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  1. Friedel Bolle & Jessica Kaehler (2006). Coleman's Hypothesis on Trusting Behaviour and a Remark on Meta‐Studies. Journal of Economic Methodology 13 (4):469-483.
    Coleman (1990) describes ?calculative trust?. He states that, in order to trust, the value of trust has to be larger than the value of mistrust. So if subjects have (not personally but on average) rational expectations about the trustworthiness of their transaction partners, we should expect the frequency of trust to increase with the average net profitability of trust. In a meta?study of trust experiments, Coleman's Hypothesis could not be confirmed while, in our own experiment with a wider parameter range, (...)
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  2. Giacomo Bonanno, Martin van Hees, Christian List & Bertil Tungodden (2009). Introduction to the Special Issue of Economics and Philosophy on Ambiguity Aversion. Economics and Philosophy 25 (3):247-248.
    The paradigm for modelling decision-making under uncertainty has undoubtedly been the theory of Expected Utility, which was first developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and later extended by Savage (1954) to the case of subjective uncertainty. The inadequacy of the theory of Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) as a descriptive theory was soon pointed out in experiments, most famously by Allais (1953) and Ellsberg (1961). The observed departures from SEU noticed by Allais and Ellsberg became known as “paradoxes”. The Ellsberg (...)
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  3. Marcel Boumans (1999). Representation and Stability in Testing and Measuring Rational Expectations. Journal of Economic Methodology 6 (3):381-402.
    There are at least two elements of theory completion necessary for measurement: (1) a measurement formula and (2) standardization of that representation. Standardization is based on the search for stability. The more stable the correlation which the measurement formula represents is, the less influence other circumstances have. Then, the interconnection between testing, mathematical representation and standardization is of a hierarchical order. By testing a model one tries to find out to what extent the model covers the data of the phenomenon, (...)
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  4. Donald W. Bruckner (2004). Prudence and Justice. Economics and Philosophy 20 (1):35-63.
    Whereas principles of justice adjudicate interpersonal conflicts, principles of prudence adjudicate intrapersonal conflicts – i.e., conflicts between the preferences an individual has now and the preferences he will have later. On a contractarian approach, principles of justice can be theoretically grounded in a hypothetical agreement in an appropriately specified pre-moral situation in which those persons with conflicting claims have representatives pushing for their claims. Similarly, I claim, principles of prudence can be grounded in a hypothetical agreement in an appropriately specified (...)
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  5. Michel de Vroey (2003). Perfect Informationà laWalras Versus Perfect Informationà laMarshall. Journal of Economic Methodology 10 (4):465-492.
    In this paper I ponder upon the meaning of the perfect information assumption, and argue that a distinction should be drawn between the Walrasian and Marshallian conceptions of perfect information. I show that the Marshallian conception is more demanding than the Walrasian, due to the absence of the auctioneer figure. Next, I examine a few modern imperfect information models (Friedman's expectations?augmented Phillips Curve model, Lucas' neutrality of money model, Shapiro and Stiglitz' efficiency wage model) in order to assess whether the (...)
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  6. Robert E. Goodin (2002). The Paradox of Persisting Opposition. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 1 (1):109-146.
    If voters accord evidentiary value to one another's reports, revising their own views in the light of them as Bayesian rationality requires, then even relatively small electoral majorities ought to prove rationally compelling and opposition ought rationally to vanish. For democratic theory, that is a jarring result. While there are no resources for avoiding that result within the Bayesian model itself, there are various aspects of the political process lying outside that model which do serve to underwrite the rationality (...)
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  7. Frédéric Laville (2000). Should We Abandon Optimization Theory? The Need for Bounded Rationality. Journal of Economic Methodology 7 (3):395-426.
