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Summary One of the primary methods of argument with respect to the metaphysics of personal identity has been to pump intuitions on a wide variety of puzzle cases, many of which involve science fiction.  These include brain and body swaps, teletransportation, fission, fusion, and many more.  The basic idea is to test the limits of our conceptual commitments by prizing apart various features of our identity that are typically conjoined.  For example, what would happen if my body went in one direction and my psychological stream went in another?  Where would I go?  This method is highly controversial, however, with several theorists questioning both the possibility of such cases as well as their utility for determining the identity conditions for non-fictional creatures like us.
Key works John Locke offered the original body swap case between a Prince and a cobbler (see Perry 1975), and others who have appealed to many varieties of puzzle cases to argue for their conclusions about personal identity include Shoemaker 1963, Wiggins 1967, Nagel 1971, Lewis 1976, Parfit 1984, Noonan 1989, Martin 1997, and McMahan 2002.  Those wary or critical of this "method of puzzle cases" include Williams 1970, Wilkes 1988, Johnston 1989, Gendler 2002, and DeGrazia 2005.
Introductions Encyclopedia entry that includes discussion of identity and puzzle cases: Gallois 2008.  No introductory texts on puzzle cases alone, but an excellent (albeit challenging) deployment of the method is Part III of Parfit 1984, and an excellent (albeit challenging) discussion of its limits is Wilkes 1988.
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  1. Pregnant Thinkers.David Mark Kovacs - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Do pregnant mothers have fetuses as parts? According to the “parthood view” they do, while according to the “containment view” they don’t. This paper raises a novel puzzle about pregnancy: if mothers have their fetuses as parts, then wherever there is a pregnant mother, there is also a smaller thinking being that has every part of the mother except for those that overlap with the fetus. This problem resembles a familiar overpopulation puzzle from the personal identity literature, known as the (...)
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  2. On a body-switching argument in defence of the immateriality of human nature.Pirooz Fatoorchi - 2024 - Theoria 90 (1):17-29.
    In an earlier paper in Theoria, I discussed an argument based on the idea of “soul-switching” that attempted to undermine the immaterialist account of human beings. The present paper deals with a parity argument against that argument in which the idea of “body-switching” plays a pivotal role. I call these two arguments, that have been reported by Razi (d. 1210), respectively “the soul-switching argument” and “the body-switching argument”. After some introductory remarks, section 2 of the paper describes the structure of (...)
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  3. Memories without Survival: Personal Identity and the Ascending Reticular Activating System.Lukas J. Meier - 2023 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 48 (5):478-491.
    Lockean views of personal identity maintain that we are essentially persons who persist diachronically by virtue of being psychologically continuous with our former selves. In this article, I present a novel objection to this variant of psychological accounts, which is based on neurophysiological characteristics of the brain. While the mental states that constitute said psychological continuity reside in the cerebral hemispheres, so that for the former to persist only the upper brain must remain intact, being conscious additionally requires that a (...)
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  4. Reflection-Philosophy Order Effects and Correlations: Aggregating and comparing results from mTurk, CloudResearch, Prolific, and undergraduate samples.Nick Byrd - manuscript
    How does reflective thinking impact decisions about ethics, mind, politics, or other philosophical domains? Reflective reasoning often correlates with better decision-making performance and certain philosophical preferences (e.g., utilitarian moral decisions). However, experiments suggest that reflection is not always the cause of these outcomes. Further, some evidence casts doubt on the trustworthiness of data from certain online crowd work platforms such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk). This paper reports results of a pre-registered experiment on participants from multiple sources (mTurk, CloudResearch, Prolific, (...)
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  5. Shadows of the Self: Reflections on the Authority of Advance Directives.Japa Pallikkathayil - 2022 - In Tamar Schapiro, Kyla Ebels-Duggan & Sharon Street (eds.), Normativity and Agency: Themes from the Philosophy of Christine M. Korsgaard. Oxford University Press. pp. 175-196.
    This paper argues that one’s authority to issue advance directives governing one’s medical care is limited in ways that have not been appreciated. It focuses on advance directives issued by people who go on to suffer from dementia. An adequate account of decision-making for those with dementia should be able to do justice to two related aspects of that condition. First, for practical purposes, sufferers of dementia both are and are not the same people they were before. Second, the “otherness” (...)
