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  1. Andre Ariew, Robert C. Cummins & Mark Perlman (eds.) (2002). Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology. Oxford University Press.
    But what are functions? Here, 15 leading scholars of philosophy of psychology and philosophy of biology present new essays on functions.
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  2. Eric Arnau, Saray Ayala & Thomas Sturm (2014). Cognitive Externalism Meets Bounded Rationality. Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):50-64.
    When proponents of cognitive externalism (CE) turn to empirical studies in cognitive science to put the framework to use and to assess its explanatory success, they typically refer to perception, memory, or motor coordination. In contrast, not much has been said about reasoning. One promising avenue to explore in this respect is the theory of bounded rationality (BR). To clarify the relationship between CE and BR, we criticize Andy Clark's understanding of BR, as well as his claim that BR does (...)
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  3. Kevin D. Ashley (1992). Case-Based Reasoning and its Implications for Legal Expert Systems. Artificial Intelligence and Law 1 (2-3):113-208.
    Reasoners compare problems to prior cases to draw conclusions about a problem and guide decision making. All Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) employs some methods for generalizing from cases to support indexing and relevance assessment and evidences two basic inference methods: constraining search by tracing a solution from a past case or evaluating a case by comparing it to past cases. Across domains and tasks, however, humans reason with cases in subtly different ways evidencing different mixes of and mechanisms for these components.In (...)
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  4. Anthony P. Atkinson & M. Wheeler (2003). Evolutionary Psychology's Grain Problem and the Cognitive Neuroscience of Reasoning. In David E. Over (ed.), Evolution and the Psychology of Thinking: The Debate. Psychology Press. 61--99.
  5. Jose Luis Bermudez (2002). Rationality and Psychological Explanation Without Language. In Jose Luis Bermudez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature. Clarendon.
  6. Jose Luis Bermudez & Alan Millar (eds.) (2002). Reason and Nature. Clarendon.
    Reason and Nature investigates the norms of reason--the standards which contribute to determining whether beliefs, inferences, and actions are rational. Nine philosophers and two psychologists discuss what kinds of things these norms are, how they can be situated within the natural world, and what role they play in the psychological explanation of belief and action. Current work in the theory of rationality is subject to very diverse influences ranging from experimental and theoretical psychology, through philosophy of logic and language, to (...)
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  7. Mark H. Bickhard, Interactivism: A Manifesto.
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  8. Mark H. Bickhard (1992). How Does the Environment Affect the Person? In L. T. Winegar & Jaan Valsiner (eds.), Children's Development Within Social Contexts: Metatheoretical, Theoretical and Methodological Issues. Erlbaum.
    How Does the Environment Affect the Person? Mark H. Bickhard invited chapter in Children's Development within Social Contexts: Metatheoretical, Theoretical and Methodological Issues, Erlbaum. edited by L. T. Winegar, J. Valsiner, in press.
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  9. John I. Biro & Kirk A. Ludwig (1994). Are There More Than Minimal a Priori Limits on Irrationality? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):89-102.
    Our concern in this paper is with the question of how irrational an intentional agent can be, and, in particular, with an argument Stephen Stich has given for the claim that there are only very minimal a priori requirements on the rationality of intentional agents. The argument appears in chapter 2 of The Fragmentation of Reason.1 Stich is concerned there with the prospects for the ‘reform-minded epistemologist’. If there are a priori limits on how irrational we can be, there are (...)
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  10. Lisa Bortolotti (2005). Intentionality Without Rationality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):385-392.
    It is often taken for granted in standard theories of interpretation that there cannot be intentionality without rationality. According to the background argument, a system can be interpreted as having irrational beliefs only against a general background of rationality. Starting from the widespread assumption that delusions can be reasonably described as irrational beliefs, I argue here that the background argument fails to account for their intentional description.
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  11. Wesley Buckwalter & Stephen Stich (2011). Competence, Reflective Equilibrium, and Dual-System Theories. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (05):251–252.
    A critique of inferences from 'is' to 'ought' plays a central role in Elqayam and Evans' defense of descriptivism. However, the reflective equilibrium strategy described by Goodman and embraced by Rawls, Cohen and many others poses an important challenge to that critique. Dual system theories may help respond to that challenge.
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  12. Bruce E. Cain & W. T. Jones (1979). Modes of Rationality and Irrationality. Philosophical Studies 36 (November):333-343.
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  13. H. G. Callaway (1992). Does Language Determine Our Scientific Ideas? Dialectica 46 (3/4):225-242.
