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  1. Louise M. Antony (1995). Law and Order in Psychology. Philosophical Perspectives 9:429-46.
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  2. Mark Bauer (2010). Psychological Laws (Revisited). Erkenntnis 73 (1):41 - 53.
    It has been suggested that a functionalist understanding of the metaphysics of psychological typing eliminates the prospect for psychological laws. Kim, Millikan, and Shapiro have each separately argued that, if psychological types as functional types are multiply realized, then the diversity of realizing mechanisms demonstrates that there can be no laws of psychology. Additionally, Millikan has argued that the role of functional attribution in the explanation of historical kinds limits the formulation of psychological principles to particular taxa; hence, psychological laws (...)
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  3. William Bechtel & Cory D. Wright (2009). What is Psychological Explanation? In P. Calvo & J. Symons (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge. 113--130.
    Due to the wide array of phenomena that are of interest to them, psychologists offer highly diverse and heterogeneous types of explanations. Initially, this suggests that the question "What is psychological explanation?" has no single answer. To provide appreciation of this diversity, we begin by noting some of the more common types of explanations that psychologists provide, with particular focus on classical examples of explanations advanced in three different areas of psychology: psychophysics, physiological psychology, and information-processing psychology. To analyze what (...)
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  4. Margaret Braithwaite (1949). Causal Laws in Psychology. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 23:45-60.
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  5. Martin Carrier (1998). In Defense of Psychological Laws. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12 (3):217 – 232.
    Abstract It is argued that psychological explanations involve psychological generalizations that exhibit the same features as laws of physics. On the basis of the ?systematic theory of lawhood?, characteristic features of laws of nature are elaborated. Investigating some examples of explanations taken from cognitive psychology shows that these features can also be identified in psychological generalizations. Particular attention is devoted to the notion of ?ccteris?paribus laws?. It is argued that laws of psychology are indeed ceteris?paribus laws. However, this feature does (...)
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  6. Axel Cleeremans (forthcoming). Attention and Awareness in Sequence Learning. Proceedings of the Fiftheenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society:227-232.
    referred to as implicit learning (Reber, 1989). Implicit learning contrasts with explicit learning (exhibited for.
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  7. Axel Cleeremans (1998). Implicit Learning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2 (10):406-416.
    Implicit learning is the process through which we become sensitive to certain regularities in the environment (1) in the absence of intention to learn about those regularities (2) in the absence of awareness that one is learning, and (3) in such a way that the resulting knowledge is difficult to express.
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  8. Axel Cleeremans & Arnaud Destrebecqz (2005). Real Rules Are Conscious. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (1):19-20.
    68 words Main Text: 1256 words References: 192 words Total Text: 1516 words.
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  9. Axel Cleeremans & Arnaud Destrebecqz (2003). The Self-Organizing Conundrum. (Commentary on Perruchet & Vinter on The Self-Organizing Conundrum. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (334).
    59 words Main Text: 1108 words References: 114 words Total Text: 1281 words.
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  10. Axel Cleeremans & Luis Jimenez (2002). Implicit Learning and Consciousness: A Graded, Dynamic Perspective. In Robert M. French & Axel Cleeremans (eds.), Implicit Learning and Consciousness: An Empirical. Psychology Press.
    While the study of implicit learning is nothing new, the field as a whole has come to embody — over the last decade or so — ongoing questioning about three of the most fundamental debates in the cognitive sciences: The nature of consciousness, the nature of mental representation (in particular the difficult issue of abstraction), and the role of experience in shaping the cognitive system. Our main goal in this chapter is to offer a framework that attempts to integrate current (...)
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  11. Roberto Cordeschi (1991). The Discovery of the Artificial: Some Protocybernetic Developments 1930-1940. Artificial Intelligence and Society 5 (3):218-238.
    In this paper I start from a definition of “culture of the artificial” which might be stated by referring to the background of philosophical, methodological, pragmatical assumptions which characterizes the development of the information processing analysis of mental processes and of some trends in contemporary cognitive science: in a word, the development of AI as a candidate science of mind. The aim of this paper is to show how (with which plausibility and limitations) the discovery of the mentioned background might (...)
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  12. Sean Crawford (2003). Relational Properties, Causal Powers and Psychological Laws. Acta Analytica 18 (30-31):193-216.
    This paper argues that Twin Earth twins belong to the same psychological natural kind, but that the reason for this is not that the causal powers of mental states supervene on local neural structure. Fodor’s argument for this latter thesis is criticized and found to rest on a confusion between it and the claim that Putnamian and Burgean type relational psychological properties do not affect the causal powers of the mental states that have them. While it is true that Putnamian (...)
