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  1. Robert P. Abelson (1995). The Secret Existence of Expressive Behavior. Critical Review 9 (1-2):25-36.
    The rational choice assumption that any chosen behavior can be understood as optimizing material self?interest is not borne out by psychological research. Expressive motives, for example, are prominent in the symbols of politics, in social relationships, and in the arts of persuasion. Moreover, instrumentality is a mindset that is learned (perhaps overlearned), and can be situationally manipulated; because it is valued in our society, it provides a privileged vocabulary for justifying behaviors that may have been performed for other reasons, and (...)
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  2. Fernando Aguiar & Andrés de Francisco (2009). Rational Choice, Social Identity, and Beliefs About Oneself. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (4):547-571.
    Social identity poses one of the most important challenges to rational choice theory, but rational choice theorists do not hold a common position regarding identity. On one hand, externalist rational choice ignores the concept of identity or reduces it to revealed preferences. On the other hand, internalist rational choice considers identity as a key concept in explaining social action because it permits expressive motivations to be included in the models. However, internalist theorists tend to reduce identity to desire—the desire of (...)
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  3. A. Ahmed (2013). Causal Decision Theory: A Counterexample. Philosophical Review 122 (2):289-306.
    The essay presents a novel counterexample to Causal Decision Theory (CDT). Its interest is that it generates a case in which CDT violates the very principles that motivated it in the first place. The essay argues that the objection applies to all extant formulations of CDT and that the only way out for that theory is a modification of it that entails incompatibilism. The essay invites the reader to find this consequence of CDT a reason to reject it.
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  4. Arif Ahmed, Smokers and Psychos: Egan Cases Don't Work.
    Andy Egan's Smoking Lesion and Psycho Button cases are supposed to be counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory. This paper argues that they are not: more precisely, it argues that if CDT makes the right call in Newcomb's problem then it makes the right call in Egan cases too.
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  5. Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Jonathan Weinstein (forthcoming). The Subjective Approach to Ambiguity: A Critical Assessment. Economics and Philosophy.
  6. Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Jonathan Weinstein (2009). Rejoinder: The “Ambiguity Aversion Literature: A Critical Assessment”. Economics and Philosophy 25 (3):357-369.
    The pioneering contributions of Bewley, Gilboa and Schmeidler highlighted important weaknesses in the foundations of economics and game theory. The Bayesian methodology on which these fields are based does not answer such basic questions as what makes beliefs reasonable, or how agents should form beliefs and expectations. Providing the initial impetus for debating these issues is a contribution that will have the lasting value it deserves.
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  7. Paul Anand (2008). Rationality and Intransitive Preference. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 22:5-15.
    “Radical The paper provides a survey of arguments for claims that rational agents should have transitive preferences and argues that they are not valid. The presentation is based on a chapter for the forthcoming Oxford Handbook of Rational and Social Choice.
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  8. Paul Anand (2005). Bayes's Theorem (Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. 113), Edited by Richard Swinburne, Oxford University Press, 2002, 160 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 21 (1):139-142.
  9. Paul Anand (1995). Foundations of Rational Choice Under Risk. Philosophical Review 104 (3):474-476.
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  10. Elizabeth Anderson (2000). Beyond Homo Economicus: New Developments in Theories of Social Norms. Philosophy and Public Affairs 29 (2):170–200.
  11. Joel Anderson (2010). Review of Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein: Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 26:369-376.
  12. Chrisoula Andreou, Dynamic Choice. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  13. Chrisoula Andreou (2007). There Are Preferences and Then There Are Preferences. In Barbara Montero and Mark D. White (ed.), Economics and the Mind.
  14. Chrisoula Andreou (2005). Incommensurable Alternatives and Rational Choice. Ratio 18 (3):249–261.
    I consider the implications of incommensurability for the assumption, in rational choice theory, that a rational agent’s preferences are complete. I argue that, contrary to appearances, the completeness assumption and the existence of incommensurability are compatible. Indeed, reflection on incommensurability suggests that one’s preferences should be complete over even the incommensurable alternatives one faces.
