Three fallacies in the rationality debate obscure the possibility for reconciling the opposed camps. I focus on how these fallacies arise in the view that subjects interpret their task differently from the experimenters (owing to the influence of conversational expectations). The themes are: first, critical assessment must start from subjects' understanding; second, a modal fallacy; and third, fallacies of distribution.

Decision theory seems to offer a very attractive normative framework for individual and social choice under uncertainty. The decisionmaker should think of her choice situation, at any given moment, in terms of a set of possible outcomes, that is, specifications of the possible consequences of choice, described in light of the decisionmaker's goals; a set of possible actions; and a "state set" consisting of possible prior "states of the world." It is this framework for choice which provides the foundation for (...) expected utility theory, as demonstrated in the work of Leonard Savage. Problems arise, however, when the decisionmaker is boundedly rational: when the mental process of thinking about outcomes, actions, and states is itself expensive and time consuming. In the case of the unboundedly rational decisionmaker, decision theory enjoins her to employ maximally specific outcomes; to consider all possible actions; and to use a set of mutually exclusive and collective exhaustive states, each of which is sufficiently finely specified so that each action, together with each state, yields one and only one maximally specific outcome. In the case of the boundedly rational decisionmaker, this procedure is either infeasible or, if feasible, irrational. This paper presents the problem of bounded rationality. It surveys possible solutions, none of which are found to be attractive. And it concludes by discussing the difficulties that the problem of bounded rationality poses for the welfarist program for legal scholarship presented by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell in their book, Fairness versus Welfare. (shrink)

The tu quoque argument is the argument that since in the end rationalism rests on an irrational choice of and commitment to rationality, rationalism is as irrational as any other commitment. Popper's and Polanyi's philosophies of science both accept the argument, and have on that account many similarities; yet Popper manages to remain a rationalist whereas Polanyi decided for an irrationalist version of rationalism. This is more marked in works of their respective followers, W. W. Bartley III and Thomas S. (...) Kuhn. Bartley declares the rationalist's very openness to criticism open to criticism, in the hope of rendering Popper's critical rationalism quite comprehensive. Kuhn makes rationality depend on the existence of an accepted model for scientific research (paradigm), thus rendering Polanyi's view of the authority of scientific leadership a sine qua non for scientific progress. The question raised here is, in what sense is a rationalist committed to his rationality, or an irrationalist to his specific axiom ? The tradition views only the life?long commitment as real. Viewing rationality as experimental open?mindedness, we may consider a rationalist unable to retreat into any life?long commitment ? even commitment to science. In this way the logic of the tu quoque argument is made irrelevant: anyone able to face the choice between rationality and commitment is already beyond such a choice; it is one thing to be still naïve and another ? and paradoxical ? thing to return to one's naïveté. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to examine the ways in which journalism—print and electronic—shapes our cultural fabric and modes of discourse. Journalists report facts and comment on them in a provocative style. They stimulate us with captivating images and colorful language, shifting our minds from a more intellectual contemplation of reality. Finally, journalists bring death into our lives through grim pictures of wars and natural disasters. I suggest that these relatively recent trends in journalism are responsible for a gradual (...) transformation in public discourse. Emotions, rather than rational thinking, are becoming our basis for understanding current events. As a result, journalists are minimizing the distance between us, as rational creatures of culture, and nature. (shrink)

When tennis fan Jane Bronstein attended the 1995 U.S. Open she probably knew there was a remote chance her image would end up on television screens around the world. But she surely did not know she was at risk of becoming the object of worldwide attention on the David Letterman Show. As it happened, Letterman spotted an unflattering clip from the U.S. Open showing a heavyset Bronstein with peach juice dripping down her chin. Not only did he show the footage (...) six times that fall, but he ridiculed her on his “Top 10 List,” calling her a “seductive temptress,” even paying to put the clip on the Sony Jumbotron electronic billboard at Time Square. Ms. Bronstein sued David Letterman’s production company under New York civil rights law for violating her privacy. (shrink)

