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Psychophysical Reduction

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  1. Jared Bates (2009). A Defence of the Explanatory Argument for Physicalism. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):315-324.
    One argument for reductive physicalism, the explanatory argument, rests on its ability to explain the vast and growing body of acknowledged psychophysical correlations. Jaegwon Kim has recently levelled four objections against the explanatory argument. I assess all of Kim's objections, showing that none is successful. The result is a defence of the explanatory argument for physicalism.
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Nonreductive Materialism
  1. Louise M. Antony (1999). Making Room for the Mental. Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):37-44.
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  2. Lynne Rudder Baker, Nonreductive Materialism I. Introduction.
    The expression ‘nonreductive materialism’ refers to a variety of positions whose roots lie in attempts to solve the mind-body problem. Proponents of nonreductive materialism hold that the mental is ontologically part of the material world; yet, mental properties are causally efficacious without being reducible to physical properties.s After setting out a minimal schema for nonreductive materialism (NRM) as an ontological position, I’ll canvass some classical arguments in favor of (NRM).1 Then, I’ll discuss the major challenge facing any construal of (NRM): (...)
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  3. Lynne Rudder Baker (2006). Review of Nancey Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (8).
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  4. J. Barrett (1995). Causal Relevance and Nonreductive Physicalism. Erkenntnis 42 (3):339-62.
    It has been argued that nonreductive physicalism leads to epiphenominalism about mental properties: the view that mental events cannot cause behavioral effects by virtue of their mental properties. Recently, attempts have been made to develop accounts of causal relevance for irreducible properties to show that mental properties need not be epiphenomenal. In this paper, I primarily discuss the account of Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit. I show how it can be developed to meet several obvious objections and to capture our (...)
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  5. Ansgar Beckermann, H. Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (1992). Emergence or Reduction?: Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism. W. De Gruyter.
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  6. Dennis D. Bielfeldt (1999). Nancey Murphy's Nonreductive Physicalism. Zygon 34 (4):619-628.
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  7. Ingo Brigandt (forthcoming). Beyond Reduction and Pluralism: Toward an Epistemology of Explanatory Integration in Biology. Erkenntnis.
    The paper works towards an account of explanatory integration in biology, using as a case study explanations of the evolutionary origin of novelties-a problem requiring the integration of several biological fields and approaches. In contrast to the idea that fields studying lower level phenomena are always more fundamental in explanations, I argue that the particular combination of disciplines and theoretical approaches needed to address a complex biological problem and which among them is explanatorily more fundamental varies with the problem pursued. (...)
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  8. Randolph Clarke (1999). Nonreductive Physicalism and the Causal Powers of the Mental. Erkenntnis 51 (2-3):295-322.
    Nonreductive physicalism is currently one of the most widely held views about the world in general and about the status of the mental in particular. However, the view has recently faced a series of powerful criticisms from, among others, Jaegwon Kim. In several papers, Kim has argued that the nonreductivist's view of the mental is an unstable position, one harboring contradictions that push it either to reductivism or to eliminativism. The problems arise, Kim maintains, when we consider the causal powers (...)
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  9. Joseph Earley, How Philosophy of Mind Needs Philosophy of Chemistry.
    By the 1960s many (perhaps most) philosophers had adopted ‘physicalism’ ─ the view that physical causes fully account for mental activities. However, controversy persists about what count as ‘physical causes’. ‘Reductive’ physicalists recognize only microphysical (elementary-particle-level) causality. Many (perhaps most) physicalists are ‘non-reductive’ ─ they hold that entities considered by other (‘special’) sciences have causal powers. Philosophy of chemistry can help resolve main issues in philosophy of mind in three ways: developing an extended mereology applicable to chemical combination, testing whether (...)
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  10. BarbaraVon Eckardt (1981). Review Article. Margolis on Persons and Nonreductive Materialism. Metaphilosophy 12 (2):169–180.
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  11. Ralph D. Ellis (2000). Consciousness, Self-Organization, and the Process-Substratum Relation: Rethinking Nonreductive Physicalism. Philosophical Psychology 13 (2):173-190.
    Knowing only what is empirically knowable can't by itself entail knowledge of what consciousness "is like." But if dualism is to be avoided, the question arises: how can a process be completely empirically unobservable when all of its components are completely observable? The recently emerging theory of self-organization offers resources with which to resolve this problem: Consciousness can be an empirically unobservable process because the emotions motivating attention are experienced only from the perspective of the one whose phenomenal states are (...)
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  12. Ronald P. Endicott (2007). Nomic-Role Nonreductionism: Identifying Properties by Total Nomic Roles. Philosophical Topics 35 (1&2):217-240.
