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Psychophysical Reduction

Edited by John Donaldson (University of Glasgow, Glasgow School of Art)
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Summary Psychophysical reduction comes in two main forms: theoretical or ontological. The former involves showing that psychological theory can be appropriately derived from physical theory, the latter involves showing that psychological entities are identical to physical entities. One can be a reductionist, and hold that the psychological reduces to the physical, or deny this and be a non-reductionist. Despite the first reductionists, such as J. J. C. Smart and Herbert Feigl, starting the debate by defending the ontological rather than theoretical form, until recently most of the discussion of the prospects for reductionism focussed on the theoretical form, with many holding that psychological theory cannot be appropriately derived from physical theory. Towards the end of the twentieth century, non-reductionism (of the materialist sort) was overwhelmingly dominant, but reductionism has gone through something of a revival since then, with ontological reductionism probably the most tenable form.
Key works According to the standard story, the roots of reductionism terminate in the work of Place 1956; Feigl 1958; Oppenheim & Putnam 1958; and Smart 1959. The classic objections to reductionism can be found in the work of Putnam 1967, 1975; Davidson 1970; Fodor 1974; and Boyd 1980. The high watermark of non-reductionism can be found in Block 1997 and Fodor 1997. Since around the time that mark was reached, most discussion has proceeded in one of two directions. First, the basic terms of the debate have been questioned. For example, some have tried to defend a version of ontological reductionism while labelling it "non-reductionism" for some other reason, see Antony & Levine 1997; Clapp 2001, and Antony 2003. Second, the prospects for a revival of reductionism of one sort or another have been examined. See, for example: Hill 1991; Kim 1992, 1998, 2005; Block & Stalnaker 1999; Bechtel & Mundale 1999; Gillett & Loewer 2001; Shapiro 2004; Polger 2004; Bickle 2008; 2010; Hohwy & Kallestrup 2008; Gozzano & Hill 2012; Gibb & Ingthorsson 2013. In the process of this, the nature of reduction has been debated - a survey of which can be found in van Riel 2014.
Introductions The introduction to the collection edited by Gozzano and Hill (2012) is a good place to start, and that volume also contains much of the state of the art thinking on the prospects for reductionism. Kim 2005 is also a good way in. Enyclopedia entries include Smart 2007, and Bickle 2008, with the latter focussing on the multiple realization argument, which is often taken to be the main argument against reductionism.
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  1. Janice Dowell (2008). Serious Metaphysics and the Vindication of Reductions. Philosophical Studies 139 (1):91 - 110.
    What would be sufficient to show of some apparently higher-level property that it is 'nothing over and above' some complex configuration of more basic properties? This paper defends a new method for justifying reductions by demonstrating its comparative advantages over two methods recently defended in the literature. Unlike its rivals, what I'll call "the semantic method" makes a reduction's truth epistemically transparent without relying on conceptual analyses.
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  2. Gary Hatfield (2009). What Can the Mind Tell Us About the Brain? Psychology, Neurophysiology, and Constraint. In Perception and Cognition: Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology. Clarendon Press 434-55.
    This chapter examines the relations between psychology and neuroscience. There is a strong philosophical intuition that direct study of the brain can and will constrain the development of psychological theory. When this intuition is tested against case studies from the psychology of perception and memory, it turns out that psychology has led the way toward knowledge of neurophysiology. The chapter presents an abstract argument to show that psychology can and must lead the way in neuroscientific study of mental function. The (...)
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  3. Laureano Luna (forthcoming). Physicalism, Truth, and the Pinocchio Paradox. Mind and Matter.
    We develop an argument sketched by Luna (2011) based on the Pinocchio paradox, which was proposed by Eldridge-Smith and Eldridge- Smith (2010). We show that, upon plausible assumptions, the claim that mental states supervene on bodily states leads to the conclusion that some proposition is both paradoxical and not paradoxical. In order to show how the presence of paradoxes can be harnessed for philosophical argumentation, we present as well a couple of related arguments.
