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Quasi-Realism

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  • Simon Blackburn, Truth and a Priori Possibility: Egan's Charge Against Quasi Realism.
    In this journal Andy Egan argued that, contrary to what I have claimed, quasi-realism is committed to a damaging asymmetry between the way a subject regards himself and the way he regards others. In particular, a subject must believe it to be a priori that if something is one of his stable or fundamental beliefs, then it is true. Whereas he will not hold that this is a priori true of other people. In this paper I rebut Egan’s argument, and (...)
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  • Simon Blackburn (1993). Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford University Press.
    This volume collects some influential essays in which Simon Blackburn, one of our leading philosophers, explores one of the most profound and fertile of philosophical problems: the way in which our judgments relate to the world. This debate has centered on realism, or the view that what we say is validated by the way things stand in the world, and a variety of oppositions to it. Prominent among the latter are expressive and projective theories, but also a relaxed pluralism that (...)
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  • Andy Egan (2007). Quasi-Realism and Fundamental Moral Error. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):205 – 219.
    A common first reaction to expressivist and quasi-realist theories is the thought that, if these theories are right, there's some objectionable sense in which we can't be wrong about morality. This worry turns out to be surprisingly difficult to make stick - an account of moral error as instability under improving changes provides the quasi-realist with the resources to explain many of our concerns about moral error. The story breaks down, though, in the case of fundamental moral error. This is (...)
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  • Allan Gibbard (1996). Projection, Quasi-Realism, and Sophisticated Realism. Mind 105 (418).
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  • Edward Harcourt (2005). Quasi-Realism and Ethical Appearances. Mind 114 (454).
    The paper develops an attack on quasi-realism in ethics, according to which expressivism about ethical discourse—understood as the thesis that the states that discourse expresses are non-representational—is consistent with some of the discourse's familiar surface features, thus ‘saving the ethical appearances’. A dilemma is posed for the quasi-realist. Either ethical discourse appears, thanks to those surface features, to express representational states, or else there is no such thing as its appearing to express such states. If the former then, by expressivism, (...)
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  • Robert Hopkins (2001). Kant, Quasi-Realism, and the Autonomy of Aesthetic Judgement. European Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):166–189.
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  • C. S. Jenkins (2006). Lewis and Blackburn on Quasi-Realism and Fictionalism. Analysis 66 (4):315–319.
    Lewis has argued that quasi-realism is fictionalism. Blackburn denies this, offering reasons which rely on a descriptive reading of quasi-realism. This note offers a different, more general argument against Lewis's claim, available to prescriptive as well as descriptive quasi-realists.
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  • Richard Jennings (1989). Scientific Quasi-Realism. Mind 98 (390):225-245.
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  • Simon Kirchin (2000). Quasi-Realism, Sensibility Theory, and Ethical Relativism. Inquiry 43 (4):413 – 427.
    This paper is a reply to Simon Blackburn's 'Is Objective Moral Justification Possible on a Quasi-realist Foundation?' Inquiry 42 (1999), pp. 213-28. Blackburn attempts to show how his version of non-cognitivism - quasi-realist projectivism - can evade the threat of ethical relativism, the thought that all ways of living are as ethically good as each other and every ethical judgment is as ethically true as any other. He further attempts to show that his position is superior in this respect to, (...)
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  • David Macarthur, Pragmatism, Quasi-Realism and the Global Challenge.
    William James said that sometimes detailed philosophical argument is irrelevant. Once a current of thought is really under way, trying to oppose it with argument is like planting a stick in a river to try to alter its course: “round your obstacle flows the water and ‘gets there just the same’”. He thought pragmatism was such a river. There is a contemporary river that sometimes calls itself pragmatism, although other titles are probably better. At any rate it is the denial (...)
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  • Matthew McGrath (1998). Quasi-Realism and the Humean Defense of Normative Non-Factualism. Philosophical Studies 90 (2).
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  • A. W. Moore (2002). Quasi-Realism and Relativism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):150–156.
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  • Huw Price, How to Stand Up for Non-Cognitivists.