    This paper argues that the influence of language on science, philosophy and other field is mediated by communicative practices. Where communications is more restrictive, established linguistic structures exercise a tighter control over innovations and scientifically motivated reforms of language. The viewpoint here centers on the thesis that argumentation is crucial in the understanding and evaluation of proposed reforms and that social practices which limit argumentation serve to erode scientific objectivity. Thus, a plea is made for a sociology of scientific belief (...)
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  14. Peter Carruthers (2002). The Roots of Scientific Reasoning: Infancy, Modularity, and the Art of Tracking. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen P. Stich & Michael Siegal (eds.), [Book Chapter]. Cambridge University Press. 73--95.
    This chapter examines the extent to which there are continuities between the cognitive processes and epistemic practices engaged in by human hunter-gatherers, on the one hand, and those which are distinctive of science, on the other. It deploys anthropological evidence against any form of 'no-continuity' view, drawing especially on the cognitive skills involved in the art of tracking. It also argues against the 'child-as-scientist' accounts put forward by some developmental psychologists, which imply that scientific thinking is present in early infancy (...)
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  15. Peter Carruthers & Jill Boucher (eds.) (1998). [Book Chapter]. Cambridge.
  16. Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen P. Stich (eds.) (2005). The Innate Mind. Oxford University Press.
    This is the first volume of a projected three-volume set on the subject of innateness. The extent to which the mind is innate is one of the central questions in the human sciences, with important implications for many surrounding debates. By bringing together the top nativist scholars in philosophy, psychology, and allied disciplines these volumes provide a comprehensive assessment of nativist thought and a definitive reference point for future nativist inquiry. The Innate Mind: Structure and Content, concerns the fundamental architecture (...)
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  17. Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa, A Verisimilitudinarian Analysis of the Linda Paradox. VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosphy of Science.
    The Linda paradox is a key topic in current debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. We present a novel analysis of this paradox, based on the notion of verisimilitude as studied in the philosophy of science. The comparison with an alternative analysis based on probabilistic confirmation suggests how to overcome some problems of our account by introducing an adequately defined notion of verisimilitudinarian confirmation.
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  18. Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa (2010). The Whole Truth About Linda: Probability, Verisimilitude and a Paradox of Conjunction. In Marcello D'Agostino, Federico Laudisa, Giulio Giorello, Telmo Pievani & Corrado Sinigaglia (eds.), New Essays in Logic and Philosophy of Science. College Publications. 603--615.
    We provide a 'verisimilitudinarian' analysis of the well-known Linda paradox or conjunction fallacy, i.e., the fact that most people judge the probability of the conjunctive statement "Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement" (B & F) as more probable than the isolated statement "Linda is a bank teller" (B), contrary to an uncontroversial principle of probability theory. The basic idea is that experimental participants may judge B & F a better hypothesis about Linda as compared (...)
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  19. Nick Chater & Mike Oaksford (2002). The Rational Analysis of Human Cognition. In Jose Luis Bermudez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature. Clarendon. 135--174.
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  20. Nick Chater & Mike Oaksford (2000). The Rational Analysis of Mind and Behavior. Synthese 122 (1-2):93-131.
    Rational analysis (Anderson 1990, 1991a) is an empiricalprogram of attempting to explain why the cognitive system isadaptive, with respect to its goals and the structure of itsenvironment. We argue that rational analysis has two importantimplications for philosophical debate concerning rationality. First,rational analysis provides a model for the relationship betweenformal principles of rationality (such as probability or decisiontheory) and everyday rationality, in the sense of successfulthought and action in daily life. Second, applying the program ofrational analysis to research on human reasoning (...)
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  21. Christopher Cherniak (1986). Minimal Rationality. MIT Press.
    In Minimal Rationality, Christopher Cherniak boldly challenges the myth of Man the the Rational Animal and the central role that the "perfectly rational...
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  22. Christopher Cherniak (1983). Rationality and the Structure of Memory. Synthese 57 (November):163-86.
    A tacit and highly idealized model of the agent's memory is presupposed in philosophy. The main features of a more psychologically realistic duplex (orn-plex) model are sketched here. It is argued that an adequate understanding of the rationality of an agent's actions is not possible without a satisfactory theory of the agent's memory and of the trade-offs involved in management of the memory, particularly involving compartmentalization of the belief set. The discussion identifies some basic constraints on the organization of knowledge (...)
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  23. Andy Clark (2006). Author's Reply to Symposium on Natural-Born Cyborgs. Metascience.
