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  1. Jamin Asay (2013). Truthmaking, Metaethics, and Creeping Minimalism. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):213-232.
    Creeping minimalism threatens to cloud the distinction between realist and anti-realist metaethical views. When anti-realist views equip themselves with minimalist theories of truth and other semantic notions, they are able to take on more and more of the doctrines of realism (such as the existence of moral truths, facts, and beliefs). But then they start to look suspiciously like realist views. I suggest that creeping minimalism is a problem only if moral realism is understood primarily as a semantic doctrine. I (...)
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  2. Matt Bedke (2013). 22 Ethics Makes Strange Bedfellows: Intuitions and Quasi-Realism. In Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory? Routledge. 416.
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  3. Matthew S. Bedke, Ethics Makes Strange Bedfellows: Intuitions and Quasi-Realism.
    You know the story. You have a few intuitions. You propose a few theories that fit them. It’s a living. Of course, things are more complicated than this. We are sensitive to counterexamples raised by others and wish to accommodate or explain away an ever-wider base of intuitive starting points. And a great deal of the action occurs in rational reflection that can alter what is intuitive, and in theorizing that overturns formerly justified beliefs and moves us to new justified (...)
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  4. John Biro (2007). Review of Angela Coventry, Hume's Theory of Causation: A Quasi-Realist Interpretation. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (4).
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  5. Gunnar Björnsson (2013). Quasi-Realism, Absolutism, and Judgment-Internal Correctness Conditions. In Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations. Ontos Verlag. 96-120.
    The traditional metaethical distinction between cognitivist absolutism,on the one hand, and speaker relativism or noncognitivism, on the other,seemed both clear and important. On the former view, moral judgmentswould be true or false independently on whose judgments they were, andmoral disagreement might be settled by the facts. Not so on the latter views. But noncognitivists and relativists, following what Simon Blackburn has called a “quasi-realist” strategy, have come a long way inmaking sense of talk about truth of moral judgments and itsindependence (...)
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  6. Simon Blackburn (forthcoming). Blessed Are the Peacemakers. Philosophical Studies:1-11.
    In this paper I explore the points of similarity and difference that distinguish expressivists such as myself from the position known as Cornell realism. I argue that there are considerable overlaps of doctrine, although these doctrines are arrived at in very different ways. I urge that Cornell realism can only benefit by taking on some of the commitments of expressivism.
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  7. Simon Blackburn (2009). Truth and A Priori Possibility: Egan's Charge Against Quasi-Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):201-213.
    In this journal Andy Egan argued that, contrary to what I have claimed, quasi-realism is committed to a damaging asymmetry between the way a subject regards himself and the way he regards others. In particular, a subject must believe it to be a priori that if something is one of his stable or fundamental beliefs, then it is true. Whereas he will not hold that this is a priori true of other people. In this paper I rebut Egan's argument, and (...)
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  8. Simon Blackburn (2006). Antirealist Expressivism and Quasi-Realism. In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. 146--162.
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  9. Simon Blackburn (2005). Quasi-Realism No Fictionalism. In Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. 322--338.
  10. Simon Blackburn (2002). Review: Précis of Ruling Passions. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):122 - 135.
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  11. Simon Blackburn (1999). Is Objective Moral Justification Possible on a Quasi-Realist Foundation? Inquiry 42 (2):213 – 227.
    This essay juxtaposes the position in metaethics defended, expressivism with quasirealistic trimmings, with the ancient problem of relativism. It argues that, perhaps surprisingly, there is less of a problem of normative truth on this approach than on others. Because ethics is not in the business of representing aspects of the world, there is no way to argue for a plurality of moral truths, simply from the existence of a plurality of moral opinions. The essay also argues that other approaches, which (...)
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  12. Simon Blackburn (1998). Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):195-198.
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  13. Simon Blackburn (1998/2000). Ruling Passions. Oxford University Press.
    Simon Blackburn puts forward a compelling and original philosophy of human motivation and morality. Why do we behave as we do? Can we improve? Is our ethics at war with our passions, or is it an upshot of those passions? Blackburn seeks the answers to such questions in an exploration of the nature of moral emotions and the structures of human motivation. He develops a naturalistic ethics, which integrates our understanding of ethics with the rest of our understanding of the (...)
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  14. Simon Blackburn (1996). Securing the Nots: Moral Epistemology for the Quasi-Realist. In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong Mark Timmons (ed.), Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology. Oxford University Press. 82--100.
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  15. Simon Blackburn (1993). Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford University Press.
