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  1. Abelson Abelson (1960). ANDLER and KESSEN'S The Language of Psychology. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 21:124.
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  2. Frederick David Abraham & Albert R. Gilgen (1995). Chaos Theory in Psychology.
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  3. Leah E. Adams-Curtis (1989). Does a Piagetian Description Work? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):588.
  4. Laird Addis (1981). Dispositions, Explanation, and Behavior. Inquiry 24 (2):205 – 227.
    According to the theory of dispositions here defended, to have a disposition is to have some (non-dispositional) property that enters into a law of a certain form. The theory does not have the crucial difficulty of the singular material implication account of dispositions, but at the same time avoids the unfortunate notion of 'reduction sentences'. It is further argued that no dispositional explanation is one of the covering-law type; but the theory shows how, for any dispositional explanation! To construct a (...)
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  5. Arif Ahmed (2015). Infallibility in the Newcomb Problem. Erkenntnis 80 (2):261-273.
    It is intuitively attractive to think that it makes a difference in Newcomb’s problem whether or not the predictor is infallible, in the sense of being certainly actually correct. This paper argues that that view is irrational and manifests a well-documented cognitive illusion.
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  6. Kenneth Aizawa (1999). Connectionist Rules: A Rejoinder to Horgan and Tienson's Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology. Acta Analytica 22 (22):59-85.
  7. Kenneth Aizawa (1999). Terence Horgan and John Tienson, Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology. Minds and Machines 9 (2):270-273.
  8. Emrah Aktunc (2011). Experimental Knowledge in Cognitive Neuroscience. Dissertation, Virginia Tech
    This is a work in the epistemology of functional neuroimaging (fNI) and it applies the error-statistical (ES) philosophy to inferential problems in fNI to formulate and address these problems. This gives us a clear, accurate, and more complete understanding of what we can learn from fNI and how we can learn it. I review the works in the epistemology of fNI which I group into two categories; the first category consists of discussions of the theoretical significance of fNI findings and (...)
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  9. Mark Alfano, James Beebe & Brian Robinson (2012). The Centrality of Belief and Reflection in Knobe-Effect Cases. The Monist 95 (2):264-289.
    Recent work in experimental philosophy has shown that people are more likely to attribute intentionality, knowledge, and other psychological properties to someone who causes a bad side effect than to someone who causes a good one. We argue that all of these asymmetries can be explained in terms of a single underlying asymmetry involving belief attribution because the belief that one’s action would result in a certain side effect is a necessary component of each of the psychological attitudes in question. (...)
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  10. Colin Allen (1995). It Isn't What You Think: A New Idea About Intentional Causation. Noûs 29 (1):115-126.
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  11. William P. Alston (1986). An Action-Plan Interpretation of Purposive Explanations of Actions. Theory and Decision 20 (3):275-299.
  12. Ron Amundson & Laurence D. Smith (1984). Clark Hull, Robert Cummins, and Functional Analysis. Philosophy of Science 51 (December):657-666.
    Robert Cummins has recently used the program of Clark Hull to illustrate the effects of logical positivist epistemology upon psychological theory. On Cummins's account, Hull's theory is best understood as a functional analysis, rather than a nomological subsumption. Hull's commitment to the logical positivist view of explanation is said to have blinded him to this aspect of this theory, and thus restricted its scope. We will argue that this interpretation of Hull's epistemology, though common, is mistaken. Hull's epistemological views were (...)
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  13. Kristin Andrews (2003). Knowing Mental States: The Asymmetry of Psychological Prediction and Explanation. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press
    Perhaps because both explanation and prediction are key components to understanding, philosophers and psychologists often portray these two abilities as though they arise from the same competence, and sometimes they are taken to be the same competence. When explanation and prediction are associated in this way, they are taken to be two expressions of a single cognitive capacity that differ from one another only pragmatically. If the difference between prediction and explanation of human behavior is merely pragmatic, then anytime I (...)
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  14. Andre Ariew, Robert C. Cummins & Mark Perlman (eds.) (2002). Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology. Oxford University Press.
  15. Angela Arkway (2000). The Simulation Theory, the Theory Theory and Folk Psychological Explanation. Philosophical Studies 98 (2):115-137.
  16. Angela Arkway, Folk Psychological Explanation, and Causal Laws.
  17. A. P. Atkinson (1998). Persons, Systems and Subsystems: The Explanatory Scope of Cognitive Psychology. Acta Analytica 20:43-60.
