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  1. James E. Alcock (1998). Science, Pseudoscience, and Anomaly. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (2):303-303.
    My criticisms of parapsychology are neither based on its subject matter per se, nor simply on a charge of sloppy research, but rather on the whole pattern of theory and research in this domain. The lack of a positive definition of psi, the use of ad hoc principles such as psi-missing and the experimenter psi effect to account for failures to confirm hypotheses, and the failure to produce a single phenomenon that can be replicated by neutral investigators are among the (...)
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  2. James E. Alcock (1990). Parapsychology: Science of the Anomalous or Search for Nonmaterial Aspects of Human Existence. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (2):390-391.
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  3. Arthurstill & Windydryden (2004). The Social Psychology of "Pseudoscience": A Brief History. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 34 (3):265–290.
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  4. Monica Azzolini (2010). The Political Uses of Astrology: Predicting the Illness and Death of Princes, Kings and Popes in the Italian Renaissance. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 41 (2):135-145.
    This paper examines the production and circulation of astrological prognostications regarding the illness and death of kings, princes, and popes in the Italian Renaissance . The distribution and consumption of this type of astrological information was often closely linked to the specific political situation in which they were produced. Depending on the astrological techniques used , and the media in which they appeared these prognostications fulfilled different functions in the information economy of Renaissance Italy. Some were used to legitimise the (...)
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  5. Lisa Bortolotti (2011). The Concept of Scientific Research. In Carlos Maria Romeo Casabona (ed.), Los Nuevos Horizontes de la Investigacion Genetica. Comares
    Chapter discussing what it takes for an activity to be an instance of scientific research.
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  6. Maarten Boudry (2013). The Hypothesis That Saves the Day: Ad Hoc Reasoning in Pseudoscience. Logique Et Analyse 223:245-258.
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  7. Maarten Boudry (2011). Exploring the Hinterland of Science. Metascience 20 (1):173-176.
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  8. Maarten Boudry & Filip Buekens (2011). The Epistemic Predicament of a Pseudoscience: Social Constructivism Confronts Freudian Psychoanalysis. Theoria 77 (2):159-179.
    Social constructivist approaches to science have often been dismissed as inaccurate accounts of scientific knowledge. In this article, we take the claims of robust social constructivism (SC) seriously and attempt to find a theory which does instantiate the epistemic predicament as described by SC. We argue that Freudian psychoanalysis, in virtue of some of its well-known epistemic complications and conceptual confusions, provides a perfect illustration of what SC claims is actually going on in science. In other words, the features SC (...)
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  9. E. M. Dadlez, William L. Andrews, Courtney Lewis & Marissa Stroud (2009). Rape, Evolution, and Pseudoscience: Natural Selection in the Academy. Journal of Social Philosophy 40 (1):75-96.
  10. Joachim L. Dagg (2003). Forgery: Prediction's Vile Twin. Science 302:783-784.
  11. Terence Rajivan Edward, Astrology, Fate and Causation.
    Some philosophers assert that astrology is a false theory. The simplest way to argue against all astrology is to identify a proposition that any kind of astrology must be committed to and then show that this proposition is false. In this paper I draw attention to some misconceptions about which propositions are essential to astrology.
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  12. Terence Rajivan Edward (2011). Are There Uncontroversial Error Theories? Philosophical Pathways (162).
    This paper evaluates an argument for the conclusion that in order to produce a viable objection to a particular error theory, the objection must not be applicable to any error theory. The reason given for this conclusion is that error theories about some discourses are uncontroversial. But the examples given of uncontroversial error theories are not good ones, nor do there appear to be other examples available.
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  13. Kendrick Frazier (ed.) (2009). Science Under Siege: Defending Science, Exposing Pseudoscience. Prometheus.
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  14. Danny Frederick, A Regimented and Concise Exposition of Karl Popper’s Critical Rationalist Epistemology.
  15. Martin Gardner (1953). In the Name of Science. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 14 (1):126-127.
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  16. Geert Keil (2005). Eine fulminante Lehnstuhlkritik der Neurowissenschaften. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 53 (6/2005):951-955.
    Review of Max Bennett's and Peter Hacker's book PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF NEUROSCIENCE, Oxford University Press 2003.
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  17. Ian James Kidd (forthcoming). Why Did Feyerabend Defend Astrology? Integrity, Virtue, and the Authority of Science. Social Epistemology:1-19.
    This paper explores the relationship between epistemic integrity, virtue, and authority by offering a virtue epistemological reading of the defences of non-scientific beliefs, practices, and traditions in the writings of Paul Feyerabend. I argue that there was arobust epistemic rationale for those defences and that it can inform contemporaryreflection on the epistemic authority of the sciences. Two common explanations of the purpose of those defences are rejected as lacking textual support. A third "pluralist" reading is judged more persuasive, but found (...)
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  18. Andrew Lugg (1995). Pseudoscience as Structurally Flawed Practice: A Reply to A.A. Derksen. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 26 (2):323 - 326.