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  4. Sonia Sedivy (1995). Consciousness Explained. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):455-483.
Nonreductive Materialism
  1. S. C. A. (1973). Interpretations of Life and Mind: Essays Around the Problem of Reduction. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 27 (1):126-127.
  2. Joseph Almog (2009). Dualistic Materialism. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press
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  3. Louise M. Antony (2007). Everybody has Got It: A Defense of Non-Reductive Materialism. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell
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  4. Louise M. Antony (1999). Making Room for the Mental. Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):37-44.
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  5. D. M. Armstrong (1980). Book Reviews : Persons and Minds: The Prospects of Nonreductive Materialism. By Joseph Margolis. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. Lvii Dordrecht--Holland/Boston--U.S.A.: D. Reidel, 1978. $26.00 (Cloth), $11.95 (Paper). [REVIEW] Philosophy of the Social Sciences 10 (2):227-229.
  6. Lynne Baker (2011). Christian Materialism in a Scientific Age. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (1):47-59.
    Many Christians who argue against Christian materialism direct their arguments against what I call ‘Type-I materialism’, the thesis that I cannot exist without my organic body. I distinguish Type-I materialism from Type-II materialism, which entails only that I cannot exist without some body that supports certain mental functions. I set out a version of Type-II materialism, and argue for its superiority to Type-I materialism in an age of science. Moreover, I show that Type-II materialism can accommodate Christian doctrines like the (...)
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  7. Lynne Rudder Baker (2013). Pereboom's Robust Nonreductive Physicalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):736-744.
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  8. Lynne Rudder Baker (2009). Nonreductive Materialsim. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. OUP Oxford
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  9. Lynne Rudder Baker (2009). Nonreductive Materialism I. Introduction. In Brian McLaughlin and Ansgar Beckermann (ed.), Oxford Handbook for the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press
    The expression ‘nonreductive materialism’ refers to a variety of positions whose roots lie in attempts to solve the mind-body problem. Proponents of nonreductive materialism hold that the mental is ontologically part of the material world; yet, mental properties are causally efficacious without being reducible to physical properties.s After setting out a minimal schema for nonreductive materialism (NRM) as an ontological position, I’ll canvass some classical arguments in favor of (NRM).1 Then, I’ll discuss the major challenge facing any construal of (NRM): (...)
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  10. Lynne Rudder Baker (2006). Review of Nancey Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (8).
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  11. Katalin Balog (2001). Commentary on Frank Jackson's From Metaphysics to Ethics. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):645–652.
    Symposium contribution on Frank Jackson’s a priori entailment thesis – which he employs to connect metaphysics and conceptual analysis. In the book he develops this thesis within the two-dimensional framework and also proposes a formal argument for it. I argue that the two-dimensional framework doesn’t provide independent support for the a priori entailment thesis since one has to build into the framework assumptions as strong as the thesis itself.
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  12. Joseph A. Baltimore (2010). Defending the Piggyback Principle Against Shapiro and Sober's Empirical Approach. Synthese 175 (2):151-168.
    Jaegwon Kim’s supervenience/exclusion argument attempts to show that non-reductive physicalism is incompatible with mental causation. This influential argument can be seen as relying on the following principle, which I call “the piggyback principle”: If, with respect to an effect, E, an instance of a supervenient property, A, has no causal powers over and above, or in addition to, those had by its supervenience base, B, then the instance of A does not cause E (unless A is identical with B). In (...)
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  13. J. Barrett (1995). Causal Relevance and Nonreductive Physicalism. Erkenntnis 42 (3):339-62.
    It has been argued that nonreductive physicalism leads to epiphenominalism about mental properties: the view that mental events cannot cause behavioral effects by virtue of their mental properties. Recently, attempts have been made to develop accounts of causal relevance for irreducible properties to show that mental properties need not be epiphenomenal. In this paper, I primarily discuss the account of Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit. I show how it can be developed to meet several obvious objections and to capture our (...)
