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  1. Gwen Adshead (2008). Vice and Viciousness. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 15 (1):23-26.
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  2. Gwen Adshead (2003). Measuring Moral Identities: Psychopaths and Responsibility. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (2):185-187.
  3. Gwen Adshead (2002). Through a Glass Darkly: Commentary on Ward. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):15-18.
  4. Gwen Adshead (1999). Psychopaths and Other-Regarding Beliefs. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6 (1):41-44.
  5. Gwen Adshead (1996). Commentary on "Psychopathy, Other-Regarding Moral Beliefs, and Responsibility&Quot. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (4):279-281.
  6. Nomy Arpaly (2005). How It is Not "Just Like Diabetes": Mental Disorders and the Moral Psychologist. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):282–298.
    Many psychiatrists tell their clients that any mental disorder is ‘‘a disease, just like diabetes’’. This slogan appears to suggest that mental states and behavior that are classified ‘‘mental disorders’’ are somehow radically different from other mental states and behaviors—both when it comes to simply understanding people and when it comes to moral assessments of mental states and of actions. After all, mental illness is just like diabetes, while other human conditions are not. That sounds like a huge difference. I (...)
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  7. Robert N. Audi (1974). Moral Responsibility, Freedom, and Compulsion. American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (January):1-14.
    This paper sets out and defends an account of free action and explores the relation between free action and moral responsibility. Free action is analyzed as a certain kind of uncompelled action. The notion of compulsion is explicated in detail, And several forms of compulsion are distinguished and compared. It is argued that contrary to what is usually supposed, A person may be morally responsible for doing something even if he did not do it freely. On the basis of the (...)
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  8. Pamela Bjorklund (2004). 'There but for the Grace of God': Moral Responsibility and Mental Illness. Nursing Philosophy 5 (3):188-200.
  9. R. James R. Blair (2008). The Cognitive Neuroscience of Psychopathy and Implications for Judgments of Responsibility. Neuroethics 1 (3):149-157.
  10. Lisa Bortolotti, Matthew R. Broome & Matteo Mameli (2013). Delusions and Responsibility for Action: Insights From the Breivik Case. Neuroethics 7 (3):377-382.
    What factors should be taken into account when attributing criminal responsibility to perpetrators of severe crimes? We discuss the Breivik case, and the considerations which led to holding Breivik accountable for his criminal acts. We put some pressure on the view that experiencing certain psychiatric symptoms or receiving a certain psychiatric diagnosis is sufficient to establish criminal insanity. We also argue that the presence of delusional beliefs, often regarded as a key factor in determining responsibility, is neither necessary nor sufficient (...)
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  11. James B. Brady (1997). Carl Elliott, the Rules of Insanity: Moral Responsibility and the Mentally Ill. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 31 (4):579-581.
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  12. Stephen E. Braude (1996). Multiple Personality and Moral Responsibility. Philosophy Psychiatry and Psychology 3 (1):37-54.
    The philosophical literature on multiple personality has focused primarily on problems about personal identity and psychological explanation. But multiple personality and other dissociative phenomena raise equally important and even more urgent questions about moral responsibility, in particular: In what respect(s) and to what extent should a multiple be held responsible for the actions of his/her alternate personalities? Cases of dreaming help illustrate why attributions of responsibility in cases of dissociation do not turn on putative changes in identity, as some have (...)
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  13. Matthew Broome, Lisa Bortolotti & Matteo Mameli (2010). Moral Responsibility and Mental Illness: A Case Study. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2 (19):179-187.
    It is far too early to say what global impact the neurocognitive and neuropsychiatric sciences will have on our intuitions about moral responsibility. And it is far too early to say whether the notion of moral responsibility will survive this impact (and if so, in what form). But it is certainly worth starting to think about the local impact that these sciences can or should have on some of our distinctions and criteria. It might be possible to use some of (...)
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  14. John S. Callender (2010). Free Will and Responsibility. A Guide for Practitioners. Oxford University Press.
