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  1. M. Cristina Amoretti & Nicla Vassallo (eds.) (2012). Reason and Rationality. Ontos Verlag.
    Reason and rationality represent crucial elements of the self-image of human beings and have unquestionably been among the most debated issues in Western philosophy, dating from ancient Greece, through the Middle Ages, and to the present day. Many words and thoughts have already been spent trying to define the nature and standards of reason and rationality, what they could or ought to be, and under what conditions something can be said to be rational. This volume focuses instead on the relationships (...)
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  2. Nathan Ballantyne & E. J. Coffman (2012). Conciliationism and Uniqueness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):657-670.
    Two theses are central to recent work on the epistemology of disagreement: Conciliationism:?In a revealed peer disagreement over P, each thinker should give at least some weight to her peer's attitude. Uniqueness:?For any given proposition and total body of evidence, the evidence fully justifies exactly one level of confidence in the proposition. 1This paper is the product of full and equal collaboration between its authors. Does Conciliationism commit one to Uniqueness? Thomas Kelly 2010 has argued that it does. After some (...)
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  3. Lisa Bortolotti (2005). Delusions and the Background of Rationality. Mind and Language 20 (2):189-208.
    I argue that some cases of delusions show the inadequacy of those theories of interpretation that rely on a necessary rationality constraint on belief ascription. In particular I challenge the view that irrational beliefs can be ascribed only against a general background of rationality. Subjects affected by delusions seem to be genuine believers and their behaviour can be successfully explained in intentional terms, but they do not meet those criteria that according to Davidson (1985a) need to be met for the (...)
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  4. Gregory Brazeal (forthcoming). How Much Does a Belief Cost?: Revisiting the Marketplace of Ideas. Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal.
    Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. is often credited with creating the metaphor of “the marketplace of ideas,” though he did not use the exact phrase and his argument for free speech was not based on distinctively economic reasoning. Truly economic investigations of the marketplace of ideas have progressed in step with developments and trends in the law and economics literature. These investigations have tended to be one-sided, with writers focusing primarily either on the production of ideas (for example, Posner) or (...)
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  5. Fernando Broncano (2000). Reliable Rationality. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:49-59.
    We propose to extend a reliabilist perspective from epistemology to the very concept of rational justification. Rationality is defined as a cognitive virtue contextually relative to an information domain, to the mean performance of a cognitive community, and to normal conditions of information gathering. This proposal answers to the skeptical position derived from the evidence of the cognitive fallacies and, on the other hand, is consistent with the ecological approach to the cognitive biases. Rationality is conceived naturalistically as a control (...)
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  6. Curtis Brown (1991). Believing the Impossible. Synthese 89 (3):353-364.
    Ruth Barcan Marcus has argued that, just as we cannot know what is false, we cannot believe what is impossible.1 I will offer an interpretation of her defense of this view. I will then argue, first, that if the defense succeeded it would also justify rejecting many, perhaps most, of our ordinary belief ascriptions; and second, that, luckily, the defense does not succeed. Finally, I suggest that despite its failure there is something correct and important in Marcus's argument.
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  7. Curtis Brown & Steven Luper-Foy (1991). Belief and Rationality. Synthese 89 (3):323 - 329.
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  8. Lara Buchak (2012). Can It Be Rational to Have Faith? In Jacob Chandler & Victoria Harrison (eds.), Probability in the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press 225.
    This paper provides an account of what it is to have faith in a proposition p, in both religious and mundane contexts. It is argued that faith in p doesn’t require adopting a degree of belief that isn’t supported by one’s evidence but rather it requires terminating one’s search for further evidence and acting on the supposition that p. It is then shown, by responding to a formal result due to I.J. Good, that doing so can be rational in a (...)
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  9. Lara Buchak (2012). Can It Be Rational to Have Faith? In Jake Chandler & Victoria Harrison (eds.), Probability in the Philosophy of Religion. OUP Oxford 225.