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  15. G. A. Antonelli (1993). Review of Robert Koons's Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 9:305-305.
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  16. Gian Aldo Antonelli (1993). Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality, Koons Robert. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, Xii + 174 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 9 (02):305-.
  17. Gary Becker (2012). The Potentials and Limitations of Rational Choice Theory: An Interview with Gary Becker. Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 5 (1):73-86.
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  18. S. I. Benn & G. W. Mortimore (eds.) (1976). Rationality and the Social Sciences: Contributions to the Philosophy and Methodology of the Social Sciences. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
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  19. William Berkson (1990). In Defense of Good Reasons. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 20 (1):84-91.
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  20. José Luis Bermúdez (2010). Rational Decisions , Ken Binmore. Princeton University Press, 2009, X + 200 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 26 (1):95-101.
  21. C. Bicchieri (2010). Norms, Preferences, and Conditional Behavior. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 9 (3):297-313.
    This article addresses several issues raised by Nichols, Gintis, and Skyrms and Zollman in their comments on my book, The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms . In particular, I explore the relation between social and personal norms, what an adequate game-theoretic representation of norms should be, and what models of norms emergence should tell us about the formation of normative expectations.
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  22. Ken Binmore (1997). Rationality and Backward Induction. Journal of Economic Methodology 4 (1):23-41.
    This paper uses the Centipede Game to criticize formal arguments that have recently been offered for and against backward induction as a rationality principle. It is argued that the crucial issues concerning the interpretation of counterfactuals depend on contextual questions that are abstracted away in current formalisms. I have a text, it always is the same, And always has been, Since I learnt the game. Chaucer, The Pardoner's Tale.
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  23. Ken Binmore (1988). Modeling Rational Players: Part II. Economics and Philosophy 4 (01):9-.
    This is the second part of a two-part paper. It can be read independently of the first part provided that the reader is prepared to go along with the unorthodox views on game theory which were advanced in Part I and are summarized below. The body of the paper is an attempt to study some of the positive implications of such a viewpoint. This requires an exploration of what is involved in modeling “rational players” as computing machines.
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  24. Ken Binmore (1987). Modeling Rational Players: Part I. Economics and Philosophy 3 (02):179-.
    Game theory has proved a useful tool in the study of simple economic models. However, numerous foundational issues remain unresolved. The situation is particularly confusing in respect of the non-cooperative analysis of games with some dynamic structure in which the choice of one move or another during the play of the game may convey valuable information to the other players. Without pausing for breath, it is easy to name at least 10 rival equilibrium notions for which a serious case can (...)
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  25. Jonathan Birch (2013). Samir Okasha and Ken Binmore (Eds) Evolution and Rationality: Decisions, Cooperation, and Strategic Behaviour. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (3):669-673.
    Evolution and Rationality marks the end of a three-year project, ‘Evolution, Cooperation, and Rationality’, directed at the University of Bristol by the book’s editors, Samir Okasha and Ken Binmore. The collection draws together the editors’ pick of the papers delivered at the conferences the project hosted, and covers a wide range of topics at the intersection of evolutionary theory and the social sciences. It is a splendid anthology: timely, interdisciplinary, thematically cohesive, and full of substantive and interesting disagreements between the (...)
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  26. Thomas Blank (2011). Normativität Im Rational-Choice-Ansatz. In Johannes Ahrens, Raphael Beer, Uwe H. Bittlingmayer & Jürgen Gerdes (eds.), Normativität: Über Die Hintergründe Sozialwissenschaftlicher Theoriebildung. Vs Verlag.
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  27. James Bohman (2010). Formal Theories, Pragmatic Purposes: Inferentialism, Rational Choice, and Communicative Action. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):423-440.
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  28. James Bohman (2003). Formal Theories, Pragmatic Purposes: Inferentialism, Rational Choice, and Communicative Action: Critical Notice. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):423-440.
