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  1. Robert Adamson (1959). Inhibitory Set in Problem Solving as Related to Reinforcement Learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology 58 (4):280.
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  2. Elsa Addessi, Fabio Paglieri & Valentina Focaroli (2011). The Ecological Rationality of Delay Tolerance: Insights From Capuchin Monkeys. Cognition 119 (1):142-147.
  3. J. S. Adelman & Z. Estes (2013). Emotion and Memory: A Recognition Advantage for Positive and Negative Words Independent of Arousal. Cognition 129 (3):530-535.
  4. Jonathan E. Adler (1983). Human Rationality: Essential Conflicts, Multiple Ideals. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):245.
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  5. Mariela Aguilera (2016). Cartographic Systems and Non-Linguistic Inference. Philosophical Psychology 29 (3):349-364.
    It is often assumed that the capability to make inferences requires language. Against this assumption, I claim that inferential abilities do not necessarily require a language. On the contrary, certain cartographic systems could be used to explain some forms of inferences, and they are capable of warranting rational relations between contents they represent. By arguing that certain maps, as well as sentences, are adequate for inferential processes, I do not mean to neglect that there are important differences between maps and (...)
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  6. George Ainslie (2007). Game Theory Can Build Higher Mental Processes From Lower Ones. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):16-18.
    The question of reductionism is an obstacle to unification. Many behavioral scientists who study the more complex or higher mental functions avoid regarding them as selected by motivation. Game-theoretic models in which complex processes grow from the strategic interaction of elementary reward-seeking processes can overcome the mechanical feel of earlier reward-based models. Three examples are briefly described. (Published Online April 27 2007).
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  7. Hakam Al-Shawi (1994). Sebastian Gardner, Irrationality and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 14 (6):391-393.
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  8. Colin Allen (2000). The Evolution of Rational Demons. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):742-742.
    If fast and frugal heuristics are as good as they seem to be, who needs logic and probability theory? Fast and frugal heuristics depend for their success on reliable structure in the environment. In passive environments, there is relatively little change in structure as a consequence of individual choices. But in social interactions with competing agents, the environment may be structured by agents capable of exploiting logical and probabilistic weaknesses in competitors' heuristics. Aspirations toward the ideal of a demon reasoner (...)
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  9. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Karl Schlag (2009). Imitation and Learning. In Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik & Clemens Puppe (eds.), The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice. OUP Oxford
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  10. Michael S. Alvard (2013). Partner Selection, Coordination Games, and Group Selection. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (1):80-81.
    The process of partner selection reflects ethnographic realities where cooperative rewards obtain that would otherwise be lost to loners. Baumard et al. neglect frequency-dependent processes exemplified by games of coordination. Such games can produce multiple equilibria that may or may not include fair outcomes. Additional, group-selection processes are required to produce the outcomes predicted by the models.
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  11. Yuichi Amitani (2015). The Natural Frequency Hypothesis and Evolutionary Arguments. Mind and Society 15 (1):1-19.
    In the rationality debate, Gerd Gigerenzer and his colleagues have argued that human’s apparent inability to follow probabilistic principles does not mean our irrationality, because we can do probabilistic reasoning successfully if probability information is given in frequencies, not percentages (the natural frequency hypothesis). They also offered an evolutionary argument to this hypothesis, according to which using frequencies was evolutionarily more advantageous to our hominin ancestors than using percentages, and this is why we can reason correctly about probabilities in the (...)
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  12. Yuichi Amitani (2012). Jonathan St. B. T. Evans , Thinking Twice: Two Minds in One Brain . Reviewed By. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 32 (3):174-176.
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  13. Yuichi Amitani (2008). The Frequency Hypothesis and Evolutionary Arguments. Kagaku Tetsugaku 41 (1):79-94.
    Gerd Gigerenzer's views on probabilistic reasoning in humans have come under close scrutiny. Very little attention, however, has been paid to his evolutionary component of his argument. According to Gigerenzer, reasoning about probabilities as frequencies is so common today because it was favored by natural selection in the past. This paper presents a critical examination of this argument. It will show first, that, _pace_ Gigerenzer, there are some reasons to believe that using the frequency format was not more adaptive than (...)
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  14. Avery D. Andrews (1993). Mental Models and Tableau Logic. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):334.
  15. William Angelette, Drawing the Line: Rational Cognitive Therapy, Information, and Boundary Issues.
    It has been claimed that cognitive therapists endorse sets of uplifting beliefs BECAUSE the client feels better believing them: not because they lead towards greater verisimilitude, a purported cognitivists’ hallmark of rational choice. Since standard cognitive therapists sometimes ask us to choose sets of beliefs that interpret evidence on the basis of greater individual happiness (all other things being equal), this suggests that the basis of choice goes beyond rationality. I contend that the case against the rationality of cognitive therapy (...)