    Inspired by recent theories of embodied cognition that emphasize matters of a mind's engineering realization, I introduce "nomic-role nonreductionism" as an alternative to traditional causal-role functionalism in the philosophy of mind. Rather than identify mental properties by a theory that describes their intra-level causal roles via types of inputs, internal states, and outputs, I suggest that one identify mental properties by a more comprehensive theory that also describes inter-level realization roles via types of lower-level engineering, internal mental states, and still (...)
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  13. Jerry A. Fodor (1974). Special Sciences. Synthese 28:97-115.
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  14. Robert M. Francescotti (1998). The Nonreductionist's Troubles with Supervenience. Philosophical Studies 89 (1):105-24.
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  15. Carl Gillett & Bradley Rives (2001). Does the Argument From Realization Generalize? Responses to Kim. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):79-98.
    By quantifying over properties we cannot create new properties any more than by quantifying over individuals we can create new individuals. Someone murdered Jones, and the murderer is either Smith or Jones or Wang. That “someone”, who murdered Jones, is not a person in addition to Smith, Jones, and Wang, and it would be absurd to posit a disjunctive person, Smith-or-Jones-or-Wang, with whom to identify the murderer. The same goes for second-order properties and their realizers. (Kim (1997a), p.201).
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  16. John Heil (2002). Mental Causation. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
    This volume presents a collection of new, specially written essays by a diverse group of philosophers, including Donald Davidson, Ted Honderich, and Philip Pettit, each of whom is widely known for defending a particular conception of minds and their place in nature.
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  17. David Hunter (2001). Mind-Brain Identity and the Nature of States. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):366 – 376.
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  18. Ingvar Johansson (2001). Hartmann's Nonreductive Materialism, Superimposition, and Supervenience. Axiomathes 12 (3-4).
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  19. Jaegwon Kim (1989). The Myth of Non-Reductive Materialism. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 63 (3):31-47.
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  20. Robert E. Kirk (2001). Nonreductive Physicalism and Strict Implication. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4):544-552.
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  21. Robert E. Kirk (1996). How Physicalists Can Avoid Reductionism. Synthese 108 (2):157-70.
    Kim maintains that a physicalist has only two genuine options, eliminativism and reductionism. But physicalists can reject both by using the Strict Implication thesis (SI). Discussing his arguments will help to show what useful work SI can do.(1) His discussion of anomalous monism depends on an unexamined assumption to the effect that SI is false.
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  22. Jonathan Knowles (1999). Physicalism, Teleology and the Miraculous Coincidence Problem. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (195):164-81.
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  23. Kathleen Lennon (1984). Anti-Reductionist Materialism. Inquiry 27 (December):363-380.
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  24. Olga Markic (2002). Nonreductive Materialism and the Problem of Causal Exclusion. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):79-88.
    In this paper I examine nonreductive materialism (physicalism). This is a position that Terry Horgan favors in his papers and is probably the most widely accepted position in the philosophy of mind in recent decades. In contrast to this, I will argue that nonreductive materialism is an unstable position and will suggest that we can show this using Horgan's own work on the concept of superdupervenience.
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  25. Ausonio Marras (2007). Kim's Supervenience Argument and Nonreductive Physicalism. Erkenntnis 66 (3).
    The aim of this paper is to show that Kim’s ‚supervenience argument’ is at best inconclusive and so fails to provide an adequate challenge to nonreductive physicalism. I shall argue, first, that Kim’s argument rests on assumptions that the nonreductive physicalist is entitled to regard as question-begging; second, that even if those assumptions are granted, it is not clear that irreducible mental causes fail to␣satisfy them; and, third, that since the argument has the overall structure of a reductio, which of (...)
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  26. Ausonio Marras (1993). Psychophysical Supervenience and Nonreductive Materialism. Synthese 95 (2):275-304.
    Jaegwon Kim and others have claimed that (strong) psychophysical supervenience entails the reducibility of mental properties to physical properties. I argue that this claim is unwarranted with respect to epistemic (explanatory) reducibility (either of a global or of a local sort), as well as with respect to ontological reducibility. I then attempt to show that a robust version of nonreductive materialism (which I call supervenient token-physicalism) can be defended against the charge that nonreductive materialism leads to epiphenomenalism in failing to (...)
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  27. Andrew Melnyk (2008). Can Physicalism Be Non-Reductive? Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1281-1296.
    Can physicalism (or materialism) be non-reductive? I provide an opinionated survey of the debate on this question. I suggest that attempts to formulate non-reductive physicalism by appeal to claims of event identity, supervenience, or realization have produced doctrines that fail either to be physicalist or to be non-reductive. Then I treat in more detail a recent attempt to formulate non-reductive physicalism by Derk Pereboom, but argue that it fares no better.
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  28. Andrew Melnyk (1998). The Prospects for Kirk's Nonreductive Physicalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):323-32.
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  29. Andrew Melnyk (1995). Two Cheers for Reductionism, or, the Dim Prospects for Nonreductive Materialism. Philosophy of Science 62 (3):370-88.