    I respond to two criticisms levelled by A. A. Derksen in a recent issue of this journal against characterizing pseudoscience as structurally flawed practice: I argue that he surreptitiously invokes this conception, his official view that we should concentrate on pseudoscientists' pretensions rather than their practices notwithstanding; and I critically examine his contention that judgements of scientificity (and pseudoscientificity) cannot properly be made independently of a consideration of whether the relevant theories and practices are empirically well-confirmed.
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  19. Sebastian Lutz (2011). On an Allegedly Essential Feature of Criteria for the Demarcation of Science. The Reasoner 5 (8):125-126.
    Laudan’s argument against the possibility of a demarcation criterion for scientific theories rests on establishing that any criterion must be a necessary and sufficient condition. But Laudan’s argument at most establishes that any criterion must provide a necessary condition and a possibly different sufficient condition. His own claims suggest that such a criterion is possible.
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  20. Hans Maes & Katrien Schaubroeck (2006). Different Kinds and Aspects of Bullshit. In Hardcastle Reisch (ed.), Bullshit and Philosophy. Open Court
    In this paper, we aim to show that there is a particular kind of bullshit that is not dealt with in Harry Frankfurt’s and G.A. Cohen’s critiques of bullshit. We also point out the evaluative complexity of bullshit. Frankfurt and Cohen both stress its negative and possibly destructive aspects, but one might wonder whether bullshit need always and necessarily be reprehensible. We will argue that there are positive or at least neutral aspects to some kinds of bullshit.
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  21. Frederik A. Muller (2003). Refutability Revamped: How Quantum Mechanics Saves the Phenomena. Erkenntnis 58 (2):189 - 211.
    On the basis of the Suppes–Sneed structuralview of scientific theories, we take a freshlook at the concept of refutability,which was famously proposed by K.R. Popper in 1934 as a criterion for the demarcation of scientific theories from non-scientific ones, e.g., pseudo-scientificand metaphysical theories. By way of an introduction we argue that a clash between Popper and his critics on whether scientific theories are, in fact, refutablecan be partly explained by the fact Popper and his criticsascribed different meanings to the term (...)
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  22. Seungbae Park (2016). To Be Scientific Is To Be Interactive. European Journal of Science and Theology 12 (1):77-86.
    Hempel, Popper, and Kuhn argue that to be scientific is to be testable, to be falsifiable, and most nearly to do normal science, respectively. I argue that to be scientific is largely to be interactive, offering some examples from science to show that the ideas from different fields of science interact with one another. The results of the interactions are that hypotheses become more plausible, new phenomena are explained and predicted, we understand phenomena from a new perspective, and our worldview (...)
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  23. Massimo Pigliucci & Maarten Boudry (eds.) (2013). The Philosophy of Pseudoscience. University of Chicago Press.
    What sets the practice of rigorously tested, sound science apart from pseudoscience? In this volume, the contributors seek to answer this question, known to philosophers of science as “the demarcation problem.” This issue has a long history in philosophy, stretching as far back as the early twentieth century and the work of Karl Popper. But by the late 1980s, scholars in the field began to treat the demarcation problem as impossible to solve and futile to ponder. However, the essays that (...)
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  24. George A. Reisch (1998). Pluralism, Logical Empiricism, and the Problem of Pseudoscience. Philosophy of Science 65 (2):333-348.
    I criticize conceptual pluralism, as endorsed recently by John Dupre and Philip Kitcher, for failing to supply strategies for demarcating science from non-science. Using creation-science as a test case, I argue that pluralism blocks arguments that keep creation-science in check and that metaphysical pluralism offers it positive, metaphysical support. Logical empiricism, however, still provides useful resources to reconfigure and manage the problem of creation-science in those practical and political contexts where pluralism will fail.
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  25. Hardcastle Reisch (ed.) (2006). Bullshit and Philosophy. Open Court.
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  26. Victor J. Stenger, ESP and Cold Fusion Parallels in Pseudoscience.
    By the late nineteenth century, science was well established in the public mind as the primary method by which useful knowledge of the material universe is obtained. Surely, it was thought, if science can discover cathode rays and radio waves, then it should easily authenticate a phenomenon that is far more widely experienced: the supernatural power of the human mind. Non-physical, “psychic” energy appeared to be everywhere, as an integral part of human experience. Indeed, psychic forces are seemingly built into (...)
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  27. Paul R. Thagard (1978). Why Astrology is a Pseudoscience. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1978:223 - 234.
    Using astrology as a case study, this paper attempts to establish a criterion for demarcating science from pseudoscience. Numerous reasons for considering astrology to be a pseudoscience are evaluated and rejected; verifiability and falsifiability are briefly discussed. A theory is said to be pseudoscientific if and only if (1) it has been less progressive than alternative theories over a long period of time, and faces many unsolved problems, but (2) the community of practitioners makes little attempt to develop the theory (...)
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  28. Song Tian, Science Fans: A Basic Description and Analysis of the Emergence of a Pseudoscience Movement in China.
    Science fans (minjian kexue aihaozhe) are a special group devoted to so-called scientific activities outside of the science community. They are different from amateur scientists (or science amateur) (yeyu kexue aihaozhe) in the way that they do not have proper channels for communication with the scientific community. The populations of Science fans' numbers increased sharply in the early 1980's in China because of the social environment, the public perception of science at that time, the misunderstanding of scientific activities by mass (...)
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