Related categories
Siblings:
82 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 82
  1. Gwen Adshead (2008). Vice and Viciousness. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 15 (1):23-26.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Gwen Adshead (2003). Measuring Moral Identities: Psychopaths and Responsibility. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (2):185-187.
  3. Gwen Adshead (2002). Through a Glass Darkly: Commentary on Ward. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):15-18.
  4. Gwen Adshead (1999). Psychopaths and Other-Regarding Beliefs. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6 (1):41-44.
  5. Gwen Adshead (1996). Commentary on "Psychopathy, Other-Regarding Moral Beliefs, and Responsibility&Quot. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (4):279-281.
  6. Robert N. Audi (1974). Moral Responsibility, Freedom, and Compulsion. American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (January):1-14.
    This paper sets out and defends an account of free action and explores the relation between free action and moral responsibility. Free action is analyzed as a certain kind of uncompelled action. The notion of compulsion is explicated in detail, And several forms of compulsion are distinguished and compared. It is argued that contrary to what is usually supposed, A person may be morally responsible for doing something even if he did not do it freely. On the basis of the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Pamela Bjorklund (2004). 'There but for the Grace of God': Moral Responsibility and Mental Illness. Nursing Philosophy 5 (3):188-200.
  8. Lene Bomann-Larsen (2013). Voluntary Rehabilitation? On Neurotechnological Behavioural Treatment, Valid Consent and (In)Appropriate Offers. Neuroethics 6 (1):65-77.
    Criminal offenders may be offered to participate in voluntary rehabilitation programs aiming at correcting undesirable behaviour, as a condition of early release. Behavioural treatment may include direct intervention into the central nervous system (CNS). This article discusses under which circumstances voluntary rehabilitation by CNS intervention is justified. It is argued that although the context of voluntary rehabilitation is a coercive circumstance, consent may still be effective, in the sense that it can meet formal criteria for informed consent. Further, for a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. James B. Brady (1997). Carl Elliott, the Rules of Insanity: Moral Responsibility and the Mentally Ill. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 31 (4):579-581.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Stephen E. Braude (1996). Multiple Personality and Moral Responsibility. Philosophy Psychiatry and Psychology 3 (1):37-54.
  11. Stephen E. Braude (1996). Multiple Personality Disorder and Moral Responsibility. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (1):37-54.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Matthew Broome, Lisa Bortolotti & Matteo Mameli (2010). Moral Responsibility and Mental Illness: A Case Study. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2 (19):179-187.
    It is far too early to say what global impact the neurocognitive and neuropsychiatric sciences will have on our intuitions about moral responsibility. And it is far too early to say whether the notion of moral responsibility will survive this impact (and if so, in what form). But it is certainly worth starting to think about the local impact that these sciences can or should have on some of our distinctions and criteria. It might be possible to use some of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. John S. Callender (2010). Free Will and Responsibility. A Guide for Practitioners. Oxford University Press.
    This book is aimed primarily at the practitioners of morals such as psychiatrists,lawyers and policy-makers. My professional background is clinical psychiatry It is divided into three parts. The first of these provides an overview of moral theory, morality in non-human species and recent developments in neuroscience that are of relevance to moral and legal responsibility. In the second part I offer a new paradigm of free action based on the overlaps between free will, moral value and art. In the overlap (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. David Carr (2000). Reason, Fantasy and Moral Responsibility: A Psycho-Philosophical Motif in the Work of John Wilson. Journal of Moral Education 29 (3):285-299.
    A constantly reworked theme in the work of John Wilson is that of some identity or overlap of (psycho) therapeutic concerns with those of more conventional learning and education: (some) instances of therapy are held to coincide with (some) instances of education à propos the alleviation of what he generally calls ''fantasies''. In an early celebrated article, Wilson casts certain aspects of education as such in this therapeutic role, but in later work it is philosophical education which is credited with (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Christopher Ciocchetti (2003). Some Thoughts on Diverse Psychopathic Offenders and Legal Responsibility. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (2):195-198.
    In this commentary, I respond to several criticisms of my prior article arguing that, for purposes of assigning moral responsibility, we should understand psychopaths as persons who lack the ability to treat actions as affecting relationships. I discuss the implications of different kinds of psychopaths and the corresponding levels of moral responsibility. I also briefly discuss the legal implications of a psychopath’s diminished moral responsibility.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Christopher Ciocchetti (2003). The Responsibility of the Psychopathic Offender. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (2):175-183.
