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  1. Carla Bagnoli (2007). The Authority of Reflection. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 22 (1):43-52.
    This paper examines Moran’s argument for the special authority of the first-person, which revolves around the Self/Other asymmetry and grounds dichotomies such as the practical vs. theoretical, activity vs. passivity, and justificatory vs. explanatory reasons. These dichotomies qualify the self-reflective person as an agent, interested in justifying her actions from a deliberative stance. The Other is pictured as a spectator interested in explaining action from a theoretical stance. The self-reflective knower has authority over her own mental states, while the Spectator (...)
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  2. Thomas Baldwin (2010). Comments on A. K. Bilgrami's Self-Knowledge and Resentment. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):773-782.
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  3. Mary Rose Barral (1964). Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity. International Philosophical Quarterly 4 (1):160-162.
  4. Hilan Bensusan & Manuel De Pinedo García (2007). When My Own Beliefs Are Not First-Personal Enough. Theoria 22 (58):35-41.
    Richard Moran has argued, convincingly, in favour of the idea that there must be more than one path to access our own mental contents. The existence of those routes, one first-personal—through avowal—the other third-personal—no different to the one used to ascribe mental states to other people and to interpret their actions—is intimately connected to our capacity to respond to norms. Moran’s account allows for conflicts between first personal and third personal authorities over my own beliefs; this enable some instances of (...)
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  5. Sven Bernecker (1996). Externalism and the Attitudinal Component of Self-Knowledge. Noûs 30 (2):262-75.
  6. Akeel Bilgrami (2010). Précis of Self-Knowledge and Resentment. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):749-765.
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  7. Akeel Bilgrami (2000). Self-Knowledge and Resentment. Knowing Our Own Minds (October):207-243.
    Once this integrated position is fully in place, the book closes with a postscript on how one might fruitfully view the kind of self-knowledge that is pursued ...
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  8. Jessica Brown (2001). Book Review. Knowing Our Own Minds Crispin Wright, Barry Smith, Cynthia MacDonald. [REVIEW] Mind 110 (438):586-588.
  9. A. Brueckner (1998). Shoemaker on Second-Order Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):361-64.
    In a number of papers, Sydney Shoemaker has argued that first-order belief plus rationality implies second-order belief. This paper is a critical discussion of Shoemaker's argument.
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  10. Tyler Burge (1996). Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:91-116.
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  11. Sarah Buss (2003). Richard Moran, Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self‐Knowledge:Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self‐Knowledge. Ethics 113 (4):898-902.
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  12. Alex Byrne (2005). Introspection. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):79-104.
    I know various contingent truths about my environment by perception. For example, by looking, I know that there is a computer before me; by hearing, I know that someone is talking in the corridor; by tasting, I know that the coffee has no sugar. I know these things because I have some built-in mechanisms specialized for detecting the state of my environment. One of these mechanisms, for instance, is presently transducing electromagnetic radiation (in a narrow band of wavelengths) coming from (...)
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  13. Taylor Carman (2003). First Persons: On Richard Moran's Authority and Estrangement. Inquiry 46 (3):395 – 408.
    Richard Moran's Authority and Estrangement offers a subtle and innovative account of self-knowledge that lifts the problem out of the narrow confines of epistemology and into the broader context of practical reasoning and moral psychology. Moran argues convincingly that fundamental self/other asymmetries are essential to our concept of persons. Moreover, the first- and the third-person points of view are systematically interconnected, so that the expression or avowal of one's attitudes constitutes a substantive form of self-knowledge. But while Moran's argument is (...)
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  14. W. Child (2009). Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge, by Richard Moran. Mind 118 (471):850-855.
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  15. Annalisa Coliva, Self-Knowledge (but Not: "Know Thyself").
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  16. Annalisa Coliva (2008). Peacocke's Self-Knowledge. Ratio 21 (1):13–27.
    knowledge. His proposal relies on the claim that first-order mental..
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  17. Mathieu Doucet (2012). Can We Be Self-Deceived About What We Believe? Self-Knowledge, Self-Deception, and Rational Agency. [REVIEW] European Journal of Philosophy 20 (S1):E1-E25.