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  6. Gibt es einen therapeutischen Imperativ zum genome editing in der menschlichen Keimbahn? [Is there a therapeutic imperative for editing the human germline genome? / Existe-t-il un impératif thérapeutique à l'édition du génome dans la lignée germinale humaine].Karla Alex & Christoph Rehmann-Sutter - 2022 - URPP Human Reproduction Reloaded | H2R (University of Zurich), Working Paper Series, 05/2022. Zurich and Geneva: Seismo 1 (5):1-21.
    Abstract: This working paper focuses on the question whether there is a therapeutic imperative that, in specific situations, would oblige us to perform genome editing at the germline level in the context of assisted reproduction. The answer to this central question is discussed primarily with reference to specific scenarios where preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) does not represent an acceptable alternative to germline genome editing based on either medical, or ethical, or – from the perspective of the potential parents – moral (...)
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  7. Till Death Do Us Part: The Moral Problems of Personites.Andrew Russo & Martin Montminy - manuscript
    According to the worm theory, persons are (maximal) aggregates of person-stages existing at different times. Personites, on the other hand, are non-maximal aggregates of stages that are nonetheless very much like persons. Their existence appears to make instances of prudential self-sacrifice morally problematic: the personites that exist at the time of the sacrifice but not at the time of the reward seem to be unfairly exploited. Instances of punishment appear to give rise to a similar problem. We argue that these (...)
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  8. Belief, Unity, and Parts to Whole in the Ontology of Person.Lucian Delescu - 2016 - Studii Franciscane 16:185-196.
    In this paper I continue to explore some of the problems I believe one encounters when attempting to unravel the ontology of person. I maintain my interest for classical philosophical theories which were equally concerned with this matter. I draw upon Hume’s philosophy and Husserl’s phenomenology by indicating their conceptual differences relevant to my current topic, but I adopt a thought-expe-rimental approach. That because, on the one hand, my purpose is not to reconstruct the logic of these philosophers in details, (...)
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  9. The split-body problem.Gunnar Babcock - 2022 - Aeon.
    If you split yourself down the middle to become two people, would you survive the process? And, if you did, would your other half be your child, your clone or your sibling? Would this create two instances of the same you, existing simultaneously in two places at the same time; or would it create two entirely new people, causing you to suddenly cease to exist? While such thought experiments raise baffling questions about personal identity, there is a more fundamental problem (...)
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  10. Personal Identity, Possible Worlds, and Medical Ethics.Nils-Frederic Wagner - 2022 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy: A European Journal (3):429-437.
    Thought experiments that concoct bizarre possible world modalities are standard fare in debates on personal identity. Appealing to intuitions raised by such evocations is often taken to settle differences between conflicting theoretical views that, albeit, have practical implications for ethical controversies of personal identity in health care. Employing thought experiments that way is inadequate, I argue, since personhood is intrinsically linked to constraining facts about the actual world. I defend a moderate modal skepticism according to which intuiting across conceptually incongruent (...)
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  11. Soul‐Switching and the Immateriality of Human Nature: On an Argument Reported by Razi.Pirooz Fatoorchi - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1067-1082.
    This article deals with an argument reported by Razi (d. 1210) that attempted to undermine the immaterialist position about human nature. After some introductory remarks and explanation of the conceptual background, the article analyses the structure of the argument, with special attention to the idea of soul-switching.’ Some comparisons are made between the argument reported by Razi and a number of arguments from modern and contemporary eras of philosophy. One section is devoted to the critique of the argument and its (...)
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  12. Generic Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey & Peter van Elswyk - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (8):405-429.
    The animalist says we are animals. This thesis is commonly understood as the universal generalization that all human persons are human animals. This article proposes an alternative: the thesis is a generic that admits of exceptions. We defend the resulting view, which we call ‘generic animalism’, and show its aptitude for diagnosing the limits of eight case-based objections to animalism.
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  13. No Work for a Theory of Personal Identity.John Schwenkler - 2021 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 69 (1):57-65.
