Material to categorize
- Robert F. Allen, The Subject is Qualia: Paronyms and Temporary Identity.
- Jay David Atlas, Qualia, Consciousness, and Memory: Dennett (2005), Rosenthal (2002), Ledoux (2002), and Libet (2004).
- Andrew R. Bailey (2007). Qualia and the Argument From Illusion: A Defence of Figment. Acta Analytica 22 (2).
- Andrew R. Bailey (2005). What is It Like to See a Bat? A Critique of Dretske's Representationalist Theory of Qualia. Disputatio 1 (18).
- John C. Bigelow & Robert Pargetter (2006). Re-Acquaintance with Qualia. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):353 – 378.
- John C. Bigelow & Robert Pargetter (1990). Acquaintance with Qualia. Theoria 61 (3):129-147.
- David Braddon-Mitchell (2003). Qualia and Analytical Conditionals. Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):111-135.
- Tyler Burge (2003). Qualia and Intentional Content: Reply to Block. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.
- Alex Byrne & Michael Tye (2006). Qualia Ain't in the Head. Noûs 40 (2):241-255.
- Roberto Casati (2003). Qualia Domesticated. In Amita Chatterjee (ed.), Perspectives on Consciousness. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.
- Dan Cavedon-Taylor (2009). Still Epiphenomenal Qualia: Response to Muller. Philosophia 37 (1):105-107.
- David J. Chalmers (1993). Self-Ascription Without Qualia: A Case-Study. Behavioral And Brain Sciences 16 (1):35-36.
- Paul M. Churchland (1985). Reduction, Qualia and the Direct Introspection of Brain States. Journal of Philosophy 82 (January):8-28.
- Jonathan Cohen (2001). Whither Visual Representations? Whither Qualia? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):980-981.
- David J. Cole (1994). Thought and Qualia. Minds and Machines 4 (3):283-302.
- Daniel C. Dennett (1991). "Epiphenomenal" Qualia? In Consciousness Explained. Little, Brown.
- Fabian Dorsch, Conceptual Qualia and Communication.
- Fred Dretske (1996). Phenomenal Externalism, or If Meanings Ain't in the Head, Where Are Qualia? Philosophical Issues 7:143-158.
- Malcolm Forster (1991). Preconditions of Predication: From Qualia to Quantum Mechanics. Topoi 10 (1).
- Brie Gertler (2006). Consciousness and Qualia Cannot Be Reduced. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science (Contemporary Debates in Philosophy). Blackwell.
- J. Goguen (2004). Musical Qualia, Context, Time and Emotion. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (3-4):117-147.
- Donald F. Gustafson (1998). Pain, Qualia, and the Explanatory Gap. Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):371-387.
- Gilbert Harman (1996). Qualia and Color Concepts. Philosophical Issues 7:75-79.
- David Hilbert, Qualia.
- Christopher S. Hill, Visual Awareness and Visual Qualia.
- David Hodgson (2002). Three Tricks of Consciousness: Qualia, Chunking and Selection. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (12):65-88.
- Jason Holt (1999). Blindsight in Debates About Qualia. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (5):54-71.
- Ted Honderich (1992). Seeing Qualia and Positing the World. In A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.), A. J. Ayer: Memorial Essays. Cambridge University Press.
- Frank Jackson (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
- James John (2010). Against Qualia Theory. Philosophical Studies 147 (3).
- Jaegwon Kim (1996). Dretske's Qualia Externalism. Philosophical Issues 7:159-165.
- Amy Kind (2008). How to Believe in Qualia. In Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. The Mit Press.
- S. L. (2003). Review of “Emotions, Qualia and Consciousness” by Alfred Kaszniak (Ed.). Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):327-333.
- Brendan J. Lalor (1999). Intentionality and Qualia. Synthese 121 (3):249-290.
- Harold Langsam (2000). Experiences, Thoughts, and Qualia. Philosophical Studies 99 (3):269-295.
- Joseph Levine (1983). Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (October):354-61.
- Brian Loar (2003). Qualia, Properties, Modality. Philosophical Issues 1 (1):113-29.
- William G. Lycan (1998). In Defense of the Representational Theory of Qualia (Replies to Neander, Rey, and Tye). Philosophical Perspectives 12.
- Pete Mandik (1999). Qualia, Space, and Control. Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):47-60.
- George Mandler (2005). The Consciousness Continuum: From "Qualia" to "Free Will". Psychological Research/Psychologische Forschung. Vol 69 (5-6):330-337.
- Ken Mogi (1999). Supervenience and Qualia. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):844-845.
- Ken Mogi, Creativity and the Neural Basis of Qualia.
- Ken Mogi (1997). Qualia and the Brain. Nikkei Science.
- Hans Muller (2008). Why Qualia Are Not Epiphenomenal. Ratio 21 (1):85–90.
- J. M. Musacchio (2005). Why Do Qualia and the Mind Seem Nonphysical? Synthese 147 (3):425-460.
- Drakon Nikolinakos (2000). Dennett on Qualia: The Case of Pain, Smell and Taste. Philosophical Psychology 13 (4):505-522.
- Georg Northoff (1995). Qualia Im Knotenpunkt Zwischen Leib Und Seele: „Argumentatives“ Dilemma in Der Gegenwärtigen Diskussion Über Die Subjektivität Mentaler Zustände. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 26 (2).
- Elisabeth Pacherie (1999). Qualia and Representations. In Denis Fisette (ed.), Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution.
- Vilayanur S. Ramachandran & William Hirstein (1998). Three Laws of Qualia: What Neurology Tells Us About the Biological Functions of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4-5):429-57.
- Stephen E. Robbins (2007). Time, Form and the Limits of Qualia. Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (1):19-43.
 | 1 — 50 / 223 |  |
|
Off-campus access
Using PhilPapers from home?
Click here to configure this browser for off-campus access.
Monitor this page
Be alerted of all new items appearing on this page. Choose how you want to monitor it:
Email
|
RSS feed
|
|