    This paper provides an account of what it is to have faith in a proposition p, in both religious and mundane contexts. It is argued that faith in p doesn’t require adopting a degree of belief that isn’t supported by one’s evidence but rather it requires terminating one’s search for further evidence and acting on the supposition that p. It is then shown, by responding to a formal result due to I.J. Good, that doing so can be rational in a (...)
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  10. John D. Collins & Achille C. Varzi (2000). Unsharpenable Vagueness. Philosophical Topics 28 (1):1-10.
    A plausible thought about vagueness is that it involves semantic incompleteness. To say that a predicate is vague is to say (at the very least) that its extension is incompletely specified. Where there is incomplete specification of extension there is indeterminacy, an indeterminacy between various ways in which the specification of the predicate might be completed or sharpened. In this paper we show that this idea is bound to founder by presenting an argument to the effect that there are vague (...)
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  11. Ronald De Sousa (2006). Restoring Emotion's Bad Rep: The Moral Randomness of Norms. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (1):29-47.
    Despite the fact that common sense taxes emotions with irrationality, philosophers have, by and large, celebrated their functionality. They are credited with motivating, steadying, shaping or harmonizing our dispositions to act, and with policing norms of social behaviour. It's time to restore emotion's bad rep. To this end, I shall argue that we should expect that some of the “norms” enforced by emotions will be unevenly distributed among the members of our species, and may be dysfunctional at the individual, social, (...)
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  12. Brian Epstein (2010). The Diviner and the Scientist: Revisiting the Question of Alternative Standards of Rationality. Journal of the American Academy of Religion 78 (4):1048-1086.
    Are the standards of reasoning and rationality in divination, religious practice, and textual exegesis different from those in the sciences? Can there be different standards of reasoning and rationality at all? The intense “rationality debate” of the 1960s, 70s, and 80s focused on these questions and the related problems of relativism across cultures and systems of practice. Although philosophers were at the center of these debates at the time, they may appear to have abandoned the question in recent years. On (...)
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  13. David Godden (forthcoming). On the Priority of Agent-Based Argumentative Norms. Topoi:1-13.
    This paper argues against the priority of pure, virtue-based accounts of argumentative norms [VA]. Such accounts are agent-based and committed to the priority thesis: good arguments and arguing well are explained in terms of some prior notion of the virtuous arguer arguing virtuously. Two problems with the priority thesis are identified. First, the definitional problem: virtuous arguers arguing virtuously are neither sufficient nor necessary for good arguments. Second, the priority problem: the goodness of arguments is not explained virtuistically. Instead, being (...)
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  14. Patricia Greenspan (2009). Resting Content: Sensible Satisficing? American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (4):305 - 317.
    Suppose I am now making plans for next summer’s vacation. I can spend a week in Rome or on the Riviera, but not both. Either choice would be excellent, but after weighing various pros and cons, I decide that for my purposes Rome would be better. If I am rational, then, I must choose Rome. It is an assumption of standard decision theory that rationality requires maximizing: trying to get the maximum amount of whatever form of value we are after (...)
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  15. Bruno Guindon (2016). Sources, Reasons, and Requirements. Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1253-1268.
    This paper offers two competing accounts of normative requirements, each of which purports to explain why some—but not all—requirements are normative in the sense of being related to normative reasons in some robust way. According to the reasons-sensitive view, normative requirements are those and only those which are sensitive to normative reasons. On this account, normative requirements are second-order statements about what there is conclusive reason to do, in the broad sense of the term. According to the reasons-providing view—which I (...)
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  16. Antonio Gutiérrez-Pozo (2000). La expresión literaria de la racionalidad vital en Ortega y Gasset / The Literary Expression of Vital Rationality in Ortega. Revista de filosofía (Chile) 33 (98):186-217.
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  17. Donald C. Hubin (1986). Review: Of Bindings and By-Products: Elster on Rationality. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Public Affairs 15 (1):82 - 95.