    Abstract: This paper considers the question of whether it is possible to be mistaken about the content of our first-order intentional states. For proponents of the rational agency model of self-knowledge, such failures might seem very difficult to explain. On this model, the authority of self-knowledge is not based on inference from evidence, but rather originates in our capacity, as rational agents, to shape our beliefs and other intentional states. To believe that one believes that p, on this view, constitutes (...)
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  18. Jim Edwards (1992). Best Opinion and Intentional States. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (166):21-33.
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  19. Jordi Fernández (2005). Self-Knowledge, Rationality and Moore's Paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):533-556.
    I offer a model of self-knowledge that provides a solution to Moore’s paradox. First, I distinguish two versions of the paradox and I discuss two approaches to it, neither of which solves both versions of the paradox. Next, I propose a model of self-knowledge according to which, when I have a certain belief, I form the higher-order belief that I have it on the basis of the very evidence that grounds my first-order belief. Then, I argue that the model in (...)
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  20. Antony Flew (1964). Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity. By Shoemaker Sydney. (Cornell University Press. London: Oxford University Press, 1963. Pp. Xi + 264. U.K. Price 38s.). [REVIEW] Philosophy 39 (149):275-.
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  21. Martin F. Fricke (2013). First Person Authority and Knowledge of One's Own Actions. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 45 (134):3-16.
    What is the relation between first person authority and knowledge of one’s own actions? On one view, it is because we know the reasons for which we act that we know what we do and, analogously, it is because we know the reasons for which we avow a belief that we know what we believe. Carlos Moya (2006) attributes some such theory to Richard Moran (2001) and criticises it on the grounds of circularity. In this paper, I examine the view (...)
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  22. Martin F. Fricke (2012). Rules of Language and First Person Authority. Polish Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):15-32.
    This paper examines theories of first person authority proposed by Dorit Bar-On (2004), Crispin Wright (1989a) and Sydney Shoemaker (1988). What all three accounts have in common is that they attempt to explain first person authority by reference to the way our language works. Bar-On claims that in our language self-ascriptions of mental states are regarded as expressive of those states; Wright says that in our language such self-ascriptions are treated as true by default; and Shoemaker suggests that they might (...)
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  23. Sebastian Gardner (2004). Critical Notice of Richard Moran, Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Review 113 (2):249-267.
  24. Brie Gertler (2011). Self-Knowledge. Routledge.
    The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of philosophy and has crucial significance for the philosophy of mind and epistemology. Gertler assesses the leading theoretical approaches to self-knowledge, explaining the work of many of the key figures in the field: from Descartes and Kant, through to Bertrand Russell and Gareth Evans, as well as recent work by Tyler Burge, David Chalmers, William Lycan and Sydney Shoemaker. -/- Beginning with an outline of the distinction between self-knowledge (...)
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  25. R. Greene (2003). Constitutive Theories of Self-Knowledge and the Regress Problem. Philosophical Papers 32 (2):141-48.
    Abstract In the contemporary literature on self-knowledge discussion is framed by and large by two competing models of self-knowledge: the observational (or perceptual) model and the constitutive model. On the observational model self-knowledge is the result of ?cognitively viewing? one's mental states. Constitutive theories of self-knowledge, on the other hand, hold that self-knowledge is constitutive of intentional states. That is, self-ascription is a necessary condition for being in a particular mental state. Akeel Bilgrami is a defender of the constitutive model. (...)
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  26. Jane Heal & Richard Moran (2004). Review: Moran's "Authority and Estrangement". [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):427 - 432.
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  27. P. Katsafanas (2007). Constitutivism and Self-Knowledge. APA Proceedings and Addresses 80 (3).
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  28. William S. Larkin (1999). Shoemaker on Moore's Paradox and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 96 (3):239-52.