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  14. Jared Bates (2009). A Defence of the Explanatory Argument for Physicalism. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):315-324.
    One argument for reductive physicalism, the explanatory argument, rests on its ability to explain the vast and growing body of acknowledged psychophysical correlations. Jaegwon Kim has recently levelled four objections against the explanatory argument. I assess all of Kim's objections, showing that none is successful. The result is a defence of the explanatory argument for physicalism.
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  15. Mark Bauer (2012). Multiple Realizability as Compatible with the Mental Constraint Thesis. Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (1):119-127.
  16. Michael Baumgartner (2013). Rendering Interventionism and Non‐Reductive Physicalism Compatible. Dialectica 67 (1):1-27.
    In recent years, the debate on the problem of causal exclusion has seen an ‘interventionist turn’. Numerous non-reductive physicalists (e.g. Shapiro and Sober 2007) have argued that Woodward's (2003) interventionist theory of causation provides a means to empirically establish the existence of non-reducible mental-to-physical causation. By contrast, Baumgartner (2010) has presented an interventionist exclusion argument showing that interventionism is in fact incompatible with non-reductive physicalism. In response, a number of revised versions of interventionism have been suggested that are compatible with (...)
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  17. Michael Baumgartner & Lorenzo Casini (forthcoming). An Abductive Theory of Constitution. Philosophy of Science.
    The first part of this paper finds Craver’s (2007) mutual manipulability theory (MM) of constitution inadequate, as it definitionally ties constitution to the feasibility of idealized experiments, which, however, are unrealizable in principle. As an alternative, the second part develops an abductive theory of constitution (NDC), which exploits the fact that phenomena and their constituents are unbreakably coupled via common causes. The best explanation for this common-cause coupling is the existence of an additional dependence relation, viz. constitution. Apart from adequately (...)
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  18. Timothy J. Bayne & Jordi Fernandez (2005). Resisting Ruthless Reductionism: A Commentary on Bickle. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):239-48.
    Philosophy and Neuroscience is an unabashed apologetic for reductionism in philosophy of mind. Bickle chides his fellow philosophers for their ignorance of mainstream neuroscience, and promises them that a subscription to Cell, Neuron, or any other journal in mainstream neuroscience will be amply rewarded. Rather than being bogged down in the intricacies of two-dimensional semantics or the ontology of properties, philosophers of mind need to get neuroscientifically informed and ruthlessly reductive.
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  19. William Bechtel (1999). Multiple Realizability Revisited: Linking Cognitive and Neural States. Philosophy of Science 66 (2):175-207.
  20. Ansgar Beckermann, Introduction - Reductive and Nonreductive Physicalism.
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  21. Ansgar Beckermann (1992). Reductive and Nonreductive Physicalism. In Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter
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  22. Ansgar Beckermann, H. Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.) (1992). Emergence or Reduction?: Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism. W. De Gruyter.
    Introduction — Reductive and Nonreductive Physicalism A Short Survey of Six Decades of Philosophical Discussion Including an Attempt to Formulate a Version ...
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  23. Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (1992). Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter.
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  24. Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.) (2007). Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
    The study of the mind has always been one of the main preoccupations of philosophers, and has been a booming area of research in recent decades, with remarkable advances in psychology and neuroscience. Oxford University Press now presents the most authoritative and comprehensive guide ever published to the philosophy of mind. An outstanding international team of contributors offer 45 specially written critical surveys of a wide range of topics relating to the mind. The first two sections cover the place of (...)
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  25. Reinaldo Bernal Velasquez (2013). Précis of "E-physicalism-a physicalist theory of phenomenal consciousness". Ideas Y Valores 152 (152):268-297.
    El libro E-physicalism - A Physicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness presenta una teoría en el área de la metafísica de laconciencia fenomenal. Está basada en las convicciones de que la experiencia subjetiva -en el sentido de Nagel - es un fenómeno real,y de que alguna variante del fisicalismo debe ser verdadera.