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  13. Arnaud Destrebecqz & Axel Cleeremans (2001). Can Sequence Learning Be Implicit? New Evidence with the Process Dissociation Procedure. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 8 (2):343-350.
    Running head: Implicit sequence learning ABSTRACT Can we learn without awareness? Although this issue has been extensively explored through studies of implicit learning, there is currently no agreement about the extent to which knowledge can be acquired and projected onto performance in an unconscious way. The controversy, like that surrounding implicit memory, seems to be at least in part attributable to unquestioned acceptance of the unrealistic assumption that tasks are process-pure, that is, that a given task exclusively involves either implicit (...)
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  14. Arnaud Destrebecqz, Philippe Peigneux, Steven Laureys, Christian Degueldre, Guy Del Fiore, Joel Aerts, Andre Luxen, Martia Van Der Linden, Axel Cleeremans & Pierre Maquet (2005). The Neural Correlates of Implicit and Explicit Sequence Learning: Interacting Networks Revealed by the Process Dissociation Procedure. Learning and Memory 12 (5):480-490.
    In cognitive neuroscience, dissociating the brain networks that ing—has thus become one of the best empirical situations subtend conscious and nonconscious memories constitutes a through which to study the mechanisms of implicit learning, very complex issue, both conceptually and methodologically.
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  15. Arnaud Destrebecqz, Philippe Peigneux, Steven Laureys, Christian Degueldre, Guy Del Fiore, Joel Aerts, Andre Luxen, Martial van der Linden, Axel Cleeremans & Pierre Maquet (2003). Cerebral Correlates of Explicit Sequence Learning. Cognitive Brain Research 16 (3):391-398.
    Using positron emission tomography (PET) and regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) measurements, we investigated the cerebral correlates of consciousness in a sequence learning task through a novel application of the Process Dissociation Procedure, a behavioral paradigm that makes it possible to separately assess conscious and unconscious contributions to performance. Results show that the metabolic response in the anterior cingulate / mesial prefrontal cortex (ACC / MPFC) is exclusively and specifically correlated with the explicit component of performance during recollection of a (...)
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  16. Jerry A. Fodor (1991). You Can Fool Some of the People All of the Time, Everything Else Being Equal: Hedged Laws and Psychological Explanation. Mind 100 (397):19-34.
  17. Jerry A. Fodor (1989). Making Mind Matter More. Philosophical Topics 17 (1):59-79.
  18. Robert M. French & Axel Cleeremans (eds.) (2002). Implicit Learning and Consciousness: An Empirical. Psychology Press.
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  19. Vincian Gaillard, Muriel Vandenberghe, Arnaud Destrebecqz & Axel Cleeremans (2006). First and Third-Person Approaches in Implicit Learning Research. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4):709-722.
    How do we find out whether someone is conscious of some information or not? A simple answer is “We just ask them”! However, things are not so simple. Here, we review recent developments in the use of subjective and objective methods in implicit learning research and discuss the highly complex methodological problems that their use raises in the domain.
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  20. Marcello Guarini (2000). Horgan and Tienson on Ceteris Paribus Laws. Philosophy of Science 67 (2):301-315.
    Terence Horgan and John Tienson claim that folk psychological laws are different in kind from basic physical laws in at least two ways: first, physical laws do not possess the kind of ceteris paribus qualifications possessed by folk psychological laws, which means the two types of laws have different logical forms; and second, applied physical laws are best thought of as being about an idealized world and folk psychological laws about the actual world. I argue that Horgan and Tienson have (...)
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  21. Alastair Hannay (1995). Conscious Episodes and Ceteris Paribus. The Monist 78 (4):447-463.
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  22. Gilbert Harman (1967). Scriven on the Unknowability of Psychological Laws. Philosophical Studies 18 (June):61-63.
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  23. David K. Henderson (1991). On the Testability of Psychological Generalizations (Psychological Testability). Philosophy of Science (December) 586 (December):586-606.
    Rosenberg argues that intentional generalizations in the human sciences cannot be law-like because they are not amenable to significant empirical refinement. This irrefinability is said to result from the principle that supposedly controls in intentional explanation also serving as the standard for successful interpretation. The only credible evidence bearing on such a principle would then need conform to it. I argue that psychological generalizations are refinable and can be nomic. I show how empirical refinement of psychological generalizations is possible by (...)
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  24. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1990). Soft Laws. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):256-279.