Gary Becker and others have done important work to broaden the content of self interest, but have not departed from seeing rationality in terms of the exclusive pursuit of self-interest. One reason why committed behavior is important is that a person can have good reason to pursue objectives other than self interest maximization (no matter how broadly it is construed). Indeed, one can also follow rules of behavior that go beyond the pursuit of one's own goals, even if the goals (...) include non-self-interested concerns. By living in a society, one develops possible reasons for considering other people's goals as well, which takes one beyond an exclusive concentration on one's own goals, not to mention the single-minded pursuit of one's own self interest. The recognition of other people's goals may be a part of rational thought. If rational behavior may depart from the relentless pursuit of one's own goals, commitment has to be important in a theory of rationality. Furthermore, seeing the role of commitment in human behavior can have explanatory importance in allowing us to understand behavior patterns that are hard to fit into the narrow format of contemporary rational choice theory. Commitment is, thus, important both for practical reason and for causal explanation. Footnotes1 Paper presented at a Workshop on Rationality and Commitment at the University of St. Gallen, May 13–15, 2004. (shrink)

Scholars from various philosophical schools of thought, including cultural relativism, hermeneutics, and postmodernism, have recently critiqued rationalism in light of new developments in the cognitive sciences. Each of these new developments set into motion new inquiries in each school philosophical school of thought. Now, in Facets of Rationality, a distinguished team of scholars examines these new inquiries and bring rationality back into the mainstream of the social sciences. The unique feature of this book lies in its multidisciplinary exploration of rational (...) concerns and in discovering the integral meaning of rationality as viewed by the perspectives of different disciplines. As such, it will of considerable interest to those involved with the study and teaching of philosophy, theoretical psychology, cognitive science, political theory, and linguistics. (shrink)

(No abstract is available for this citation).

We present an axiomatic approach for a class of finite, extensive form ganies of perfect information that makes use of notions like "rationality at a node" and "knowledge at a node." We show that, in general, a theory that is sufEcient to infer an equilibrium must be modular: for each subgame G' of a game G the theory of game G must contain just enough inforniation about the subgame G' to infer an equilibrium for G'. This means, in general, that (...) the level of knowledge relative to any subgame of G must not be the same as the level of knowledge relative to tlie original game G. We show that whenever the theory of the game is the same at each node, a deviation from equilibrium play forces a revision of the theory at later nodes. On the contrary, whenever a theory of the game is modular, a deviation from equilibrium play does not cause any revision of the theory of the game. (shrink)

O'Keefe's contention that Epicurus devised the atomic swerve to counter a threat to the efficacy of reason posed by the thesis that the future is fixed regardless of what we do, is not supported by the evidence he adduces. Epicurus' own words in On nature XXV, and testimony from Lucretius and Cicero, tell far more strongly in favour of the traditional view, that Epicurus' concerns were causal determinism and its threat to moral responsiblity for our actions and characters.

Summary Critics have said that Kuhn's account of scientific revolutions represents them as subjective and irrational processes, in which mystical conversions and community pressures rather than good reasons determine choices between theories. Kuhn rejects the charge, insisting that there is partial communication among proponents of competing paradigm candidates and their arguments are rational though not coercive. The critics reply that in fact Kuhn's position entails total non-communication and irrationality. A Kuhnian account of partial communication is thus necessary. Kuhn's attempt to (...) give one, based on the notion that the good reasons advanced in paradigm debates function asvalues, fails. But a more satisfactory account can be given if it is recognized that paradigm-debaters will, in one or both of two ways, share paradigmsother than the ones at issue. Further, Kuhn's position both should and can accommodate a notion of theory reduction; his unqualified rejection of reduction is an unnecessary weakness, even apart from questions about the rationality of revolutions. The paper concludes with a brief examination of the contrast between Kuhn's and Feyerabend's strategies for the advancement of science. (shrink)

Traditionally scientific rationality has been distinguished from mere practical rationality. It has seemed that it is sometimes rational to accept statements for the purposes of particular practical deliberations even though it would not be rational to count them as having been confirmed by science. Isaac Levi contends that this traditional view is mistaken. He thinks that there should be a single standard of acceptance for all purposes, scientific and practical. The author contends that Levi has given no good reason for (...) identifying scientific with practical rationality. And he argues that Levi's own theory is inconsistent with the thesis that a scientist should use a single standard of acceptance in all his scientific deliberations. (shrink)

Harvey Siegel's (1985) attempts to revive the traditional epistemological formulation of the rationality of science. Contending that "a general commitment to evidence" is constitutive of method and rationality in science, Siegel advances its compatibility with specific, historically attuned formulations of principles of evidential support as a virtue of his aprioristic candidate for science's rationality. In point of fact, this account is compatible with virtually any formulation of evidential support, which runs afoul of Siegel's claim that scientific beliefs must be evaluated (...) with respect to their rationality. The unwelcome consequence of Siegel's view is that most any belief, scientific or pseudoscientific, can be defended as rational. Indeed, if we want to furnish a warrant for rational choice, we must turn to the very historically informed principles of evidential support that are dismissed by Siegel as providing a misleading portrait of science's rationality. (shrink)

