-indices (underlying truth conditions).
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  43. A. R. J. Fisher (2014). Examination of Merricks' Primitivism About Truth. Metaphysica 15 (2):281-98.
    Trenton Merricks argues for and defends a novel version of primitivism about truth : being true is a primitive monadic but non-intrinsic property. This examination consists of the following triad: a critical discussion of Merricks’ argument for his view, a rejection of his objection against Paul Horwich’s minimalist theory of truth, and a direct objection against his view on the grounds that it entails being true is a mysterious and suspicious property. The conclusion is that Merricks’ primitivism should be rejected.
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  44. W. Friedrich & H. Luckhardt (1980). Intuitionistic Uniformity Principles for Propositions and Some Applications. Studia Logica 39 (4):361 - 369.
    This note deals with the prepositional uniformity principlep-UP: p x N A (p, x) x N p A (p, x) ( species of all propositions) in intuitionistic mathematics.p-UP is implied by WC and KS. But there are interestingp-UP-cases which require weak KS resp. WC only. UP for number species follows fromp-UP by extended bar-induction (ranging over propositions) and suitable weak continuity. As corollaries we have the disjunction property and the existential definability w.r.t. concrete objects. Other consequences are: there is no (...)
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  45. André Fuhrmann (2010). Russell´s Early Type Theory and the Paradox of Propositions. Principia 5 (1-2):19-42.
    The paradox of propositiOns, presented in Appenclix B of Russell's The Principies of Mathernatics (1903), is usually taken as Russell's principal motive, at the time, for moving from a simple to a ramified theory of types. I argue that this view is mistaken. A closer study of Russell's correspondence with Frege reveals that Russell carne to adopt a very different resolution of the paradox, calling into question not the simplicity of his early type theory but the simplicity of his early (...)
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  46. Manuel García-Carpintero & Stephan Torre (eds.) (2016). About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford University Press Uk.
    This volume addresses foundational issues concerning the nature of first-personal, or de se, thought and how such thoughts are communicated. Many have held that first-person thought motivates a revision of traditional accounts of content or motivates positing special ways of accessing such contents. Gottlob Frege held that first-person thoughts involve a subject being 'presented to himself in a particular and primitive way, in which he is presented to no-one else.' However, as Frege also noted, this raises many puzzling questions when (...)
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  47. Christopher Gauker (2012). Perception Without Propositions. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):19-50.
    In recent years, many philosophers have supposed that perceptual representations have propositional content. A prominent rationale for this supposition is the assumption that perceptions may justify beliefs, but this rationale can be doubted. This rationale may be doubted on the grounds that there do not seem to be any viable characterizations of the belief-justifying propositional contents of perceptions. An alternative is to model perceptual representations as marks in a perceptual similarity space. A mapping can be defined between points in perceptual (...)
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  48. Christopher Gauker (2003). Review of Andrea Iacona, Propositions. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (9).
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  49. Heimir Geirsson (2001). Discovering Identity. Southwest Philosophy Review 17 (2):43-57.
    Driven by the intuition that the propositions expressed by a=a and a=b, where ‘a’ and ‘b’ are codesignative names, differ in cognitive value, philosophers constructing theories of beliefs and belief attributions have been attracted to elements from both Frege’s and Russell’s theories. This, I will argue, has had the consequence that some of the theories entail that it is a necessary condition for making the astronomical discovery that Hesperus is Phosphorus that we make a mental discovery about our representations of (...)
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  50. Michael Glanzberg (2005). Presuppositions, Truth Values, and Expressing Propositions. In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth. Oxford University Press 349--396.
    Philosophers like to talk about propositions. There are many reasons for this. Perhaps the most common is that philosophers are sometimes more interested in the content of a thought or utterance than in the particular sentence or utterance that might express it on some occasion. Propositions are offered as these contents.
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