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  16. D. Archard (forthcoming). Sebastian Gardner, Irrationality and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis. Radical Philosophy.
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  17. David Archard (1996). Irrationality and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis. [REVIEW] Radical Philosophy 76.
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  18. Andre Ariew, Robert C. Cummins & Mark Perlman (eds.) (2002). Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology. Oxford University Press.
  19. Eric Arnau, Saray Ayala & Thomas Sturm (2014). Cognitive Externalism Meets Bounded Rationality. Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):50-64.
    When proponents of cognitive externalism (CE) turn to empirical studies in cognitive science to put the framework to use and to assess its explanatory success, they typically refer to perception, memory, or motor coordination. In contrast, not much has been said about reasoning. One promising avenue to explore in this respect is the theory of bounded rationality (BR). To clarify the relationship between CE and BR, we criticize Andy Clark's understanding of BR, as well as his claim that BR does (...)
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  20. Kevin D. Ashley (1992). Case-Based Reasoning and its Implications for Legal Expert Systems. Artificial Intelligence and Law 1 (2-3):113-208.
    Reasoners compare problems to prior cases to draw conclusions about a problem and guide decision making. All Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) employs some methods for generalizing from cases to support indexing and relevance assessment and evidences two basic inference methods: constraining search by tracing a solution from a past case or evaluating a case by comparing it to past cases. Across domains and tasks, however, humans reason with cases in subtly different ways evidencing different mixes of and mechanisms for these components.In (...)
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  21. Anthony P. Atkinson & M. Wheeler (2003). Evolutionary Psychology's Grain Problem and the Cognitive Neuroscience of Reasoning. In David E. Over (ed.), Evolution and the Psychology of Thinking: The Debate. Psychology Press 61--99.
  22. Vincent Bergeron & Mohan Matthen (2008). Assembling the Emotions. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (sup1):185-212.
  23. Jose Luis Bermudez (2002). Rationality and Psychological Explanation Without Language. In Jose Luis Bermudez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature. Clarendon
  24. Jose Luis Bermudez & Alan Millar (eds.) (2002). Reason and Nature. Clarendon.
    Reason and Nature investigates the norms of reason--the standards which contribute to determining whether beliefs, inferences, and actions are rational. Nine philosophers and two psychologists discuss what kinds of things these norms are, how they can be situated within the natural world, and what role they play in the psychological explanation of belief and action. Current work in the theory of rationality is subject to very diverse influences ranging from experimental and theoretical psychology, through philosophy of logic and language, to (...)
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  25. Mark H. Bickhard, Interactivism: A Manifesto.
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  26. Mark H. Bickhard (1992). How Does the Environment Affect the Person? In L. T. Winegar & Jaan Valsiner (eds.), Children's Development Within Social Contexts: Metatheoretical, Theoretical and Methodological Issues. Erlbaum
    How Does the Environment Affect the Person? Mark H. Bickhard invited chapter in Children's Development within Social Contexts: Metatheoretical, Theoretical and Methodological Issues, Erlbaum. edited by L. T. Winegar, J. Valsiner, in press.
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  27. John I. Biro & Kirk A. Ludwig (1994). Are There More Than Minimal a Priori Limits on Irrationality? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):89-102.
    Our concern in this paper is with the question of how irrational an intentional agent can be, and, in particular, with an argument Stephen Stich has given for the claim that there are only very minimal a priori requirements on the rationality of intentional agents. The argument appears in chapter 2 of The Fragmentation of Reason.1 Stich is concerned there with the prospects for the ‘reform-minded epistemologist’. If there are a priori limits on how irrational we can be, there are (...)
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  28. Lisa Bortolotti (2005). Intentionality Without Rationality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):385-392.
    It is often taken for granted in standard theories of interpretation that there cannot be intentionality without rationality. According to the background argument, a system can be interpreted as having irrational beliefs only against a general background of rationality. Starting from the widespread assumption that delusions can be reasonably described as irrational beliefs, I argue here that the background argument fails to account for their intentional description.
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  29. Lisa Bortolotti (2003). Inconsistency and Interpretation. Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):109-123.
    Abstract In this paper I discuss one apparent counterexample to the rationality constraint on belief ascription. The fact that there are inconsistent believers does not seem compatible with the idea that only rational creatures can be ascribed beliefs. I consider Davidson's explanation of the possibility of inconsistent believers and claim that it involves a reformulation of the rationality constraint in terms of the believers' subscription to norms of rationality. I shall argue that Davidson's strategy is partially successful, but that the (...)
