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  1. Carla Bagnoli (2007). The Authority of Reflection. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 22 (1):43-52.
    This paper examines Moran’s argument for the special authority of the first-person, which revolves around the Self/Other asymmetry and grounds dichotomies such as the practical vs. theoretical, activity vs. passivity, and justificatory vs. explanatory reasons. These dichotomies qualify the self-reflective person as an agent, interested in justifying her actions from a deliberative stance. The Other is pictured as a spectator interested in explaining action from a theoretical stance. The self-reflective knower has authority over her own mental states, while the Spectator (...)
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  2. Thomas Baldwin (2010). Comments on A. K. Bilgrami's Self-Knowledge and Resentment. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):773-782.
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  3. Mary Rose Barral (1964). Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity. International Philosophical Quarterly 4 (1):160-162.
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  4. Hilan Bensusan & Manuel De Pinedo García (2007). When My Own Beliefs Are Not First-Personal Enough. Theoria 22 (58):35-41.
    Richard Moran has argued, convincingly, in favour of the idea that there must be more than one path to access our own mental contents. The existence of those routes, one first-personal—through avowal—the other third-personal—no different to the one used to ascribe mental states to other people and to interpret their actions—is intimately connected to our capacity to respond to norms. Moran’s account allows for conflicts between first personal and third personal authorities over my own beliefs; this enable some instances of (...)
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  5. Sven Bernecker (1996). Externalism and the Attitudinal Component of Self-Knowledge. Noûs 30 (2):262-275.
    Tyler Burge and other externalists about mental content have tried to accommodate privileged self-knowledge and to neutralize skepticism about one's ability to authoritatively know one's present thoughts. I show that, though Burgean compatibilism explains knowing it is p I believe, it doesn't explain how I can have privileged knowledge that the state I occupy is a state of believing rather than, say, a state of doubting. Moreover, given externalism, self-knowledge of attitudinal component is vulnerable to a certain kind of error (...)
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  6. Akeel Bilgrami (2010). Précis of Self-Knowledge and Resentment. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):749-765.
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  7. Akeel Bilgrami (2000). Self-Knowledge and Resentment. Knowing Our Own Minds (October):207-243.
    Once this integrated position is fully in place, the book closes with a postscript on how one might fruitfully view the kind of self-knowledge that is pursued ...
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  8. Jessica Brown (2001). Book Review. Knowing Our Own Minds Crispin Wright, Barry Smith, Cynthia MacDonald. [REVIEW] Mind 110 (438):586-588.
  9. A. Brueckner (1998). Shoemaker on Second-Order Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):361-64.
    In a number of papers, Sydney Shoemaker has argued that first-order belief plus rationality implies second-order belief. This paper is a critical discussion of Shoemaker's argument.
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  10. Tyler Burge (1996). Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1):91-116.
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  11. Sarah Buss (2003). Richard Moran, Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self‐Knowledge:Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self‐Knowledge. Ethics 113 (4):898-902.
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  12. Alex Byrne (2005). Introspection. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):79-104.
    I know various contingent truths about my environment by perception. For example, by looking, I know that there is a computer before me; by hearing, I know that someone is talking in the corridor; by tasting, I know that the coffee has no sugar. I know these things because I have some built-in mechanisms specialized for detecting the state of my environment. One of these mechanisms, for instance, is presently transducing electromagnetic radiation (in a narrow band of wavelengths) coming from (...)
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  13. Taylor Carman (2003). First Persons: On Richard Moran's Authority and Estrangement. Inquiry 46 (3):395 – 408.
    Richard Moran's Authority and Estrangement offers a subtle and innovative account of self-knowledge that lifts the problem out of the narrow confines of epistemology and into the broader context of practical reasoning and moral psychology. Moran argues convincingly that fundamental self/other asymmetries are essential to our concept of persons. Moreover, the first- and the third-person points of view are systematically interconnected, so that the expression or avowal of one's attitudes constitutes a substantive form of self-knowledge. But while Moran's argument is (...)
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  14. W. Child (2009). Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge, by Richard Moran. Mind 118 (471):850-855.
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  15. Annalisa Coliva, Self-Knowledge (but Not: "Know Thyself").
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  16. Annalisa Coliva (2008). Peacocke's Self-Knowledge. Ratio 21 (1):13–27.
    knowledge. His proposal relies on the claim that first-order mental..