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  30. Derk Pereboom (2002). Robust Nonreductive Materialism. Journal of Philosophy 99 (10):499-531.
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  31. Derk Pereboom & Hilary Kornblith (1991). The Metaphysics of Irreducibility. Philosophical Studies 63 (August):125-45.
    During the 'sixties and 'seventies, Hilary Putnam, Jerry Fodor, and Richard Boyd, among others, developed a type of materialism that eschews reductionist claims.1 In this view, explana- tions, natural kinds, and properties in psychology do not reduce to counterparts in more basic sciences, such as neurophysiology or physics. Nevertheless, all token psychological entities-- states, processes, and faculties--are wholly constituted of physical entities, ultimately out of entities over which microphysics quantifies. This view quickly became the standard position in philosophy of mind, (...)
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  32. David Pineda (2001). Functionalism and Nonreductive Physicalism. Theoria 16 (40):43-63.
    Most philosophers of mind nowadays espouse two metaphysical views: Nonreductive Physicalism and the causal efficacy of the mental. Throughout this work I will refer to the conjunction of both claims as the Causal Autonomy of the Mental. Nevertheless, this position is threatened by a number of difficulties which are far more serious than one would imagine given the broad consensus that it has generated during the last decades. This paper purports to offer a careful examination of some of these difficulties (...)
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  33. Douglas V. Porpora (1982). Nonreductive Materialism and the Materialisms of Marx and Heidegger. Human Studies 5 (1).
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  34. Paul Raymont (2003). Kim on Overdetermination, Exclusion, and Nonreductive Physicalism. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic.
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  35. Howard M. Robinson (2001). Davidson and Nonreductive Materialism: A Tale of Two Cultures. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.
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  36. Alex Rosenberg (2005). How to Reconcile Physicalism and Antireductionism About Biology. Philosophy Of Science 72 (1):43-68.
    Physicalism and antireductionism are the ruling orthodoxy in the philosophy of biology. But these two theses are difficult to reconcile. Merely embracing an epistemic antireductionism will not suffice, as both reductionists and antireductionists accept that given our cognitive interests and limitations, non-molecular explanations may not be improved, corrected or grounded in molecular ones. Moreover, antireductionists themselves view their claim as a metaphysical or ontological one about the existence of facts molecular biology cannot identify, express, or explain. However, this is tantamount (...)
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  37. Marc Slors (2003). Epiphenomenalism and Cross-Realization Induction. Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):15-36.
    In the first part of this paper I argue that epiphenomenalism does not pose a threat to nonreductive physicalism, if type-epiphenomenalism does not imply the redundancy of mental (or in general higher-level) typing of events and/or states. Furthermore, if justifiable induction over folk-psychological regularities is possible independently of the ways in which these regularities are realized, type-epiphenomenalism does not imply the redundancy ofmental typing. Inthe second part of this paper I explain how justifiable 'cross-realization induction' can be possible. This explanation (...)
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  38. Kelly Trogdon (2009). Physicalsim and Sparse Ontology. Philosophical Studies 143 (2):147-165.
    A major stumbling block for non-reductive physicalism is Kim’s disjunctive property objection. In this paper I bring certain issues in sparse ontology to bear on the objection, in particular the theses of priority monism and priority pluralism. Priority pluralism (or something close to it, anyway) is a common ontological background assumption, so in the first part of the paper I consider whether the disjunctive property objection applies with equal force to non-reductive physicalism on the assumption that priority monism is instead (...)
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  39. Donald H. Wacome (2004). Reductionism's Demise: Cold Comfort. Zygon 39 (2):321-337.
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  40. Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (2003). Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic.
  41. Richard Warner & Tadeusz Szubka (1994). The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Blackwell.
  42. Ralph Wedgwood (2000). The Price of Non-Reductive Physicalism. Noûs 34 (3):400-421.
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  43. Jessica M. Wilson, Non-Reductive Physicalism and Degrees of Freedom.
    Some claim that NRP is an unstable position, either collapsing into reductive physicalism (so denying Non-reduction) or expanding into emergentism of a robust or “strong” variety (so denying Physicalism).2 I argue here that this claim is unfounded. NRP occupies a viable middle ground between reductive physicalism and robust emergentism, according to which some phenomena are (as I will sometimes put it) ‘weakly..
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  44. Jessica M. Wilson, Non-Reductive Realization and the Powers-Based Subset Strategy.
    I argue that an adequate account of non-reductive realization must guarantee satisfaction of a certain condition on the token causal powers associated with (instances of) realized and realizing entities---namely, what I call the 'Subset Condition on Causal Powers'. In terms of states, the condition requires that the token powers had by a realized state on a given occasion be a proper subset of the token powers had by the state that realizes it on that occasion. Accounts of non-reductive realization conforming (...)
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  45. Jessica M. Wilson (2009). Determination, Realization and Mental Causation. Philosophical Studies 145 (1):149--169.