    A main element in Richard Swinburne’s (2019) argument for substance dualism concerns the conditions of a person’s continued existence over time. In this commentary I aim to question two things: first, whether the kind of imaginary cases that Swinburne relies on to make his case should be accorded the kind of weight he supposes; and second, whether philosophers should be concerned to give any substantial theory, of the sort that dualism and its competitors are apparently meant to provide, to explain (...)
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  14. I Think; Therefore, I am a Fiction.T. Parent - forthcoming - In Tamas Demeter, T. Parent & Adam Toon (eds.), Mental Fictionalism: Philosophical Explorations. New York:
    The Cartesian thinking self may seem indisputably real. But if it is real, then so thinking, which would undercut mental fictionalism. Thus, in defense of mental fictionalism, this paper argues for fictionalism about the thinking self. In short form, the argument is: (1) If I exist outside of fiction, then I am identical to (some part of/) this biomass [= my body]. (2) If I die at t, I cease to exist at t. (3) If I die at t, no (...)
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  15. Why animalism matters.Andrew M. Bailey, Allison Krile Thornton & Peter van Elswyk - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (9):2929-2942.
    Here is a question as intriguing as it is brief: what are we? The animalist’s answer is equal in brevity: we are animals. This stark formulation of the animalist slogan distances it from nearby claims—that we are essentially animals, for example, or that we have purely biological criteria of identity over time. Is the animalist slogan—unburdened by modal or criterial commitments—still interesting, though? Or has it lost its bite? In this article we address such questions by presenting a positive case (...)
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  16. Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief.David Builes - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):3033-3049.
    The epistemology of self-locating belief concerns itself with how rational agents ought to respond to certain kinds of indexical information. I argue that those who endorse the thesis of Time-Slice Rationality ought to endorse a particular view about the epistemology of self-locating belief, according to which ‘essentially indexical’ information is never evidentially relevant to non-indexical matters. I close by offering some independent motivations for endorsing Time-Slice Rationality in the context of the epistemology of self-locating belief.
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  17. Being of Two Minds (or of One in Two Ways): A New Puzzle for Constitution Views of Personal Identity.Rina Tzinman - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (1):22-42.
    According to constitution views of persons, we are constituted by spatially coinciding human animals. Constitution views face an ‘overpopulation’ puzzle: if the animal has my brain, there is another thinker where I am. An influential solution to this problem distinguishes between derivative and non‐derivative property possession: persons non‐derivatively have their personal properties, while inheriting others from their constituters. I will show that this solution raises a new problem, by constructing a puzzle with the absurd result that we instantiate certain properties (...)
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  18. Introduction to Part Three: Personal Identity.Andrea Sauchelli - 2020 - In Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry. London, UK: pp. 48-67.
  19. The Composite View and the Hard Problem of Diachronic Identity.M. Cerullo - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (5-6):88-103.
    The enigma of diachronic identity continues to challenge philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists. The current paper will first review a recent taxonomy developed by philosophers that groups theories of identity into simple and complex views. An ideal theory of identity would satisfy proponents of both views and this requires addressing what we will term the hard problem of identity. The hard problem of identity parallels Chalmers' formulation of the hard problem of consciousness and requires that any theory of identity address the (...)
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  20. Selving' and Union.I. McGilchrist - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (1-2):196-213.
    The idea that the self is an illusion is problematic and possibly incoherent. Moreover, that the self is multiform and change-able does not argue against its existence. However some of the target papers suggest that there are 'self' states that are sufficiently divergent for them to have incompatible properties -- one refers to the analogy of light as both wave and particle. Many of these dualities have parallels with some of the main distinctions between the ways in which the left (...)
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  21. Memory, organisms and the circle of life.Rina Tzinman - 2018 - In Valerio Buonomo (ed.), The Persistence of Persons. Studies in the metaphysics of personal identity over time. Neunkirchen-Seelscheid: pp. 243-273.
  22. Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry.Andrea Sauchelli (ed.) - 2020 - New York, NY: Routledge.
    Derek Parfit (1942–2017) is widely considered to be one of the most important moral philosophers of the twentieth century. Reasons and Persons is arguably the most influential of the two books published in his lifetime and hailed as a classic work of ethics and personal identity. Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry is an outstanding introduction to and assessment of Parfit’s book, with chapters by leading scholars of ethics, metaphysics and of Parfit’s work. Part I provides (...)