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  25. Luis Jimenez, Castor Mendez & Axel Cleeremans (1996). Comparing Direct and Indirect Measures of Sequence Learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology 22 (4):948-969.
    Comparing the relative sensitivity of direct and indirect measures of learning is proposed as the best way to provide evidence for unconscious learning when both conceptual and operative definitions of awareness are lacking. This approach was first proposed by Reingold & Merikle (1988) in the context of subliminal perception. In this paper, we apply it to a choice reaction time task in which the material is generated based on a probabilistic finite-state grammar (Cleeremans, 1993). We show (1) that participants progressively (...)
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  26. Harold Kincaid (2004). Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science. Blackwell Publishing.
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  27. Harold Kincaid (2004). There Are Laws in the Social Sciences. In Christopher Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science. Blackwell Publishing. 168--186.
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  28. Richard F. Kitchener (1976). Are There Molar Psychological Laws? Philosophy of the Social Sciences 6 (2):143-154.
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  29. William G. Lycan (1981). Psychological Laws. Philosophical Topics 12 (3):9-38.
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  30. William G. Lycan (1981). Psychological Laws. Philosophical Topics 12 (3):9-38.
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  31. C. A. Mace (1949). Causal Laws in Psychology. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 23:61-68.
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  32. C. D. Mace (1949). Causal Laws in Psychology, Part III. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61:61-68.
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  33. Pierre Maquet, Steven Laureys, Philippe Peigneux, Sonia Fuchs, Christophe Petiau, Christophe Phillips, Joel Aerts, Guy Del Fiore, Christian Degueldre, Thierry Meulemans, Andre Luxen, Georges Franck, Martial Van Der Linden, Carlyle Smith & Axel Cleeremans (2000). Experience-Dependent Changes in Cerebral Activation During Human Rem Sleep. Nature Neuroscience 3 (8):831-36.
    Pierre Maquet1,2,6, Steven Laureys1,2, Philippe Peigneux1,2,3, Sonia Fuchs1, Christophe Petiau1, Christophe Phillips1,6, Joel Aerts1, Guy Del Fiore1, Christian Degueldre1, Thierry Meulemans3, André Luxen1, Georges Franck1,2, Martial Van Der Linden3, Carlyle Smith4 and Axel Cleeremans5.
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  34. G. Marcello (2000). Horgan and Tienson on Ceteris Paribus Laws. Philosophy of Science 67 (2):301-315.
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  35. Peter Mott (1992). Fodor and Ceteris Paribus Laws. Mind 101 (402):335-46.
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  36. Andrea Onofri (2013). On Non-Pragmatic Millianism. Philosophical Studies 166 (2):305-327.
    Speakers often judge the sentence “Lois Lane believes that Superman flies” to be true and the sentence “Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent flies” to be false. If Millianism is true, however, these sentences express the very same proposition and must therefore have same truth value. “Pragmatic” Millians like Salmon and Soames have tried to explain speakers’ “anti-substitution intuitions” by claiming that the two sentences are routinely used to pragmatically convey different propositions which do have different truth values. “Non-Pragmatic” Millians (...)
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  37. Paul M. Pietroski & Georges Rey (1995). When Other Things Aren't Equal: Saving Ceteris Paribus Laws From Vacuity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (1):81-110.
    A common view is that ceteris paribus clauses render lawlike statements vacuous, unless such clauses can be explicitly reformulated as antecedents of ?real? laws that face no counterinstances. But such reformulations are rare; and they are not, we argue, to be expected in general. So we defend an alternative sufficient condition for the non-vacuity of ceteris paribus laws: roughly, any counterinstance of the law must be independently explicable, in a sense we make explicit. Ceteris paribus laws will carry a plethora (...)
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  38. Ype H. Poortinga & Fons J. R. Van de Vijver (1997). Is There No Cross-Cultural Evidence in Colour Categories of Psychological Laws, Only of Cultural Rules? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (2):205-206.
    Two points are made on the basis of (mainly) the cross-cultural psychological record. The first is that cross-cultural data indicate at least weak, nontrivial constraints on colour classification. The second is that exceptions to cross-cultural regularities as described by Saunders & van Brakel are compatible with the view that constraints on colour categories are probabilistic rather than deterministic.
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  39. Howard Rachlin (1994). Behavior and Mind: The Roots of Modern Psychology. Oxford University Press.