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  26. John Bickle (2001). Precis of Psychoneural Reduction: The New Wave. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61:249-255.
  27. Dennis D. Bielfeldt (1999). Nancey Murphy's Nonreductive Physicalism. Zygon 34 (4):619-628.
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  28. Robert C. Bishop (2012). Excluding the Causal Exclusion Argument Against Non-Redirective Physicalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (5-6):57-74.
    A much discussed argument in the philosophy of mind against non-reductive physicalism leads to the conclusion that all genuine causes involved in mental phenomena must be reductive physical causes. The latter ostensibly exclude any other causes from having genuine effects in human thought and behaviour. Jaegwon Kim has been the chief exponent of this line of argument, calling it variously the causal exclusion argument or the supervenience argument against non-reductive physicalism. I will analyse this argument and show that some of (...)
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  29. Thomas Bittner & Barry Smith (2003). Granular Spatio-Temporal Ontologies. AAAI Symposium:12-17.
    We propose an ontological theory that is powerful enough to describe both complex spatio-temporal processes (occurrents) and the enduring entities (continuants) that participate therein. The theory is divided into two major categories of sub-theories: (sub-) theories of type SPAN and (sub-)theories of type SNAP. These theories represent two complementary perspectives on reality and result in distinct though compatible systems of categories. In SNAP we have enduring entities such as substances, qualities, roles, functions; in SPAN we have perduring entities such as (...)
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  30. Richard J. Blackwell (1973). "Interpretations of Life and Mind: Essays Around the Problem of Reduction," Ed. Marjorie Grene. Modern Schoolman 50 (2):239-240.
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  31. Thomas Bontly (2000). John Bickle Psychoneural Reduction: The New Wave. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):901-905.
  32. A. Botterell (2005). A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism. Philosophical Review 114 (1):125-128.
    A review of Andrew Melnyk's _A Physicalist Manifesto_ (Cambridge: CUP, 2003).
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  33. Richard Boyd (1980). Materialism Without Reductionism: What Physicalism Does Not Entail. In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. , Vol 1 1--67.
  34. Janez Bregant (2009). Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):219-232.
    The article critically examines Jaegwon Kim’s book Physicalism, or Something Near Enough (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). It recognizes the »near enough type of physicalism« involving functional reduction and covering the relational properties of qualia. Its intrinsic qualites are left out, but since it is qualia’s differences and similarities that matter, i.e. which affect our cognition and behaviour, this is, according to Kim, “no big loss”. While appreciating the book’s effort to offer an intelligible physicalistic theory of the world, the (...)
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  35. Ingo Brigandt (2010). Beyond Reduction and Pluralism: Toward an Epistemology of Explanatory Integration in Biology. Erkenntnis 73 (3):295-311.
    The paper works towards an account of explanatory integration in biology, using as a case study explanations of the evolutionary origin of novelties-a problem requiring the integration of several biological fields and approaches. In contrast to the idea that fields studying lower level phenomena are always more fundamental in explanations, I argue that the particular combination of disciplines and theoretical approaches needed to address a complex biological problem and which among them is explanatorily more fundamental varies with the problem pursued. (...)
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  36. Andrei A. Buckareff (2011). Intralevel Mental Causation. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):402-425.
    This paper identifies and critiques a theory of mental causation defended by some proponents of nonredutive physicalism that I call “intralevelism.” Intralevelist theories differ in their details. On all versions, the causal outcome of the manifestation of physical properties is physical and the causal outcome of the manifestation of mental properties is mental. Thus, mental causation on this view is intralevel mental to mental causation. This characterization of mental causation as intralevel is taken to insulate nonreductive physicalism from some objections (...)
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  37. J. Butterfield (2011). Emergence, Reduction and Supervenience: A Varied Landscape. [REVIEW] Foundations of Physics 41 (6):920-959.