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  29. James Bohman (2003). Formal Theories, Pragmatic Purposes: Inferentialism, Rational Choice, and Communicative Action: Critical Notice of Joseph Heath, Communicative Action and Rational Choice. [REVIEW] Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):423-440.
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  30. J. Boluman (2003). Formal Theories, Pragmatic Purposes: Inferentialism, Rational Choice, and Communicative Action Critical Notice of Joseph Heath Communicative Action and Rational Choice. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):423-440.
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  31. Giacomo Bonanno (1995). Review of Cristina Bicchieri's Rationality and Coordination. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 11 (2):359-366.
    In her book Rationality and coordination (Cambridge University Press, 1994) Cristina Bicchieri brings together (and adds to) her own contributions to game theory and the philosophy of economics published in various journals in the period 1987-1992. The book, however, is not a collection of separate articles but rather a homogeneous unit organized around some central themes in the foundations of non-cooperative game theory. Bicchieri’s exposition is admirably clear and well organized. Somebody with a good knowledge of game theory would probably (...)
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  32. J. P. Z. Bonilla (2004). The Scientist as an Entrepreneur A Review of The Economics of Scientific Knowledge. A Rational Choice Neo-Institutionalist Theory of Science, by Yanfei Shi. Journal of Economic Methodology 11 (1):97-103.
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  33. Paul Borrill & Leigh Tesfatsion (2011). Agent-Based Modeling: The Right Mathematics for the Social Sciences? In J. B. Davis & D. W. Hands (eds.), Elgar Companion to Recent Economic Methodology. Edward Elgar Publishers.
    This study provides a basic introduction to agent-based modeling (ABM) as a powerful blend of classical and constructive mathematics, with a primary focus on its applicability for social science research. The typical goals of ABM social science researchers are discussed along with the culture-dish nature of their computer experiments. The applicability of ABM for science more generally is also considered, with special attention to physics. Finally, two distinct types of ABM applications are summarized in order to illustrate concretely the duality (...)
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  34. Raymond Boudon (2008). Rational Choice Theory. Nuova Civiltà Delle Macchine 26 (3).
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  35. Alban Bouvier (2002). An Epistemological Plea for Methodological Individualism and Rational Choice Theory in Cognitive Rhetoric. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (1):51-70.
    Some current attempts to go beyond the narrow scope of rational choice theory (RCT) in the social sciences and the artificial reconstructions it sometimes provides focus on the arguments that people give to justify their beliefs and behaviors themselves. But the available argumentation theories are not constructed to fill this gap. This article argues that relevance theory, on the contrary, suggests interesting tracks. This provocative idea requires a rereading of Sperber and Wilson's theory. Actually, the authors do not explicitly support (...)
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  36. Thomas A. Boylan & Ruvin Gekker (eds.) (2009). Economics, Rational Choice and Normative Philosophy. Routledge.
    Following Amartya Sen’s insistence to expand the framework of rational choice theory by taking into account ‘non-utility information,’ economists, political scientists and philosophers have recently concentrated their efforts in analysing the issues related to rights, freedom, diversity intentions and equality. Thomas Boylan and Ruvin Gekker have gathered essays that reflect this trend. The particular themes addressed in this volume include: the measurement of diversity and freedom, formal analysis of individual rights and intentions, judgment aggregation under constraints and strategic manipulation in (...)
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  37. Richard Bradley (2001). Review. James M. Joyce 'Foundations of Causal Decision Theory'. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 17 (2):275-294.
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  38. Geoffrey Brennan & Philip Pettit (2000). The Hidden Economy of Esteem. Economics and Philosophy 16 (1):77-98.
    A generation of social theorists have argued that if free-rider considerations show that certain collective action predicaments are unresolvable under individual, rational choice – unresolvable under an arrangement where each is free to pursue their own relative advantage – then those considerations will equally show that the predicaments cannot be resolved by recourse to norms (Buchanan, 1975, p. 132; Heath, 1976, p. 30; Sober and Wilson, 1998, 156ff; Taylor, 1987, p. 144). If free-rider considerations explain why people do not spontaneously (...)