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  18. Marko Jurjako & Luca Malatesti (2016). Instrumental Rationality in Psychopathy: Implications From Learning Tasks. Philosophical Psychology:1-15.
    The issue whether psychopathic offenders are practically rational has attracted philosophical attention. The problem is relevant in theoretical discussions on moral psychology and in those concerning the appropriate social response to the crimes of these individuals. We argue that classical and current experiments concerning the instrumental learning in psychopaths cannot directly support the conclusion that they have impaired instrumental rationality, construed as the ability for transferring the motivation by means-ends reasoning. In fact, we defend the different claim that these experiments (...)
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  19. Matthew Kopec (2015). A Counterexample to the Uniqueness Thesis. Philosophia 43 (2):403-409.
    In this essay, I present a straightforward counterexample to the Uniqueness Thesis, which holds, roughly speaking, that there is a unique rational response to any particular body of evidence.
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  20. Timothy Lane (forthcoming). Rationality and its Contexts. In Hung T. W. & Lane T. J. (eds.), Rationality: Constraints and Contexts. Elsevier
  21. Timothy Lane & Georg Northoff (forthcoming). Is Depressive Rumination Rational? In T. W. Hung & T. J. Lane (eds.), Rationality: Constraints and Contexts. Elsevier
    Most mental disorders affect only a small segment of the population. On the reasonable assumption that minds or brains are prone to occasional malfunction, these disorders do not seem to pose distinctive explanatory problems. Depression, however, because it is so prevalent and costly, poses a conundrum that some try to explain by characterizing it as an adaptation—a trait that exists because it performed fitness-enhancing functions in ancestral populations. Heretofore, proposed evolutionary explanations of depression did not focus on thought processes; instead, (...)
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  22. Errol Lord (forthcoming). The Explanatory Problem for Cognitivism About Practical Reason. In Conor McHugh Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Practical and Epistemic.
    Cognitivists about practical reason hold that we can explain why certain wide-scope requirements of practical rationality are true by appealing to certain epistemic requirements. Extant discussions of cognitivism focus solely on two claims. The first is the claim that intentions involve beliefs. The second is that whenever your intentions are incoherent in certain ways, you will be epistemically irrational (given that intentions involve beliefs). Even if the cognitivist successfully defends these claims, she still needs to show that (...)
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  23. Errol Lord (forthcoming). What You're Rationally Required to Do and What You Ought to Do (Are the Same Thing!). Mind.
    It is a truism that we ought to be rational. Despite this (or because of it), it has become popular to think that it is not the case that we ought to be rational. In this paper I argue for a view about rationality--the view that what you are rationally required to do is determined by the normative reasons you possess--by showing that it can vindicate that we ought to be rational. I do this by showing that it is independently (...)
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  24. Errol Lord (2014). The Coherent and the Rational. Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):151-175.
  25. Errol Lord (2013). The Real Symmetry Problem(s) for Wide-Scope Accounts of Rationality. Philosophical Studies (3):1-22.
    You are irrational when you are akratic. On this point most agree. Despite this agreement, there is a tremendous amount of disagreement about what the correct explanation of this data is. Narrow-scopers think that the correct explanation is that you are violating a narrow-scope conditional requirement. You lack an intention to x that you are required to have given the fact that you believe you ought to x. Wide-scopers disagree. They think that a conditional you are required to make true (...)
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  26. Diego E. Machuca (2015). Suspension, Equipollence, and Inquiry: A Reply to Wieland. Analytic Philosophy 56 (2):177-187.
    It is generally thought that suspension of judgment about a proposition p is the doxastic attitude one is rationally compelled to adopt whenever the epistemic reasons for and against p are equipollent or equally credible, that is, whenever the total body of available evidence bearing on p epistemically justifies neither belief nor disbelief in p. However, in a recent contribution to this journal, Jan Wieland proposes “to broaden the conditions for suspension, and argue that it is rational to (...)