This paper challenges the assumption that reasons are intrinsic to rational action. A great many actions are not best understood as ones in which the agent acted for reasons--and yet they can be understood as rational, and as open to rational criticism. The relative paucity of explicit reason-giving, practical arguments in daily life presents a general philosophical problem. It reflects the existence of a class of ways in which reason can regulate action, which goes far beyond producing reasons or applying (...) principles. Much practical reasoning takes the form of what H. P. Grice called 'thought-transitions'. These are neither in the form of standard practical arguments, nor can they be so reconstructed without distorting the ways in which an agent thinks. Some actions to which one is led by a thought transition are rational, namely when what Grice called a 'propension' towards a given class of actions--a standing inclination to act in certain ways--would itself stand up to rational evaluation. The paper examines two bases for such endorsement, one local and limited, and one much more speculative, due to Grice himself. (shrink)

Inspired by the work of the influential philosopher John McDowell, Bakhurst maintains that the distinctive character of human psychological powers resides in ...

Gibbard''s theory of rationality is evolutionary in terms of its result as well as its underpinning argument. The result is that judgments about what is rational are analyzed as being similar to judgments of morality — in view of what Darwin suggests concerning the latter. According to the Darwinian theory, moral judgments are based on sentiments which evolve to promote the survival and welfare of human societies. On Gibbard''s theory, rationality judgments should be similarly regarded as expressing emotional attachments to (...) behavioral norms which originate and function to coordinate social interaction. Consequently, Gibbard''s theory of rationality might be used to illuminate Darwin''s theory of morality, and vice versa. Additionally, as argued in the present essay, both can be further elaborated, and defended, by developing related themes in philosophical ethics: viz., connected with Hume and 20th-century emotivists. The main problem is that this general Darwinian approach faces widespread opposition nowadays, not only in ethics but in philosophy of science. The purpose of this essay is to analyze Gibbard''s theory, critically and constructively, with emphasis on the pertinent commonalities in Darwin, Hume and the emotivists, while also critically addressing their common enemies. The pervasive methodological orientation is to relate this analysis to (philosophy of) science in general, and biological science in particular. (shrink)

Two theses figure centrally in work on the epistemology of disagreement: Equal Weight (‘EW’) and Uniqueness (‘U’). According to EW, you should give precisely as much weight to the attitude of a disagreeing epistemic peer as you give to your own attitude. U has it that, for any given proposition and total body of evidence, some doxastic attitude is the one the evidence makes rational (justifies) toward that proposition. Although EW has received considerable discussion, the case for U has not (...) been critically evaluated. Endorsing U, we argue, commits one to the highly controversial thesis that whatever fixes your rational attitudes can do so only by fixing what evidence you have. This commitment imposes a relatively demanding requirement on justified belief in U, one that we argue is not satisfied by what is currently the strongest available case for U, due to Roger White [2005]. Our challenge to U makes more trouble for its proponents than do the worries about U expressed by Gideon Rosen [2001] and Thomas Kelly [2010]. Moreover, if Kelly [2010] is correct in thinking that EW “carries with it a commitment to” U—a claim which we accept for reasons similar to Kelly’s but is beyond this paper’s scope (but see Ballantyne and Coffman [forthcoming])—then our challenge to U bears importantly on EW: to the extent that our challenge to U succeeds, EW also suffers. (shrink)

We formalise a notion of dynamic rationality in terms of a logic of conditional beliefs on (doxastic) plausibility models. Similarly to other epistemic statements (e.g. negations of Moore sentences and of Muddy Children announcements), dynamic rationality changes its meaning after every act of learning, and it may become true after players learn it is false. Applying this to extensive games, we “simulate” the play of a game as a succession of dynamic updates of the original plausibility model: the epistemic situation (...) when a given node is reached can be thought of as the result of a joint act of learning (via public announcements) that the node is reached. We then use the notion of “stable belief”, i.e. belief that is preserved during the play of the game, in order to give an epistemic condition for backward induction: rationality and common knowledge of stable belief in rationality. This condition is weaker than Aumann’s and compatible with the implicit assumptions (the “epistemic openness of the future”) underlying Stalnaker’s criticism of Aumann’s proof. The “dynamic” nature of our concept of rationality explains why our condition avoids the apparent circularity of the “backward induction paradox”: it is consistent to (continue to) believe in a player’s rationality after updating with his irrationality. (shrink)

The two standard theories of vagueness—vagueness-as-ignorance and vagueness-asindeterminacy—agree on the following principle: if you are certain that it is clearly vague whether p, then you clearly should not believe p and you clearly should not believe not-p. I argue against the principle, and thus against the two standard theories. I offer an explanation of the initial appeal of the principle. And I show how a rival principle helps to better explain a recalcitrant trio of widely accepted data.