    How can mental properties bring about physical effects, as they seem to do, given that the physical realizers of the mental goings-on are already sufficient to cause these effects? This question gives rise to the problem of mental causation (MC) and its associated threats of causal overdetermination, mental causal exclusion, and mental causal irrelevance. Some (e.g., Cynthia and Graham Macdonald, and Stephen Yablo) have suggested that understanding mental-physical realization in terms of the determinable/determinate relation (henceforth, ‘determination’) provides the key to (...)
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  46. Jessica M. Wilson (2005). Supervenience-Based Formulations of Physicalism. Noûs 39 (3):426-459.
    The many and varied formulations of physicalism instantiate the following schema: Physicalism: All entities are nothing over and above physical entities. Supervenience-based accounts of “nothing over and aboveness” also instantiate a schema: Supervenience-based Nothing Over and Aboveness: The A-entities are nothing over and above the B-entities if the A-entities supervene on the B-entities. The four main approaches to filling in the latter schema correspond to different ways of characterizing the modal strength, the supervenience base, or the supervenience connection at issue. (...)
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  47. Jessica M. Wilson (1999). How Superduper Does a Physicalist Supervenience Need to Be? Philosophical Quarterly 50 (194):33-52.
    The standard formulations of the supervenience relation present the supervenience of one set of properties on another in terms of property correlations, without placing any constraints on the dependency relation concerned. As Horgan notes, this does not ensure that properties supervening upon physicalistically acceptable base properties are not themselves emergent in a way at odds with materialism; hence he concludes that what physicalism needs is "superdupervenience" -- supervenience plus robust ontological explanation of the supervenient in terms of the base properties. (...)
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  48. D. Gene Witmer (2004). Review of Andrew Melnyk, A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (6).
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Reduction in Psychology and Neuroscience
  1. Ken Aizawa (2009). Neuroscience and Multiple Realization: A Reply to Bechtel and Mundale. Synthese 167 (3).
    One trend in recent work on topic of the multiple realization of psychological properties has been an emphasis on greater sensitivity to actual science and greater clarity regarding the metaphysics of realization and multiple realization. One contribution to this trend is Bechtel and Mundale’s examination of the implications of brain mapping for multiple realization. Where Bechtel and Mundale argue that studies of brain mapping undermine claims about the multiple realization, this paper challenges that argument.
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  2. Harald Atmanspacher (2007). Contextual Emergence From Physics to Cognitive Neuroscience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1-2):18-36.
    The concept of contextual emergence has been proposed as a non-reductive, yet well- defined relation between different levels of description of physical and other systems. It is illustrated for the transition from statistical mechanics to thermodynamical properties such as temperature. Stability conditions are shown to be crucial for a rigorous implementation of contingent contexts that are required to understand temperature as an emergent property. Are such stability conditions meaningful for contextual emergence beyond physics as well? An affirmative example from cognitive (...)
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  3. Sunny Auyang, Are You Nothing but Genes or Neurons?
    All complex systems are complex, but some are more complex than others are. Biological systems are generally more complex than physical systems. How do biologists tackle complex systems? In this talk, we will consider two biological systems, the genome and the brain. Scientists know much about them, but much more remains unknown. Ignorance breeds philosophical speculation. Reductionism makes a strong showing here, as it does in other frontier sciences where large gaps remain in our understanding. I will show that reductionism (...)
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  4. Philip Barnard & Tim Dalgleish (2005). Psychological-Level Systems Theory: The Missing Link in Bridging Emotion Theory and Neurobiology Through Dynamic Systems Modeling. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):196-197.
    Bridging between psychological and neurobiological systems requires that the system components are closely specified at both the psychological and brain levels of analysis. We argue that in developing his dynamic systems theory framework, Lewis has sidestepped the notion of a psychological level systems model altogether, and has taken a partisan approach to his exposition of a brain-level systems model.
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  5. R. L. Barnette (1972). Comments on Neurophysiological Reduction. Theoria 38:143-144.
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  6. C. Philip Beaman (2000). Neurons Amongst the Symbols? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (4):468-470.
    Page's target article presents an argument for the use of localist, connectionist models in future psychological theorising. The “manifesto” marshalls a set of arguments in favour of localist connectionism and against distributed connectionism, but in doing so misses a larger argument concerning the level of psychological explanation that is appropriate to a given domain.
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  7. William P. Bechtel (2002). Aligning Multiple Research Techniques in Cognitive Neuroscience: Why is It Important? Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3):548-558.
    The need to align multiple experimental procedures and produce converging results so as to demonstrate that the phenomenon under investigation is real and not an artifact is a commonplace both in scientific practice and discussions of scientific methodology (Campbell and Stanley 1963; Wimsatt 1981). Although sometimes this is the purpose of aligning techniques, often there is a different purpose—multiple techniques are sought to supply different perspectives on the phenomena under investigation that need to be integrated to answer the questions scientists (...)