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  17. Josep E. Corbi, Komarine Romdenh-Romluc, Josep L. Prades, Hilan Bensusan, Manuel de Pinedo, Carla Bagnoli & Richard Moran (2007). On Richard Moran's Authority and Estrangement. Author's Reply. Theoria 22 (58).
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  18. Nilanjan Das & Bernhard Salow (2016). Transparency and the KK Principle. Noûs 50 (2).
    An important question in epistemology is whether the KK principle is true, i.e., whether an agent who knows that p is also thereby in a position to know that she knows that p. We explain how a “transparency” account of self-knowledge, which maintains that we learn about our attitudes towards a proposition by reflecting not on ourselves but rather on that very proposition, supports an affirmative answer. In particular, we show that such an account allows us to reconcile a version (...)
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  19. Sinan Dogramaci (forthcoming). Knowing Our Degrees of Belief. Episteme:1-19.
    The main question of this paper is: how do we manage to know what our own degrees of belief are? Section 1 briefly reviews and criticizes the traditional functionalist view, a view notably associated with David Lewis and sometimes called the theory-theory. I use this criticism to motivate the approach I want to promote. Section 2, the bulk of the paper, examines and begins to develop the view that we have a special kind of introspective access to our degrees of (...)
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  20. Mathieu Doucet (2012). Can We Be Self-Deceived About What We Believe? Self-Knowledge, Self-Deception, and Rational Agency. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (S1):E1-E25.
    Abstract: This paper considers the question of whether it is possible to be mistaken about the content of our first-order intentional states. For proponents of the rational agency model of self-knowledge, such failures might seem very difficult to explain. On this model, the authority of self-knowledge is not based on inference from evidence, but rather originates in our capacity, as rational agents, to shape our beliefs and other intentional states. To believe that one believes that p, on this view, constitutes (...)
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  21. Jim Edwards (1992). Best Opinion and Intentional States. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (166):21-33.
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  22. Jordi Fernández (2005). Self-Knowledge, Rationality and Moore's Paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):533-556.
    I offer a model of self-knowledge that provides a solution to Moore’s paradox. First, I distinguish two versions of the paradox and I discuss two approaches to it, neither of which solves both versions of the paradox. Next, I propose a model of self-knowledge according to which, when I have a certain belief, I form the higher-order belief that I have it on the basis of the very evidence that grounds my first-order belief. Then, I argue that the model in (...)
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  23. Antony Flew (1964). Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity. By Shoemaker Sydney. (Cornell University Press. London: Oxford University Press, 1963. Pp. Xi + 264. U.K. Price 38s.). [REVIEW] Philosophy 39 (149):275-.
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  24. Martin F. Fricke (2013). First Person Authority and Knowledge of One's Own Actions. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 45 (134):3-16.
    What is the relation between first person authority and knowledge of one’s own actions? On one view, it is because we know the reasons for which we act that we know what we do and, analogously, it is because we know the reasons for which we avow a belief that we know what we believe. Carlos Moya (2006) attributes some such theory to Richard Moran (2001) and criticises it on the grounds of circularity. In this paper, I examine the view (...)
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  25. Martin F. Fricke (2012). Rules of Language and First Person Authority. Polish Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):15-32.
    This paper examines theories of first person authority proposed by Dorit Bar-On (2004), Crispin Wright (1989a) and Sydney Shoemaker (1988). What all three accounts have in common is that they attempt to explain first person authority by reference to the way our language works. Bar-On claims that in our language self-ascriptions of mental states are regarded as expressive of those states; Wright says that in our language such self-ascriptions are treated as true by default; and Shoemaker suggests that they might (...)
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  26. Martin F. Fricke (2012). Racionalidad y autoconocimiento en Shoemaker. In Pedro Stepanenko (ed.), La primera persona y sus percepciones. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México 53-73.
    En su artículo “On Knowing One’s Own Mind” (1988), Shoemaker argumenta en favor de tres afirmaciones: (1) se requiere un autoconocimiento directo (self-acquaintance) para la cooperación racional con otras personas (porque ésta depende de que podamos decirles qué es lo que creemos e intentamos hacer); (2) el autoconocimiento directo es necesario para la deliberación sobre qué creer y qué hacer (porque no podemos ajustar racionalmente creencias y deseos sin saber qué creencias y deseos tenemos); y (3) el autoconocimiento directo es (...)
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  27. Martin Francisco Fricke (2009). Evans and First Person Authority. Abstracta 5 (1):3-15.
