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  1. James E. Alcock (1998). Science, Pseudoscience, and Anomaly. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (2):303-303.
    My criticisms of parapsychology are neither based on its subject matter per se, nor simply on a charge of sloppy research, but rather on the whole pattern of theory and research in this domain. The lack of a positive definition of psi, the use of ad hoc principles such as psi-missing and the experimenter psi effect to account for failures to confirm hypotheses, and the failure to produce a single phenomenon that can be replicated by neutral investigators are among the (...)
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  2. Arthurstill & Windydryden (2004). The Social Psychology of "Pseudoscience": A Brief History. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 34 (3):265–290.
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  3. Lisa Bortolotti (2011). The Concept of Scientific Research. In Carlos Maria Romeo Casabona (ed.), Los Nuevos Horizontes de la Investigacion Genetica. Comares.
  4. Maarten Boudry (2013). The Hypothesis That Saves the Day: Ad Hoc Reasoning in Pseudoscience. Logique Et Analyse 223:245-258.
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  5. Maarten Boudry (2011). Exploring the Hinterland of Science. Metascience 20 (1):173-176.
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  6. Maarten Boudry & Filip Buekens (2011). The Epistemic Predicament of a Pseudoscience: Social Constructivism Confronts Freudian Psychoanalysis. Theoria 77 (2):159-179.
    Social constructivist approaches to science have often been dismissed as inaccurate accounts of scientific knowledge. In this article, we take the claims of robust social constructivism (SC) seriously and attempt to find a theory which does instantiate the epistemic predicament as described by SC. We argue that Freudian psychoanalysis, in virtue of some of its well-known epistemic complications and conceptual confusions, provides a perfect illustration of what SC claims is actually going on in science. In other words, the features SC (...)
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  7. E. M. Dadlez, William L. Andrews, Courtney Lewis & Marissa Stroud (2009). Rape, Evolution, and Pseudoscience: Natural Selection in the Academy. Journal of Social Philosophy 40 (1):75-96.
  8. Joachim L. Dagg (2003). Forgery: Prediction's Vile Twin. Science 302:783-784.
  9. Terence Rajivan Edward, Astrology, Fate and Causation.
    Some philosophers assert that astrology is a false theory. The simplest way to argue against all astrology is to identify a proposition that any kind of astrology must be committed to and then show that this proposition is false. In this paper I draw attention to some misconceptions regarding which propositions any kind of astrology is committed to.
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  10. Terence Rajivan Edward (2011). Are There Uncontroversial Error Theories? Philosophical Pathways (162).
    This paper evaluates an argument for the meta-philosophical conclusion that in order to produce a viable objection to a particular error theory, the objection must not be applicable to any error theory. The reason given for this conclusion is that error theories about some discourses are uncontroversial. But the examples given of uncontroversial error theories are not good ones, nor do there appear to be other examples available.
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  11. Andrew Lugg (1995). Pseudoscience as Structurally Flawed Practice: A Reply to A.A. Derksen. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science 26 (2):323 - 326.
    I respond to two criticisms levelled by A. A. Derksen in a recent issue of this journal against characterizing pseudoscience as structurally flawed practice: I argue that he surreptitiously invokes this conception, his official view that we should concentrate on pseudoscientists' pretensions rather than their practices notwithstanding; and I critically examine his contention that judgements of scientificity (and pseudoscientificity) cannot properly be made independently of a consideration of whether the relevant theories and practices are empirically well-confirmed.
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  12. Sebastian Lutz (2011). On an Allegedly Essential Feature of Criteria for the Demarcation of Science. The Reasoner 5 (8):125-126.
    Laudan’s argument against the possibility of a demarcation criterion for scientific theories rests on establishing that any criterion must be a necessary and sufficient condition. But Laudan’s argument at most establishes that any criterion must provide a necessary condition and a possibly different sufficient condition. His own claims suggest that such a criterion is possible.
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  13. Hans Maes & Katrien Schaubroeck (2006). Different Kinds and Aspects of Bullshit. In Hardcastle Reisch (ed.), Bullshit and Philosophy. Open Court.
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  14. Frederik A. Muller (2003). Refutability Revamped: How Quantum Mechanics Saves the Phenomena. Erkenntnis 58 (2):189 - 211.
    On the basis of the Suppes–Sneed structuralview of scientific theories, we take a freshlook at the concept of refutability,which was famously proposed by K.R. Popper in 1934 as a criterion for the demarcation of scientific theories from non-scientific ones, e.g., pseudo-scientificand metaphysical theories. By way of an introduction we argue that a clash between Popper and his critics on whether scientific theories are, in fact, refutablecan be partly explained by the fact Popper and his criticsascribed different meanings to the term (...)
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  15. Massimo Pigliucci & Maarten Boudry (eds.) (forthcoming). The Philosophy of Pseudoscience. University of Chicago Press.
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  16. George A. Reisch (1998). Pluralism, Logical Empiricism, and the Problem of Pseudoscience. Philosophy of Science 65 (2):333-348.
    I criticize conceptual pluralism, as endorsed recently by John Dupre and Philip Kitcher, for failing to supply strategies for demarcating science from non-science. Using creation-science as a test case, I argue that pluralism blocks arguments that keep creation-science in check and that metaphysical pluralism offers it positive, metaphysical support. Logical empiricism, however, still provides useful resources to reconfigure and manage the problem of creation-science in those practical and political contexts where pluralism will fail.
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  17. Victor J. Stenger, ESP and Cold Fusion Parallels in Pseudoscience.
    By the late nineteenth century, science was well established in the public mind as the primary method by which useful knowledge of the material universe is obtained. Surely, it was thought, if science can discover cathode rays and radio waves, then it should easily authenticate a phenomenon that is far more widely experienced: the supernatural power of the human mind. Non-physical, “psychic” energy appeared to be everywhere, as an integral part of human experience. Indeed, psychic forces are seemingly built into (...)
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