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  8. William P. Bechtel (1983). A Bridge Between Cognitive Science and Neuroscience: The Functional Architecture of Mind. Philosophical Studies 44 (November):319-30.
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  9. William P. Bechtel & Jennifer Mundale (1996). Integrating Neuroscience, Psychology, and Evolutionary Biology Through a Teleological Conception of Function. Minds And Machines 6 (4):481-505.
    The idea of integrating evolutionary biology and psychology has great promise, but one that will be compromised if psychological functions are conceived too abstractly and neuroscience is not allowed to play a contructive role. We argue that the proper integration of neuroscience, psyychology, and evolutionary biology requires a telelogical as opposed to a merely componential analysis of function. A teleological analysis is required in neuroscience itself; we point to traditional and curent research methods in neuroscience, which make critical use of (...)
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  10. Jonathan Bentwich (2006). The Duality Principle: Irreducibility of Sub-Threshold Psychophysical Computation to Neuronal Brain Activation. Synthese 153 (3):451-455.
    A key working hypothesis in neuroscience is ‘materialistic reductionism’, i.e., the assumption whereby all physiological, behavioral or cognitive phenomena is produced by localized neurochemical brain activation (but not vice versa). However, analysis of sub-threshold Weber’s psychophysical stimulation indicates its computational irreducibility to the direct interaction between psychophysical stimulation and any neuron/s. This is because the materialistic-reductionistic working hypothesis assumes that the determination of the existence or non-existence of any psychophysical stimulation [s] may only be determined through its direct interaction [di1] (...)
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  11. John Bickle (2006). Reducing Mind to Molecular Pathways: Explicating the Reductionism Implicit in Current Cellular and Molecular Neuroscience. Synthese 151 (3):411-434.
    As opposed to the dismissive attitude toward reductionism that is popular in current philosophy of mind, a “ruthless reductionism” is alive and thriving in “molecular and cellular cognition”—a field of research within cellular and molecular neuroscience, the current mainstream of the discipline. Basic experimental practices and emerging results from this field imply that two common assertions by philosophers and cognitive scientists are false: (1) that we do not know much about how the brain works, and (2) that lower-level neuroscience cannot (...)
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  12. John Bickle (2005). Molecular Neuroscience to My Rescue (Again): Reply to Looren De Jong and Schouten. Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):487-494.
    In their review essay (published in this issue), Looren de Jong and Schouten take my 2003 book to task for (among other things) neglecting to keep up with the latest developments in my favorite scientific case study (memory consolidation). They claim that these developments have been guided by psychological theorizing and have replaced neurobiology's traditional 'static' view of consolidation with a 'dynamic' alternative. This shows that my 'essential but entirely heuristic' treatment of higher-level cognitive theorizing is a mistaken view of (...)
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  13. John Bickle (2005). Precis of Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):231-238.
    This book precis describes the motives behind my recent attempt to bring to bear “ruthlessly reductive” results from cellular and molecular neuroscience onto issues in the philosophy of mind. Since readers of this journal will probably be most interested in results addressing features of conscious experience, I highlight these most prominently. My main challenge is that philosophers (even scientifically-inspired ones) are missing the nature and scope of reductionism in contemporary neuroscience by focusing exclusively on higher-level cognitive neuroscience, and ignoring the (...)
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  14. John Bickle (2005). Replies. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):285-296.
    I reply to challenges raised by contributors to this book symposium. Key challenges include (but are not limited to): distancing my new account of reductionism-in-practice from my previous “new wave” account; clarifying my claimed “heuristic” status for higher-level investigations (including cognitive-neuroscientific ones); defending the “reorientation of philosophical desires” I claim to be required by my project; and addressing consideration about normativity.
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  15. Erhard Bieberich, In Search of a Neuronal Substrate of the Human Mind: New Concepts From "Topological Neurochemistry".
    Neurochemistry is a powerful discipline of modern neuroscience based on a description of neuronal function in terms of molecular reaction and interaction. This study aims at a neurochemical approach to the "hard" philosophical mind-body problem: the search for the neuronal correlate of consciousness. The scattered pattern of remote areas in the human brain simultaneously busy with the computation of single perceptions has left us with the unanswered questions why, where, and how the neuronal activity gives rise to a unified conscious (...)
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  16. Alison C. Boyce (2009). Neuroimaging in Psychiatry: Evaluating the Ethical Consequences for Patient Care. Bioethics 23 (6):349-359.
    According to many researchers, it is inevitable and obvious that psychiatric illnesses are biological in nature, and that this is the rationale behind the numerous neuroimaging studies of individuals diagnosed with mental disorders. Scholars looking at the history of psychiatry have pointed out that in the past, the origins and motivations behind the search for biological causes, correlates, and cures for mental disorders are thoroughly social and historically rooted, particularly when the diagnostic category in question is the subject of controversy (...)
