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  1. Robert P. Abelson (1995). The Secret Existence of Expressive Behavior. Critical Review 9 (1-2):25-36.
    The rational choice assumption that any chosen behavior can be understood as optimizing material self?interest is not borne out by psychological research. Expressive motives, for example, are prominent in the symbols of politics, in social relationships, and in the arts of persuasion. Moreover, instrumentality is a mindset that is learned (perhaps overlearned), and can be situationally manipulated; because it is valued in our society, it provides a privileged vocabulary for justifying behaviors that may have been performed for other reasons, and (...)
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  2. Fernando Aguiar & Andrés de Francisco (2009). Rational Choice, Social Identity, and Beliefs About Oneself. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (4):547-571.
    Social identity poses one of the most important challenges to rational choice theory, but rational choice theorists do not hold a common position regarding identity. On one hand, externalist rational choice ignores the concept of identity or reduces it to revealed preferences. On the other hand, internalist rational choice considers identity as a key concept in explaining social action because it permits expressive motivations to be included in the models. However, internalist theorists tend to reduce identity to desire—the desire of (...)
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  3. Arif Ahmed, Causal Decision Theory is False.
    Causal Decision Theory (CDT) cares only about the effects of a contemplated act, not its causes. The paper constructs a case in which CDT consequently recommends a bet that the agent is certain to lose, rather than a bet that she is certain to win. CDT is plainly giving wrong advice in this case. It therefore stands refuted.
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  4. Arif Ahmed, Smokers and Psychos: Egan Cases Don't Work.
    Andy Egan's Smoking Lesion and Psycho Button cases are supposed to be counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory. This paper argues that they are not: more precisely, it argues that if CDT makes the right call in Newcomb's problem then it makes the right call in Egan cases too.
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  5. Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Jonathan Weinstein (2009). Rejoinder: The “Ambiguity Aversion Literature: A Critical Assessment”. Economics and Philosophy 25 (3):357-369.
  6. Paul Anand (2008). Rationality and Intransitive Preference. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 22:5-15.
    “Radical The paper provides a survey of arguments for claims that rational agents should have transitive preferences and argues that they are not valid. The presentation is based on a chapter for the forthcoming Oxford Handbook of Rational and Social Choice.
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  7. Paul Anand (2005). Bayes's Theorem (Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. 113), Edited by Richard Swinburne, Oxford University Press, 2002, 160 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 21 (1):139-142.
  8. Elizabeth Anderson (2000). Beyond Homo Economicus: New Developments in Theories of Social Norms. Philosophy and Public Affairs 29 (2):170–200.
  9. Gian Aldo Antonelli (1993). Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality, Koons Robert. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, Xii + 174 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 9 (02):305-.
  10. S. I. Benn & G. W. Mortimore (eds.) (1976). Rationality and the Social Sciences: Contributions to the Philosophy and Methodology of the Social Sciences. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
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  11. William Berkson (1990). In Defense of Good Reasons. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 20 (1):84-91.
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  12. José Luis Bermúdez (2010). Rational Decisions , Ken Binmore. Princeton University Press, 2009, X + 200 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 26 (1):95-101.
  13. C. Bicchieri (2010). Norms, Preferences, and Conditional Behavior. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 9 (3):297-313.
    This article addresses several issues raised by Nichols, Gintis, and Skyrms and Zollman in their comments on my book, The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms . In particular, I explore the relation between social and personal norms, what an adequate game-theoretic representation of norms should be, and what models of norms emergence should tell us about the formation of normative expectations.
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  14. Ken Binmore (1997). Rationality and Backward Induction. Journal of Economic Methodology 4 (1):23-41.
    This paper uses the Centipede Game to criticize formal arguments that have recently been offered for and against backward induction as a rationality principle. It is argued that the crucial issues concerning the interpretation of counterfactuals depend on contextual questions that are abstracted away in current formalisms. I have a text, it always is the same, And always has been, Since I learnt the game. Chaucer, The Pardoner's Tale.
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  15. Ken Binmore (1988). Modeling Rational Players: Part II. Economics and Philosophy 4 (01):9-.
  16. Ken Binmore (1987). Modeling Rational Players: Part I. Economics and Philosophy 3 (02):179-.
  17. Jonathan Birch (2013). Samir Okasha and Ken Binmore (Eds) Evolution and Rationality: Decisions, Cooperation, and Strategic Behaviour. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (3):669-673.