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  27. Nicholas Maxwell (2016). Can Scientific Method Help Us Create a Wiser World? In N. Dalal, A. Intezari & M. Heitz (eds.), Practical Wisdom in the Age of Technology: Insights, Issues and Questions for a New Millennium. Routledge 147-161.
    Two great problems of learning confront humanity: (1) learning about the universe, and about ourselves as a part of the universe, and (2) learning how to make progress towards as good a world as possible. We solved the first problem when we created modern science in the 17th century, but we have not yet solved the second problem. This puts us in a situation of unprecedented danger. Modern science and technology enormously increase our power to act, but not our power (...)
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  28. Nicholas Maxwell (2015). How Humanity Might Avoid Devastation. Ethical Record 120 (1):18-23.
    We face grave global problems. One might think universities are doing all they can to help solve these problems. But universities, in successfully pursuing scientific knowledge and technological know-how in a way that is dissociated from a more fundamental concern with problems of living, have actually made possible the genesis of all our current global problems. Modern science and technology have led to modern industry and agriculture, modern medicine and hygiene, modern armaments, which in turn have led to habitat destruction, (...)
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  29. Nicholas Maxwell (2014). What Philosophy Ought to Be. In Charles Tandy (ed.), Death And Anti-Death, Volume 11: Ten Years After Donald Davidson (1917-2003). Ria University Press 125-162.
    The proper task of philosophy is to keep alive awareness of what our most fundamental, important, urgent problems are, what our best attempts are at solving them and, if possible, what needs to be done to improve these attempts. Unfortunately, academic philosophy fails disastrously even to conceive of the task in these terms. It makes no attempt to ensure that universities tackle global problems - global intellectually, and global in the sense of concerning the future of the earth and humanity. (...)
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  30. Nicholas Maxwell, How to Create a Better World: Bring About a Revolution in Universities. Discussion Blog.
    In order to create a better world we need to bring about a revolution in universities so that they become devoted to helping humanity learn how to make progress towards as good a world as possible.
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  31. Nicholas Maxwell (2011). Zagrożenie nauką bez cywilizacji: od wiedzy do mądrości (Polish translation of "The Menace of Science without Civilization: From Knowledge to Wisdom" (2012)). Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa 47 (3):269-294.
    We are in a state of impending crisis. And the fault lies in part with academia. For two centuries or so, academia has been devoted to the pursuit of knowledge and technological know-how. This has enormously increased our power to act which has, in turn, brought us both all the great benefits of the modern world and the crises we now face. Modern science and technology have made possible modern industry and agriculture, the explosive growth of the world’s population, global (...)
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  32. Nicholas Maxwell (2009). How Can Life of Value Best Flourish in the Real World? In Leemon McHenry (ed.), Science and the Pursuit of Wisdom. Ontos Verlag
    The Urgent Need for an Intellectual Revolution For much of my working life (from 1972 onwards) I have argued, in and out of print, that we need to bring about a revolution in the aims and methods of science – and of academic inquiry more generally. Instead of giving priority to the search for knowledge, academia needs to devote itself to seeking and promoting wisdom by rational means, wisdom being the capacity to realize what is of value in life, for (...)
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  33. Nicholas Maxwell (2005). Philosophy Seminars for Five-Year-Olds,. Learning for Democracy 1 (2):71-77.
    We need a revolution in education, from five year olds onwards, so that exploration of problems is at the heart of the enterprise.
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  34. Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling (2004). Introduction: Aspects of Rationality. In Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford University Press
    This article examines the nature of rationality. The domain of rationality is customarily divided into the theoretical and the practical. Whereas theoretical or epistemic rationality is concerned with what it is rational to believe, and sometimes with rational degrees of belief, practical rationality is concerned with what it is rational to do, or intend or desire to do. This article raises some of the main issues relevant to philosophical discussion of the nature of rationality. Discussions of the nature of practical (...)