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  17. Andrew Brook (1998). Neuroscience Versus Psychology in Freud. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 843 (1):66-79.
    In the 1890's, Freud attempted to lay out the foundations of a complete, interdisciplinary neuroscience of the mind. The conference that gave rise to this collection of papers, Neuroscience of the Mind on the Centennial of Freud's Project for a Scientific Psychology, celebrated the centrepiece of this work, the famous Project (1895a). Freud never published this work and by 1896 or 1897 he had abandoned the research programme behind it. As he announced in the famous Ch. VII of The Interpretation (...)
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  18. Alex Byrne (2000). Two Radical Neuron Doctrines. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):833-833.
    G&S describe the radical neuron doctrine in a number of slightly different ways, and we think this hides an important distinction. On the one hand, the radical neuron doctrine is supposed to have the consequence "that a successful theory of the mind will make no reference to anything like the concepts of linguistics or the psychological sciences as we currently understand them", and so Chomskyan linguistics "is doomed from the beginning" (sect. 2.2.2, paras. 2,3).[1] (Note that `a successful theory' must (...)
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  19. Keith Campbell (1986). Can Intuitive Psychology Survive the Growth of Neuroscience? Inquiry 29 (June):143-152.
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  20. Nick Chater (1999). Why Biological Neuroscience Cannot Replace Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):834-834.
    Gold & Stoljar argue persuasively that there is presently not a good case for the “radical neuron doctrine.” There are strong reasons to believe that this doctrine is false. An analogy between psychology and economics strongly throws the radical neuron doctrine into doubt.
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  21. Antonio Chella (2005). An Intermediate Level Between the Psychological and the Neurobiological Levels of Descriptions of Appraisal-Emotion Dynamics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):199-200.
    Conceptual space is proposed as an intermediate representation level between the psychological and the neurobiological levels of descriptions of appraisal and emotions. The main advantage of the proposed intermediate representation is that the appraisal and emotions dynamics are described by using the terms of geometry.
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  22. Wayne D. Christensen & Luca Tomassi (2006). Neuroscience in Context: The New Flagship of the Cognitive Sciences. Biological Theory 1 (1):78-83.
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  23. Paul M. Churchland (1986). Some Reductive Strategies in Cognitive Neurobiology. Mind 95 (July):279-309.
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  24. Huib L. de Jong & Maurice K. D. Schouten (2005). Ruthless Reductionism: A Review Essay of John Bickle's Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account. Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):473-486.
    John Bickle's new book on philosophy and neuroscience is aptly subtitled 'a ruthlessly reductive account'. His 'new wave metascience' is a massive attack on the relative autonomy that psychology enjoyed until recently, and goes even beyond his previous (Bickle, J. (1998). Psychoneural reduction: The new wave. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.) new wave reductionsism. Reduction of functional psychology to (cognitive) neuroscience is no longer ruthless enough; we should now look rather to cellular or molecular neuroscience at the lowest possible level for (...)
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  25. William Dembski, Challenging Materialism's "Chokehold" on Neuroscience.
    In the epilogue to The Mind and the Brain , we read: "Finally, after a generation or more in which biological materialism has had neuroscience -- indeed, all the life sciences -- in a chokehold, we may at last be breaking free.... Biological materialism did and does have real-world consequences. We feel its reach every time a pharmaceutical company tells us that, to cure shyness (or "social phobia"), we need only reach for a little pill.... Biological materialism is nothing if (...)
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  26. Birgitta Dresp (1999). The Cognitive Impenetrability Hypothesis: Doomsday for the Unity of the Cognitive Neurosciences? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):375-376.
    The heuristic value of Pylyshyn's cognitive impenetrability theory is questioned in this commentary, mainly because, as it stands, the key argument cannot be challenged empirically. Pylyshyn requires unambiguous evidence for an effect of cognitive states on early perceptual mechanisms, which is impossible to provide because we can only infer what might happen at these earlier levels of processing on the basis of evidence collected at the post-perceptual stage. Furthermore, the theory that early visual processes cannot be modified by cognitive states (...)
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  27. Ronald P. Endicott (2007). Reinforcing the Three ‘R's: Reduction, Reception, and Replacement. In M. Schouten & H. Looren de Jong (eds.), The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience, and Reduction. Blackwell.
    Philosophers of science have offered different accounts of what it means for one scientific theory to reduce to another. I propose a more or less friendly amendment to Kenneth Schaffner’s “General Reduction-Replacement” model of scientific unification. Schaffner interprets scientific unification broadly in terms of a continuum from theory reduction to theory replacement. As such, his account leaves no place on its continuum for type irreducible and irreplaceable theories. The same is true for other accounts that incorporate Schaffner's continuum, for example, (...)