    This is one of two papers about emergence, reduction and supervenience. It expounds these notions and analyses the general relations between them. The companion paper analyses the situation in physics, especially limiting relations between physical theories. I shall take emergence as behaviour that is novel and robust relative to some comparison class. I shall take reduction as deduction using appropriate auxiliary definitions. And I shall take supervenience as a weakening of reduction, viz. to allow infinitely long definitions. The overall claim (...)
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  38. J. Butterfield (2011). Less is Different: Emergence and Reduction Reconciled. [REVIEW] Foundations of Physics 41 (6):1065-1135.
    This is a companion to another paper. Together they rebut two widespread philosophical doctrines about emergence. The first, and main, doctrine is that emergence is incompatible with reduction. The second is that emergence is supervenience; or more exactly, supervenience without reduction.In the other paper, I develop these rebuttals in general terms, emphasising the second rebuttal. Here I discuss the situation in physics, emphasising the first rebuttal. I focus on limiting relations between theories and illustrate my claims with four examples, each (...)
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  39. A. S. C. (1973). Interpretations of Life and Mind. Review of Metaphysics 27 (1):126-127.
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  40. Lawrence Cahoone (2008). Reduction, Emergence, and Ordinal Physicalism. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 44 (1):pp. 40-62.
    A metaphysics of the world described by contemporary science faces the problem of the relative ontological status of microphysical constituents (e.g. elementary particles), ultimate mathematical structures (e.g. of the Standard Model and General Relativity), and complex macroscopic systems with their arguably emergent properties. Justus Buchler's ordinal metaphysics, which provides a "view from anywhere" by analyzing whatever is under consideration through its location in an order of relationships, refusing to privilege any type of being, contributes a fresh perspective to this discussion. (...)
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  41. Keith Campbell (1988). "The Faces of Existence: An Essay in Nonreductive Metaphysics" by John F. Post. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (2):358.
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  42. David Charles & Kathleen Lennon (eds.) (1992). Reduction, Explanation, and Realism. Oxford University Press.
    The contributors to this volume examine the motivations for anti-reductionist views, and assess their coherence and success, in a number of different fields, including moral and mental philosophy, psychology, organic biology, and the social sciences.
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  43. Colin Cheyne (1993). Reduction, Elimination, and Firewalking. Philosophy of Science 60 (2):349-357.
    Schwartz (1991) argues that the worry that successful reduction would eliminate rather than conserve the mental is a needless worry. He examines cases of reduction from the natural sciences and claims that if reduction of the mental is like any of those cases then it would not be a case of elimination. I discuss other cases of scientific reduction which do involve elimination. Schwartz has not shown that reduction of the mental could not be like such cases, so his argument (...)
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  44. Jonas Christensen & Jesper Kallestrup (2012). Counterfactuals and Downward Causation: A Reply to Zhong. Analysis 72 (3):513-517.
    Lei Zhong (2012. Counterfactuals, regularity and the autonomy approach. Analysis 72: 75–85) argues that non-reductive physicalists cannot establish the autonomy of mental causation by adopting a counterfactual theory of causation since such a theory supports a so-called downward causation argument which rules out mental-to-mental causation. We respond that non-reductive physicalists can consistently resist Zhong's downward causation argument as it equivocates between two familiar notions of a physical realizer.
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  45. John Ross Churchill (2010). Nonreductive Physicalism or Emergent Dualism : The Argument From Mental Causation. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism. Oxford University Press
    Throughout the 1990s, Jaegwon Kim developed a line of argument that what purport to be nonreductive forms of physicalism are ultimately untenable, since they cannot accommodate the causal efficacy of mental states. His argument has received a great deal of discussion, much of it critical. We believe that, while the argument needs some tweaking, its basic thrust is sound. In what follows, we will lay out our preferred version of the argument and highlight its essential dependence on a causal-powers metaphysic, (...)
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  46. Paul M. Churchland (1980). Joseph Margolis: Persons and Minds: The Prospects of Nonreductive Materialism. Dialogue 19 (3):461-469.
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