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  30. Lisa Bortolotti & Magdalena Antrobus (2015). Costs and Benefits of Realism and Optimism. Current Opinion in Psychiatry 28 (2):194-198.
    Purpose of review: What is the relationship between rationality and mental health? By considering the psychological literature on depressive realism and unrealistic optimism it was hypothesized that, in the context of judgments about the self, accurate cognitions are psychologically maladaptive and inaccurate cognitions are psychologically adaptive. Recent studies recommend being cautious in drawing any general conclusion about style of thinking and mental health. Recent findings: Recent investigations suggest that people with depressive symptoms are more accurate than controls in tasks involving (...)
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  31. Lisa Bortolotti & Ema Sullivan-Bissett (2015). Costs and Benefits of Imperfect Cognitions. Consciousness and Cognition 33:487-489.
    Introduction to a special issue of Consciousness and Cognition on the costs and benefits of imperfect cognitions.
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  32. Miro Brada (2003). We Are Again at the Very Beginning. Nove Slovo.
    About selected philosophical questions of the past and today, with Egon Bondy (1930-2007). In a reaction to his response, I'll add a redefinition of the existential view of decision that is incomplete, and an explanation why 'social science' can be mathematized. The article also include my other ideas which have been developed since 1995. The interview was published in Blisty and Nove Slovo (2003), and some experts were published in The Ice House, Holland Park, London (2013), and Parallax Art Fair (...)
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  33. Berit Brogaard (ed.) (2001). Rationality and Irrationality: Proceeedings of the 23rd International Wittgenstein Symposium, 13-19 August 2000, Kirchberg Am Wechsel. [REVIEW] Öbv&Hpt.
  34. Gérald Bronner (2004). Contribution à une théorie de l'abandon des croyances : la fin du Père Noël. Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie 116 (1):117.
    Cet article propose, à la lumière d’un exemple particulier – l’abandon de la croyance en l’existence du Père Noël –, de tester différents scénarios théoriques de la rupture cognitive. L’exemple choisi, en raison de ses spécificités, ne peut prétendre invalider un modèle ou en confirmer définitivement un autre, mais il souhaite être une contribution au débat sur la base d’un matériau empirique rarement réuni en cette matière. Les 142 entretiens mobilisés permettent d’appréhender dans le détail divers aspects de l’abandon de (...)
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  35. P. J. Brooks & M. D. Braine (1996). What Do Children Know About the Universal Quantifiers All and Each? Cognition 60 (3):235-268.
    Children's comprehension of the universal quantifiers all and each was explored in a series of experiments using a picture selection task. The first experiment examined children's ability to restrict a quantifier to the noun phrase it modifies. The second and third experiments examined children's ability to associate collective, distributive, and exhaustive representations with sentences containing universal quantifiers. The collective representation corresponds to the "group" meaning (for All the flowers are in a vase all of the flowers are in the same (...)
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  36. Wesley Buckwalter & Stephen Stich (2011). Competence, Reflective Equilibrium, and Dual-System Theories. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (05):251–252.
    A critique of inferences from 'is' to 'ought' plays a central role in Elqayam and Evans' defense of descriptivism. However, the reflective equilibrium strategy described by Goodman and embraced by Rawls, Cohen and many others poses an important challenge to that critique. Dual system theories may help respond to that challenge.
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  37. Nick Byrd (2014). Intuitive And Reflective Responses In Philosophy. Dissertation, University of Colorado
    Cognitive scientists have revealed systematic errors in human reasoning. There is disagreement about what these errors indicate about human rationality, but one upshot seems clear: human reasoning does not seem to fit traditional views of human rationality. This concern about rationality has made its way through various fields and has recently caught the attention of philosophers. The concern is that if philosophers are prone to systematic errors in reasoning, then the integrity of philosophy would be threatened. In this paper, I (...)
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  38. Bruce E. Cain & W. T. Jones (1979). Modes of Rationality and Irrationality. Philosophical Studies 36 (November):333-343.
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  39. H. G. Callaway (1992). Does Language Determine Our Scientific Ideas? Dialectica 46 (3/4):225-242.
    This paper argues that the influence of language on science, philosophy and other field is mediated by communicative practices. Where communications is more restrictive, established linguistic structures exercise a tighter control over innovations and scientifically motivated reforms of language. The viewpoint here centers on the thesis that argumentation is crucial in the understanding and evaluation of proposed reforms and that social practices which limit argumentation serve to erode scientific objectivity. Thus, a plea is made for a sociology of scientific belief (...)
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  40. Peter Carruthers (2002). The Roots of Scientific Reasoning: Infancy, Modularity, and the Art of Tracking. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen P. Stich & Michael Siegal (eds.), [Book Chapter]. Cambridge University Press 73--95.