  18. Alban Bouvier (2002). An Epistemological Plea for Methodological Individualism and Rational Choice Theory in Cognitive Rhetoric. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (1):51-70.
    Some current attempts to go beyond the narrow scope of rational choice theory (RCT) in the social sciences and the artificial reconstructions it sometimes provides focus on the arguments that people give to justify their beliefs and behaviors themselves. But the available argumentation theories are not constructed to fill this gap. This article argues that relevance theory, on the contrary, suggests interesting tracks. This provocative idea requires a rereading of Sperber and Wilson's theory. Actually, the authors do not explicitly support (...)
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  19. Thomas A. Boylan & Ruvin Gekker (eds.) (2009). Economics, Rational Choice and Normative Philosophy. Routledge.
    Following Amartya Sen’s insistence to expand the framework of rational choice theory by taking into account ‘non-utility information,’ economists, political scientists and philosophers have recently concentrated their efforts in analysing the issues related to rights, freedom, diversity intentions and equality. Thomas Boylan and Ruvin Gekker have gathered essays that reflect this trend. The particular themes addressed in this volume include: the measurement of diversity and freedom, formal analysis of individual rights and intentions, judgment aggregation under constraints and strategic manipulation in (...)
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  20. Richard Bradley (2001). Review. James M. Joyce 'Foundations of Causal Decision Theory' [Book Review]. Economics and Philosophy 17 (2):275-294.
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  21. Geoffrey Brennan & Philip Pettit (2000). The Hidden Economy of Esteem. Economics and Philosophy 16 (1):77-98.
    A generation of social theorists have argued that if free-rider considerations show that certain collective action predicaments are unresolvable under individual, rational choice – unresolvable under an arrangement where each is free to pursue their own relative advantage – then those considerations will equally show that the predicaments cannot be resolved by recourse to norms (Buchanan, 1975, p. 132; Heath, 1976, p. 30; Sober and Wilson, 1998, 156ff; Taylor, 1987, p. 144). If free-rider considerations explain why people do not spontaneously (...)
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  22. Jason Brennan (2009). Tuck on the Rationality of Voting: A Critical Note. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3 (3):1-5.
    This paper argues that Richard Tuck, in his book Free Riding, fails to show it is rational to vote except in unusual cases.
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  23. Timothy J. Brennan (1989). A Methodological Assessment of Multiple Utility Frameworks. Economics and Philosophy 5 (02):189-.
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  24. Harry Brighouse (1994). Choosing Justice: An Experimental Approach to Ethical Theory, Frohlich Norman and Joe A. Oppenheimer. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992, Xiv + 258 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 10 (01):127-.
  25. Richard Bronk (2009). The Romantic Economist: Imagination in Economics. Cambridge University Press.
    Since economies are dynamic processes driven by creativity, social norms, and emotions as well as rational calculation, why do economists largely study them using static equilibrium models and narrow rationalistic assumptions? Economic activity is as much a function of imagination and social sentiments as of the rational optimisation of given preferences and goods. Richard Bronk argues that economists can best model and explain these creative and social aspects of markets by using new structuring assumptions and metaphors derived from the poetry (...)
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  26. John Broome (2007). Replies. Economics and Philosophy 23 (1):115-124.
  27. John Broome (1992). Hard Choices: Decision Making Under Unresolved Conflict, Isaac Levi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, Xii + 250 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 8 (01):169-.
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  28. John Broome (1991). “Utility”. Economics and Philosophy 7 (01):1-12.
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  29. Luigino Bruni & Robert Sugden (2009). Fraternity, Intrinsic Motivation and Sacrifice: A Reply to Gui and Nelson. Economics and Philosophy 25 (2):195-198.
    This paper responds to Gui and Nelson's separate comments on our paper , which analysed sociality in markets as joint commitment to mutual assistance. We argue that our analysis is fundamentally different both from Nelson's analysis (a mixture of self-interested and intrinsic motivations) and from that provided by theories of warm glow or guilt aversion, as discussed by Gui. We agree with Gui that, in initiating and maintaining cooperative relationships, individuals sometimes incur personal costs to benefit others without any certainty (...)
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  30. Krzysztof Brzechczyn (ed.) (2009). Idealization Xiii: Modeling in History. Rodopi.
