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  1. Paul L. Allen (2013). An Augustinian Philosopher Between Dualism and Materialism: Ernan McMullin on Human Emergence. Zygon 48 (2):294-304.
    In claiming the independence of theology from science, Ernan McMullin nevertheless saw the danger of separating these disciplines on questions of mutual significance, as his accompanying article “Biology and the Theology of the Human” in this edition of Zygon shows. This paper analyzes McMullin's adoption of emergence as a qualified endorsement of a view that avoids the excesses of both dualism and materialism. I argue that McMullin's distinctive contribution is the conceptual clarification of emergence in the light of a precise (...)
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  2. Sean Allen-Hermanson (2005). Morgan's Canon Revisited. Philosophy of Science 72 (4):608-31.
    The famous ethological maxim known as “Morgan’s Canon” continues to be the subject of interpretive controversy. I reconsider Morgan’s canon in light of two questions: First, what did Morgan intend? Second, is this, or perhaps some re-interpretation of the canon, useful within cognitive ethology? As for the first issue, Morgan’s distinction between higher and lower faculties is suggestive of an early supervenience concept. As for the second, both the canon in its original form, and various recent re-readings, offer nothing useful (...)
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  3. A. Atkin (1992). On Consciousness: What is the Role of Emergence? Medical Hypotheses 38:311-14.
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  4. John Blodwell (2011). Physicalism and Emergence. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (11-12):11-12.
    Physicalist theories of mind are usually taken to imply causal closure in the physical domain, which implies that physical events are wholly determined by the physical principles governing the context in which they exist. This leads inevitably to some form of reductionism or epiphenomenalism when applied to the neurophysical correlates of conscious experience. If intentionality, characterized in terms of an operative consciousness, is to have any purchase on physical reality then its action must have distinctive and objective structural features that (...)
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  5. Raymond D. Bradley (2015). Why Survival is Metaphysically Impossible. In Keith Augustine & Michael Martin (eds.), The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death. Rowman & Littlefield 297-328.
    Human bodies have a totally different mode of existence from those collections of mental properties (intelligence, will power, consciousness, etc.) that we call minds. They belong to the ontological category of physical substances or entities, whereas mental properties belong to the ontological category of properties or attributes, and as such can exist only so long as their physical bearers exist. Mental properties “emerge” (in a sense that makes emergence ubiquitous throughout the natural world) when the constituent parts of a biological (...)
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  6. Godehard Brüntrup (1998). Is Psycho-Physical Emergentism Committed to Dualism? The Causal Efficacy of Emergent Mental Properties. Erkenntnis 3 (2):133-151.
  7. Tim Crane (2001). The Significance of Emergence. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press
    This paper is an attempt to understand the content of, and motivation for, a popular form of physicalism, which I call ‘non-reductive physicalism’. Non-reductive physicalism claims although the mind is physical (in some sense), mental properties are nonetheless not identical to (or reducible to) physical properties. This suggests that mental properties are, in earlier terminology, ‘emergent properties’ of physical entities. Yet many non-reductive physicalists have denied this. In what follows, I examine their denial, and I argue that on a plausible (...)
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  8. Cian Dorr (2003). Merricks on the Existence of Human Organisms. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):711–718.
    BB Whenever a baseball causes an event, the baseball’s constituent atoms also cause that event, and the baseball is causally irrelevant to whether those atoms cause that event.
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  9. Todd E. Feinberg (2001). Why the Mind is Not a Radically Emergent Feature of the Brain. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (9-10):123-145.
    In this article I will attempt to refute the claim that the mind is a radically emergent feature of the brain. First, the inter-related concepts of emergence, reducibility and constraint are considered, particularly as these ideas relate to hierarchical biological systems. The implications of radical emergence theories of the mind such as the one posited by Roger Sperry, are explored. I then argue that the failure of Sperry's model is based on the notion that consciousness arises as a radically emergent (...)
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  10. Raphaël Fiorese (forthcoming). Stoljar’s Dilemma and Three Conceptions of the Physical: A Defence of the Via Negativa. Erkenntnis:1-29.
    Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical. But what does it mean to say that everything is physical? Daniel Stoljar has recently argued that no account of the physical is available which allows for a formulation of physicalism that is both possibly true and deserving of the name. As against this claim, I argue that a version of the via negativa—roughly, the view that the physical is to be characterised in terms of the nonmental—provides just such an account.
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  11. Robert Francescotti (2007). Emergence. Erkenntnis 67 (1):47 - 63.
    Here I offer a precise analysis of what it takes for a property to count as emergent. The features widely considered crucial to emergence include novelty, unpredictability, supervenience, relationality, and downward causal influence. By acknowledging each of these distinctive features, the definition provided below captures an important sense in which the whole can be more than the sum of its parts.
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  12. Matthew C. Haug (2011). Emergence in Mind * Edited by Cynthia MacDonald and Graham MacDonald. Analysis 71 (4):783-785.