    This paper makes explicit the rhetoric of optimization. Various arguments are examined, in order to determine whether we should retain optimization theory or assume bounded rationality. Empirical evidence confounds optimization theory; in the face of experimental studies, an empirical dilemma emerges, according to which we should discard either the theory of expected utility or the criterion of empirical refutation. Methodological criticisms attack optimization theory's epistemological status; together, they give rise to a methodological trilemma, according to which optimization theory is indeterminate, (...)
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  8. Silvia Lerner (2014). A Non-Monotonic Intensional Framework for Framing Effects. Journal of Economic Methodology 21 (1):37-53.
    Expected Utility Theory (EUT) has anomalies when interpreted descriptively and tested empirically. Experiments show that the way in which options are formulated is, in most cases, relevant for decision-making. This kind of anomaly is directly related, however, not with a proper axiom of EUT but rather with the logical principle of extensionality and its decision theoretic version: the principle of invariance. This paper focuses on the phenomenon of framing effects (FE) and the associated failures of invariance. FE arise when different (...)
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  9. Miroslav Misina (2008). Rationality of Beliefs and Model Consistency. Economics and Philosophy 24 (1):65-79.
    The assumption of rational expectations (RE) plays two roles in economic models: it imposes restrictions on behaviour of agents, and it ensures model consistency. Dissatisfaction with RE on behavioural grounds has, in a variety of models, led to its replacement by more behaviourally plausible postulates. However, replacing RE by ad hoc behavioural postulates may result in internally inconsistent models. This work introduces a conceptual framework within which the nature of the issue can be described, and points to potential problems that (...)
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  10. Stephen Morris (1995). The Common Prior Assumption in Economic Theory. Economics and Philosophy 11 (02):227-.
    Why is (it that) common priors are implicit or explicit in the vast majority of the differential information literature in economics and game theory? Why has the economic community been unwilling, in practice, to accept and actually use the idea of truly personal probabilities in much the same way that it did accept the idea of personal utility functions? After all, in (Savage's expected utility theory), both the utilities and probabilities are derived separately for each decision maker. Why were the (...)
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  11. Klaus Nehring (2009). Coping Rationally with Ambiguity: Robustness Versus Ambiguity-Aversion. Economics and Philosophy 25 (3):303-334.
    Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2009) argue that the extant literature on ambiguity aversion is not successful in accounting for Ellsberg choices as rational responses to ambiguity. We concur, and propose that rational choice under ambiguity aims at robustness rather than avoidance of ambiguity. A central argument explains why robust choice is intrinsically context-dependent and legitimately violates standard choice consistency conditions. If choice consistency is forced, however, ambiguity-aversion emerges as a semi-rational response to ambiguity.
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  12. Skog Ole-Jérgen (2001). Theorizing About Patience Formation±the Necessity of Conceptual Distinctions. Economics and Philosophy 17:207-219.
    The concept of patience describes a person's ability to make prolonged efforts towards future goals, and his or her ability to consider long-term future consequences. Clearly, patience is a capacity that comes by degrees. On the following pages, a person will be said to be patient to the extent that his actions are motivated by future consequences. Hence, a person is not patient if he has the ability to see long-term consequences, while being unable to take these consequences into consideration (...)
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  13. Martin Peterson (2010). Theory of Decision Under Uncertainty , Itzak Gilboa. Cambridge University Press, 2009. XIV + 215 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 26 (2):254-258.
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  14. Piers Rawling (1997). Expected Utility, Ordering, and Context Freedom. Economics and Philosophy 13 (01):79-.
  15. Jack Vromen (2010). On the Surprising Finding That Expected Utility is Literally Computed in the Brain. Journal of Economic Methodology 17 (1):17-36.
    Advocates of neuroeconomics sometimes argue that one of the most surprising findings in neuroeconomic studies is that expected utilities are literally computed in the brain. This claim is scrutinized closely in the paper. Not surprisingly, the tenability of the claim is shown to depend critically on what is meant by ?literal computation? and ?surprising?. It is argued that the findings do not show that expected utilities are literally computed, if by ?literal computation? we mean a particular kind of mental activity (...)
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