    Thought happens. Here I sit, sipping coffee, scribbling on paper, accessing files, reading and re-reading those four wonderful, challenging, yet immaculately constructive reviews. And somewhere, and to my eternal surprise, thought happens. But where, amidst the whirl of organization, should we locate the cognitive process? One possibility is that everything worth counting as (all or part) of any genuinely cognitive process hereabouts is firmly located inside the head, safe behind the ancient fortress of skin and skull. All the rest, according (...)
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  24. Andy Clark (2003). Forces, Fields, and the Role of Knowledge in Action. Adaptive Behavior 11 (4):270-272.
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  25. Andy Clark & Pete Mandik (2002). Selective Representing and World-Making. Minds And Machines 12 (3):383-395.
    In this paper, we discuss the thesis of selective representing — the idea that the contents of the mental representations had by organisms are highly constrained by the biological niches within which the organisms evolved. While such a thesis has been defended by several authors elsewhere, our primary concern here is to take up the issue of the compatibility of selective representing and realism. In this paper we hope to show three things. First, that the notion of selective representing (...)
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  26. L. Jonathan Cohen (1986). The Dialogue of Reason. Cambridge University Press.
    Johnathan Cohen's book provides a lucid and penetrating treatment of the fundamental issues of contemporary analytical philosophy. This field now spans a greater variety of topics and divergence of opinion than fifty years ago, and Cohen's book addresses the presuppositions implicit to it and the patterns of reasoning on which it relies.
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  27. L. Jonathan Cohen (1981). Can Human Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):317-370.
    The object of this paper is to show why recent research in the psychology of deductive and probabilistic reasoning does not have.
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  28. L. Jonathan Cohen (1980). Whose is the Fallacy? A Rejoinder to Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. Cognition 8 (March):89-92.
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  29. L. Jonathan Cohen (1979). On the Psychology of Prediction: Whose is the Fallacy? Cognition 7 (December):385-407.
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  30. Arthur W. Collins & Daniel C. Bennett (1966). Jonathan Bennett on Rationality: Two Reviews. Journal of Philosophy 63 (May):253-266.
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  31. Harry Collins (2013). The Core of Expertise. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (2):399-416.
    I reply to my critics in respect of my work on expertise. I define the 'core' of the multidisciplinary 'expertise studies'. I argue that those who have taken the work seriously could resolve their problems by paying more attention to the core. Each could have made good use of an aspect of the core.
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  32. K. S. Cook & M. Levi (1990). The Limits of Rationality. University of Chicago Press.
    Intended to introduce novices to rational choice theory, this accessible, interdisciplinary book collects writings by leading researchers.
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  33. Richard P. Cooper (2010). Cognitive Control: Componential or Emergent? Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (4):598-613.
    The past 25 years have witnessed an increasing awareness of the importance of cognitive control in the regulation of complex behavior. It now sits alongside attention, memory, language, and thinking as a distinct domain within cognitive psychology. At the same time it permeates each of these sibling domains. This introduction reviews recent work on cognitive control in an attempt to provide a context for the fundamental question addressed within this topic: Is cognitive control to be understood as resulting from the (...)
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  34. Brian R. Cornwell, Aron K. Barbey & W. Kyle Simmons (2004). The Embodied Bases of Supernatural Concepts. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (6):735-736.
    According to embodied cognition theory, our physical embodiment influences how we conceptualize entities, whether natural or supernatural. In serving central explanatory roles, supernatural entities (e.g., God) are represented implicitly as having unordinary properties that nevertheless do not violate our sensorimotor interactions with the physical world. We conjecture that other supernatural entities are similarly represented in explanatory contexts.
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  35. Marcello D'Agostino, Federico Laudisa, Giulio Giorello, Telmo Pievani & Corrado Sinigaglia (eds.) (2010). New Essays in Logic and Philosophy of Science. College Publications.
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  36. Donald Davidson (1995). Could There Be a Science of Rationality? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 3 (1):1-16.
  37. Donald Davidson (1985). Incoherence and Irrationality. Dialectica 39 (4):345-54.
    * [Irrationality]: ___ Irrationality, like rationality, is a normative concept. Someone who acts or reasons irrationally, or whose beliefs or emotions are irrational, has departed from a standard.
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  38. Ronald B. de Sousa (2004). Rational Animals: What the Bravest Lion Won't Risk. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (12):365-386.
    I begin with a rather unpromising dispute that Nozick once had with Ian Hacking in the pages of the London Review of Books, in which both vied with one another in their enthusiasm to repudiate the thesis that some human people or peoples are closer than others to animality. I shall attempt to show that one can build, on the basis of Nozick’s discussion of rationality, a defense of the view that the capacity tor language places human rationality out of (...)