    Shoemaker argues that a satisfactory resolution of Moore's paradox requires a _self-intimation thesis that posits a "constitutive relation between belief and believing that one believes." He claims that such a thesis is needed to explain the crucial fact that the assent conditions for '_P' entail those for '_I believe that P'. This paper argues for an alternative resolution of Moore's paradox that provides for an adequate explanation of the crucial fact without relying on the kind of necessary connection between first (...)
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  29. Byeong D. Lee (2002). Shoemaker on Second-Order Belief and Self-Deception. Dialogue 41 (2):279-289.
    In a number of papers, Sydney Shoemaker has argued that first-order belief plus rationality implies second-order belief. This paper is a critical discussion of Shoemaker's argument.
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  30. Eric Lormand (2000). Shoemaker and "Inner Sense". Philosophical Topics 28 (2):147-170.
    In the last of his three Royce Lectures called "Self‑Knowledge and 'Inner Sense'", Sydney Shoemaker attempts to reconcile two commitments: (1) that experiences have "qualia", nonrepresentational features that constitute what it is like to have the experiences, and (2) that perceptual experiences seem "diaphanous", yielding to introspection only the way they represent the environment, not intrinsic or otherwise nonrepresentational qualia. On the idea that we internally sense qualia�that we sense what our experiences are like�one way to explain apparent diaphanousness is (...)
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  31. Cynthia Macdonald (2014). In My ‘Mind’s Eye’: Introspectionism, Detectivism, and the Basis of Authoritative Self-Knowledge. Synthese (15):1-26.
    It is widely accepted that knowledge of certain of one’s own mental states is authoritative in being epistemically more secure than knowledge of the mental states of others, and theories of self-knowledge have largely appealed to one or the other of two sources to explain this special epistemic status. The first, ‘detectivist’, position, appeals to an inner perception-like basis, whereas the second, ‘constitutivist’, one, appeals to the view that the special security awarded to certain self-knowledge is a conceptual matter. I (...)
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  32. Bruno Mölder (2010). Mind Ascribed. An Elaboration and Defence of Interpretivism. John Benjamins.
    This book provides a thoroughly worked out and systematic presentation of an interpretivist position in the philosophy of mind, of the view that having mental properties is a matter of interpretation. Bruno Mölder elaborates and defends a particular version of interpretivism, the ascription theory, which explicates the possession of mental states with contents in terms of their canonical ascribability, and shows how it can withstand various philosophical challenges. Apart from a defence of the ascription theory from the objections commonly directed (...)
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  33. Richard Moran (2007). Replies to Critics. Theoria 22 (1):53-77.
    In this article, I respond to the comments of six philosophers on my book Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-knowledge. My reply to Josep Corbí mostly concerns the relation between the two modes of self-knowledge I call ‘avowal’ and ‘attribution’, and the sense of activity involved in self-knoweldge; in responding to Josep Prades I try to clarify my picture of deliberation and show that it is not ‘intellectualist’ in an objectionable sense; Komarine Romdenh-Romluc’s paper enables me to say some (...)
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  34. Richard Moran (2004). Précis of Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):423–426.
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  35. Richard Moran (2004). Review: Replies to Heal, Reginster, Wilson, and Lear. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):455 - 472.
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  36. Richard A. Moran (2003). Responses to O'Brien and Shoemaker. European Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):402-19.
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  37. Richard A. Moran (2001). Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Princeton University Press.
    Drawing on certain themes from Wittgenstein, Sartre, and others, the book explores the extent to which what we say about ourselves is a matter of discovery or...
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  38. Richard A. Moran (1999). The Authority of Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):174-200.
    central to virtually all contemporary thinking on self-consciousness and first-person authority. And a good measure of its importance has been not only as an evolving philosophical account of these phenomena, but also as a model of an account that places the capacity for specifically first-person awareness of one's mental states at the center of what it is to be a subject of mental states in the first place. For not every philosophical account of introspection will take its specifically first-person features (...)
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  39. Richard A. Moran (1997). Self-Knowledge: Discovery, Resolution, and Undoing. European Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):141-61.
    remarks some lessons about self-knowledge (and some other self-relations) as well as use them to throw some light on what might seem to be a fairly distant area of philosophy, namely, Sartre's view of the person as of a divided nature, divided between what he calls the self-as-facticity and the self-as-transcendence. I hope it will become clear that there is not just perversity on my part in bringing together Wittgenstein and the last great Cartesian. One specific connection that will occupy (...)