Commitment to a pattern of altruism or self-control may indeed be learnable and sometimes rational. Commitment may also result from illusions. In one illusion, people think that their present behavior causes their future behavior, or causes the behavior of others, when really only correlation is present. Another happy illusion is that morality and self-interest coincide, so that altruism appears self-interested.

Abstract Robert Solomon, a philosopher noted for arguing the conciliation of reason and emotion, holds that emotions which are a lapse from rationality are unimportant. Their importance is supported here. Emotional habits of discourse, as well as of action, are discussed, unlike in most treatments of reason and emotion. The implication for cognitive and moral education is that the ability to engage in rational discussion, and the discipline to maintain application to difficult tasks, are seen as potentially curtailed by emotional (...) habits of evasion. Comments are added to contest the decisiveness of the main argument used to reconcile reason and emotion, that is, the analysis of emotions as having a cognitive element. (shrink)

PROCESS THOUGHT Edited by Nicholas Rescher • Johanna Seibt • Michel Weber Advisory Board Mark Bickhard • Jaime Nubiola • Roberto Poli Volume 14 ...

Where assistance in suicide is readily available to those dying of AIDS, as in the west coast gay communities of the United States and in the Netherlands, we must examine the different roles of physicians and friends (including lovers, spouses, family members, religious advisors, members of support groups, and intimate others) in helping a person with AIDS decide about and carry out suicide. This paper makes a central assumption: that where assistance in suicide is available, it is the moral obligation (...) of others to protect and enhance as much as possible the rationality of that choice. Four components are identified in a rational choice about suicide in AIDS – whether it is a choice for or against suicide. Phrased as questions a person with AIDS might ask him- or herself, they are: (1) "Is suicide an option I want to consider?" (2) "Shall I hold out for the chance of a cure?" (3) "How shall I time my suicide?" (4) "What weight shall I give to the welfare and interests of others?" Although physicians often make assertions relevant to (1), they are appropriately involved only in (3); and although friends or intimate partners often provide the patient with anecdotal information relevant to (3), they should be involved primarily in (1). In short, both physicians and friends often intervene in the wrong parts of choices made by a person with AIDS about suicide. Keywords: AIDS, assisted suicide, euthanasia, rationality, role of friends and physicians, timing CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Regulatory bodies tend to treat people’s emotional responses towards foods as a nuisance for rational opinion-formation and decision-making. This position is thought to be supported by such evidence as: (1) people showing negative emotional responses to the idea of eating meat products from vaccinated livestock; and (2) people showing positive emotional responses to Magnum’s “7 sins” marketing campaign. Such cases are thought to support the idea that regulatory communication about foods should abstract from people’s emotional perceptions and that corporate marketing (...) of foods should show restraint in capitalizing upon these weaknesses of the heart. This paper, on the contrary, argues that people’s emotional perceptions of foods represent valuable sources of knowledge. This argument is developed by making the dominant reception of people’s emotions intelligible by tracing its roots through the history of the Platonic paradigm. Although this paradigm has dominated the philosophical and psychological debate about emotions, the idea that emotions are sources of knowledge has recently gained force. This paper also traces the historical roots of the alternative Aristotelian paradigm. The cases of meat products from vaccinated livestock and Magnum’s 7 sins serve to illustrate this controversy. The paper concludes by showing that a neo-Platonic emphasis on the irrationality of emotions does not contribute to a fruitful discussion about implications of people’s perceptions for agricultural and food politics, whereas a neo-Aristotelian account of rational emotions could enable regulatory bodies to engage people in a fruitful process of opinion-formation and decision-making about food production and consumption. (shrink)

Gigerenzer and his co-workers make some bold and striking claims about the relation between the fast and frugal heuristics discussed in their book and the traditional norms of rationality provided by deductive logic and probability theory. We are told, for example, that fast and frugal heuristics such as “Take the Best” replace “the multiple coherence criteria stemming from the laws of logic and probability with multiple correspondence criteria relating to real-world decision performance.” This commentary explores just how we should interpret (...) this proposed replacement of logic and probability theory by fast and frugal heuristics. (shrink)