    In this paper, I argue that the responsibility-affecting defect of psychopaths is their incapacity for responding to acts within relationships. I begin with Piers Benn's account of psychopaths as incapable of forming participant reactive attitudes. Benn argues that participant reactive attitudes are essentially communicative and the ability to form and understand participant reactive attitudes is crucial to being a member of the moral community. Against Benn, I argue, though participant reactive attitudes can be communicative, they are not essentially communicative. Instead, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Stephen R. L. Clark (1996). Commentary on "Multiple Personality and Moral Responsibility&Quot. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (1):55-57.
  18. Simon Cushing (2013). Autism: The Very Idea. In Jami L. Anderson & Simon Cushing (eds.), The Philosophy of Autism. Rowman & Littlefield. 17-45.
    If each of the subtypes of autism is defined simply as constituted by a set of symptoms, then the criteria for its observation are straightforward, although, of course, some of those symptoms themselves might be hard to observe definitively. Compare with telling whether or not someone is bleeding: while it might be hard to tell if someone is bleeding internally, we know what it takes to find out, and when we have the right access and instruments we can settle the (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. David DeGrazia (1994). Autonomous Action and Autonomy-Subverting Psychiatric Conditions. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 19 (3):279-297.
    The following theses are defended in this paper: (1) The concept of autonomous action is centrally relevant to understanding numerous psychiatric conditions, namely, conditions that subvert autonomy; (2) The details of an analysis of autonomous action matter; a vague or rough characterization is less illuminating; (3) A promising analysis for this purpose (and generally) is a version of the "multi-tier model". After opening with five vignettes, I begin the discussion by highlighting strengths and weaknesses of contributions by other authors who (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. John M. Doris & Dominic Murphy (2007). From My Lai to Abu Ghraib: The Moral Psychology of Atrocity. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):25–55.
    While nothing justifies atrocity, many perpetrators manifest cognitive impairments that profoundly degrade their capacity for moral judgment, and such impairments, we shall argue, preclude the attribution of moral responsibility.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. R. S. Downie (1997). The Rules of Insanity: Moral Responsibility and the Mentally Ill Offender. Journal of Medical Ethics 23 (3):196-197.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Annette Dufner (2013). Should the Late Stage Demented Be Punished for Past Crimes? Criminal Law and Philosophy 7 (1):137-150.
    The paper investigates whether it is plausible to hold the late stage demented criminally responsible for past actions. The concern is based on the fact that policy makers in the United States and in Britain are starting to wonder what to do with prison inmates in the later stages of dementia who do not remember their crimes anymore. The problem has to be expected to become more urgent as the population ages and the number of dementia patients increases. This paper (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Craig Edwards (2009). Changing Functions, Moral Responsibility, and Mental Illness. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (1):105-107.
  24. Carl Elliott (1992). Diagnosing Blame: Responsibility and the Psychopath. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 17 (2):199-214.
    The diagnosis of psychopathy is controversial largely because of two notions: first, that because of their defects, psychopaths cannot understand morality, and second, that these defects should thus excuse psychopaths from moral responsibility for their actions. However, it is not clear just what is involved in understanding morality. The argument that the psychopath is ignorant of morality in the same way that one might be ignorant of facts is difficult to sustain. However, a closer examination of the psychopath's peculiar deficiencies (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Carl Elliott (1991). Moral Responsibility, Psychiatric Disorders and Duress. Journal of Applied Philosophy 8 (1):45-56.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. David Faraci & David Shoemaker (2010). Insanity, Deep Selves, and Moral Responsibility: The Case of JoJo. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3): 319-332.
    Susan Wolf objects to the Real Self View (RSV) of moral responsibility that it is insufficient, that even if one’s actions are expressions of one’s deepest or “real” self, one might still not be morally responsible for one’s actions. As a counterexample to the RSV, Wolf offers the case of JoJo, the son of a dictator, who endorses his father’s (evil) values, but who is insane and is thus not responsible for his actions. Wolf’s data for this conclusion derives from (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Ferenc Feher (1991). Who is the Author of Dora's Story? (Moral Responsibility in Psychoanalytical Hermeneutics. Philosophy and Social Criticism 17 (4):345-358.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Lloyd Fields (1996). Psychopathy, Other-Regarding Moral Beliefs, and Responsibility. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (4):261-277.
  29. Philip Gerrans & Jeanette Kennett (2010). Neurosentimentalism and Moral Agency. Mind 119 (475):585-614.
    Metaethics has recently been confronted by evidence from cognitive neuroscience that tacit emotional processes play an essential causal role in moral judgement. Most neuroscientists, and some metaethicists, take this evidence to vindicate a version of metaethical sentimentalism. In this paper we argue that the ‘dual process’ model of cognition that frames the discussion within and without philosophy does not do justice to an important constraint on any theory of deliberation and judgement. Namely, decision-making is the exercise of a capacity for (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Jessy Giroux (2012). Les Psychopathes Sont-Ils Heureux? Un Défi Pour la Moralité. Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 7 (1):213-233.