    This book is aimed primarily at the practitioners of morals such as psychiatrists,lawyers and policy-makers. My professional background is clinical psychiatry It is divided into three parts. The first of these provides an overview of moral theory, morality in non-human species and recent developments in neuroscience that are of relevance to moral and legal responsibility. In the second part I offer a new paradigm of free action based on the overlaps between free will, moral value and art. In the overlap (...)
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  15. Justin Caouette (2013). Moral Responsibility and Psychopathy: Why We Do Not Have Special Obligations To The Psychopath. AJOB Neuroscience 4 (2):26-27.
  16. David Carr (2000). Reason, Fantasy and Moral Responsibility: A Psycho-Philosophical Motif in the Work of John Wilson. Journal of Moral Education 29 (3):285-299.
    A constantly reworked theme in the work of John Wilson is that of some identity or overlap of (psycho) therapeutic concerns with those of more conventional learning and education: (some) instances of therapy are held to coincide with (some) instances of education à propos the alleviation of what he generally calls ''fantasies''. In an early celebrated article, Wilson casts certain aspects of education as such in this therapeutic role, but in later work it is philosophical education which is credited with (...)
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  17. Christopher Ciocchetti (2003). Some Thoughts on Diverse Psychopathic Offenders and Legal Responsibility. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (2):195-198.
    In this commentary, I respond to several criticisms of my prior article arguing that, for purposes of assigning moral responsibility, we should understand psychopaths as persons who lack the ability to treat actions as affecting relationships. I discuss the implications of different kinds of psychopaths and the corresponding levels of moral responsibility. I also briefly discuss the legal implications of a psychopath’s diminished moral responsibility.
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  18. Christopher Ciocchetti (2003). The Responsibility of the Psychopathic Offender. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (2):175-183.
    In this paper, I argue that the responsibility-affecting defect of psychopaths is their incapacity for responding to acts within relationships. I begin with Piers Benn's account of psychopaths as incapable of forming participant reactive attitudes. Benn argues that participant reactive attitudes are essentially communicative and the ability to form and understand participant reactive attitudes is crucial to being a member of the moral community. Against Benn, I argue, though participant reactive attitudes can be communicative, they are not essentially communicative. Instead, (...)
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  19. Stephen R. L. Clark (1996). Commentary on "Multiple Personality and Moral Responsibility&Quot. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (1):55-57.
  20. David DeGrazia (1994). Autonomous Action and Autonomy-Subverting Psychiatric Conditions. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 19 (3):279-297.
    The following theses are defended in this paper: (1) The concept of autonomous action is centrally relevant to understanding numerous psychiatric conditions, namely, conditions that subvert autonomy; (2) The details of an analysis of autonomous action matter; a vague or rough characterization is less illuminating; (3) A promising analysis for this purpose (and generally) is a version of the "multi-tier model". After opening with five vignettes, I begin the discussion by highlighting strengths and weaknesses of contributions by other authors who (...)
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  21. John M. Doris & Dominic Murphy (2007). From My Lai to Abu Ghraib: The Moral Psychology of Atrocity. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):25–55.
    While nothing justifies atrocity, many perpetrators manifest cognitive impairments that profoundly degrade their capacity for moral judgment, and such impairments, we shall argue, preclude the attribution of moral responsibility.
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  22. R. S. Downie (1997). The Rules of Insanity: Moral Responsibility and the Mentally Ill Offender. Journal of Medical Ethics 23 (3):196-197.
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  23. Annette Dufner (2013). Should the Late Stage Demented Be Punished for Past Crimes? Criminal Law and Philosophy 7 (1):137-150.
    The paper investigates whether it is plausible to hold the late stage demented criminally responsible for past actions. The concern is based on the fact that policy makers in the United States and in Britain are starting to wonder what to do with prison inmates in the later stages of dementia who do not remember their crimes anymore. The problem has to be expected to become more urgent as the population ages and the number of dementia patients increases. This paper (...)
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  24. Craig Edwards (2009). Changing Functions, Moral Responsibility, and Mental Illness. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (1):105-107.