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  23. 'He Only Comes Out When I Drink My Gin’: DID, Personal Identity, and Moral Responsibility.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2016 - In Rocco J. Gennaro & Casey Harison (eds.), The Who and Philosophy. Rowman & Littlefield: Lexington Press. pp. 121-134.
    This essay explores the topic of Dissociative Identity Disorder (formerly called “Multiple Personality Disorder”) with special attention to such Quadrophenia masterpieces as “Dr. Jimmy” and “The Real Me.” A number of major philosophical questions arise: Can two or more “persons” really inhabit the same body? How can we hold Dr. Jimmy morally responsible for the reprehensible actions of Mr. Jim? Wouldn’t it be wrong to do so if they are really different people? What is it to be the “same” person (...)
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  24. Immortality and Meaning: Reflections on the Makropulos Debate.Mikel Burley - 2009 - Philosophy 84 (4):529-547.
    This article reflects upon the debate, initiated by Bernard Williams in 1973, concerning the desirability of immortality, where the latter expression is taken to mean endless bodily life as a human or humanoid being. Williams contends that it cannot be desirable; others have disputed this contention. I discuss a recent response from Timothy Chappell and attempt to pinpoint the central disagreement between Chappell and Williams. I propose that neither side in the debate has firm grounds for its claims, and then (...)
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  25. Epistemological Fission.Paul K. Moser - 1998 - The Monist 81 (3):353-370.
    Reflection on the state of contemporary epistemology leaves many of us bewildered and baffled. Without naming personal names, let's mention just a sample of the kinds of epistemological theory now in circulation; foundationalism, coherentism, contextualism, reliabilism, evidentialism, explanationism, pragmatism, internalism, externalism, deontologism, naturalism, skepticism. These general positions do not all compete to explain the same epistemological phenomena, and for this we should always be grateful. They do, however, all subsume remarkably diverse species of epistemological theory. For example, reliabilism now comes (...)
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  26. The Personite Problem: Should Practical Reason Be Tabled?Mark Johnston - 2016 - Noûs 50 (4):617-644.
  27. Review of Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death. [REVIEW]I. Woodbridge Riley - 1903 - Psychological Review 10 (5):556-565.
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  28. Non-branching and circularity - reply to Brueckner.H. W. Noonan - 2006 - Analysis 66 (2):163-167.
  29. Speaking about Oneself.Isidora Stojanovic - 2015 - In Stephan Torre & Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford University Press. pp. 200-219.
    It has long been known (cf. Frege 1918, Castañeda 1968, Anscombe 1975 , Perry 1977, 1979, Lewis 1981) that de se attitudes, that is beliefs, desires, hopes etc. that one has about oneself as oneself,1 are interestingly different fromthe attitudes that one holds in a third-personal mode about some individual, who might or might not turn out to be them. Frege suggested that Dr. Lauben’s belief that he has been wounded is a belief that only Dr. Lauben himself can entertain. (...)
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  30. The Subject in Neuropsychology: Individuating Minds in the Split‐Brain Case.Elizabeth Schechter - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (5):501-525.
    Many experimental findings with split-brain subjects intuitively suggest that each such subject has two minds. The conceptual and empirical basis of this duality intuition has never been fully articulated. This article fills that gap, by offering a reconstruction of early neuropsychological literature on the split-brain phenomenon. According to that work, the hemispheres operate independently of each other insofar as they interact via the mediation of effection and transduction—via behavior and sensation, essentially. This is how your mind and my mind interact (...)
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  31. I Think Therefore I Persist.Matt Duncan - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):740-756.
    Suppose that you're lying in bed. You just woke up. But you're alert. Your mind is clear and you have no distractions. As you lie there, you think to yourself, ‘2 + 2 = 4.’ The thought just pops into your head. But, wanting to be sure of your mathematical insight, you once again think ‘2 + 2 = 4’, this time really meditating on your thought. Now suppose that you're sitting in an empty movie theatre. The lighting is normal (...)
