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  1. Theodore Bach (2016). Social Categories Are Natural Kinds, Not Objective Types (and Why It Matters Politically). Journal of Social Ontology 2 (2):177-201.
    There is growing support for the view that social categories like men and women refer to “objective types” (Haslanger 2000, 2006, 2012; Alcoff 2005). An objective type is a similarity class for which the axis of similarity is an objective rather than nominal or fictional property. Such types are independently real and causally relevant, yet their unity does not derive from an essential property. Given this tandem of features, it is not surprising why empirically-minded researchers interested in fighting oppression and (...)
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  2. Theodore Bach (2012). Gender Is a Natural Kind with a Historical Essence. Ethics 122 (2):231-272.
    Traditional debate on the metaphysics of gender has been a contrast of essentialist and social-constructionist positions. The standard reaction to this opposition is that neither position alone has the theoretical resources required to satisfy an equitable politics. This has caused a number of theorists to suggest ways in which gender is unified on the basis of social rather than biological characteristics but is “real” or “objective” nonetheless – a position I term social objectivism. This essay begins by making explicit the (...)
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  3. Marilyn Frye (2011). Metaphors of Being a Phi. In Charlotte Witt (ed.), Feminist Metaphysics: Explorations in the Ontology of Gender and the Self. Springer 85--95.
  4. Sally Haslanger (2000). Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them to Be? Noûs 34 (1):31–55.
    It is always awkward when someone asks me informally what I’m working on and I answer that I’m trying to figure out what gender is. For outside a rather narrow segment of the academic world, the term ‘gender’ has come to function as the polite way to talk about the sexes. And one thing people feel pretty confident about is their knowledge of the difference between males and females. Males are those human beings with a range of familiar primary and (...)
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  5. Teresa Marques (2014). É o Género uma Construção Social? In A. P. Mesquita, C. Beckert, J. L. Pérez & Xavier M. L. L. O. (eds.), A Paixão da Razão. Homenagem a Maria Luísa Ribeiro Ferreira. Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa 561-578.
    É muitas vezes aceite que certas categorias, tipicamente as de género, raça, orientação sexual ou doença mental, são construções sociais e não divisões naturais no mundo. A distinção entre categorias naturais e categorias sociais, como pretende ser a distinção entre o sexo e o género, tem servido no âmbito da crítica e ciência social para advogar a abolição de certas normas sociais, e para a implementação de políticas mais equitativas. Contudo, há aspectos centrais do construtivismo que são pouco claros. O (...)
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  6. Mari Mikkola (2009). Gender Concepts and Intuitions. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):pp. 559-583.
    The gender concept woman is central to feminism but has proven to be notoriously difficult to define. Some feminist philosophers, most notably Sally Haslanger, have recently argued for revisionary analyses of the concept where it is defined pragmatically for feminist political purposes. I argue against such analyses: pragmatically revising woman may not best serve feminist goals and doing so is unnecessary. Instead, focusing on certain intuitive uses of the term ‘woman’ enables feminist philosophers to make sense of it.
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  7. Mari Mikkola (2006). Elizabeth Spelman, Gender Realism, and Women. Hypatia 21 (4):77-96.
    : Elizabeth Spelman has famously argued against gender realism. By and large, feminist philosophers have embraced Spelman's arguments and deemed gender realist positions counterproductive. To the contrary, Mikkola shows that Spelman's arguments do not in actual fact give good reason to reject gender realism in general. She then suggests a way to understand gender realism that does not have the adverse consequences feminist philosophers commonly think gender realist positions have.
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  8. Titus Stahl (2014). Criticizing Social Reality From Within: Haslanger on Race, Gender, and Ideology. Krisis: Journal for Contemporary Philosophy (1):5-12.
    This paper critically evaluates the semantic externalist conception of Race and Gender concepts put forward in Sally Haslanger's 2012 essay collection "Resisting Reality". I argue that her endorsement of "objective type externalism" limits the options for critique compared to social externalist approaches.
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