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  28. Ronald P. Endicott (2001). Post-Structuralist Angst - Critical Notice: John Bickle, Psychoneural Reduction: The New Wave. Philosophy of Science 68 (3):377-393.
    I critically evaluate Bickle’s version of scientific theory reduction. I press three main points. First, a small point, Bickle modifies the new wave account of reduction developed by Paul Churchland and Clifford Hooker by treating theories as set-theoretic structures. But that structuralist gloss seems to lose what was distinctive about the Churchland-Hooker account, namely, that a corrected theory must be specified entirely by terms and concepts drawn from the basic reducing theory. Set-theoretic structures are not terms or concepts but the (...)
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  29. Ronald P. Endicott (1998). Collapse of the New Wave. Journal of Philosophy 95 (2):53-72.
    I critically evaluate the influential new wave account of theory reduction in science developed by Paul Churchland and Clifford Hooker. First, I cast doubt on claims that the new wave account enjoys a number of theoretical virtues over its competitors, such as the ability to represent how false theories are reduced by true theories. Second, I argue that the genuinely novel claim that a corrected theory must be specified entirely by terms from the basic reducing theory is in fact too (...)
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  30. Ronald P. Endicott (1993). Species-Specific Properties and More Narrow Reductive Strategies. Erkenntnis 38 (3):303-21.
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  31. James Fahey & Michael Zenzen (1999). Reductionism and the Neuron Doctrine: A Metaphysical Fix of Gold & Stoljar's Trivial–Radical Distinction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):835-836.
    The trivial neuron doctrine (TND) holds that psychology merely depends on neurobiology. The radical neuron doctrine (RND) goes further and claims that psychology is superfluous in that neuroscience can “replace it.” Popular among RND notions of “replacement” is “reduction,” and in our commentary we challenge Gold & Stoljar (G&S) to make clear their distinction between merely depends on (TND) and is reducible to (RND). G&S give us a TND–RND distinction that is a distinction without a difference; a defensible TND–RND distinction (...)
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  32. J. Gaito & D. Leonard (1965). Philosophical and Empirical Reductionism in Psychology. Journal of General Psychology 72:69-75.
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  33. Bernard Gendron (1970). On the Relation of Neurological and Psychological Theories: A Critique of the Hardware Thesis. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 8:483-95.
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  34. Ian Gold & Daniel Stoljar (1999). A Neuron Doctrine in the Philosophy of Neuroscience. Behavioral And Brain Sciences 22 (5):809-830.
  35. Verena Gottschling (2005). The Mind Reduced to Molecules? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):279-283.
    According to Bickle, certain empirical results demonstrate that the bottom-up reduction of phychological concepts to the concepts of neuroscience has already been accomplished. I argue that this conclusion is hasty. Bickle claims that all high-level investigations depend on a mistake. I argue that this overstates the explanatory character of neuroscientific findings. Bickle's assessment is highly optimistic, but he is far from making a decisive argument. Those who wait for a full-blown reductionism will have to wait a little longer.
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  36. Keith Gunderson (1999). What Neuron Doctrines Might Never Explain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):837-838.
    My focus is on the inability of neuron doctrines to provide an explanatory context for aspects of consciousness that give rise to the mind–body and other minds problem(s). Neuroscience and related psychological sciences may be viewed as richly contributing to our taxonomic understanding of the mind and conditions underlying consciousness, without illuminating mind–body and other minds perplexities.
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  37. Stuart Hameroff (1999). The Neuron Doctrine is an Insult to Neurons. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):838-839.
    As presently implemented, the neuron doctrine (ND) portrays the brain's neurons and chemical synapses as fundamental components in a computer-like switching circuit, supporting a view of brain = mind = computer. However, close examination reveals individual neurons to be far more complex than simple switches, with enormous capacity for intracellular information processing (e.g., in the internal cytoskeleton). Other poorly appreciated factors (gap junctions, apparent randomness, dendritic-dendritic processing, possible quantum computation, the living state) also suggest that the ND grossly oversimplifies neuronal (...)
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  38. Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1999). The Nontrivial Doctrine of Cognitive Neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):839-839.
    Gold & Stoljar's “trivial” neuron doctrine is neither a truism in cognitive science nor trivial; it has serious consequences for the future direction of the mind/brain sciences. Not everyone would agree that these consequences are desirable. The authors' “radical” doctrine is not so radical; their division between cognitive neuroscience and neurobiology is largely artificial. Indeed, there is no sharp distinction between cognitive neuroscience and other areas of the brain sciences.
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  39. Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1992). Reduction, Explanatory Extension, and the Mind/Brain Sciences. Philosophy of Science 59 (3):408-28.
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  40. Cliff A. Hooker (2006). Reduction as Cognitive Strategy. In Brian L. Keeley (ed.), Paul Churchland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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  41. Barry Horwitz (1999). Neuron Doctrine: Trivial Versus Radical Versus Do Not Dichotomize. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):839-840.