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  18. Robert Nemir Audi (1967). The Explanation of Human Action in Common Sense and Contemporary Psychology. Dissertation, University of Michigan
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  19. Guy Axtell, Philosophical Implications of Dual Process Theory.
    A further exploration of philosophical implications of ecological rationality and dual-process theories. Topics include the reasons-responsiveness of automaticity and heuristic/T1 processing; DPT as a response to epistemic situationism; implications for character epistemology of substantial individual differences shown in T2 critical reasoning dispositions; and connections to work on more effective pedagogy for developing critical reasoning skills and dispositions.
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  20. Guy Axtell, Thinking Twice About Virtue and Vice.
    This chapter provides an empirical defense of credit theories of knowing against Alfano’s the-ses of inferential cognitive situationism and of epistemic situationism. It also develops a Nar-row-Broad Spectrum of agency-ascriptions in reply to Olin and Doris’ ‘trade-off problem.’ In order to support the claim that credit theories can treat many cases of success through heuristic cognitive strategies as credit-conferring, the paper develops the compatibility between VE and dual-process theories (DPT) in cognitive psychology. A genuine convergence between VE and DPT is (...)
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  21. R. J. B. (1964). The Explanation of Behavior. Review of Metaphysics 18 (2):387-387.
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  22. Lynne Rudder Baker (2002). Attitudes in Action: A Causal Account. Manuscrito 25 (3):47-78.
    This article aims to vindicate the commonsensical view that what we think affects what we do. In order to show that mental properties like believing, desiring and intending are causally explanatory, I propose a nonreductive, materialistic account that identifies beliefs and desires by their content, and that shows how differences in the contents of beliefs and desires can make causal differences in what we do.
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  23. Gillian A. Barker, Patrick G. Derr & Nicholas S. Thompson (2004). The Perils of Confusing Nesting with Chaining in Psychological Explanations. Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):293 - 303.
    Despite its diminished importance amongst philosophers, the deductive-nomological framework is still important to contemporary behavioral scientists. Behavioral theorists operating within this framework must be careful to distinguish between nesting and chaining. Explanations are chained when the explanandum sentence of one explanation is one of the antecedent conditions of another. They are nested when one of the antecedent conditions or the explanandum sentence of one explanation is one of the covering laws of another. Confusion between nesting and chaining leads to explanation (...)
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  24. Gerald W. Barnes (1990). George Wilson, The Intentionality of Human Action Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 10 (5):212-216.
  25. William M. Baum (2005). Understanding Behaviorism: Behavior, Culture, and Evolution. Blackwell.
    Understanding Behaviorism explains the basis of behavior analysis and its application to human problems in a scholarly but accessible manner. Behaviorism is defined as the proposition that a science of behavior is possible, and the book begins by exploring the question of whether behavior is free or determined, relating behaviorism to pragmatism, and showing how feelings and thoughts can be treated scientifically. Baum then discusses ancient concepts such as purpose, knowledge, and thought, as well as social problems such as freedom, (...)
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  26. William Bechtel (2008). Mechanisms in Cognitive Psychology: What Are the Operations? Philosophy of Science 75 (5):983-994.
    Cognitive psychologists, like biologists, frequently describe mechanisms when explaining phenomena. Unlike biologists, who can often trace material transformations to identify operations, psychologists face a more daunting task in identifying operations that transform information. Behavior provides little guidance as to the nature of the operations involved. While not itself revealing the operations, identification of brain areas involved in psychological mechanisms can help constrain attempts to characterize the operations. In current memory research, evidence that the same brain areas are involved in what (...)
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  27. William Bechtel (2007). Reducing Psychology While Maintaining its Autonomy Via Mechanistic Explanations. In M. Schouten & H. L. De Joong (eds.), The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction. Blackwell Publishing
    Arguments for the autonomy of psychology or other higher-level sciences have often taken the form of denying the possibility of reduction. The form of reduction most proponents and critics of the autonomy of psychology have in mind is theory reduction. Mechanistic explanations provide a different perspective. Mechanistic explanations are reductionist insofar as they appeal to lower-level entities—the component parts of a mechanism and their operations— to explain a phenomenon. However, unlike theory reductions, mechanistic explanations also recognize the fundamental role of (...)