  25. Carl Elliott (1996). The Rules of Insanity Moral Responsibility and the Mentally Ill Offender. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
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  26. Carl Elliott (1992). Diagnosing Blame: Responsibility and the Psychopath. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 17 (2):199-214.
    The diagnosis of psychopathy is controversial largely because of two notions: first, that because of their defects, psychopaths cannot understand morality, and second, that these defects should thus excuse psychopaths from moral responsibility for their actions. However, it is not clear just what is involved in understanding morality. The argument that the psychopath is ignorant of morality in the same way that one might be ignorant of facts is difficult to sustain. However, a closer examination of the psychopath's peculiar deficiencies (...)
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  27. Carl Elliott (1991). Moral Responsibility, Psychiatric Disorders and Duress. Journal of Applied Philosophy 8 (1):45-56.
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  28. Robert William Evans (2000). The Jurisprudence of Moral Responsibility: Toward a Descriptive Theory of the Relative Contributions of Moral Philosophy, Christian Theology, and Behavioral Medicine to the Origins and Historical Development of the Insanity Defense and Mental Elements of Crime. Dissertation, Trinity Evangelical Divinity School
    The purpose of this study was to investigate the origins, development and changes of mental disability law and to examine how the law has handled the mentally ill offender. It was argued that the core elements of insanity are rooted in the moral philosophical writings of antiquity, biblical and theological sources, and in the literature of behavioral medicine. ;This study then turned to an examination of several models which have been proposed as reformulations of the insanity defense. These models were (...)
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  29. David Faraci & David Shoemaker (2010). Insanity, Deep Selves, and Moral Responsibility: The Case of JoJo. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3): 319-332.
    Susan Wolf objects to the Real Self View (RSV) of moral responsibility that it is insufficient, that even if one’s actions are expressions of one’s deepest or “real” self, one might still not be morally responsible for one’s actions. As a counterexample to the RSV, Wolf offers the case of JoJo, the son of a dictator, who endorses his father’s (evil) values, but who is insane and is thus not responsible for his actions. Wolf’s data for this conclusion derives from (...)
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  30. Michele Farisco & Carlo Petrini (2014). On the Stand. Another Episode of Neuroscience and Law Discussion From Italy. Neuroethics 7 (2):243-245.
    After three proceedings in which neuroscience was a relevant factor for the final verdict in Italian courts, for the first time a recent case puts in question the legal relevance of neuroscientific evidence. This decision deserves international attention in its underlining that the uncertainty still affecting neuroscientific knowledge can have a significant impact on the law. It urges the consideration of such uncertainty and the development of a shared management of it.
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  31. Ferenc Feher (1991). Who is the Author of Dora's Story? (Moral Responsibility in Psychoanalytical Hermeneutics. Philosophy and Social Criticism 17 (4):345-358.
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  32. Lloyd Fields (1996). Psychopathy, Other-Regarding Moral Beliefs, and Responsibility. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (4):261-277.
  33. Cordelia Fine & Jeanette Kennett (2004). Mental Impairment, Moral Understanding and Criminal Responsibility: Psychopathy and the Purposes of Punishment. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 27 (5):425-443.
    We have argued here that to attribute criminal responsibility to psychopathic individuals is to ignore substantial and growing evidence that psychopathic individuals are significantly impaired in moral understanding. They do not appear to know why moral transgressions are wrong in the full sense required by the law. As morally blameless offenders, punishment as a basis for detention cannot be justified. Moreover, as there are currently no successful treatment programs for psychopathy, nor can detention be justified on grounds of treatment. Instead, (...)
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  34. Philip Gerrans & Jeanette Kennett (2010). Neurosentimentalism and Moral Agency. Mind 119 (475):585-614.
    Metaethics has recently been confronted by evidence from cognitive neuroscience that tacit emotional processes play an essential causal role in moral judgement. Most neuroscientists, and some metaethicists, take this evidence to vindicate a version of metaethical sentimentalism. In this paper we argue that the ‘dual process’ model of cognition that frames the discussion within and without philosophy does not do justice to an important constraint on any theory of deliberation and judgement. Namely, decision-making is the exercise of a capacity for (...)