    This book attempts to synthesize two apparently contradictory views of psychology: as the science of internal mental mechanisms and as the science of complex external behavior. Most books in the psychology and philosophy of mind reject one approach while championing the other, but Rachlin argues that the two approaches are complementary rather than contradictory. Rejection of either involves disregarding vast sources of information vital to solving pressing human problems--in the areas of addiction, mental illness, education, crime, and decision-making, to name (...)
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  40. Robert D. Rupert (2008). Ceteris Paribus Laws, Component Forces, and the Nature of Special-Science Properties. Noûs 42 (3):349-380.
    Laws of nature seem to take two forms. Fundamental physics discovers laws that hold without exception, ‘strict laws’, as they are sometimes called; even if some laws of fundamental physics are irreducibly probabilistic, the probabilistic relation is thought not to waver. In the nonfundamental, or special, sciences, matters differ. Laws of such sciences as psychology and economics hold only ceteris paribus – that is, when other things are equal. Sometimes events accord with these ceteris paribus laws (c.p. laws, hereafter), but (...)
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  41. Robert D. Rupert (2007). Realization, Completers, and Ceteris Paribus Laws in Psychology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (1):1-11.
    University of Colorado, Boulder If there are laws of psychology, they would seem to hold only ceteris paribus (c.p., hereafter), i.e., other things being equal. If a person wants that q and believes that doing a is the most efficient way to make it the case that q, then she will attempt to do a—but not, however, if she believes that a carries with it consequences much more hated than q is liked, or she believes she is incapable of doing (...)
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  42. Stephen R. Schiffer (1991). Ceteris Paribus Laws. Mind 100 (397):1-17.
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  43. Arnold Silverberg (2003). Psychological Laws. Erkenntnis 58 (3):275-302.
    John McDowell claims that the propositional attitudes, and our conceptual abilities in general, are not appropriate topics for inquiry of the sort that is done in natural science. He characterizes the natural sciences as making phenomena intelligible in terms of their place in the realm of laws of nature. He claims that this way of making phenomena intelligible contrasts crucially with essential features of our understanding of propositional attitudes and conceptual abilities. In this article I show that scientific work of (...)
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  44. Arnold Silverberg (1996). Psychological Laws and Nonmonotonic Logic. Erkenntnis 44 (2):199-224.
    In this essay I enter into a recently published debate between Stephen Schiffer and Jerry Fodor concerning whether adequate sense can be made of the ceteris paribus conditions in special science laws, much of their focus being on the case of putative psychological laws. Schiffer argues that adequate sense cannot be made of ceteris paribus clauses, while Fodor attempts to overcome Schiffer's arguments, in defense of special science laws. More recently, Peter Mott has attempted to show that Fodor's response to (...)
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  45. Wolfgang Spohn (2002). Laws, Ceteris Paribus Conditions, and the Dynamics of Belief. Erkenntnis 57 (3):373-394.
    The characteristic difference between laws and accidental generalizations lies in our epistemic or inductive attitude towards them. This idea has taken various forms and dominated the discussion about lawlikeness in the last decades. Likewise, the issue about ceteris paribus conditions is essentially about how we epistemically deal with exceptions. Hence, ranking theory with its resources of defeasible reasoning seems ideally suited to explicate these points in a formal way. This is what the paper attempts to do. Thus it will turn (...)
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  46. Karsten Stueber, Intentional Explanation, Psychological Laws, and the Irreducibility of the First Person Perspective.
    1. Introduction: Naturalism and Psychological Explanations To a large extent, contemporary philosophical debate takes place within a framework of naturalistic assumptions. From the perspective of the history of philosophy, naturalism is the legacy of positivism without its empiricist epistemology and empiricist conception of meaning and cognitive significance. Systematically, it is best to characterize naturalism as the philosophical articulation of the underlying presuppositions of a reductive scientific research program that was rather successful in the last few centuries and, equally important, promises (...)
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  47. Paul Thagard (ed.) (2007). Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. North-Holland.
    Psychology is the study of thinking, and cognitive science is the interdisciplinary investigation of mind and intelligence that also includes philosophy, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, linguistics, and anthropology. In these investigations, many philosophical issues arise concerning methods and central concepts. The Handbook of Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science contains 16 essays by leading philosophers of science that illuminate the nature of the theories and explanations used in the investigation of minds. Topics discussed include representation, mechanisms, reduction, perception, consciousness, language, emotions, (...)
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  48. Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.) (2003). Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic.
  49. Ted A. Warfield (1993). Folk-Psychological Ceteris-Paribus Laws. Philosophical Studies 71 (1):99-112.
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  50. G. Witmer (2003). Multiple Realizability and Psychological Laws: Evaluating Kim's Challenge. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. 59.
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