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  39. Jason Brennan (2009). Tuck on the Rationality of Voting: A Critical Note. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3 (3):1-5.
    This paper argues that Richard Tuck, in his book Free Riding, fails to show it is rational to vote except in unusual cases.
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  40. Timothy J. Brennan (1989). A Methodological Assessment of Multiple Utility Frameworks. Economics and Philosophy 5 (02):189-.
    One of the fundamental components of the concept of economic rationality is that preference orderings are “complete,” i.e., that all alternative actions an economic agent can take are comparable . The idea that all actions can be ranked may be called the single utility assumption. The attractiveness of this assumption is considerable. It would be hard to fathom what choice among alternatives means if the available alternatives cannot be ranked by the chooser in some way. In addition, the efficiency criterion (...)
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  41. Harry Brighouse (1994). Choosing Justice: An Experimental Approach to Ethical Theory, Frohlich Norman and Joe A. Oppenheimer. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992, Xiv + 258 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 10 (01):127-.
  42. Richard Bronk (2009). The Romantic Economist: Imagination in Economics. Cambridge University Press.
    Since economies are dynamic processes driven by creativity, social norms, and emotions as well as rational calculation, why do economists largely study them using static equilibrium models and narrow rationalistic assumptions? Economic activity is as much a function of imagination and social sentiments as of the rational optimisation of given preferences and goods. Richard Bronk argues that economists can best model and explain these creative and social aspects of markets by using new structuring assumptions and metaphors derived from the poetry (...)
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  43. John Broome (2007). Replies. Economics and Philosophy 23 (1):115-124.
  44. John Broome (1992). Hard Choices: Decision Making Under Unresolved Conflict, Isaac Levi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, Xii + 250 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 8 (01):169-.
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  45. John Broome (1991). “Utility”. Economics and Philosophy 7 (01):1-12.
    “Utility,” in plain English, means usefulness . In Australia, a ute is a useful vehicle. Jeremy Bentham specialized the meaning to a particular sort of usefulness. “By utility,” he said, “is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness or to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered” . The “principle of utility” is the principle that actions are to be judged by (...)
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  46. Luigino Bruni & Robert Sugden (2009). Fraternity, Intrinsic Motivation and Sacrifice: A Reply to Gui and Nelson. Economics and Philosophy 25 (2):195-198.
    This paper responds to Gui and Nelson's separate comments on our paper , which analysed sociality in markets as joint commitment to mutual assistance. We argue that our analysis is fundamentally different both from Nelson's analysis (a mixture of self-interested and intrinsic motivations) and from that provided by theories of warm glow or guilt aversion, as discussed by Gui. We agree with Gui that, in initiating and maintaining cooperative relationships, individuals sometimes incur personal costs to benefit others without any certainty (...)
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  47. Krzysztof Brzechczyn (ed.) (2009). Idealization Xiii: Modeling in History. Rodopi.
    The book reveals different dimensions of modeling in the historical sciences. Papers collected in the first part (Ontology of the Historical Process) consider different models of historical reality and discuss their status. The second part (Modeling in the Methodology of History) presents various forms of idealization in historiographic research. The papers in the third part (Modeling in the Research Practice) present various models of past reality (e.g. of Poland, Central Europe and the general history of the feudal system) put forward (...)
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  48. Allen Buchanan (1975). Revisability and Rational Choice. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):395 - 408.
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  49. James M. Buchanan (1988). The Economics of Rights, Co-Operation, and Welfare, Robert Sugden. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, Vii + 191 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 4 (02):341-.
  50. Krister Bykvist (2010). Can Unstable Preferences Provide a Stable Standard of Well-Being? Economics and Philosophy 26 (1):1-26.
    How do we determine the well-being of a person when her preferences are not stable across worlds? Suppose, for instance, that you are considering getting married, and that you know that if you get married, you will prefer being unmarried, and that if you stay unmarried, you will prefer being married. The general problem is to find a stable standard of well-being when the standard is set by preferences that are not stable. In this paper, I shall show that the (...)
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