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  35. Jessy Giroux (2012). Les Psychopathes Sont-Ils Heureux? Un D�Fi Pour la Moralit�. Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 7 (1):213-233.
    Dans le but de d�fendre la th�se de la correspondance entre le comportement moral et le bonheur, j�analyse dans cet article le cas probl�matique des psychopathes. Les psychopathes sont des individus qui ne reculent devant aucun interdit moral pour satisfaire leurs d�sirs, et qui ne ressentent aucun remord ou scrupule face � leurs agissements. En ce sens, ils paraissent obtenir un ��ticket gratuit�� dans le domaine de la moralit�. Comment un d�fenseur de la th�se de la correspondance entre moralit� et (...)
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  36. Walter Glannon (2011). Brain, Body, and Mind: Neuroethics with a Human Face. Oxford University Press.
    This book is a discussion of the most timely and contentious issues in the two branches of neuroethics: the neuroscience of ethics; and the ethics of neuroscience. Drawing upon recent work in psychiatry, neurology, and neurosurgery, it develops a phenomenologically inspired theory of neuroscience to explain the brain-mind relation. The idea that the mind is shaped not just by the brain but also by the body and how the human subject interacts with the environment has significant implications for free will, (...)
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  37. Walter Glannon (2008). Moral Responsibility and the Psychopath. Neuroethics 1 (3):158-166.
    Psychopathy involves impaired capacity for prudential and moral reasoning due to impaired capacity for empathy, remorse, and sensitivity to fear-inducing stimuli. Brain abnormalities and genetic polymorphisms associated with these traits appear to justify the claim that psychopaths cannot be morally responsible for their behavior. Yet psychopaths are capable of instrumental reasoning in achieving their goals, which suggests that they have some capacity to respond to moral reasons against performing harmful acts and refrain from performing them. The cognitive and affective impairment (...)
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  38. Andrea L. Glenn (2014). Psychopathy: An Introduction to Biological Findings and Their Implications. New York University Press.
  39. George Graham (2004). In and Out of Me. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (4):323-326.
  40. Stuart Henry & Dena Plemmons (2012). Neuroscience, Neuropolitics and Neuroethics: The Complex Case of Crime, Deception and fMRI. Science and Engineering Ethics 18 (3):573-591.
    Scientific developments take place in a socio-political context but scientists often ignore the ways their innovations will be both interpreted by the media and used by policy makers. In the rush to neuroscientific discovery important questions are overlooked, such as the ways: (1) the brain, environment and behavior are related; (2) biological changes are mediated by social organization; (3) institutional bias in the application of technical procedures ignores race, class and gender dimensions of society; (4) knowledge is used to the (...)
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  41. William Hirstein & Katrina Sifferd (2014). Ethics and the Brains of Psychopaths: The Significance of Psychopathy for Our Ethical and Legal Theories. In Charles Wolfe (ed.), Brain Theory: Essays in Critical Neurophilosophy. Springer 149-170.
    The emerging neuroscience of psychopathy will have several important implications for our attempts to construct an ethical society. In this article we begin by describing the list of criteria by which psychopaths are diagnosed. We then review four competing neuropsychological theories of psychopathic cognition. The first of these models, Newman’s attentional model, locates the problem in a special type of attentional narrowing that psychopaths have shown in experiments. The second and third, Blair’s amygdala model and Kiehl’s paralimbic model represent the (...)
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  42. C. Iria, F. Barbosa & R. Paixao (2012). The Identification of Negative Emotions Through a Go/No-Go Task. European Psychologist 17:291-292.
    This study compares the performance, when identifying negative emotions on facial expression, of male offenders (n = 62) with a high level of psychopathy (n = 25) with other criminals with a low level of psychopathy (n = 37), as well as other ‘‘successful psychopaths’’(n = 12) and non-criminals with a low level of psychopathy (n = 39) in order to clarify the negative emotional processing of offenders and nonoffenders that are either high or low in psychopathy. The participants were (...)