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  32. Dementia: Mind, Meaning, and the Person.Julian Hughes, Stephen Louw & Steven R. Sabat (eds.) - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Dementia is an illness that raises important questions about our own attitudes to illness and aging. It also raises very important issues beyond the bounds of dementia to do with how we think of ourselves as people - fundamental questions about personal identity. Is the person with dementia the same person he or she was before? Is the individual with dementia a person at all? In a striking way, dementia seems to threaten the very existence of the self. This book (...)
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  33. A Matter of Personal Survival: Life After Death.Michael Marsh - 1985 - Quest Books.
    Describes beliefs concerning immortality, looks at the evidence supporting and refuting life after death, and speculates on the nature of eternal life.
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  34. Divided Consciousness, Divided Self.Kamuran Godelek - 1994 - Dissertation, University of Minnesota
    This work addresses issues of self integrity and self identity arising from cases of split brain and multiple personality disorder. It takes on the task of accounting for a unified conscious experience of oneself and, more importantly, a unified and continuous self within a multiple systems, information processing approach to consciousness and the self. Cases of split-brain syndrome are examined in detail, and the view that commissurotomy produces dual selves in one body, advanced by leading researchers in neuropsychology and philosophy, (...)
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  35. The Poetics of Fission in Robinson Jeffers.Scott Mcclintock - 2008 - Clio: A Journal of Literature, History, and the Philosophy of History 37 (2):171-193.
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  36. Human Identity in Mulla Sadra's Philosophy.Zahra Khaza'I. - 2011 - Kheradnameh Sadra Quarterly 64.
    Personal identity is one of the important and complex issues in the field of the philosophy of the soul. It is also related to the philosophy of ethics and metaphysics in different respects and has given rise to some problems in these two areas. The justification of ethical responsibility and man's eternity in the posthumous state have attracted psychologist-philosophers' attention to the significance and necessity of explaining personal identity. This paper examines the issue from the view point of Mulla Sadra. (...)
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  37. Lewis, H. D.-"The Self and Immortality". [REVIEW]H. H. Price - 1974 - Philosophy 49:102.
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  38. Is Immortality Desirable?Wm A. Hammond - 1910 - Philosophical Review 19 (1):92-93.
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  39. Immortality.Josiah Royce - 1908 - Philosophical Review 17:241.
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  40. Immortality.Count Hermann Keyserling - 1940 - Philosophical Review 49:92.
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  41. Persons and Immortality.Kenneth A. Bryson (ed.) - 1999 - Rodopi.
    This book casts the argument for personal immortality into new light as the outcome of systems processes rather than human nature. Personal immortality is the output of becoming human rather than of being human. If this is the case, then God must be seen to enter into personal relationships with us: a view that current science supports.
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  42. Implications of Immortality.R. J. Hankinson - 1990 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 6 (1):1-27.
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  43. Fission, Freedom, and the Fall.Hud Hudson - 2009 - In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion: Volume 2. Oxford University Press.
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  44. Imminent immortality?Ewa Bartnik - 2000 - Dialogue and Universalism 10:39.
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  45. Survival and Immortality.William Ralph Inge - 1917 - Hibbert Journal 15 (4).
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  46. Immortality.Anthony Flew - 1967 - In Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. New York: Macmillan. pp. 3--139.
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  47. Is My Head a Person?Michael B. Burke - 2003 - In Klaus Petrus (ed.), On Human Persons. Heusenstamm Nr Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 107-125.
    It is hard to see why the head and other brain-containing parts of a person are not themselves persons, or at least thinking, conscious beings. Some theorists have sought to reconcile us to the existence of thinking person-parts. Others have sought to avoid them but have relied on radical theories at odds with the metaphysic implicit in ordinary ways of thinking. This paper offers a novel, conservative solution, one on which the heads and other brain-containing parts of persons do exist (...)
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  48. Attention in Split-Brain Patients.Todd C. Handy & Michael S. Gazzaniga - 2005 - In Laurent Itti, Geraint Rees & John K. Tsotsos (eds.), Neurobiology of Attention. Academic Press.
  49. The Faces of Immortality.Kai Nielsen - 1994 - In John Donnelly (ed.), Language, Metaphysics, and Death. Fordham University Press. pp. 237--264.
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  50. Split‐Brain Research.Maryse Lassonde - 2002 - In Lynn Nadel (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.
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