    Is non-cognitivism compatible with minimalism about truth? A contemporary argument claims not, and therefore that moral realists, for example, should take heart from the popularity of semantic minimalism. The same is said to apply to cognitivism about other topics—conditionals, for example—for the argument depends only on the fact that ordinary usage applies the notions of truth and falsity to utterances of the kind in question. Given this much, minimalism about truth is said to leave no room for the view that (...)
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  • Huw Price, Pragmatism, Quasi-Realism and the Global Challenge.
    William James said that sometimes detailed philosophical argument is irrelevant. Once a current of thought is really under way, trying to oppose it with argument is like planting a stick in a river to try to alter its course: “round your obstacle flows the water and ‘gets there just the same’”. He thought pragmatism was such a river. There is a contemporary river that sometimes calls itself pragmatism, although other titles are probably better. At any rate it is the denial (...)
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  • Huw Price, René Descartes Lectures, Tilburg, 2008.
    Lecture I begins with a distinction between two themes in philosophical naturalism. The first theme takes science to be our best guide to what there is, the second takes it to be our best guide to the nature of our own thought and talk. Thus the first theme ('object naturalism') motivates a scientifically-constrained metaphysics, while the second ('subject naturalism') motivates a scientifically-constrained philosophy of language and philosophical psychology. The lecture discusses a sense in which these two themes may conflict: in (...)
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  • Stig Alstrup Rasmussen (1985). Quasi-Realism and Mind-Dependence. Philosophical Quarterly 35 (139):185-191.
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  • Gideon Rosen (1998). Blackburn's Essays in Quasi-Realism (New York: Oxford University Press). Noûs 32 (3):386–405.
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  • Neil Sinclair (2007). Propositional Clothing and Belief. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):342�362.
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  • Alan Thomas, Minimalism and Quasi-Realism.
    Expressivism's problem in solving the Frege/Geach problem concerning unasserted contexts is evaluated in the light of Blackburn's own methodological commitment to assessing philosophical theories in terms of costs and benefits, notably quasi-realism's aim of minimising the ontological commitments of a broadly naturalistic worldview. The problem emerges when a competitor theory can explain the same phenomena at lower cost: the minimalist about truth has no problem with unasserted contexts whereas the quasi-realist/expressivist package does. However, this form of projectivism is supposed to (...)
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  • Alan Thomas, Minimalism Versus Quasi-Realism: Why the Minimalist has a Dialectical Advantage.
    Minimalist and quasi-realist approaches to problematic discourses such as the causal, moral and modal are compared and contrasted. The problem of unasserted contexts demonstrates that while quasi-realism can meet the challenge of reconstructing a logic of "commitment" to cover both "projected" and "detected" discourses, it can only do so at an unacceptable cost. The theory must globally revise logic, in spite of its implicit commitment to a substantial notion of truth for "detected" discourses. Thus, quasi-realism fails to meet its own (...)
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  • Cain Samuel Todd (2004). Quasi-Realism, Acquaintance, and the Normative Claims of Aesthetic Judgement. British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (3).
    My primary aim in this paper is to outline a quasi-realist theory of aesthetic judgement. Robert Hopkins has recently argued against the plausibility of this project because he claims that quasi-realism cannot explain a central component of any expressivist understanding of aesthetic judgements, namely their supposed ‘autonomy’. I argue against Hopkins’s claims by contending that Roger Scruton’s aesthetic attitude theory, centred on his account of the imagination, provides us with the means to develop a plausible quasi-realist account of aesthetic judgement. (...)
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  • Jennifer Trusted (1990). Scientific Quasi-Realism. Mind 99 (393):109-111.
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  • Nick Zangwill (1990). Quasi-Quasi-Realism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (3):583-594.
    I. Projcctivism, Subjcctivism, and Error (i) According to Simon Blackburn, somconc who wants t0 avoid a ‘rcalistic’ account of our motal thought faces a choice} Thc choicc is bctwccn his non-rcductionist ‘projcctivism’ and rcductionist ‘subjcctivism’. Thc foymcr is thc vicw that moral judgments cxprcss attitudcs (approval, disapproval, liking or disliking, for example), which wc ‘projcct’ or ‘sprcad’ onto thc world, while thc latter is thc vicw that moral judgments arc bclicfs about attitudes. Blackburn bcratcs philosophers for not sccing thc diffcrcncc, (...)
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