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  43. Christine James (1998). Irrationality in Philosophy and Psychology: The Moral Implications of Self-Defeating Behavior. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (2):224-234.
    The philosophical study of irrationality can yield interesting insights into the human mind. One provocative issue is self-defeating behaviours, i.e. behaviours that result in failure to achieve one’s apparent goals and ambitions. In this paper I consider a self-defeating behaviour called choking under pressure, explain why it should be considered irrational, and how it is best understood with reference to skills. Then I describe how choking can be explained without appeal to a purely Freudian subconscious or ‘sub-agents’ view of mind. (...)
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  44. Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.) (2008). Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology. Johns Hopkins University Press.
    This multidisciplinary collection explores three key concepts underpinning psychiatry -- explanation, phenomenology, and nosology -- and their continuing relevance in an age of neuroimaging and genetic analysis. An introduction by Kenneth S. Kendler lays out the philosophical grounding of psychiatric practice. The first section addresses the concept of explanation, from the difficulties in describing complex behavior to the categorization of psychological and biological causality. In the second section, contributors discuss experience, including the complex and vexing issue of how self-agency and (...)
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  45. Jeanette Kennett (2007). Mental Disorder, Moral Agency, and the Self. In Bonnie Steinbock (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Bioethics. Oxford University Press 90-113.
    A person suffering a mental illness or disorder may differ dramatically from his or her previous well self. Family and close friends who knew the person before the onset of illness tend to regard the illness as obscuring their loved one's true self and see the goal of treatment as the restoration of that self. ‘He is not really like this,’ they will say with increasing desperation. Treatment teams and others, who have no acquaintance with the person when well, respond (...)
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  46. Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews (2003). The Unity and Disunity of Agency. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (4):308-312.
    Effective agency, according to contemporary Kantians, requires a unity of purpose both at a time, in order that we may eliminate conflict among our motives, and over time, because many of the things we do form part of longer-term projects and make sense only in the light of these projects and life plans. Call this the unity of agency thesis. This thesis can be regarded as a normative constraint on accounts of personal identity and indeed on accounts of what it (...)
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  47. Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews (2002). Identity, Control and Responsibility: The Case of Dissociative Identity Disorder. Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):509-526.
    Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) (formerly known as Multiple Personality Disorder) is a condition in which a person appears to possess more than one personality, and sometimes very many. Some recent criminal cases involving defendants with DID have resulted in "not guilty" verdicts, though the defense is not always successful in this regard. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Stephen Behnke have argued that we should excuse DID sufferers from responsibility, only if at the time of the act the person was insane (typically delusional); (...)
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  48. Matt King & Joshua May (forthcoming). Moral Responsibility and Mental Illness. In N. Levy, M. Griffiths & K. Timpe (eds.), Routledge Companion to Free Will. Routledge
    In this chapter, we explore how mental illness affects the aptness for attributing responsibility to individuals as well as the justification for holding them responsible for their acts. We begin in Section 2 by tackling some preliminaries, both to refine our guiding question and the parameters relevant to that inquiry. In Section 3, we consider when mental illness surely excuses. In Section 4, we consider conditions that don’t excuse agents from responsibility. Section 5 looks at how the answer to the (...)
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  49. Frank Kortmann (1998). Elliott, C.: 1996, The Rules of Insanity; Moral Responsibility and the Mentally Ill Offender. [REVIEW] Medicine, Healthcare and Philosophy 1 (2):178-179.
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  50. Michael Ladner, Unconscious Motives and Intentional Action.
    Few philosophers would deny that unconscious motives enter into causal explanations of human behavior. But many would be reluctant to say that deeply unconscious motives have anything to do with the intentionality with which we act. I argue to the contrary that deeply unconscious motives can indeed contribute to agent-intentionality on the following condition: If she were self-aware and honest with respect to her unconscious motive, the agent would believe that it constituted her reason for the action of which it (...)
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