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  35. Adam Morton (forthcoming). Shared Knowledge From Individual Vice: The Role of Unworthy Epistemic Emotions. Philosophical Inquiries.
    This paper begins with a discussion the role of less-than-admirable epistemic emotions in our respectable, indeed admirable inquiries: nosiness, obsessiveness, wishful thinking, denial, partisanship. The explanation for their desirable effect is Mandevillian: because of the division of epistemic labour individual epistemic vices can lead to shared knowledge. In fact it is sometimes essential to it.
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  36. C. Piller (2007). Ewing's Problem. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 3 (1):0-0.
    Two plausible claims seem to be inconsistent with each other. One is the idea that if one reasonably believes that one ought to fi, then indeed, on pain of acting irrationally, one ought to fi. The other is the view that we are fallible with respect to our beliefs about what we ought to do. Ewing’s Problem is how to react to this apparent inconsistency. I reject two easy ways out. One is Ewing’s own solution to his problem, which is (...)
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  37. Gilbert Plumer (2009). Commentary On: Marcin Lewiński’s “‘You’Re Moving From Irrelevant to Irrational’—Critical Reactions in Internet Discussion Forums”. In Juho Ritola (ed.), Argument Cultures. Proceedings of the 8th OSSA Conference [CD-ROM]. Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation 1-3.
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  38. Abelard Podgorski (forthcoming). A Reply to the Synchronist. Mind:fzv153.
    On the face of it, in ordinary practices of rational assessment, we criticize agents both for the combinations of attitudes, like belief, desire, and intention, that they possess at particular times, and for the ways that they behave cognitively over time, by forming, reconsidering, and updating those attitudes. Accordingly, philosophers have proposed norms of rationality that are synchronic - concerned fundamentally with our individual time-slices, and diachronic - concerned with our temporally extended behaviour. Recently, however, a number of philosophers have (...)
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  39. Abelard Podgorski (forthcoming). Dynamic Permissivism. Philosophical Studies:1-17.
    There has been considerable philosophical debate in recent years over a thesis called epistemic permissivism. According to the permissivist, it is possible for two agents to have the exact same total body of evidence and yet differ in their belief attitudes towards some proposition, without either being irrational. However, I argue, not enough attention has been paid to the distinction between different ways in which permissivism might be true. In this paper, I present a taxonomy of forms of epistemic permissivism (...)
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  40. Grant Reaber (2012). Rational Feedback. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):797-819.
    Suppose you think that whether you believe some proposition A at some future time t might have a causal influence on whether A is true. For instance, maybe you think a woman can read your mind, and either (1) you think she will snap her fingers shortly after t if and only if you believe at t that she will, or (2) you think she will snap her fingers shortly after t if and only if you don't believe at t (...)
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  41. Andrew Reisner (forthcoming). Peer Disagreement, Rational Requirements, and Evidence of Evidence as Evidence Against. In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms, Epistemic Goals. De Gruyter
    This chapter addresses an ambiguity in some of the literature on rational peer disagreement about the use of the term 'rational'. In the literature 'rational' is used to describe a variety of normative statuses related to reasons, justification, and reasoning. This chapter focuses most closely on the upshot of peer disagreement for what is rationally required of parties to a peer disagreement. This follows recent work in theoretical reason which treats rationality as a system of requirements among (...)
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  42. Susanna Rinard (2015). Against the New Evidentialists. Philosophical Issues 25 (1):208-223.
    Evidentialists and Pragmatists about reasons for belief have long been in dialectical stalemate. However, recent times have seen a new wave of Evidentialists who claim to provide arguments for their view which should be persuasive even to someone initially inclined toward Pragmatism. This paper reveals a central flaw in this New Evidentialist project: their arguments rely on overly demanding necessary conditions for a consideration to count as a genuine reason. In particular, their conditions rule out the possibility of pragmatic reasons (...)