    Gold & Stoljar argue that there are two (often confused) neuron doctrines, one trivial and the other radical, with only the latter having the consequence that non-neuroscientific sciences of the mind will be discarded. They also attempt to show that there is no evidence supporting the radical doctrine. It is argued here that their dichotomy is artificial and misrepresents modern approaches to understanding the neuroscientific correlates of cognition and behavior.
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  42. Michael E. Hyland (1995). Against Nomological Reductionism in Psychology: A Response to Robinson. New Ideas in Psychology 13:9-11.
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  43. Frank Jackson (1999). A Slightly Radical Neuron Doctrine. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):840-841.
    The element of truth in behaviorism tells us that some versions of a radical neuron doctrine must be false. However, the representational nature of many mental states implies that neuroscience may well bear on some topics traditionally addressed by philosophers of mind. An example is the individuation of belief states.
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  44. Anne Jaap Jacobson (2005). Is the Brain a Memory Box? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):271-278.
    Bickle argues for both a narrow causal reductionism, and a broader ontological-explanatory reductionism. The former is more successful than the latter. I argue that the central and unsolved problem in Bickle's approach to reductionism involves the nature of psychological terms. Investigating why the broader reductionism fails indicates ways in which phenomenology remains more than a handmaiden of neuroscience.
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  45. Dale Jamieson (1999). The “Trivial Neuron Doctrine” is Not Trivial. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):841-842.
    I argue that the trivial neuron doctrine as characterized by Gold & Stoljar is not trivial; it appears to be inconsistent with property dualism as well as some forms of functionalism and externalism. I suggest that the problem is not so much with the particular way in which Gold & Stoljar draw the distinction as with the unruliness of the distinction itself. Their failure to see this may be why they misunderstand the views of the Churchlands.
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  46. J. Scott Jordan (1999). “Mind is Brain” is Trivial and Nonscientific in Both Neurobiology and Cognitive Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):842-842.
    Gold & Stoljar reveal that adherence to the radical neuron doctrine cannot be maintained via appeals to scientific principles. Using arguments from (1) naturalism and materialism, (2) unification, and (3) exemplars, it is shown that the “mind-is-brain” materialism explicit in the trivial version of the neuron doctrine ultimately suffers the same theoretical fate. Cognitive science, if it is to adopt an ontology at all, would be better served by a metaphysically neutral ontology such as double-aspect theory or neutral monism.
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  47. Brian L. Keeley (2005). Paul Churchland. Cambridge University Press.
    This collection offers an introduction to Churchland's work, as well as a critique of some of his most famous philosophical positions.
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  48. Pim Klaassen, Erik Rietveld & Julien Topal (2010). Inviting Complementary Perspectives on Situated Normativity in Everyday Life. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):53-73.
    In everyday life, situations in which we act adequately yet entirely without deliberation are ubiquitous. We use the term “situated normativity” for the normative aspect of embodied cognition in skillful action. Wittgenstein’s notion of “directed discontent” refers to a context-sensitive reaction of appreciation in skillful action. Extending this notion from the domain of expertise to that of adequate everyday action, we examine phenomenologically the question of what happens when skilled individuals act correctly with instinctive ease. This question invites exploratory contributions (...)
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  49. Joe Y. F. Lau (1999). A More Substantive Neuron Doctrine. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):843-844.
    (1) It is not clear from Gold and Stoljar’s definition of biological neuroscience whether it includes computational and representational concepts. If so, then their evaluation of Kandel’s theory is problematic. If not, then a more direct refutation of the radical neuron doctrine is available. (2) Objections to the psychological sciences might derive not just from the conflation of the radical and the trivial neuron doctrine. There might also be the implicit belief that for many mental phenomena, adequate theories must invoke (...)
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  50. Dorothée Legrand & Franck Grammont (2005). A Matter of Facts. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):249-257.
    We discuss the justification of Bickle's “ruthless” reductionism. Bickle intends to show that we know enough about neurons to draw conclusions about the “whole” brain and about the mind. However, his reductionism does not take into account the complexity of the nervous system and the fact that new properties emerge at each significant level of integration from the coupled functioning of elementary components. From a methodological point of view, we argue that neuronal and cognitive models have to exert a mutual (...)
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  51. Julian C. Leslie (2000). Meanings of “Function” in Neuroscience, Cognition, and Behaviour Analysis. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (4):546-547.
    Different sciences approach the brain-behaviour system at various levels, but often apparently share terminology. “Function” is used both ontogenetically and phylogenetically. Within the ontogeny it has various meanings; the one adopted by Arbib et al. is that of mainstream cognitive psychology. This usage is relatively imprecise, and the psychologists who are sceptical about the ability of cognitive psychology to predict behavioural outcomes may have the same reservations about Arbib et al.'s cognitive neuroscience.
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