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  39. Eric Dietrich (2008). Some Strangeness in the Proportion, or How to Stop Worrying and Learn to Love the Mechanistic Forces of Darkness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (3):349-352.
    Understanding humans requires viewing them as mechanisms of some sort, since understanding anything requires seeing it as a mechanism. It is science’s job to reveal mechanisms. But science reveals much more than that: it also reveals enduring mystery—strangeness in the proportion. Concentrating just on the scientific side of Selinger’s and Engström’s call for a moratorium on cyborg discourse, I argue that this strangeness prevents cyborg discourse from diminishing us.
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  40. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, Reason-Based Rationalization.
    We introduce a “reason-based” way of rationalizing an agent’s choice behaviour, which explains choices by specifying which properties of the options or choice context the agent cares about (the “motivationally salient properties”) and how he or she cares about these properties (the “fundamental preference relation”). Reason-based rationalizations can explain non-classical choice behaviour, including boundedly rational and sophisticated rational behaviour, and predict choices in unobserved contexts, an issue neglected in standard choice theory. We characterize the behavioural implications of different reason-based models (...)
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  41. Fred Dretske (2006). Minimal Rationality. In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.
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  42. Mitch Earleywine (ed.) (2005). Mind-Altering Drugs. Oxford University Press.
    Provides theories and techniques behind the investigations of intoxication and how subjective experiences relate to addictive potential, which should help ...
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  43. Andreas Elpidorou (2012). Where is My Mind? Mark Rowlands on the Vehicles of Cognition. Avant 3 (1):145-160.
    Do our minds extend beyond our brains? In a series of publications, Mark Rowlands has argued that the correct answer to this question is an affirmative one. According to Rowlands, certain types of operations on bodily and worldly structures should be considered to be proper and literal parts of our cognitive and mental processes. In this article, I present and critically evaluate Rowlands' position.
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  44. Richard H. Feldman (1988). Rationality, Reliability, and Natural Selection. Philosophy of Science 55 (June):218-27.
    A tempting argument for human rationality goes like this: it is more conducive to survival to have true beliefs than false beliefs, so it is more conducive to survival to use reliable belief-forming strategies than unreliable ones. But reliable strategies are rational strategies, so there is a selective advantage to using rational strategies. Since we have evolved, we must use rational strategies. In this paper I argue that some criticisms of this argument offered by Stephen Stich fail because they rely (...)
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  45. James H. Fetzer (1990). Evolution, Rationality and Testability. Synthese 82 (3):423-39.
    Cosmides, Wason, and Johnson-Laird, among others, have suggested evidence that reasoning abilities tend to be domain specific, insofar as humans do not appear to acquire capacities for logical reasoning that are applicable across different contexts. Unfortunately, the significance of these findings depends upon the specific variety of logical reasoning under consideration. Indeed, there seem to be at least three grounds for doubting such conclusions, since: (1) tests of reasoning involving the use of material conditionals may not be appropriate for representing (...)
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  46. Timothy Fuller & Richard Samuels (2011). Overselling the Case Against Normativism. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 34 (5):255.
    Though we are in broad agreement with much of Elqayam & Evans' (E&E's) position, we criticize two aspects of their argument. First, rejecting normativism is unlikely to yield the benefits that E&E seek. Second, their conception of rational norms is overly restrictive and, as a consequence, their arguments at most challenge a relatively restrictive version of normativism.
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  47. Sebastian Gardner (1996). Irrationality and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis. Cambridge University Press.
    In a reconstruction of the theories of Freud and Klein, Sebastian Gardner asks: what causes irrationality, what must the mind be like for it to be irrational,...
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  48. Mikkel Gerken (2012). On the Cognitive Bases of Knowledge Ascriptions. In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press.
    I develop an epistemic focal bias account of certain patterns of judgments about knowledge ascriptions by integrating it with a general dual process framework of human cognition. According to the focal bias account, judgments about knowledge ascriptions are generally reliable but systematically fallible because the cognitive processes that generate them are affected by what is in focus. I begin by considering some puzzling patters of judgments about knowledge ascriptions and sketch how a basic focal bias account seeks to account for (...)
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  49. Allan F. Gibbard (2002). Normative Explanations: Invoking Rationality to Explain Happenings. In Jose Luis Bermudez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature. Clarendon.
  50. Gerd Gigerenzer (1991). Probability and Rationality. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
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