Many philosophers and game theorists have been struck by the thought that the backward induction argument (BIA) for the finite iterated pris- oner’s dilemma (FIPD) recommends a course of action which is grossly counter-intuitive and certainly contrary to the way in which people behave in real-life FIPD-situations (Luce and Raiffa 1957, Pettit and Sugden 1989, Bovens 1997).1 Yet the backwards induction argument puts itself forward as binding upon rational agents. What are we to conclude from this? Is it that people (...) in real-life FIPD-situations tend to act irrationally and that our own intuitions about what to do in such situations reveal us to be irra- tional? Alternatively, should we abandon game theory and decision theory as a guide to rationality? Or are there other ways in which the apparent disparity between the dictates of rationality and the reality of reasoning can be accommodated? (shrink)

The essays in this volume investigate the norms of reason--the standards which contribute to determining whether beliefs, inferences, and actions are rational. Nine philosophers and two psychologists discuss what kinds of things these norms are, how they can be situated within the natural world, and what role they play in the psychological explanation of belief and action. Current work in the theory of rationality is subject to very diverse influences ranging from experimental and theoretical psychology, through philosophy of logic and (...) language, to metaethics and the theory of practical reasoning; this range is well represented here. (shrink)

The goal I pursue is to redefine the study of religious epistemology on the basis of an ethnomethodological extension of Wittgenstein. This approach shows that the nature of religious belief and its relation to facts, proofs, and empirical reality are matters that are dealt with by ordinary members of society. The examination of this lay epistemology reveals that – far from being a settled and established entity – religious belief is a polymorphous phenomenon. Religious belief is a pragmatic resource whose (...) configuration is shaped to allow the accomplishment of interactional moves within specific contexts. I defend this thesis by analyzing accounts pertaining to a contemporary religious apparition claim. (shrink)

We present an axiomatic approach for a class of finite, extensive form games of perfect information that makes use of notions like rationality at a node and knowledge at a node. We distinguish between the game theorist's and the players' own theory of the game. The latter is a theory that is sufficient for each player to infer a certain sequence of moves, whereas the former is intended as a justification of such a sequence of moves. While in general the (...) game theorist's theory of the game is not and need not be axiomatized, the players' theory must be an axiomatic one, since we model players as analogous to automatic theorem provers that play the game by inferring (or computing) a sequence of moves. We provide the players with an axiomatic theory sufficient to infer a solution for the game (in our case, the backwards induction equilibrium), and prove its consistency. We then inquire what happens when the theory of the game is augmented with information that a move outside the inferred solution has occurred. We show that a theory that is sufficient for the players to infer a solution and still remains consistent in the face of deviations must be modular. By this we mean that players have distributed knowledge of it. Finally, we show that whenever the theory of the game is group-knowledge (or common knowledge) among the players (i.e., it is the same at each node), a deviation from the solution gives rise to inconsistencies and therefore forces a revision of the theory at later nodes. On the contrary, whenever a theory of the game is modular, a deviation from equilibrium play does not induce a revision of the theory. (shrink)

Rationality and Logic J. Kekes i It is a basic assumption of the Western intellectual and moral tradition that rationality is a central value. ...

In 1978 and 1979, the concept of governmentality was introduced by Foucault in his lectures at the Collège de France. Foucault finds the genealogical origin of this concept in the Christian figure of the shepherd. From this starting-point, he then embarks on a eulogy of liberalism, in stark contrast to the Marxist critique of political economy. These two grand narratives of modern liberalism differ markedly in their political and philosophical presuppositions. The latter, rooted in the tradition of natural law, is (...) directed towards revolution. The former, rooted in the tradition of English radicalism, is directed towards resistance. Beyond their different reconstructions of liberalism, however, the article concludes by showing how these two narratives, can in fact be combined in a politically fruitful way. (shrink)

The standard Bayesian recipe for selecting the rational choice is presented. A familiar example in which the recipe fails to produce any definite result is introduced. It is argued that a generalization of Gärdenfors’ and Sahlin’s theory of unreliable probabilities — which itself does not guarantee a solution to the problem — offers the best available approach. But a number of challenges to this approach are also presented and discussed.