    Dans le but de défendre la thèse de la correspondance entre le comportement moral et le bonheur, j’analyse dans cet article le cas problématique des psychopathes. Les psychopathes sont des individus qui ne reculent devant aucun interdit moral pour satisfaire leurs désirs, et qui ne ressentent aucun remord ou scrupule face à leurs agissements. En ce sens, ils paraissent obtenir un « ticket gratuit » dans le domaine de la moralité. Comment un défenseur de la thèse de la correspondance entre (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Walter Glannon (2008). Moral Responsibility and the Psychopath. Neuroethics 1 (3):158-166.
    Psychopathy involves impaired capacity for prudential and moral reasoning due to impaired capacity for empathy, remorse, and sensitivity to fear-inducing stimuli. Brain abnormalities and genetic polymorphisms associated with these traits appear to justify the claim that psychopaths cannot be morally responsible for their behavior. Yet psychopaths are capable of instrumental reasoning in achieving their goals, which suggests that they have some capacity to respond to moral reasons against performing harmful acts and refrain from performing them. The cognitive and affective impairment (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. George Graham (2004). In and Out of Me. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (4):323-326.
  33. William Hirstein & Katrina Sifferd (2014). Ethics and the Brains of Psychopaths: The Significance of Psychopathy for Our Ethical and Legal Theories. In Charles Wolfe (ed.), Brain Theory: Essays in Critical Neurophilosophy. Springer. 149-170.
    The emerging neuroscience of psychopathy will have several important implications for our attempts to construct an ethical society. In this article we begin by describing the list of criteria by which psychopaths are diagnosed. We then review four competing neuropsychological theories of psychopathic cognition. The first of these models, Newman’s attentional model, locates the problem in a special type of attentional narrowing that psychopaths have shown in experiments. The second and third, Blair’s amygdala model and Kiehl’s paralimbic model represent the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Christine James (1998). Irrationality in Philosophy and Psychology: The Moral Implications of Self-Defeating Behavior. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (2):224-234.
    The philosophical study of irrationality can yield interesting insights into the human mind. One provocative issue is self-defeating behaviours, i.e. behaviours that result in failure to achieve one’s apparent goals and ambitions. In this paper I consider a self-defeating behaviour called choking under pressure, explain why it should be considered irrational, and how it is best understood with reference to skills. Then I describe how choking can be explained without appeal to a purely Freudian subconscious or ‘sub-agents’ view of mind. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.) (2008). Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology. Johns Hopkins University Press.
    This multidisciplinary collection explores three key concepts underpinning psychiatry -- explanation, phenomenology, and nosology -- and their continuing relevance in an age of neuroimaging and genetic analysis. An introduction by Kenneth S. Kendler lays out the philosophical grounding of psychiatric practice. The first section addresses the concept of explanation, from the difficulties in describing complex behavior to the categorization of psychological and biological causality. In the second section, contributors discuss experience, including the complex and vexing issue of how self-agency and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews (2003). The Unity and Disunity of Agency. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (4):308-312.
    Effective agency, according to contemporary Kantians, requires a unity of purpose both at a time, in order that we may eliminate conflict among our motives, and over time, because many of the things we do form part of longer-term projects and make sense only in the light of these projects and life plans. Call this the unity of agency thesis. This thesis can be regarded as a normative constraint on accounts of personal identity and indeed on accounts of what it (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews (2002). Identity, Control and Responsibility: The Case of Dissociative Identity Disorder. Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):509-526.
    Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) (formerly known as Multiple Personality Disorder) is a condition in which a person appears to possess more than one personality, and sometimes very many. Some recent criminal cases involving defendants with DID have resulted in "not guilty" verdicts, though the defense is not always successful in this regard. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Stephen Behnke have argued that we should excuse DID sufferers from responsibility, only if at the time of the act the person was insane (typically delusional); (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Frank Kortmann (1998). Elliott, C.: 1996, The Rules of Insanity; Moral Responsibility and the Mentally Ill Offender. [REVIEW] Medicine, Healthcare and Philosophy 1 (2):178-179.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Neil Levy (2008). Introducing Neuroethics. Neuroethics 1 (1):1-8.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Heidi L. Maibom (2008). The Mad, the Bad, and the Psychopath. Neuroethics 1 (3):167-184.