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  28. William Bechtel & Adele Abrahamsen (2005). Mechanistic Explanation and the Nature-Nurture Controversy. Bulletin d'Histoire Et d'pistmologie Des Sciences de La Vie 12:75-100.
    Both in biology and psychology there has been a tendency on the part of many investigators to focus solely on the mature organism and ignore development. There are many reasons for this, but an important one is that the explanatory framework often invoked in the life sciences for understanding a given phenomenon, according to which explanation consists in identifying the mechanism that produces that phenomenon, both makes it possible to side-step the development issue and to provide inadequate resources for actually (...)
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  29. William Bechtel & Cory D. Wright (2009). What is Psychological Explanation? In P. Calvo & J. Symons (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge 113--130.
    Due to the wide array of phenomena that are of interest to them, psychologists offer highly diverse and heterogeneous types of explanations. Initially, this suggests that the question "What is psychological <span class='Hi'>explanation</span>?" has no single answer. To provide appreciation of this diversity, we begin by noting some of the more common types of explanations that psychologists provide, with particular focus on classical examples of explanations advanced in three different areas of psychology: psychophysics, physiological psychology, and information-processing psychology. To (...)
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  30. Jose Luis Bermudez (2002). Rationality and Psychological Explanation Without Language. In Jose Luis Bermudez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature. Clarendon
  31. Jose Luis Bermudez & Alan Millar (eds.) (2002). Reason and Nature. Clarendon.
    Reason and Nature investigates the norms of reason--the standards which contribute to determining whether beliefs, inferences, and actions are rational. Nine philosophers and two psychologists discuss what kinds of things these norms are, how they can be situated within the natural world, and what role they play in the psychological explanation of belief and action. Current work in the theory of rationality is subject to very diverse influences ranging from experimental and theoretical psychology, through philosophy of logic and language, to (...)
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  32. Sara Bernal (2005). Object Lessons: Spelke Principles and Psychological Explanation. Philosophical Psychology 18 (3):289-312.
    There is general agreement that from the first few months of life, our apprehension of physical objects accords, in some sense, with certain principles. In one philosopher's locution, we are 'perceptually sensitive' to physical principles describing the behavior of objects. But in what does this accordance or sensitivity consist? Are these principles explicitly represented or merely 'implemented'? And what sort of explanation do we accomplish in claiming that our object perception accords with these principles? My main goal here is to (...)
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  33. Michael H. Birnbaum (1984). Philosophical Criteria for Psychological Explanation. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 22 (6):562-565.
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  34. J. Bishop (2001). McCANN, HJ-The Works of Agency. Philosophical Books 42 (3):232-232.
  35. Ned Block (1971). Are Mechanistic and Teleological Explanations of Behaviour Incompatible? Philosophical Quarterly 21 (April):109-117.
  36. Margaret A. Boden (1981). Minds And Mechanisms: Philosophical Psychology And Computational Models. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
  37. John Herbert Bolender (1996). Explaining Psychology: Psychophysical Reductionism, Explanation, and the Unity of Science. Dissertation, Columbia University
    Since functionalism implies that mental categories cross classify physical categories, it has classically been construed as precluding both the reduction of psychological theory to physical theory as well as the replacement of psychological by physical theory. However, many recent arguments for psychophysical reductionism and eliminative materialism also presuppose that mental categories cross classify physical categories. This raises questions as to the true significance of the cross classification of mental and physical categories. ;I argue that viewing psychophysical reductionism or eliminative materialism (...)
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  38. Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome (2012). Affective Dimensions of the Phenomenon of Double Bookkeeping in Delusions. Emotion Review 4 (2):187-191.
    It has been argued that schizophrenic delusions are “behaviourally inert.” This is evidence for the phenomenon of “double bookkeeping,” according to which people are not consistent in their commitment to the content of their delusions. The traditional explanation for the phenomenon is that people do not genuinely believe the content of their delusions. In the article, we resist the traditional explanation and offer an alternative hypothesis: people with delusions often fail to acquire or to maintain the motivation to act on (...)
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  39. George Botterill (2009). Right and Wrong Reasons in Folk-Psychological Explanation. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (4):463 – 488.