Tolerance is at the heart of Western liberalism, permitting mutually exclusive ideas and practices to coexist peacefully with one another, without the proponents of the differing ideas and practices killing one another. Yet, nothing challenges tolerance like the practice of sunna, female circumcision, clitorectomy, or genital mutilation. In this essay, I critique the Western critics of the practices, not in order to defend these practices, but rather to show that Western liberalism itself does not offer transcultural and transtemporal principles, for (...) these principles only cohere within the tradition of liberalism. The Western critique of sunna often maps onto the bodies of African women Western symbolic notions of sexual and political freedom, as symbolized in the clitoris. The practices of sunna cohere within the web of beliefs, the tradition, of those who practice them and, thus, are rationally justified within those traditions. I offer Alasdair MacIntyre's notion of moral inquiry as a guide through the complex world of cultural and moral dialogue between differing traditions. (shrink)

Information is a force multiplier. Knowledge of the enemy's capability and intentions may be of far more value to a military force than additional troops or firepower. Situation assessment is the ongoing process of inferring relevant information about the forces of concern in a military situation. Relevant information can include force types, firepower, location, and past, present and future course of action. Situation assessment involves the incorporation of uncertain evidence from diverse sources. These include photographs, radar scans, and other forms (...) of image intelligence, or IMINT; electronics intelligence, or ELINT, derived from characteristics (e.g., wavelength) of emissions generated by enemy equipment; communications intelligence, or COMINT, derived from the characteristics of messages sent by the enemy; and reports from human informants (HUMINT). These sources must be combined to form a model of the situation. The sheer volume of data, the ubiquity of uncertainty, the number and complexity of hypotheses to consider, the high-stakes environment, the compressed time frame, and deception and damage from hostile forces, combine to present a staggeringly complex problem. Even if one could formulate a decision problem in reasonable time, explicit determination of an optimal decision policy exceeds any reasonable computational resources. While it is tempting to drop any attempt at rational analysis and rely purely on simple heuristics, we argue that this can lead to catastrophic outcomes. We present an architecture for a ``complex decision machine'' that performs rational deliberation to make decisions in real time. We argue that resource limits require such an architecture to be grounded in simple heuristic reactive processes. We thus argue that both simple heuristics and complex decision machines are required for effective decision making in real time for complex problems. We describe an implementation of our architecture applied to the problem of military situation assessment. (shrink)

Maclntyre's critique of modern moral theory is supported by a theory of narrative in turn premised on a discontinuous reading of history. Thought through to the end, historical discontinuity redefines objectivity according to the rules of the particular context in which it appears. This claim both founds Maclntyre's intervention in moral debate and troubles that intervention from within. Against his opponents, he claims to have the argument most in accord with the rules of our context; Maclntyre's narra tivity is thus (...) universalistic within the post-Enlightenment context. But contrary to his own tendency and occasional statements, that same com mitment to contextuality deprives him of the possibility of a final, secure position. This tension within Maclntyre's argument better expresses his theory of contextuality than does the specific direction he wishes to take it in: narrativity can be considered to embody an instability essential to not only moral debate but also moral identity. Key Words: Aristotle • . context • Maclntyre • narrative • rationality • relativism • Spinoza • tradition • universalism. (shrink)

We consider strategic-form games with ordinal payoffs and provide a syntactic analysis of common belief/knowledge of rationality, which we define axiomatically. Two axioms are considered. The first says that a player is irrational if she chooses a particular strategy while believing that another strategy is better. We show that common belief of this weak notion of rationality characterizes the iterated deletion of pure strategies that are strictly dominated by pure strategies. The second axiom says that a player is irrational if (...) she chooses a particular strategy while believing that a different strategy is at least as good and she considers it possible that this alternative strategy is actually better than the chosen one. We show that common knowledge of this stronger notion of rationality characterizes the restriction to pure strategies of the iterated deletion procedure introduced by Stalnaker (1994). Frame characterization results are also provided. (shrink)

In her book Rationality and coordination (Cambridge University Press, 1994) Cristina Bicchieri brings together (and adds to) her own contributions to game theory and the philosophy of economics published in various journals in the period 1987-1992. The book, however, is not a collection of separate articles but rather a homogeneous unit organized around some central themes in the foundations of non-cooperative game theory. Bicchieri’s exposition is admirably clear and well organized. Somebody with a good knowledge of game theory would probably (...) benefit mainly from reading the second part of Chapter 3 (from Section 3.6 onward) and Chapter 4. On the other hand, those who have had little exposure to game theory, would certainly benefit from reading the entire book. I shall begin with an overview of the content of the book and then offer some critical comments on what I consider to be the most important part of it. (shrink)