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  43. D. J. Saab & U. V. Riss (eds.) (2010). Logic and Abstraction as Capabilities of the Mind: Reconceptualizations of Computational Approaches to the Mind. IGI.
    In this chapter we will investigate the nature of abstraction in detail, its entwinement with logical thinking, and the general role it plays for the mind. We find that non-logical capabilities are not only important for input processing, but also for output processing. Human beings jointly use analytic and embodied capacities for thinking and acting, where analytic thinking mirrors reflection and logic, and where abstraction is the form in which embodied thinking is revealed to us. We will follow the philosophical (...)
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  44. Miriam Schoenfield (forthcoming). Bridging Rationality and Accuracy. Journal of Philosophy.
    Rationality and accuracy have to be connected somehow. It’s not a coincidence that rational people tend to do a better job forming accurate beliefs and navigating the world than irrational people. But how are they connected? The aim of this paper is to explore this question. I outline two ways of thinking about the connection between rationality and accuracy and I argue that what we say about higher order evidence will depend on how we think about the nature of this (...)
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  45. Alfred Schramm (2002). Rationalitätsbegriffe und Begründungsurteile. In Jan M. Böhm, Heiko Holweg & Claudia Hoock (eds.), Karl Poppers kritischer Rationalismus heute. Mohr Siebeck
    In einer früheren Arbeit habe ich neben anderem auch Poppers Theorie der rationalen Präferabilität der bestbewährten Theorie kritisiert und festgestellt, daß sie weder als Theorie der theoretischen Rationalität (d.i. die Rationalität des bloßen, an keinem anderen Zweck als dem des an der wissenschaftlichen Neugierde orientierten Glaubens, Meinens oder Führwahrhaltens)noch als Theorie der praktischen Rationalität (d.i. die Rationalität der auch an sonstigen Zwecken orientierten Handlungen bzw. Handlungsentscheidungen)tauglich sei. Im wesentlichen habe ich argumentiert, daß es bei der Verfolgung des Zieles, sich der (...)
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  46. Sam Shpall (2013). Wide and Narrow Scope. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):717-736.
    In this paper I present an original and relatively conciliatory solution to one of the central contemporary debates in the theory of rationality, the debate about the proper formulation of rational requirements. I begin by offering my own version of the “symmetry problem” for wide scope rational requirements, and I show how this problem necessitates the introduction of a normative concept other than the traditional notions of reason and requirement. I then sketch a theory of rational commitment , showing how (...)
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  47. Declan Smithies (2015). Ideal Rationality and Logical Omniscience. Synthese 192 (9):2769-2793.
    Does rationality require logical omniscience? Our best formal theories of rationality imply that it does, but our ordinary evaluations of rationality seem to suggest otherwise. This paper aims to resolve the tension by arguing that our ordinary evaluations of rationality are not only consistent with the thesis that rationality requires logical omniscience, but also provide a compelling rationale for accepting this thesis in the first place. This paper also defends an account of apriori justification for logical beliefs that is designed (...)
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  48. Scott Sturgeon (2008). Reason and the Grain of Belief. Noûs 42 (1):139–165.
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  49. Iris van Rooij, Cory D. Wright, Johan Kwisthout & Todd Wareham (forthcoming). Rational Analysis, Intractability, and the Prospects of ‘as If’-Explanations. Synthese.
    Despite their success in describing and predicting cognitive behavior, the plausibility of so-called ‘rational explanations’ is often contested on the grounds of computational intractability. Several cognitive scientists have argued that such intractability is an orthogonal pseudoproblem, however, since rational explanations account for the ‘why’ of cognition but are agnostic about the ‘how’. Their central premise is that humans do not actually perform the rational calculations posited by their models, but only act as if they do. Whether or not the problem (...)
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  50. Xinli Wang & 王 新力 (1989). The Issue of Defending the Rationality of Science (科学合理性辩护问题). 自然辩证法通讯 11 (2):20-30.
    on how to justify the rationality of sciences.
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