    This chapter examines the extent to which there are continuities between the cognitive processes and epistemic practices engaged in by human hunter-gatherers, on the one hand, and those which are distinctive of science, on the other. It deploys anthropological evidence against any form of 'no-continuity' view, drawing especially on the cognitive skills involved in the art of tracking. It also argues against the 'child-as-scientist' accounts put forward by some developmental psychologists, which imply that scientific thinking is present in early infancy (...)
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  41. Peter Carruthers & Jill Boucher (eds.) (1998). [Book Chapter]. Cambridge.
  42. Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen P. Stich (eds.) (2005). The Innate Mind. Oxford University Press.
    This is the first volume of a projected three-volume set on the subject of innateness. The extent to which the mind is innate is one of the central questions in the human sciences, with important implications for many surrounding debates. By bringing together the top nativist scholars in philosophy, psychology, and allied disciplines these volumes provide a comprehensive assessment of nativist thought and a definitive reference point for future nativist inquiry. The Innate Mind: Structure and Content, concerns the fundamental architecture (...)
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  43. Marcia Cavell & Sebastian Gardner (1996). Irrationality and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis. Philosophical Review 105 (3):405.
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  44. Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa (2012). A Verisimilitudinarian Analysis of the Linda Paradox. VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosphy of Science.
    The Linda paradox is a key topic in current debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. We present a novel analysis of this paradox, based on the notion of verisimilitude as studied in the philosophy of science. The comparison with an alternative analysis based on probabilistic confirmation suggests how to overcome some problems of our account by introducing an adequately defined notion of verisimilitudinarian confirmation.
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  45. Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa (2010). The Whole Truth About Linda: Probability, Verisimilitude and a Paradox of Conjunction. In Marcello D'Agostino, Federico Laudisa, Giulio Giorello, Telmo Pievani & Corrado Sinigaglia (eds.), New Essays in Logic and Philosophy of Science. College Publications 603--615.
    We provide a 'verisimilitudinarian' analysis of the well-known Linda paradox or conjunction fallacy, i.e., the fact that most people judge the probability of the conjunctive statement "Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement" (B & F) as more probable than the isolated statement "Linda is a bank teller" (B), contrary to an uncontroversial principle of probability theory. The basic idea is that experimental participants may judge B & F a better hypothesis about Linda as compared (...)
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  46. Gustavo Cevolani & Gerhard Schurz (forthcoming). Probability, Approximate Truth, and Truthlikeness: More Ways Out of the Preface Paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
    The so-called Preface Paradox seems to show that one can rationally believe two logically incompatible propositions. We address this puzzle, relying on the notions of truthlikeness and approximate truth as studied within the post-Popperian research programme on verisimilitude. In particular, we show that adequately combining probability, approximate truth, and truthlikeness leads to an explanation of how rational belief is possible in the face of the Preface Paradox. We argue that our account is superior to other solutions of the paradox, including (...)
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  47. Marc Champagne (2015). Don’T Be an Ass: Rational Choice and its Limits. Reason Papers 37 (1):137-147.
    Deliberation is often seen as the site of human freedom, but the binding power of rationality seems to imply that deliberation is, in its own way, a deterministic process. If one knows the starting preferences and circumstances of an agent, then, assuming that the agent is rational and that those preferences and circumstances don’t change, one should be in a position to predict what the agent will decide. However, given that an agent could conceivably confront equally attractive alternatives, it is (...)
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  48. Nick Chater (2009). Rational Models of Conditioning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):204-205.
    Mitchell et al. argue that conditioning phenomena may be better explained by high-level, rational processes, rather than by non-cognitive associative mechanisms. This commentary argues that this viewpoint is compatible with neuroscientific data, may extend to nonhuman animals, and casts computational models of reinforcement learning in a new light.
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  49. Nick Chater & Mike Oaksford (2002). The Rational Analysis of Human Cognition. In Jose Luis Bermudez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature. Clarendon 135--174.
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  50. Nick Chater & Mike Oaksford (2000). The Rational Analysis of Mind and Behavior. Synthese 122 (1-2):93-131.
    Rational analysis (Anderson 1990, 1991a) is an empiricalprogram of attempting to explain why the cognitive system isadaptive, with respect to its goals and the structure of itsenvironment. We argue that rational analysis has two importantimplications for philosophical debate concerning rationality. First,rational analysis provides a model for the relationship betweenformal principles of rationality (such as probability or decisiontheory) and everyday rationality, in the sense of successfulthought and action in daily life. Second, applying the program ofrational analysis to research on human reasoning (...)
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