- István Aranyosi (2003). Physical Constituents of Qualia. Philosophical Studies 116 (2):103-131.
- Andrew R. Bailey, Multiple Realizability, Qualia, and Natural Kinds.
- Nick Bostrom, Quantity of Experience: Brain Duplication and Degrees of Consciousness.
- Richard Double (1985). Phenomenal Properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (March):383-92.
- L. C. Holborow (1973). Materialism and Phenomenal Qualities. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 47 (July):107-19.
- Terence E. Horgan (1987). Supervenient Qualia. Philosophical Review 96 (October):491-520.
- Robert J. Howell, The Hard Problem of Consciousness. Scholarpedia.
- Kelly D. Jolley & Michael Watkins (1998). What is It Like to Be a Phenomenologist? Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):204-9.
- David Lewis (1995). Should a Materialist Believe in Qualia? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (1):140-44.
- William G. Lycan (1987). Phenomenal Objects: A Backhanded Defense. Philosophical Perspectives 3:513-26.
- Pete Mandik & Josh Weisberg (2008). Type-Q Materialism. In Chase Wrenn (ed.), Naturalism, Reference and Ontology: Essays in Honor of Roger F. Gibson. Peter Lang Publishing Group.
- Leslie Marsh, Man Without Qualities.
- David V. Newman (2004). Chaos and Qualia. Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-21.
- David Robb (2008). Zombies From Below. In Simone Gozzano Francesco Orilia (ed.), Tropes, Universals, and the Philosophy of Mind: Essays at the Boundary of Ontology and Philosophical Psychology. Ontos Verlag.
- Howard M. Robinson (1972). Professor Armstrong on 'Non-Physical Sensory Items'. Mind 81 (January):84-86.
- Michael Tye (1986). The Subjective Qualities of Experience. Mind 95 (January):1-17.
- Nicholas Unwin, Explaining Colour Phenomenology: Reduction Versus Connection.
- Brad Weslake (2004). Review of Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness. Metapsychology Online Reviews 8 (49).
|
Off-campus access
Using PhilPapers from home?
Click here to configure this browser for off-campus access.
Monitor this page
Be alerted of all new items appearing on this page. Choose how you want to monitor it:
Email
|
RSS feed
|
|