    In The Varieties of Reference, Gareth Evans describes the acquisition of beliefs about one’s beliefs in the following way: ‘I get myself in a position to answer the question whether I believe that p by putting into operation whatever procedure I have for answering the question whether p.’ In this paper I argue that Evans’s remark can be used to explain first person authority if it is supplemented with the following consideration: Holding on to the content of a belief and (...)
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  28. Sebastian Gardner (2004). Critical Notice of Richard Moran, Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Review 113 (2):249-267.
  29. Brie Gertler (2016). Self-Knowledge for Humans, by Quassim Cassam. [REVIEW] Mind 125 (497):269-280.
    With this provocative book, Quassim Cassam aspires to reorient the philosophical study of self-knowledge so as to bring its methodology and subject matter into line with recognizably human concerns. He pursues this reorientation on two fronts. He proposes replacing what he sees as the field’s standard subject, an ideally rational being he calls Homo Philosophicus, with a more realistic Homo Sapiens. And he proposes shifting the field’s primary focus from ‘narrow epistemological concerns’ to issues reflecting ‘what matters to humans’, such (...)
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  30. Brie Gertler (2016). Self‐Knowledge and Rational Agency: A Defense of Empiricism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2).
    How does one know one's own beliefs, intentions, and other attitudes? Many responses to this question are broadly empiricist, in that they take self-knowledge to be epistemically based in empirical justification or warrant. Empiricism about self-knowledge faces an influential objection: that it portrays us as mere observers of a passing cognitive show, and neglects the fact that believing and intending are things we do, for reasons. According to the competing, agentialist conception of self-knowledge, our capacity for self-knowledge derives from our (...)
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  31. Brie Gertler (2011). Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief. In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press
    In this paper, I argue that the method of transparency --determining whether I believe that p by considering whether p -- does not explain our privileged access to our own beliefs. Looking outward to determine whether one believes that p leads to the formation of a judgment about whether p, which one can then self-attribute. But use of this process does not constitute genuine privileged access to whether one judges that p. And looking outward will not provide for access to (...)
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  32. Brie Gertler (2011). Self-Knowledge. Routledge.
    The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of philosophy and has crucial significance for the philosophy of mind and epistemology. Gertler assesses the leading theoretical approaches to self-knowledge, explaining the work of many of the key figures in the field: from Descartes and Kant, through to Bertrand Russell and Gareth Evans, as well as recent work by Tyler Burge, David Chalmers, William Lycan and Sydney Shoemaker. -/- Beginning with an outline of the distinction between self-knowledge (...)
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  33. R. Greene (2003). Constitutive Theories of Self-Knowledge and the Regress Problem. Philosophical Papers 32 (2):141-48.
    Abstract In the contemporary literature on self-knowledge discussion is framed by and large by two competing models of self-knowledge: the observational (or perceptual) model and the constitutive model. On the observational model self-knowledge is the result of ?cognitively viewing? one's mental states. Constitutive theories of self-knowledge, on the other hand, hold that self-knowledge is constitutive of intentional states. That is, self-ascription is a necessary condition for being in a particular mental state. Akeel Bilgrami is a defender of the constitutive model. (...)
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  34. Jane Heal & Richard Moran (2004). Review: Moran's "Authority and Estrangement". [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):427 - 432.
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  35. Hanne Jacobs (2016). Husserl on Reason, Reflection, and Attention. Research in Phenomenology 46 (2):257-276.
    This paper spells out Husserl’s account of the exercise of rationality and shows how it is tied to the capacity for critical reflection. I first discuss Husserl’s views on what rationally constrains our intentionality. Then I localize the exercise of rationality in the positing that characterizes attentive forms of intentionality and argue that, on Husserl’s account, when we are attentive to something we are also pre-reflectively aware of what speaks for and against our taking something to be a certain way. (...)
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  36. David James Barnett (2016). Inferential Justification and the Transparency of Belief. Noûs 50 (1):184-212.
    This paper critically examines currently influential transparency accounts of our knowledge of our own beliefs that say that self-ascriptions of belief typically are arrived at by “looking outward” onto the world. For example, one version of the transparency account says that one self-ascribes beliefs via an inference from a premise to the conclusion that one believes that premise. This rule of inference reliably yields accurate self-ascriptions because you cannot infer a conclusion from a premise without believing the premise, and so (...)
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  37. P. Katsafanas (2007). Constitutivism and Self-Knowledge. APA Proceedings and Addresses 80 (3).