    Davidson argued that the fact we can have a reason for acting, and yet not be the reason why we act, requires explanation of action in terms of the agent's reasons to be causal. The present paper agrees with Dickenson (_Pacific Philosophical Quarterly_, 2007) in taking this argument to be an inference to the best explanation. However, its target phenomenon is the very existence of a case in which an agent has more than one reason, but acts exclusively becaue of (...)
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  40. Raymond Boudon & Riccardo Viale (2000). Reasons, Cognition and Society. Mind and Society 1 (1):41-56.
    Homo sociologicus and homo oeconomicus are, for different reasons, unsatisfactory models for the social sciences. A third model, called “rational model in the broad sense”, seems better endowed to cope with the many different expressions of rationality of the social agent. Some contributions by Weber, Durkheim and Marx are early examples of the application of this model of social explanation based on good subjective reasons. According to this model and to the evidence of cognitive anthropology, it is possible to reconcile (...)
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  41. Myles Brand (1987). Intending and Acting: Toward a Naturalized Action Theory. Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):49-54.
  42. Myles Brand (1970). Causes of Actions. Journal of Philosophy 67 (21):932-947.
  43. Johannes L. Brandl, Marian David & Leopold Stubenberg (eds.) (2001). Agents and Their Actions. Rodopi.
    IntroductionE.J. LOWE: Event Causation and Agent CausationRalf STOECKER: Agents in ActionGeert KEIL: How Do We Ever Get Up? On the Proximate Causation of Actions and EventsMaria ALVAREZ: Letting Happen, Omissions, and CausationFrederick STOUTLAND: Responsive Action and the Belief-Desire ModelMarco IORIO: How Are Agents Related to Their Actions? The Existentialist ResponseJens KULENKAMPFF: What Oedipus Did When He Married Jocasta or What Ancient Tragedy Tells Us About Agents, Their Actions, and the WorldRüdiger BITTNER: Agents as RulersMonika BETZLER: How Can an Agent Rationally (...)
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  44. Richard Brandt, Jaegwon Kim & Sidney Morgenbesser (1963). Wants as Explanations of Actions. Journal of Philosophy 60 (15):425-435.
    Some features of the concept of a want, and of the explaining relation in which a want may stand to an action, have not received sufficient attention. In what follows we shall offer some suggestions and descriptions which may be one step toward remedy of this situationi. We shall be at pains to point out the extent to which the features we describe fit in with a conception of the explanations of actions conforming to the inferential (deductive or inductive) and (...)
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  45. Michael E. Bratman (1995). Review of Action, Intention, and Reason by Robert Audi. [REVIEW] Ethics 105 (4):927-.
  46. Michael E. Bratman (1990). Dretske's Desires. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):795-800.
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  47. David Martin Braun (1987). Content and Psychological Explanation. Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles
    Thought experiments show that people who are physically identical but have different environments can have mental states with different contents. But many philosophers think that physically identical people must also be psychologically identical. They therefore believe these thought experiments show that differences in mental state content do not necessarily mark genuine psychological differences, but are instead merely fallible signs of psychological differences. They conclude that content attributions do not have a fundamental role to play in psychological explanation. ;I argue that (...)
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  48. David Howard Brendel (1999). Psychoanalysis, Neuropsychiatry, and the Mind: A Philosophical Inquiry Into the Contemporary Status of Psychological Explanation. Dissertation, The University of Chicago
    The rapid growth of neuroscience in the twentieth century raises questions about the relationship between psychological and neurological explanations of human action. Paul Churchland's theory of eliminative materialism says the trajectory of explanation is away from psychology and toward neuroscience, thereby raising the possibility that someday psychological concepts will disappear from our vocabulary. I open this essay by arguing why I consider eliminative materialism a coherent set of philosophical claims which should be engaged seriously. I proceed to call its core (...)
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  49. Jason Bridges (2006). Teleofunctionalism and Psychological Explanation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 28 (September):359-372.
    Fred Dretske’s teleofunctional theory of content aims to simultaneously solve two ground-floor philosophical puzzles about mental content: the problem of naturalism and the problem of epiphenomenalism. It is argued here that his theory fails on the latter score. Indeed, the theory insures that content can have no place in the causal explanation of action at all. The argument for this conclusion depends upon only very weak premises about the nature of causal explanation. The difficulties Dretske’s theory encounters indicate the severe (...)
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  50. Robert Brown (1965). The Explanation of Behaviour. [REVIEW] Philosophy 40 (October):344-348.
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