    The book reveals different dimensions of modeling in the historical sciences. Papers collected in the first part (Ontology of the Historical Process) consider different models of historical reality and discuss their status. The second part (Modeling in the Methodology of History) presents various forms of idealization in historiographic research. The papers in the third part (Modeling in the Research Practice) present various models of past reality (e.g. of Poland, Central Europe and the general history of the feudal system) put forward (...)
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  31. James M. Buchanan (1988). The Economics of Rights, Co-Operation, and Welfare, Robert Sugden. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, Vii + 191 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 4 (02):341-.
  32. Krister Bykvist (2010). Can Unstable Preferences Provide a Stable Standard of Well-Being? Economics and Philosophy 26 (1):1-26.
    How do we determine the well-being of a person when her preferences are not stable across worlds? Suppose, for instance, that you are considering getting married, and that you know that if you get married, you will prefer being unmarried, and that if you stay unmarried, you will prefer being married. The general problem is to find a stable standard of well-being when the standard is set by preferences that are not stable. In this paper, I shall show that the (...)
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  33. Krister Bykvist (2007). Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason, Edited by Michael Byron. Cambridge University Press, 2004, 245 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 23 (2):240-245.
  34. Colin F. Camerer (2008). The Potential of Neuroeconomics. Economics and Philosophy 24 (3):369-379.
    The goal of neuroeconomics is a mathematical theory of how the brain implements decisions, that is tied to behaviour. This theory is likely to show some decisions for which rational-choice theory is a good approximation (particularly for evolutionarily sculpted or highly learned choices), to provide a deeper level of distinction among competing behavioural alternatives, and to provide empirical inspiration for economics to incorporate more nuanced ideas about endogeneity of preferences, individual difference, emotions, endogeneous regulation of states, and so forth. I (...)
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  35. Thomas Christiano (2004). Is Normative Rational Choice Theory Self‐Defeating? Ethics 115 (1):122-141.
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  36. Miranda Del Corral & Jesús Zamora Bonilla (2008). Introduction:Also Sprach der Homo Oeconomicus. Journal of Economic Methodology 15 (3):241-244.
  37. Tyler Cowen (2002). Prelude to Political Economy, Kaushik Basu. Cambridge University Press, 2000, XV + 288 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 18 (1):183-204.
  38. C. Crothers (2013). Thin Explanations A Review of The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology. [REVIEW] Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (2):257-267.
    The Oxford Handbook provides an extensive and innovative review of developments in Analytical Sociology (AS) which is a theory program which seeks to develop ‘thin explanations’ of social phenomena by understanding their micro-foundations through explicitly developed models and then tracing through the broader consequences of these actions and interactions for aggregate social patterns. The volume covers the key characteristics of this approach in terms of ontology and epistemology and then assays recent developments across over two dozen areas of application: each (...)
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  39. Ann E. Cudd (2005). How to Explain Oppression: Criteria of Adequacy for Normative Explanatory Theories. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (1):20-49.
    This article discusses explanatory theories of normative concepts and argues for a set of criteria of adequacy by which such theories may be evaluated. The criteria offered fall into four categories: ontological, theoretical, pragmatic, and moral. After defending the criteria and discussing their relative weighting, this article uses them to prune the set of available explanatory theories of oppression. Functionalist theories, including Hegelian recognition theory and Foucauldian social theory, are rejected, as are psychoanalytic theory and social dominance theory. Finally, the (...)
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  40. Jelle de Boer (2008). Collective Intention, Social Identity, and Rational Choice. Journal of Economic Methodology 15 (2):169-184.
    In this paper I propose that what social psychologists refer to as social identity is a plausible empirical correlate on the part of the individual to what some philosophers and economists call collective intention. A discussion of an experiment yields the question what kind of mental state social identity might be and how it is related to the standard desire/belief conception. It is argued that social identity involves both a desire and a belief, and that one distinguishing feature of it (...)
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  41. Boudewijn de Bruin (2008). Reducible and Nonsensical Uses of Game Theory. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 38 (2):247-266.
    The mathematical tools of game theory are frequently used in the social sciences and economic consultancy. But how do they explain social phenomena and support prescriptive judgments? And is the use of game theory really necessary? I analyze the logical form of explanatory and prescriptive game theoretical statements, and argue for two claims: (1) explanatory game theory can and should be reduced to rational choice theory in all cases; and (2) prescriptive game theory gives bad advice in some cases, is (...)