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  38. William S. Larkin (1999). Shoemaker on Moore's Paradox and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 96 (3):239-52.
    Shoemaker argues that a satisfactory resolution of Moore's paradox requires a _self-intimation thesis that posits a "constitutive relation between belief and believing that one believes." He claims that such a thesis is needed to explain the crucial fact that the assent conditions for '_P' entail those for '_I believe that P'. This paper argues for an alternative resolution of Moore's paradox that provides for an adequate explanation of the crucial fact without relying on the kind of necessary connection between first (...)
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  39. Kwok-Choi Lau & 劉國材, Personal Identity and the Concept of a Person : A Critical Examination of the Main Themes of Sydney Shoemaker's Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity.
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  40. Byeong D. Lee (2002). Shoemaker on Second-Order Belief and Self-Deception. Dialogue 41 (2):279-289.
    In a number of papers, Sydney Shoemaker has argued that first-order belief plus rationality implies second-order belief. This paper is a critical discussion of Shoemaker's argument.
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  41. Eric Lormand (2000). Shoemaker and “Inner Sense”. Philosophical Topics 28 (2):147-170.
    In the last of his three Royce Lectures called "Self‑Knowledge and 'Inner Sense'", Sydney Shoemaker attempts to reconcile two commitments: (1) that experiences have "qualia", nonrepresentational features that constitute what it is like to have the experiences, and (2) that perceptual experiences seem "diaphanous", yielding to introspection only the way they represent the environment, not intrinsic or otherwise nonrepresentational qualia. On the idea that we internally sense qualia�that we sense what our experiences are like�one way to explain apparent diaphanousness is (...)
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  42. Kevin Lynch (2016). Self‐Knowledge for Humans, by Quassim Cassam (Oxford University Press, 2014). [REVIEW] Dialectica 70 (1):113-119.
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  43. Cynthia Macdonald (2014). ‘‘In My ‘Mind’s Eye’: Introspectionism, Detectivism, and the Basis of Authoritative Self-Knowledge. Synthese (15):1-26.
    It is widely accepted that knowledge of certain of one’s own mental states is authoritative in being epistemically more secure than knowledge of the mental states of others, and theories of self-knowledge have largely appealed to one or the other of two sources to explain this special epistemic status. The first, ‘detectivist’, position, appeals to an inner perception-like basis, whereas the second, ‘constitutivist’, one, appeals to the view that the special security awarded to certain self-knowledge is a conceptual matter. I (...)
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  44. Alfred Mele (2004). Rational Irrationality. The Philosophers' Magazine 26 (26):31-32.
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  45. Bruno Mölder (2010). Mind Ascribed. An Elaboration and Defence of Interpretivism. John Benjamins.
    This book provides a thoroughly worked out and systematic presentation of an interpretivist position in the philosophy of mind, of the view that having mental properties is a matter of interpretation. Bruno Mölder elaborates and defends a particular version of interpretivism, the ascription theory, which explicates the possession of mental states with contents in terms of their canonical ascribability, and shows how it can withstand various philosophical challenges. Apart from a defence of the ascription theory from the objections commonly directed (...)
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  46. Richard Moran (2007). Replies to Critics. Theoria 22 (1):53-77.
    In this article, I respond to the comments of six philosophers on my book Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-knowledge. My reply to Josep Corbí mostly concerns the relation between the two modes of self-knowledge I call ‘avowal’ and ‘attribution’, and the sense of activity involved in self-knoweldge; in responding to Josep Prades I try to clarify my picture of deliberation and show that it is not ‘intellectualist’ in an objectionable sense; Komarine Romdenh-Romluc’s paper enables me to say some (...)
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  47. Richard Moran (2004). Précis of Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):423–426.
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  48. Richard Moran (2004). Review: Replies to Heal, Reginster, Wilson, and Lear. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):455 - 472.
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  49. Richard A. Moran (2003). Responses to O'Brien and Shoemaker. European Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):402-19.
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  50. Richard A. Moran (2001). Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Princeton University Press.
    Since Socrates, and through Descartes to the present day, the problems of self-knowledge have been central to philosophy's understanding of itself. Today the idea of ''first-person authority''--the claim of a distinctive relation each person has toward his or her own mental life--has been challenged from a number of directions, to the point where many doubt the person bears any distinctive relation to his or her own mental life, let alone a privileged one. In Authority and Estrangement, Richard Moran argues for (...)
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