    This volume collects some influential essays in which Simon Blackburn, one of our leading philosophers, explores one of the most profound and fertile of philosophical problems: the way in which our judgments relate to the world. This debate has centered on realism, or the view that what we say is validated by the way things stand in the world, and a variety of oppositions to it. Prominent among the latter are expressive and projective theories, but also a relaxed pluralism that (...)
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  16. Simon Blackburn (1993). Morals and Modals. In , Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford University Press.
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  17. Simon Blackburn (1984). Spreading the Word. Clarendon Press.
    Provides a comprehensive introduction to the major philosophical theories attempting to explain the workings of language.
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  18. Simon W. Blackburn (1984). Supervenience Revisited. In Ian Hacking (ed.), Exercises in Analysis: Essays by Students of Casimir Lewy. Cambridge University Press. 59--74.
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  19. T. D. J. Chappell (1998). The Incompleat Projectivist: How to Be an Objectivist and an Attitudinist. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (190):50-66.
    What is at stake in the dispute between moral objectivism and subjectivism is how we are to give a rational grounding to ethical first principles or basic commitments. The search is for an explanation of what if anything makes any commitments good. Subjectivisms such as Blackburn's quasi‐realism can give any set of commitments no ‘rational grounding’ in this sense except in considerations about internal consistency. But this is inadequate. Internal consistency is not sufficient for ethical rationality, since a set of (...)
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  20. Angela Coventry (2009). The Delicate Causalist: Reply to My Critics on "Hume's Theory of Causation: A Quasi-Realist Interpretation”. Manuscrito — Revista Internacional de Filosofia 32 (2).
  21. Angela Coventry (2006). Hume's Theory of Causation: A Quasi-Realist Interpretation. Continuum Books.
    Presents an interpretation of David Hume's account of what a 'cause' is. This book emphasises on the connections between Hume's theories of cause, space and time, morals, and aesthetics.
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  22. Terence Cuneo (2008). Moral Realism, QuasiRealism, and Skepticism. In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press. 176.
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  23. Stephen Davey (2012). The Problem With (Quasi-Realist) Expressivism. Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):33-41.
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  24. James Dreier (2004). Meta‐Ethics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):23–44.
    This is a paper about the problem of realism in meta-ethics (and, I hope, also in other areas, but that hope is so far pretty speculative). But it is not about the problem of whether realism is true. It is about the problem of what realism is. More specifically, it is about the question of what divides meta-ethical realists from irrealists. I start with a potted history of the Good Old Days.
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  25. James Dreier (2002). The Expressivist Circle: Invoking Norms in the Explanation of Normative Judgment. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):136–143.
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  26. James Dreier (1996). Expressivist Embeddings and Minimalist Truth. Philosophical Studies 83 (1):29-51.
    This paper is about Truth Minimalism, Norm Expressivism, and the relation between them. In particular, it is about whether Truth Minimalism can help to solve a problem thought to plague Norm Expressivism. To start with, let me explain what I mean by 'Truth Minimalism' and 'Norm Expressivism.'.
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  27. Jamie Dreier (2012). Quasi-Realism and the Problem of Unexplained Coincidence. Analytic Philosophy 53 (3):269-287.
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  28. Andy Egan (2007). Quasi-Realism and Fundamental Moral Error. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):205 – 219.
    A common first reaction to expressivist and quasi-realist theories is the thought that, if these theories are right, there's some objectionable sense in which we can't be wrong about morality. This worry turns out to be surprisingly difficult to make stick - an account of moral error as instability under improving changes provides the quasi-realist with the resources to explain many of our concerns about moral error. The story breaks down, though, in the case of fundamental moral error. This is (...)
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  29. Arthur Fine (1995). Book Review:Essays in Quasi-Realism. Simon Blackburn. [REVIEW] Ethics 105 (3):646-.
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  30. A. Gibbard (1996). Critical Notice. Mind 105 (418):331 - 335.
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  31. Allan Gibbard (1996). Projection, Quasi-Realism, and Sophisticated Realism. Mind 105 (418):331-335.
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  32. Bob Hale (2002). Can Arboreal Knotwork Help Blackburn Out of Frege's Abyss? [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):144–149.
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  33. Edward Harcourt (2005). Quasi-Realism and Ethical Appearances. Mind 114 (454):249-275.
    The paper develops an attack on quasi-realism in ethics, according to which expressivism about ethical discourse—understood as the thesis that the states that discourse expresses are non-representational—is consistent with some of the discourse's familiar surface features, thus ‘saving the ethical appearances’. A dilemma is posed for the quasi-realist. Either ethical discourse appears, thanks to those surface features, to express representational states, or else there is no such thing as its appearing to express such states. If the former then, by expressivism, (...)
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  34. Deborah K. Heikes (1996). The Realism in Quasi-Realism. Southwest Philosophy Review 12 (1):75-83.