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  42. Boudewijn de Bruin (2006). Popper's Conception of the Rationality Principle in the Social Sciences. In Ian Jarvie, David Miller & Karl Milford (eds.), Karl Popper: A Centenary Assessment: Selected Papers from Karl Popper 2002: Volume III: Science. Ashgate.
    In this paper I criticize Popper's conception of the rationality principle in the social sciences. First, I survey Popper's outlook on the role of a principle of rationality in theorizing in the social sciences. Then, I critically examine his view on the status of the principle of rationality concluding that the arguments supporting it are quite weak. Finally, I contrast his standpoint with an alternative conception. This, I show, helps us understand better Popper's reasons for adopting his perspective on rationality.
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  43. Rogier de Langhe (2010). The Division of Labour in Science: The Tradeoff Between Specialisation and Diversity. Journal of Economic Methodology 17 (1):37-51.
    Economics is a typical resource for social epistemology and the division of labour is a common theme for economics. As such it should come as no surprise that the present paper turns to economics to formulate a view on the dynamics of scientific communities, with precursors such as Kitcher (1990), Goldman and Shaked (1991) and Hull (1988). But although the approach is similar to theirs, the view defended is different. Mäki (2005) points out that the lessons philosophers draw from economics (...)
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  44. A. A. Derksen (1984). Elster, Rationality and the Rational Choice Approach in the Social Sciences. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 14 (4):553-558.
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  45. Shatakshee Dhongde & Prasanta K. Pattanaik (2009). Preference, Choice, and Rationality : Amartya Sen's Critique of the Theory of Rational Choice in Economics. In Christopher W. Morris (ed.), Amartya Sen. Cambridge University Press.
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  46. Daniel Diermeier (1995). Rational Choice and the Role of Theory in Political Science. Critical Review 9 (1-2):59-70.
    In their survey of empirical research based on rational choice theory, Don Green and Ian Shapiro point to a list of methodological deficiencies or ?pathologies.? The main problem with Green and Shapiro's list lies in the standards they use to evaluate the achievements of rational choice theory. These standards are derived from a view of empirical research that is deeply questionable and, in the stated form, inconsistent with both standard insights in contemporary philosophy of science and the established practice in (...)
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  47. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, Reason-Based Rationalization.
    We introduce a “reason-based” way of rationalizing an agent’s choice behaviour, which explains choices by specifying which properties of the options or choice context the agent cares about (the “motivationally salient properties”) and how he or she cares about these properties (the “fundamental preference relation”). Reason-based rationalizations can explain non-classical choice behaviour, including boundedly rational and sophisticated rational behaviour, and predict choices in unobserved contexts, an issue neglected in standard choice theory. We characterize the behavioural implications of different reason-based models (...)
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  48. Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2013). A Reason-Based Theory of Rational Choice. Noûs 47 (1):104-134.
    There is a surprising disconnect between formal rational choice theory and philosophical work on reasons. The one is silent on the role of reasons in rational choices, the other rarely engages with the formal models of decision problems used by social scientists. To bridge this gap, we propose a new, reason-based theory of rational choice. At its core is an account of preference formation, according to which an agent’s preferences are determined by his or her motivating reasons, together with a (...)
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  49. Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2013). Where Do Preferences Come From? International Journal of Game Theory 42 (3):613-637.
    Rational choice theory analyzes how an agent can rationally act, given his or her preferences, but says little about where those preferences come from. Preferences are usually assumed to be fixed and exogenously given. Building on related work on reasons and rational choice, we describe a framework for conceptualizing preference formation and preference change. In our model, an agent's preferences are based on certain "motivationally salient" properties of the alternatives over which the preferences are held. Preferences may change as new (...)
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  50. Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2011). A Model of Non-Informational Preference Change. Journal of Theoretical Politics 23 (2):145-164.
    According to standard rational choice theory, as commonly used in political science and economics, an agent's fundamental preferences are exogenously fixed, and any preference change over decision options is due to Bayesian information learning. Although elegant and parsimonious, such a model fails to account for preference change driven by experiences or psychological changes distinct from information learning. We develop a model of non-informational preference change. Alternatives are modelled as points in some multidimensional space, only some of whose dimensions play a (...)
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