  13. Jaegwon Kim (1999). Making Sense of Emergence. Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):3-36.
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  14. Christian List (2014). Free Will, Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise. Noûs 48 (1):156-178.
    I argue that free will and determinism are compatible, even when we take free will to require the ability to do otherwise and even when we interpret that ability modally, as the possibility of doing otherwise, and not just conditionally or dispositionally. My argument draws on a distinction between physical and agential possibility. Although in a deterministic world only one future sequence of events is physically possible for each state of the world, the more coarsely defined state of an agent (...)
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  15. Olga Markic (2004). Crane on the Mind-Body Problem and Emergence. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):199-205.
    In his book Elements of Mind, Tim Crane gives us a very clear and interesting introduction to the main problems in the philosophy of mind. The central theme of his book is intentionality, but he also gives an account of the mind-body problem, consciousness, and perception, and then he suggests his own solutions to these problems. In this paper I will concentrate on a part in which he discusses the mind-body problem. My main aim will be to look at different (...)
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  16. Trenton Merricks (2001). Objects and Persons. Oxford University Press.
    With ontology motivated largely by causal considerations, this lucid and provocative work focuses on the idea that physical objects are causally non-redundant. Merricks "eliminates" inanimate composite macrophysical objects on the grounds that they would--if they existed--be at best completely causally redundant. He defends human existence by arguing, from certain facts about mental causation, that we cause things that are not determined by our proper parts. He also provides insight into a variety of philosophical puzzles, while addressing many significant issues like (...)
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  17. David V. Newman (2001). Chaos, Emergence, and the Mind-Body Problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):180-96.
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  18. David V. Newman (1996). Emergence and Strange Attractors. Philosophy of Science 63 (2):245-61.
    Recent work in the Philosophy of Mind has suggested that alternatives to reduction are required in order to explain the relationship between psychology and biology or physics. Emergence has been proposed as one such alternative. In this paper, I propose a precise definition of emergence, and I argue that chaotic systems provide concrete examples of properties that meet this definition. In particular, I suggest that being in the basin of attraction of a strange attractor is an emergent property of any (...)
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  19. Natika Newton (2001). Emergence and the Uniqueness of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (9-10):47-59.
    This paper argues that phenomenal consciousness arises from the forced blending of components that are incompatible, or even logically contradictory, when combined by direct methods available to the subject; and that it is, as a result, analytically, ostensively and comparatively indefinable. First, I examine a variety of cases in which unpredictable novelties arise from the forced merging of contradictory elements, or at least elements that are unable in human experience to co-occur. The point is to show that the uniqueness of (...)
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  20. Timothy O'Connor & John Ross Churchil (2009). Nonreductive Physicalism or Emergent Dualism : The Argument From Mental Causation. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press
  21. Lisa Paul Streitfeld, Overcoming the Heisenberg Principle: Art Theory Arising Out of Wolfgang Pauli’s Collapsed Wave.
    “Applying the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle to 21st Century Art” was delivered to the 2009 Congress of the International Association of Art Critics (AICA) in Dublin as a guide to critical thinking through a paradigm shift. This new paper uncovers a new critical theory in the form of a formula that has been successfully applied to a universal appraisal of arts across all boundaries, whether they be gender, discipline or culture. The configuration predicted by Pauli as arising from under the collapsed (...)
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  22. Elly Vintiadis (2012). Emergence in Mind (Mind Association Occasional Series) . Edited by Cynthia and Macdonald. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 288 Pages ISBN 13: 978-0-19-958362-1. [REVIEW] Philosophy 87 (04):603-610.
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  23. Jessica M. Wilson (forthcoming). Metaphysical Emergence: Weak and Strong. In Tomasz Bigaj & Christian Wuthrich (eds.), Metaphysics in Contemporary Physics. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities
    Motivated by the seeming structure of the sciences, metaphysical emergence combines broadly synchronic dependence coupled with some degree of ontological and causal autonomy. Reflecting the diverse, frequently incompatible interpretations of the notions of dependence and autonomy, however, accounts of emergence diverge into a bewildering variety. Here I argue that much of this apparent diversity is superficial. I first argue, by attention to the problem of higher-level causation, that two and only two strategies for addressing this problem accommodate the genuine emergence (...)
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  24. David Yates (2013). Emergence. In Hal Pashler (ed.), Encyclopaedia of the Mind. SAGE Reference 283-7.
    This article surveys different forms of emergence, distinguishing them from each other by means of their relationship to deducibility conceived as Kimian functional reduction.
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  25. David Yates (2009). Emergence, Downwards Causation and the Completeness of Physics. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):110 - 131.
    The 'completeness of physics' is the key premise in the causal argument for physicalism. Standard formulations of it fail to rule out emergent downwards causation. I argue that it must do this if it is tare in a valid causal argument for physicalism. Drawing on the notion of conferring causal power, I formulate a suitable principle, 'strong completeness'. I investigate the metaphysical implications of distinguishing this principle from emergent downwards causation, and I argue that categoricalist accounts of properties are better (...)
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