    It is common for philosophers to argue that psychopaths are not morally responsible because they lack some of the essential capacities for morality. In legal terms, they are criminally insane. Typically, however, the insanity defense is not available to psychopaths. The primary reason is that they appear to have the knowledge and understanding required under the M’Naghten Rules. However, it has been argued that what is required for moral and legal responsibility is ‘deep’ moral understanding, something that psychopaths do not (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Luca Malatesti & John McMillan (eds.) (2010). Responsibility and Psychopathy: Interfacing Law, Psychiatry, and Philosophy. Oxford University Press, Usa.
    Psychopaths have emotional and rational impairments that can be expressed in persistent criminal behaviour. UK and US law has not traditionally excused disordered individuals for their crimes citing these impairments as a cause for their criminal behaviour. Until now, the discussion of whether psychopaths are morally responsible for their behaviour has usually taken place in the realm of philosophy. However, in recent years, this debate has been informed by scientific and psychiatric advancements, fundamentally so with the development of Robert Hare's (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Mike W. Martin (2010). Personality Disorders and Moral Responsibility. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (2):127-129.
    In “Personality Disorders: Moral or Medical Kinds—or Both?” Peter Zachar and Nancy Nyquist Potter (2010) reject any general dichotomy between morality and mental health, and specifically between character vices and personality disorders. In doing so, they provide a nuanced and illuminating discussion that connects Aristotelian virtue ethics to a multidimensional understanding of personality disorders. I share their conviction that dissolving morality–health dichotomies is the starting point for any plausible understanding of human beings (Martin 2006), but I register some qualms about (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Matt Matravers (2007). Holding Psychopaths Responsible. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 139-142.
  44. Steve Matthews (2004). Failed Agency and the Insanity Defence. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 27:413-424.
    In this article I argue that insanity defences such as M’Nagten should be abolished in favour of a defence of failed agency. It is not insanity per se, or any other empirical condition, which constitutes the moral reason for exculpation. Rather, we should first recognize the conditions for being a responsible moral agent. These include some capacity to direct and control one’s behavior, a non-delusional component, and the capacity to recognize that one’s behavior is expressive of what they have reason (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. John McMillan & Grant R. Gillett (2005). Moral Responsibility, Consciousness and Psychiatry. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 39 (11):1018-1021.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Gerben Meynen (2010). Free Will and Mental Disorder: Exploring the Relationship. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (6):429-443.
    A link between mental disorder and freedom is clearly present in the introduction of the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV). It mentions “an important loss of freedom” as one of the possible defining features of mental disorder. Meanwhile, it remains unclear how “an important loss of freedom” should be understood. In order to get a clearer view on the relationship between mental disorder and (a loss of) freedom, in this article, I will explore (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Gerben Meynen (2010). Free Will and Psychiatric Assessments of Criminal Responsibility: A Parallel with Informed Consent. [REVIEW] Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 13 (4):313-320.
    In some criminal cases a forensic psychiatrist is asked to make an assessment of the state of mind of the defendant at the time of the legally relevant act. A considerable number of people seem to hold that the basis for this assessment is that free will is required for legal responsibility, and that mental disorders can compromise free will. In fact, because of the alleged relationship between the forensic assessment and free will, researchers in forensic psychiatry also consider the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Gerben Meynen (2009). Should or Should Not Forensic Psychiatrists Think About Free Will? Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 12 (2):203-212.
    The forensic psychiatrist’s task is often considered to be tightly connected to the concept of free will. Yet, there is also a lack of clarity about the role of the concept of free will in forensic psychiatry. Recently, Morse has argued that forensic psychiatrists should not mention free will in their reports or testimonies, and, moreover, that they should not even think about free will. Starting from a discussion on Morse’s claims, I will develop my own view on how forensic (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Stephen J. Morse (2008). Psychopathy and Criminal Responsibility. Neuroethics 1 (3):205-212.
    This article considers whether psychopaths should be held criminally responsible. After describing the positive law of criminal responsibility in general and as it applies to psychopaths, it suggests that psychopaths lack moral rationality and that severe psychopaths should be excused from crimes that violate the moral rights of others. Alternative forms of social control for dangerous psychopaths, such as involuntary civil commitment, are considered, and the potential legal implications of future scientific understanding of psychopathy are addressed.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Daniel Moseley & Gary Gala (forthcoming). On the Nature of Psychopathy. In Fabrice Jotterand & James Giordano (eds.), The Neurobiology of Social Disruption: International Perspectives of Psychiatry, Pathology and Society. Potomic Institute Press.
    The primary goal of this essay is to clarify the concept of psychopathy and distinguish it from other, related, concepts. We contend that the paradigmatic trait of psychopathy is a propensity to violence that is accompanied by a lack of conscience. We also argue that conceptual clarity on this point is important for devising empirical criteria for identifying psychopaths. We also argue that a full theory of psychopathy will require one to utilize theories and assumptions that pertain to central issues (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 82