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  35. Robert Hopkins (2001). Kant, Quasi-Realism, and the Autonomy of Aesthetic Judgement. European Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):166–189.
    Aesthetic judgements are autonomous, as many other judgements are not: for the latter, but not the former, it is sometimes justifiable to change one's mind simply because several others share a different opinion. Why is this? One answer is that claims about beauty are not assertions at all, but expressions of aesthetic response. However, to cover more than just some of the explananda, this expressivism needs combining with some analogue of cognitive command, i.e. the idea that disagreements over beuaty can (...)
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  36. C. S. Jenkins (2006). Lewis and Blackburn on Quasi-Realism and Fictionalism. Analysis 66 (4):315–319.
    Lewis has argued that quasi-realism is fictionalism. Blackburn denies this, offering reasons which rely on a descriptive reading of quasi-realism. This note offers a different, more general argument against Lewis's claim, available to prescriptive as well as descriptive quasi-realists.
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  37. Richard Jennings (1989). Scientific Quasi-Realism. Mind 98 (390):225-245.
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  38. Simon Kirchin (2000). Quasi-Realism, Sensibility Theory, and Ethical Relativism. Inquiry 43 (4):413 – 427.
    This paper is a reply to Simon Blackburn's 'Is Objective Moral Justification Possible on a Quasi-realist Foundation?' Inquiry 42 (1999), pp. 213-28. Blackburn attempts to show how his version of non-cognitivism - quasi-realist projectivism - can evade the threat of ethical relativism, the thought that all ways of living are as ethically good as each other and every ethical judgment is as ethically true as any other. He further attempts to show that his position is superior in this respect (...)
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  39. Iain Law (1996). Improvement and Truth in Quasi-Realism. Cogito 10 (3):189-193.
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  40. David Lewis (2005). Quasi-Realism is Fictionalism. In Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. 314-321.
  41. Per Lindström (2000). Quasi-Realism in Mathematics. The Monist 83 (1):122-149.
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  42. David Macarthur (2007). Pragmatism, Quasi-Realism, and the Global Challenge. In C. J. Misak (ed.), New Pragmatists. Oxford University Press. 91.
    William James said that sometimes detailed philosophical argument is irrelevant. Once a current of thought is really under way, trying to oppose it with argument is like planting a stick in a river to try to alter its course: “round your obstacle flows the water and ‘gets there just the same’”. He thought pragmatism was such a river. There is a contemporary river that sometimes calls itself pragmatism, although other titles are probably better. At any rate it is the denial (...)
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  43. Matthew McGrath (1998). Quasi-Realism and the Humean Defense of Normative Non-Factualism. Philosophical Studies 90 (2):113-127.
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  44. A. W. Moore (2002). Quasi-Realism and Relativism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):150–156.
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  45. A. W. Moore (2002). Review: Quasi-Realism and Relativism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):150 - 156.
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  46. Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall & Caroline West (2005). Moral Fictionalism Versus the Rest. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):307 – 330.
    In this paper we introduce a distinct metaethical position, fictionalism about morality. We clarify and defend the position, showing that it is a way to save the 'moral phenomena' while agreeing that there is no genuine objective prescriptivity to be described by moral terms. In particular, we distinguish moral fictionalism from moral quasi-realism, and we show that fictionalism possesses the virtues of quasi-realism about morality, but avoids its vices.
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  47. A. W. Price (1995). Simon Blackburn, Essays in Quasi-Realism, New York, Oxford University Press, 1993, Pp. 262. Utilitas 7 (01):172-.
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  48. Huw Price (2007). Pragmatism, Quasi-Realism, and the Global Challenge. In C. J. Misak (ed.), New Pragmatists. Oxford University Press. 91.
    William James said that sometimes detailed philosophical argument is irrelevant. Once a current of thought is really under way, trying to oppose it with argument is like planting a stick in a river to try to alter its course: “round your obstacle flows the water and ‘gets there just the same’”. He thought pragmatism was such a river. There is a contemporary river that sometimes calls itself pragmatism, although other titles are probably better. At any rate it is the denial (...)
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  49. Huw Price (1996). How to Stand Up for Non-Cognitivists. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):275-292.
    Is non-cognitivism compatible with minimalism about truth? A contemporary argument claims not, and therefore that moral realists, for example, should take heart from the popularity of semantic minimalism. The same is said to apply to cognitivism about other topics—conditionals, for example—for the argument depends only on the fact that ordinary usage applies the notions of truth and falsity to utterances of the kind in question. Given this much, minimalism about truth is said to leave no room for the view that (...)
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  50. Huw Price (1996). Essays in Quasi-Realism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):965-968.
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