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  40. Richard A. Moran (1994). Interpretation Theory and the First-Person. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):154-73.
  41. Richard A. Moran (1988). Making Up Your Mind: Self-Interpretation and Self-Constitution. Ratio 1 (2):135-51.
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  42. Carlos J. Moya (2006). Moran on Self-Knowledge, Agency and Responsibility (Richard Moran: Autoconocimiento, Agencia y Responsabilidad). Critica 38 (114):3 - 20.
    In this paper I deal with Richard Moran's account of self-knowledge in his book Authority and Estrangement. After presenting the main lines of his account, I contend that, in spite of its novelty and interest, it may have some shortcomings. Concerning beliefs formed through deliberation, the account would seem to face problems of circularity or regress. And it looks also wanting concerning beliefs not formed in this way. I go on to suggest a diagnosis of these problems, according to which (...)
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  43. Lucy O'Brien (2007). Self-Knowing Agents. Oxford University Press.
    * Fascinating topic in the philosophy of mind and action * Changes the focus of, and gives fresh momentum to, current discussions of self-identification and self-reference * Rigorous discussion of rival views Lucy OBrien argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. She considers two main questions. First, what account of first-person reference can we give that respects the guaranteed nature of such reference? Second, what account can we give of (...)
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  44. Lucy O'Brien (2005). Self-Knowledge, Agency and Force. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):580-601.
  45. Lucy F. O'Brien (2005). Self-Knowledge, Agency, and Force. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):580–601.
    My aim in this paper is to articulate further what may be called an agency theory of self-knowledge. Many theorists have stressed how important agency is to self- knowledge, and much work has been done drawing connections between the two notions.<sup>2</sup> However, it has not always been clear what _epistemic_ advantage agency gives us in this area and why it does so. I take it as a constraint on an adequate account of how a subject knows her own mental states (...)
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  46. Lucy F. O'Brien (2003). Moran on Agency and Self-Knowledge. European Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):391-401.
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  47. Lucy F. O'Brien (2003). On Knowing One's Own Actions. In Johannes Roessler & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness. Clarendon Press.
    Book description: * Seventeen brand-new essays by leading philosophers and psychologists * Genuinely interdisciplinary work, at the forefront of both fields * Includes a valuable introduction, uniting common threads Leading philosophers and psychologists join forces to investigate a set of problems to do with agency and self-awareness, in seventeen specially written essays. In recent years there has been much psychological and neurological work purporting to show that consciousness and self-awareness play no role in causing actions, and indeed to demonstrate that (...)
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  48. David Owens (2008). Deliberation and the First Person. In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    Philosophers like Shoemaker and Burge argue that only self-conscious creatures can exercise rational control over their mental lives. In particular they urge that reflective rationality requires possession of the I-concept, the first person concept. These philosophers maintain that rational creatures like ourselves can exercise reflective control over belief as well as action. I agree that we have this sort of control over our actions and that practical freedom presupposes self-consciousness. But I deny that anything like this is true of belief.
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  49. David J. Owens (2003). Knowing Your Own Mind. Dialogue 42 (4):791-798.
    What is it to “know your own mind”? In ordinary English, this phrase connotes clear headed decisiveness and a firm resolve but in the language of contemporary philosophy, the indecisive and the susceptible can know their own minds just as well as anybody else. In the philosopher’s usage, “knowing your own mind” is just a matter of being able to produce a knowledgeable description of your mental state, whether it be a state of indecision, susceptibility or even confusion. What exercises (...)
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  50. Christopher Peacocke (2009). Mental Action and Self-Awareness : Epistemology. In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press.
    We often know what we are judging, what we are deciding, what problem we are trying to solve. We know not only the contents of our judgements, decidings and tryings; we also know that it is judgement, decision and attempted problem-solving in which we are engaged. How do we know these things?
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